GOLDEN v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-1186V

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DOUGLAS GOLDEN AND RISHANNE *

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DRADT, as parents and next of kin of the *

decedent, HALEIGH GOLDEN, * Special Master Jennifer A. Shah

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Petitioners, *

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v. * Filed: October 21, 2025

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SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *

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HUMAN SERVICES, *

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Respondent. *

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Courtney Jorgenson, Siri & Glimstad, LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioners.

Madelyn Weeks, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On September 11, 2020, Douglas Golden and Rishanne Dradt (“Petitioners”) filed a

petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §

300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”), alleging that their daughter, Haleigh Golden

(“Ms. Golden” or “H.G.”), suffered a severe adverse reaction that ultimately caused her death on

November 6, 2018, from the Meningitis MTV-4 (meningococcal) vaccine she received on June 1,

2016. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1.

1

Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it must be made publicly

accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government

Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other

information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review,

I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2

National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

(2012).

1

On October 14, 2022, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report, opposing compensation in

this case. ECF No. 38 at 2. Thereafter, Petitioners filed additional medical records, and both

parties submitted expert reports and medical literature. See ECF Nos. 46, 57, 58, 60-63, 66, 76.

This case was reassigned to my docket on August 13, 2024. ECF No. 65.

On December 29, 2024, Petitioners filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and

costs, requesting a total of $61,538.29, comprised of $30,560.00 for attorneys’ fees and $30,978.29

for attorneys’ costs. ECF No. 68 (“Fees App.”) at 7. Respondent filed a response on January 23,

2025, opposing Petitioners’ fees application on the ground that Petitioners lacked a reasonable

basis for their claim and had not made a special showing warranting an interim award. ECF No.

71 (“Fees Resp.”). Petitioners filed a reply brief, arguing that “Respondent’s opposition does not

address reasonable basis underlying the filing of the claim, but rather attempts to make an

entitlement argument as to why [Petitioners’] case should fail.” ECF No. 72 (“Fees Reply”) at 1.

This is Petitioners’ first motion for interim fees and costs. Petitioners have not incurred any

personal costs. Fees App. at 12.

Petitioners were initially represented by Mr. Andrew D. Downing. On January 3, 2025,

Ms. Alison Haskins filed a motion to substitute as counsel for Petitioners. ECF No. 69. On January

24, 2025, Ms. Courtney Jorgenson filed a motion to substitute as counsel for Petitioners. ECF No.

74.

I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioners’ application and award a total of $60,538.29 in

interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is

permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed.

Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the

Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys’ fees under

the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases

where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.

Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of

litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is

proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not,

however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special

masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-

241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Special

masters have viewed the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony,

and undue hardship -- as factors to consider in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352;

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see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl.

Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner;

it also looks at expenditures by a petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2. Referring

to Avera, former Chief Special Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general principle

underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial hardship on

petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

B. Good Faith

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs only if

the special master finds that the petition was brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis.

§15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012); Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 323,

334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear, 2013

WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520,

at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The good faith requirement is met through a subjective

inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). It “focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed he had a

legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007

WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith,

“petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as petitioner had an honest belief that her claim could

succeed, the good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.

09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993

WL 496981, at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just a

petitioner’s belief in her claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must be

supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 3,

2015).

Although the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable

basis, it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to prevail on one’s

vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who submits no

evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis. . .” Id. at 286. The Chuisano court found

that a petition that relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient to

establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-

564V, 2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis

when petitioner submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec’y Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no

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reasonable basis when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney). The

Federal Circuit has affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof

could provide sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v.

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding Petitioner submitted

objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical records and a vaccine

package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984 F.3d 1374, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation did not by itself

negate the claim's reasonable basis”).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements

for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient

evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award

compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by

medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal

Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or

expert medical opinion in support of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35

Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table

theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury)).

When determining if a reasonable basis exists, a special master may consider a myriad of

factors, including “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim,

the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa, 138 Fed. Cl.

at 289. This approach allows the special master to look at each application for attorneys’ fees and

costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL

4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007).

II. Factual Background

This is a tragic case involving the death of a young woman, Haleigh Golden. Ms. Golden

was 17 years old when she was given the subject meningococcal vaccine on June 1, 2016. Ex. 5

at 3. She had a prior diagnosis of asthma, but no other health history of significance.

In the fall of 2016, Ms. Golden began college. On September 20, 2016, her father called

her pediatrician to report that she was experiencing head, back, and neck pain while at school. Ex.

5 at 53. The provider noted that Ms. Golden had received a meningococcal vaccine but stated that

the vaccine was “not full protection of meningitis.” Id. The provider advised that if Ms. Golden

should go to the college clinic if she developed a severe headache with fever, pain with flexing her

neck up and down, fever lasting more than 72 hours, poor intake, or rash. Id.

The next day, Ms. Golden presented to the emergency department (“ED”) at the University

of Cincinnati Medical Center. Ex. 9 at 11. She complained of four days of headache, myalgia,

arthralgia, and pain along her spinal column. Id. Her father accompanied her to the ED and

expressed concern that she had meningitis. Id. She had no rash. Id. She had a cough without

sputum production. Id. She denied neck stiffness, nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. Id. She did not

4

have any known contacts with ill persons in her dorm. Id. She did not have pain with extraocular

motion. Id.

On exam, Ms. Golden had full range of motion in her neck, along with negative Kernig

and Brudzinski signs3 of meningitis. Ex. 9 at 13. Based on these findings, the examining physician

did not suspect meningitis. Id. (“Although the patient’s mother was concerned about her having

meningitis this does not appear to be [the] case.”). Instead, he suspected a viral syndrome, which

the he noted the “patient’s father” agreed was more likely as well. Id. As such, Ms. Golden did

not undergo a lumbar puncture, CT scan, or blood work. Id. She declined a prescription pain

medicine. Id. She was discharged with instructions to immediately return if she had vomiting,

changes in mental status, stiff neck, or other concerns. Id.

Almost three months later, on December 20, 2016, Ms. Golden was taken to an ED in

Orlando, Florida, while on vacation with her family. Ex. 3 at 16. Her mother reported that she

woke up the first day of vacation, which was one week earlier, with a significant bite mark on her

tongue. Id. at 26. She was able to continue with her daily activities despite this. Id. Then, that

morning, Ms. Golden’s sister heard her making “gurgling sounds” and discovered that she was

unresponsive. Id. The family called EMS; Ms. Golden was more responsive by the time EMS

arrived. Id.

Ms. Golden reported that in September 2016, she had neck pain, headaches, and one week

of “flu-like” symptoms and fevers, which she said had been assessed as a possible viral

meningitis.4 Ex. 3 at 26. She reported she had recovered, and she denied any recent similar

symptoms. Id.

The ED physician diagnosed probable seizures and admitted Ms. Golden for further

evaluation. Ex. 3 at 27. An exam, EEG, brain MRI, EKG, echocardiogram, labs, and head CT

were all unremarkable. Id. at 27, 29, 37-39, 55-56, 58, 143, 145. The family was hesitant to

proceed with a lumbar puncture to rule out meningitis. Id. at 27.

Over the next 23 months, Ms. Golden was treated for a seizure disorder. She was seen by

both traditional and alternative medical providers. See generally Exs. 4, 10, 12. She was treated

with Keppra but continued to have seizures, including at least one in October 2017 that caused her

to fall from her bed, requiring an ED visit. Ex. 9 at 33.

3

Kernig sign: a sign of meningitis: the patient can easily and completely extend the lower limb when in the

dorsal decubitus position but not when in the sitting posture or when lying with the thigh flexed upon the

abdomen. Kernig sign, DORLAND’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY ONLINE (“DORLAND’S”),

https://www.dorlandsonline.com/dorland/definition?id=106323 (last accessed on August 21, 2025).

Brudzinski sign: 1. in meningitis, flexion of the neck usually results in flexion of the hip and knee; called

also neck s. 2. in meningitis, when passive flexion of the lower limb on one side is made, a similar

movement will be seen in the opposite limb; called also contralateral s. Brudzinski sign, DORLAND’S,

https://www.dorlandsonline.com/dorland/definition?id=106144 (last accessed on August 21, 2025).

4

This recitation was incorrect. As noted above, the ED physician who treated her in September 2016 did

not suspect meningitis. Ex. 9 at 13.

5

On November 6, 2018, Ms. Golden’s college roommates discovered her in bed, not

breathing. Ex. 7 at 2. She had passed away. Id. The Hamilton County Coroner’s office listed the

cause of death as “epilepsy complicated by positional asphyxia” when Ms. Golden experienced a

seizure while lying face down in bed. Id. The manner of death was ruled an accident. Id.

III. Petitioners’ Expert Opinions

Petitioners have produced a total of three expert reports, along with curricula vitae and

numerous items of medical literature, from two experts: internist and clinical immunologist

Yehuda Shoenfeld, M.D., and neurologist Steven Spillers, M.D. Exs. 17-148.

In brief, Dr. Shoenfeld generally opined that vaccines can lead to adverse events, including

death. Ex. 17 at 5. There are case reports of deaths following meningococcal and other

vaccinations. Id. at 5-6. In several cases, death was caused by seizures after vaccination. Id. at

5-8. Additionally, the literature shows that meningitis can be caused by several types of vaccines.

Id. at 5-6.

With respect to a mechanism of causation, Dr. Shoenfeld opined that the meningococcal

vaccine could increase the proliferation of other pathogens in the population, termed “vaccine

strain replacement theory.” Ex. 17 at 9. He explained:

Pathogens engage in competitive interactions for host cells at both the intra-host

and inter-host levels. Within hosts, the immune system exerts selective pressures

on pathogen communities. The introduction of vaccines alters the selection

dynamic by targeting specific pathogen variants. The resultant selective pressure

exerted enables non-targeted strains to proliferate and become more prevalent in a

population. This phenomenon is recognized as vaccine-induced pathogen strain

replacement. The replacement of strains has been documented in regard to

numerous infections and infectious agents.

Id. He opined that Ms. Golden probably developed meningitis from “meningococcal serotypes

not included in the original vaccine,” causing a seizure disorder and ultimately her death. Id. at

22. He did not address the timing of the onset of Ms. Golden’s purported meningitis or seizure

disorder in relation to the vaccination.

Dr. Spillers opined that central nervous system disorders, like meningitis, are “well-known

triggers of epilepsy.” Ex. 19 at 4. He concluded Ms. Golden likely contracted Neisseria

meningitidis bacterial meningitis, which was “identified by her doctors as probable meningitis,”

though it was not confirmed by lumbar puncture. Id. at 5. He agreed with Dr. Shoenfeld that this

infection was likely caused by a “replacement” strain of the bacterium that was not covered by the

vaccine Ms. Golden received and was therefore permitted to proliferate. Id. He concluded this

infection led to the development of epilepsy in Ms. Golden sometime during “the three months

between 20 September 2016 and 20 December 2016;” this time frame, he said, was consistent with

the theory of causation offered by Dr. Shoenfeld. Id.

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IV. Discussion

A. Propriety of Interim Award

The Federal Circuit has noted that interim fees “are particularly appropriate in cases where

proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2008). Respondent argues that there has been no special showing justifying an interim award

here. Fees Resp. at 23. He contends that Petitioners themselves are primarily responsible for the

protracted nature of this case, which was filed nearly five years ago. Id. at 23-24. Furthermore,

the fact that Mr. Downing has withdrawn as counsel does not per se create an undue financial

hardship for Petitioners. Id. Petitioners counter that their request comports with the guidelines

governing interim fee requests set forth in the Initial Order issued by former Special Master

Katherine E. Oler. Fees Reply at 1-3, see also ECF No. 14 (“Initial Order”) at 5.

Under the circumstances presented here, I conclude an interim award is appropriate. This

is a tragic case that has warranted careful consideration and prosecution. Since the case was

commenced, though they requested numerous extensions of time, Petitioners did file the pertinent

records, three expert reports, and voluminous medical literature. See ECF Nos. 8, 9, 17, 30, 46,

57, 60-63, 76. Furthermore, because Mr. Downing is unwinding his practice, it would be an undue

hardship to him if an interim fee award were not issued. See Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2

(financial hardship to counsel should be considered in deciding interim fee requests). Other special

masters have taken a similar approach to Mr. Downing’s recent interim fee requests. See, e.g.,

Weiss v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 24-546V, 2025 WL 2304491, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec.

Mstr. July 9, 2025) (granting an interim fee award “almost wholly in light of [Mr. Downing’s]

withdrawal); Breault v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-1220V, 2025 WL 2028524, at *1

(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 25, 2025); Fiorello v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1869V,

2025 WL 785004, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 11, 2025) (finding persuasive that “[Mr.

Downing] is entirely winding down his practice, a process that will likely depend on resolution of

his firm’s outstanding deliverables”).

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Respondent has not contested whether the petition was filed in good faith. I conclude that

Petitioners filed the petition in good faith.

Respondent’s opposition to the fees request centers on the reasonable basis threshold. Fees

Resp. at 16. He maintains that, despite the production of expert opinions supporting Petitioners’

claim, I should, in my discretion, conclude no reasonable basis exists. Id. at 16-17. He criticizes

the “far too attenuated” claim from the experts that the subject vaccine caused the proliferation of

other pathogens, one of which infected Ms. Golden, causing meningitis and ultimately her seizure

disorder and death. Id. at 17-18. Moreover, the medical records were misinterpreted by

Petitioners’ experts and do not support the opinion that Ms. Golden ever developed bacterial

meningitis. Id. at 19-21. In any event, even if Ms. Golden developed a “non-vaccine strain” of

meningitis, that constituted an intervening cause of her seizures and death, obviating vaccine

causation. Id. at 18. Also, the onset of Ms. Golden’s purported meningitis infection occurred far

too long after the subject vaccination for her condition to be vaccine-caused. Id. at 22-23.

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The threshold for reasonable basis is much lower than the burden to prove entitlement to

compensation. Petitioners have proffered two relevant experts who have produced detailed reports

and literature and have articulated a theory for how the subject vaccine caused Ms. Golden’s

seizure disorder and death. See Exs. 17, 19, 148. With this, Petitioners have met the low bar of

producing more than a scintilla of evidence supporting causation. Compare with Thatcher v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., 2021 WL 4287353, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 25, 2021)

(concluding the claim lacked reasonable basis because the only evidence supporting causation was

a two-sentence, conclusory statement from an expert). Accordingly, in my discretion I conclude

Petitioners have, to date, maintained a reasonable basis for their claim.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioners request a total of $30,650.00 in attorneys’ fees. Fees App. at 7. Petitioners bear

the burden of establishing that the rates charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are

reasonable. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993). Petitioners’

former counsel, Mr. Downing, split his time between two law firms: Downing, Allison &

Jorgenson, and Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC. Mr. Downing and his colleagues billed their hourly

rates consistently between the two law firms.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d

at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for

the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of

[P]etitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.

Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for

attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of

Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for

subsequent years.5

Petitioners request compensation for Mr. Downing at the following hourly rates: $385.00

for work performed in 2021; $445.00 for work performed in 2022-2023; and $485.00 for work

performed in 2024. Fees App. at 10. Petitioners request compensation for Ms. Ann Allison,

counsel, at the following hourly rates: $415.00 for work performed in 2022-2023; and $435.00

for work performed in 2024. Id. Petitioner requests compensation for Ms. Courtney Jorgenson,

counsel, at the following hourly rates: $275.00 for work performed in 2021; $345.00 for work

performed in 2022-2023; and $375.00 for work performed in 2024. Id. Additionally, Petitioners

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The Office of Special Masters Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule for 2015 through 2025 can be

accessed at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-hourly-rate-fee-schedules. The hourly

rates contained within the schedules are updated based on the decision in McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323.

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request compensation for Mr. Downing’s paralegal staff. Id. at 10-11. Petitioners request

compensation for Ms. Danielle Avery, paralegal, at the following hourly rates: $135.00 for work

performed in 2021; $155.00 for work performed in 2022-2023; and $175.00 for work performed

in 2024. Id. at 10-11. Petitioners request compensation for Mr. Alex Malvick, paralegal, at the

following hourly rates: $155.00 for work completed in 2023; and $175.00 for work performed in

2024. Id. at 11. Lastly, Petitioners request compensation for Ms. Samantha Perez, paralegal, at

a rate of $175.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Id.

The rates requested for Mr. Downing and his colleagues are consistent with what they

have previously been awarded and are in accordance with the Office of Special Masters’ Fee

Schedule. See, e.g., Coons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1067V, 2025 WL 1011347,

at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 17, 2025); Wakileh v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-

1136V, 2023 WL 9228198, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 18, 2023); Martin v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., No. 22-384V, 2025 WL 996725 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2025). I see no

reason to disturb Mr. Downing’s requested rates and award them in full.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master’s discretion

to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work

done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a

percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed.

Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours);

Guy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master’s

reduction of attorney and paralegal hours). Further, special masters may reduce awards sua sponte,

independent of enumerated objections from the respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed.

Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2008), aff’d, No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr.

22, 2008).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application

when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed.

Cl. 2011). Special masters may look to their experience and judgment to reduce an award of fees

and costs to a level they find reasonable for the work performed. Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521. It is

within a special master’s discretion to make a global reduction to the total amount of fees

requested. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“special

masters have wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs”);

Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec.

Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011 WL 6292218, at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying

review of the special master’s decision and endorsing “a global – rather than line-by-line –

approach to determine the reasonable number of hours expended in this case”).

While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be

comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical

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and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.,

McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. It is well-established that billing for administrative and

clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379,

387 (1989).

The overall hours spent on this matter by Mr. Downing and his staff appear to be largely

reasonable; however, a minor reduction is necessary due to paralegal time billed for administrative

and clerical tasks. These tasks can be summarized as “preparing filings to be filed,” “drafting a

notice of filing,” filing exhibits, and receiving and reviewing ECF notifications for filed

documents. See generally Fees App., Ex. A.

In total, the paralegals billed approximately 13.0 hours for these tasks. Because these tasks

were performed by various paralegals over various years, I will deduct $1,000.00. These issues

have previously been raised with Mr. Downing’s firms. See, e.g., Pearce v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 22-1362V, 2025 WL 2306298, at *4-5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 15, 2025);

Coons, 2025 WL 1011347, at *3; Wakileh, 2023 WL 9228198, at *3; Hoover on behalf of L.H. v.

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1394V, 2021 WL 5575768, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Nov. 1, 2021).

Accordingly, Petitioners are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $29,560.00.

D. Reasonable Costs

Petitioners request a total of $30,978.29 for attorneys’ costs, comprised of the following:

$400.00 for the Court’s filing fee; $172.49 for medical records requests; $53.16 for postage and

photocopies; $35.95 for medical literature; $22,045.00 for Dr. Shoenfeld’s expert costs; and

$8,271.69 for Dr. Spillers’ expert costs. Fees App., Ex. A at 10, 49.

Petitioner provided documentation for the costs associated with the medical record requests,

postage costs, printing costs, and filing expenses. Fees App., Ex. A at 36-152, 155-56; Fees App.,

Ex. B at 3-12. I find the costs for these items to be reasonable and award them in full. I discuss

Petitioner’s expert costs below.

1. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for Yehuda Shoenfeld, M.D.

Petitioner requests $22,045.00 for Dr. Shoenfeld’s work. This is comprised of 44 hours of

work at an hourly rate of $500.00, and a $45.00 wire transfer fee. Fees App. at 12. Dr. Shoenfeld

has been awarded his requested hourly rate; therefore I see no reason to disturb this request. See,

e.g., Robbins v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1385V, 2023 WL 9502992, at *3 (Fed. Cl.

Spec. Mstr. Dec. 27, 2023); Vance v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-675V, 2021 WL

3011903, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 9, 2021). I will award Dr. Shoenfeld’s requested hourly

rate in full.

Dr. Shoenfeld spent 44 hours reviewing Ms. Golden’s medical records, writing the expert

report, and researching applicable medical literature. Fees App., Ex. A at 29. The total number

of hours seem reasonable given the complexity of this case. Counsel for Petitioners are warned

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that should Dr. Shoenfeld continue to block bill his hours, his rates or expert costs may be reduced

in the future. Block billing, even for experts, is discouraged in the Vaccine Program. See

Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-559V, 2009 WL 2568468, at *22 (“The

Guidelines for Practice state that petitioner should explain costs sufficiently to demonstrate their

relation to the prosecution of the petition. Without invoices, it is impossible to determine precisely

what services [the expert] rendered or at what cost.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing

Guidelines for Practice at 69 (Section X, Chapter 3, Part B(2). Because the overall total number

of hours is reasonable, I will award Dr. Schoenfeld’s expert costs in full.

2. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for Steven H. Spillers, M.D.

Petitioner requests $8,271.69 for Dr. Spillers’ work, at a rate of $500.00 per hour, for 993

minutes (or approximately 16.5 hours) of work. Fee App., Ex. A at 157-170. Dr. Spillers has

been awarded his requested hourly rate by other special masters, and I see no reason to disturb his

request. See Morgan on Behalf of B.M. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1324V, 2025

WL 1010935, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 14, 2025). I find the overall number of hours

expended by Dr. Spillers to be reasonable, and I will award his expert costs in full.6

I award Petitioner a total of $30,978.29 in attorneys’ costs.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of

awards of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART

Petitioner’s application. Petitioner is awarded interim attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount

of $60,538.29 as follows:

• A lump sum in the amount of $60,538.29, representing reimbursement of

Petitioner’s interim attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to

Petitioner’s former counsel Mr. Andrew Downing’s IOLTA account for prompt

disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of

Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jennifer A. Shah

Jennifer A. Shah

Special Master

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Dr. Spillers invoice reflects a $8.33/minute expert rate, which is extremely close to, but not quite,

$500.00/hour. This explains the difference between 16.55 hours of work performed x $500.00/hour =

$8,275.00, and the amount Dr. Spillers charged: $8,271.69. I will award the amount requested.

7

Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice

renouncing their right to seek review.

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