LANS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTONIO MICHAEL LANS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-6172 (ZNQ) (JTQ)

v.

OPINION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) filed on

May 29, 2025 by Defendants New Jersey Office of the Attorney General; State of New Jersey

Judiciary, Middlesex Vicinage Probation Division, Child Support Enforcement Unit; Hon.

Deborah J. Venezia, P.J.F.P.; Hon. Daniel H. Brown; Hon Barbara Clarke Stolte; James Lubrich;

James Newterwitz; Elena Calingasan; Christopher Czapek; Michael Barry; Blanca Martinez;

Gerhard Baumer; and Ken Bijlani (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Defendants filed a brief in

support of their Motion. (ECF No. 21-1.) Plaintiff Antonio Michael Lans (“Plaintiff”) filed an

Opposition (ECF No. 22), to which Defendants replied (ECF No. 24).

The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the Motion

without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion.

1 Defendants New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development (“DFD”), Office of Child

Support Services, and Patricia Risch, Director of DFD’s Office of Child Support Services join in Defendants’ Motion.

(ECF Nos. 26, 27.)

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action arises from proceedings conducted in New Jersey State Court that resulted in

Plaintiff being ordered to pay child support for his two children. (“FAC,” ECF No. 18 at 3 ¶ 8.2)

Back in 1997, Plaintiff and his ex-wife divorced. (Id. ¶ 4.) At that time, Plaintiff and his ex-wife

had two children, who are now 41 and 33 years old. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff, over twenty

years ago he was “automatically enrolled in the New Jersey Child Support system without a court

appearance or any voluntary agreements or actions on [his] part,” despite no longer living in New

Jersey. (Id. ¶ 6.) He alleges that the state court ordered him to pay $1,200 per month in child

support and “imposed automatic cost of living increases for more than twenty-five (25) years.”

(Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was improperly ordered to pay child-support after his

children’s eighteenth birthdays and that the state-court revoked his passport privileges. (Id. ¶ 9.)

In the early 2000s, Plaintiff claims that he hired a lawyer to handle his child support case,

but that after he paid the lawyer, she stopped responding to Plaintiff’s inquiries. (Id. ¶¶ 14–17.)

Subsequently, Plaintiff, without counsel, filed two motions in New Jersey Superior Court. The

first motion was filed on October 23, 2013, which sought financial relief and the emancipation of

his two adult children. (Id. ¶¶ 21–23.) Defendant Hon. Barbara C. Stolte, the presiding judge,

denied Plaintiff’s requests for financial relief, but did emancipate his two children. (Id. ¶ 24.) The

second motion, filed on April 8, 2019, also requested financial relief. (Id. ¶ 37.) Defendant Hon.

Daniel H. Brown, the presiding judge, also denied Plaintiff’s request. (Id. ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff commenced this action on May 14, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants subsequently

filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7), which the Court granted on April 4, 2025 (ECF No. 17). In

granting the motion, the Court found that Plaintiff’s pleadings failed to comport with the

2 The Court cites to the FAC by its internal page number and paragraph number because Plaintiff’s paragraph

numbering is inconsistent.

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the extent they seek relief from final state court judgments. (ECF No.

17.)

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on May 2, 2025. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint remedies some of the pleading defects previously identified by the Court,

and now clearly brings twenty-eight causes of action against Defendants. These causes of action

relate to the underlying state-court judgments entered against Plaintiff, and include, among other

things, counts for fraud, civil rights violations, and due process violations. As a result of these

alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks numerous orders from the Court, including relief from child

support, reimbursement of “all money stolen,” reinstatement of Plaintiff’s U.S. passport, and the

removal of child support-related information from credit reporting agencies. (FAC at 64.)

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and

exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law tort claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss a claim if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). Federal

courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,

even in the absence of a challenge from any party,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514

(2006), and to “raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect

not to press.” Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.5 (3d

Cir. 2016) (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011)). A Rule

12(b)(1) motion can raise a facial attack or a factual attack, which determines the standard of

review. Mazo v. Way, 551 F. Supp. 3d 478, 489 (D.N.J. 2021).

A facial attack “is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is

insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not

present a question of federal law . . . or because some other jurisdictional defect is present.”

Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). In reviewing a facial attack,

“the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein

and attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 358. “A factual attack

concerns the actual failure of [plaintiff's] claims to comport with the jurisdictional perquisites.”

CAN v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008); see id. (“So, for example, while diversity

of citizenship might have been adequately pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant can submit proof

that, in fact, diversity is lacking.”) When considering a factual challenge, “the plaintiff [has] the

burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist,” the court “is free to weigh the evidence and

satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case,” and “no presumptive truthfulness

attaches to [the] plaintiff's allegations . . . .” Mortenson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

CONST. amend. XI. In other words, the Eleventh Amendment “renders unconsenting States

immune from suits brought in federal courts by private parties.” Haybarger v. Lawrence County

Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2008). This immunity has been extended

to suits brought against a State by its own citizens. See id. at 197–98. In addition to suits against

States themselves, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for

damages against “arms of the State.” Maliandi v. Montclair State University, 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d

Cir. 2016). The Third Circuit has established a “fact-intensive, three-step balancing test to

ascertain whether a state-affiliated entity is an ‘arm of the State’ that falls within the ambit of the

Eleventh Amendment.” Id. These factors are: (1) the funding factor, i.e., whether the state treasury

is responsible for an adverse judgment entered against the alleged army of the State; (2) the status

under state law factor, i.e., whether the entity is treated as an army of the State under state case

law and statutes; and (3) the autonomy factor, i.e., whether, based largely on the structure of its

governance, the entity retains significant autonomy from state control. See id. However, there are

three primary exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) congressional abrogation, (2)

waiver by the statute, and (3) suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law. See Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs,

Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).

1. Claims Against the State and State Entity Defendants

Plaintiff brings claims against the State of New Jersey and numerous other defendants,

including the Attorney General of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey, and a series

other New Jersey Agencies (collectively, “Entity Defendants”). These claims are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. First, there is no question that the State of New Jersey is immune from

Plaintiff’s suit. See Johnson v. State of N.J., 869 F. Supp. 289, 296 (D.N.J. 1994). Second, Courts

in this District have held that the remaining Entity Defendants are “arms of the State,” and

therefore also protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Johnson, 869 F. Supp. at 297 (holding

that New Jersey Superior Court is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Tucker v.

City of Phila., 679 F. Supp. 127, 140 (D.N.J. 2023) (holding that New Jersey Attorney General is

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Gattuso v. N.J. Dept. of Human Services, 881

F. Supp. 639, 650 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding that New Jersey Department of Human Services is

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment).

Nor do any of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. None of the Entity

Defendants are individual state officers, so Plaintiff’s claims against the Entity Defendants may

only proceed if there has been congressional abrogation or a waiver by statute. See Pa. Fed’n of

Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc., 297 F.3d at 323. None of these exceptions are applicable. Although

Plaintiff brings twenty-eight causes of action, his claims can be grouped into two categories: (1)

civil rights claims based on violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) state-law tort

claims based on fraud and theft. (FAC at 47–63.) With respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, it is

well-established that Congress did not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity when it enacted 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). Similarly, Plaintiff’s state-law

fraud claims are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Saint-Jean v. County of Bergan,

509 F. Supp. 3d 87, 114 (D.N.J. 2020). Indeed, the Third Circuit has held that New Jersey has not

waived sovereign immunity for tort claims in federal court. See Hyatt v. Cnty. of Passaic, 340 F.

App’x 833, 837 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Entity Defendants must

be dismissed.

2. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Plaintiff also brings causes of actions against Judges Barbara Stolte, Daniel Brown,

Deborah Venezia (“Judge Defendants”), Hearing Officers Michael Barry and James Lubrich

(“Hearing Officer Defendants”), Child Support Workers Elena Calingasan, Blanca Martinez,

Christopher Czapek, James Nesterwitz, and Patricia Risch (“CSEW Defendants”), and Probation

Officers Gerhard Baumer, Ken Bijlani, (“Probation Defendants”). As explained below, to the

extent Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants are brought in their official capacities,

they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

It is well-established that employees of the Superior Court that are sued in their official

capacity are entitled to protection under the State’s sovereign immunity. See Beckett v. Vega, Civ.

No. 05-3443, 2006 WL 1320043, at *2 (D.N.J. May 11, 2006). This not only applies to judges,

but to other employees of the judiciary, such as hearing officers. See Torres v. Velasquez, Civ.

No. 17-1685, 2017 WL 572053, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017). Moreover, courts in this district

have also held that probation officers are immune from suit. See Beckett, 2006 WL 1320043, at

*2–3. In Beckett, a district court held that a senior probation officer was considered a judicial

employee, which was based on the State Judicial Unification Act. See id. Here, given that CSEW

Defendants are also employees of the Probation Office, they are also protected by the State’s

sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary damages against

Individual Defendants in their official capacities will be dismissed.3

As noted above, however, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits against state

officials that seek prospective or injunctive relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law.

See MCI Telecommunication Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir.

3 To the extent Plaintiff brings claims for monetary damages against Individual Defendants in their personal capacity,

those claims are barred by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. It is well-established that “judges are generally

immune from a suit for money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). This immunity

may only be overcome in two circumstances: (1) for actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity and (2) actions

taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir.

2000). Given that Plaintiff challenges the judge’s enforcement of child support, neither of these exceptions apply.

See Rashduni v. Dente, Civ. No. 16-240, 2016 WL 4035437, at *3 (D.N.J. July 26, 2016). Moreover, the remaining

Individual Defendants are entitled to assert quasi-judicial immunity as to the claims against them in their personal

capacity. See Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Quasi-judicial immunity extends only to the

acts authorized by court order, i.e., to the execution of a court order, and not to the manner in which it is executed.”)

Here, it appears that the actions taken by the remaining Individual Defendants consist of sending out mail related to

Plaintiff’s child support payments. (See, e.g., FAC at 28 ¶ 8). Accordingly, they are all entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity. See Rashduni, 2016 WL 4035437, at *3.

2001). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s remaining claims are barred under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.

B. Rooker-Feldman

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts “lack subject matter jurisdiction

to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are

inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a judicial proceeding.” FOCUS v.

Allegheny County Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation modified); Lane

v. New Jersey, 725 F. App’x 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives

federal district courts of jurisdiction over lawsuits that essentially seek appellate review of state-

court judgments.”). For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, the following must be satisfied:

“(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the]

state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and

(4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W.

Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil

Corp., 544 U.S. at 284). In other words, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only when in order

to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court

judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment

ineffectual.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840.

Here, the FAC seeks “swift and immediate removal from the New Jersey Child Support

system,” “immediate eradication and removal of all illegally, unlawfully, and fraudulently

amassed arrears,” “immediate rectification and removal of any Child Support related information

from all credit reporting agencies,” “reinstatement of [his] U.S. Passport,” and other relief

stemming from final judgments in state court. (FAC at 64.) Therefore, the Court finds that the

FAC meets the elements under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff lost in state court; he is

now complaining of injuries arising from those losses; the final state judgments were rendered

prior to this action; and review by this Court would render the prior state judgment ineffectual.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from the state-court judgments, the Court lacks

jurisdiction.4

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Insofar as the Court finds further amendment futile, the Amended Complaint will be DISMISSED

without prejudice and without further leave to amend. See Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858,

864 (3d Cir. 1984); Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). An

appropriate Order will follow.

Date: December 4, 2025

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi

ZAHID N. QURAISHI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 To the extent Plaintiff’s claims concern ongoing state-court proceedings, the Court lacks jurisdiction over those

claims under the Younger doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Indeed, “Courts in this Circuit have

overwhelmingly abstained under the Younger doctrine when faced with challenges to ongoing child support

proceedings.” Frederick of Family Gonora v. Risch, Civ. No. 23-893, 2023 WL 8271932, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 30,

2023) (collecting cases).