The opinion
Filed 12/4/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
VILLA ZINFANDEL, LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171987
v.
CHRISTOPHER BEARMAN, (Napa County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV001130)
Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiff Villa Zinfandel, LLC (Villa Zinfandel) purchased real property
from the party that had purchased it at a foreclosure sale. Defendant
Christopher Bearman occupied the property.
Villa Zinfandel filed an unlawful detainer case against Bearman as a
limited civil action, in which damages are limited to $35,000. (Code Civ.
Proc.,1 § 85, subd. (a).) The action was subsequently consolidated for all
purposes with an unlimited civil action that sought to unwind the foreclosure
sale. The trial court granted summary adjudication as to the latter claim,
and Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer claim proceeded to trial. As part of
its case-in-chief, Villa Zinfandel had to prove that the foreclosure sale was
conducted in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 (§ 1161a, subd. (b)(3)),
which requires the recording and posting of certain notices. The court
ultimately found in favor of Villa Zinfandel and awarded it damages
exceeding $300,000.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1
On appeal, Bearman contends the trial court erred in failing to sustain
his objections to the admissibility of the statutory foreclosure notices and the
trustee’s deed upon sale. He further argues that the award of damages
should be reduced to $35,000 because consolidation did not remove the
jurisdictional cap on Villa Zinfandel’s damages claim.2 We reject both
contentions and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2022, Villa Zinfandel filed an unlawful detainer
complaint against Bearman. The caption of the complaint stated that the
case was a “Limited Civil Case.” The complaint alleged the following facts:
Bearman or his predecessors executed a deed of trust secured by real
property located in Saint Helena (the “Property”). They later defaulted under
the terms of the deed of trust, and a notice of default was recorded. After
Bearman or his predecessors failed to cure the default, a notice of trustee’s
sale of the Property was recorded. The Property was sold to Bank of New
York Mellon (BNYM) in compliance with Civil Code section 2924 et seq., and
a trustee’s deed upon sale was recorded. BNYM sold the Property to Villa
Zinfandel.
As required by section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3), Villa Zinfandel served
a three-day notice to quit upon Bearman. However, Bearman refused to
relinquish possession of the Property. As a result, Villa Zinfandel sought
holdover damages “at a daily rate” from the date of its complaint until the
date that judgment was entered.
2 Throughout his brief, Bearman claims that the jurisdictional cap on
damages is $25,000. That was the case up until January 2024, when
amendments to section 85 raising the jurisdictional cap to $35,000 became
effective. (Stats. 2023, ch. 861, § 2.)
2
In December 2022, Edward Sanchez filed a separate action against
BNYM, Villa Zinfandel, and the Law Offices of Les Zieve, the foreclosure
trustee, to set aside the trustee’s deed upon sale. He alleged that BNYM and
the Law Offices of Les Zieve violated Civil Code section 2924m, under which
an “eligible bidder” has 15 days from the foreclosure sale to submit a bid
equal to or higher than the last and highest bid and then 45 days from the
sale date to pay the bid to the trustee. (Civ. Code, § 2924m, subd. (c)(1), (3),
4(A).) Sanchez claimed he was an eligible bidder and timely submitted a bid
letter in compliance with Civil Code section 2924m, but defendants
transferred title to the Property to BNYM only two days later. Sanchez
further alleged that Villa Zinfandel knew the foreclosure sale was conducted
in violation of Civil Code section 2924m, and thus it was not a bona fide
purchaser of the Property.
The following month, Bearman filed a motion to stay the unlawful
detainer action and/or consolidate the action with Sanchez’s action. He
argued the two matters should be resolved simultaneously to avoid the
possibility of inconsistent outcomes. Villa Zinfandel opposed the motion,
arguing that the actions involved different parties and did not present
common questions of law or fact.
The trial court initially denied the motion to stay and/or consolidate but
sua sponte reconsidered the motion after the parties submitted supplemental
briefs regarding whether non-compliance with Civil Code section 2924m
could be raised as an affirmative defense in the unlawful detainer action.
The court concluded it could be raised as an affirmative defense and found
that consolidation of the two actions was therefore justified. The court noted
that upon consolidation, “the unlawful detainer action is treated as an
ordinary civil action rather than as a summary proceeding,” meaning that the
3
expedited procedures of unlawful detainer no longer applied. (See Martin-
Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 388–389.)
In May 2024, the trial court granted the wrongful foreclosure
defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Sanchez’s cause of action to set
aside the trustee’s deed upon sale. The court later corrected its ruling to
grant summary adjudication, rather than summary judgment, since
Sanchez’s action had been consolidated with the unlawful detainer action “for
all purposes” and only one judgment could be entered in the consolidated
action.
Thereafter, Villa Zinfandel moved for summary judgment on its
unlawful detainer complaint. The trial court denied the motion on the
ground that Villa Zinfandel provided Bearman insufficient notice of the
motion. It reasoned that the shortened notice period for summary judgment
motions filed in unlawful detainer actions did not apply because the “order
consolidating the two matters for all purposes serves to remove the unlawful
detainer cause of action from its expedited nature.”
Trial on Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer complaint was held in June
2024. Three people testified on behalf of Villa Zinfandel, including Les
Poppitt, an assistant administrator for the Law Offices of Les Zieve. The
appellate record does not include a reporter’s transcript, but the clerk’s
transcript shows that Poppitt testified he was familiar with the maintenance
and storage of business records at the Law Offices of Les Zieve, and he
described the steps the Law Offices of Les Zieve took as the foreclosure
trustee, such as recording the notice of default and the notice of trustee’s sale.
Several documents, including the recorded notice of default, notice of
trustee’s sale, and trustee’s deed upon sale, were admitted into evidence.
4
Bearman objected to the admission of the recorded notices and the
recorded trustee’s deed upon sale on the grounds of hearsay and lack of
foundation. He argued that Poppitt did not have personal knowledge of the
amount of the default set forth in those documents.
Following closing arguments, the trial court requested briefing from the
parties on two issues: (1) whether Villa Zinfandel was required to “prove-up”
the amounts owed under the deed of trust as part of its case-in-chief for its
unlawful detainer claim; and (2) whether the order consolidating the
unlawful detainer complaint with Sanchez’s unlimited civil action had the
effect of removing the “ ‘limited’ ” designation from the unlawful detainer
complaint, thereby allowing Villa Zinfandel to seek holdover damages greater
than $35,000.
Regarding the first issue, Villa Zinfandel argued that an unlawful
detainer plaintiff does not have to prove the borrower’s underlying default on
the loan or the amount owed on the loan at the time of foreclosure. Rather,
the plaintiff is only required to prove the “technical validity” of the trustee’s
compliance with Civil Code section 2924 in conducting the sale. Bearman
disagreed, contending that an unlawful detainer plaintiff must not only
submit the recorded notices and trustee’s deed upon sale, but must also
establish that the allegations in those documents are true. He further argued
that the recorded notices and the truth of the matters asserted therein were
not judicially noticeable.
On the second issue, Villa Zinfandel argued that a single action cannot
be of both limited and unlimited jurisdiction under section 88. It contended
that because Bearman sought to have the unlawful detainer action
consolidated with Sanchez’s unlimited civil action, Bearman consented to the
reclassification of the unlawful detainer action as unlimited. Bearman
5
asserted that there was no authority for the proposition that a limited action
is converted into an unlimited action upon consolidation.
In August 2024, the trial court issued a tentative decision finding in
favor of Villa Zinfandel on its unlawful detainer complaint and awarding
Villa Zinfandel $340,000 in holdover damages, continuing at a daily rate of
$923.08 through judgment. In response, Bearman informed the court that he
was objecting to “every statement made” in the recorded documents, and not
just “whether there was any default.”
In October 2024, the trial court issued a final statement of decision that
was consistent with its tentative decision. In reaching its decision, the court
took judicial notice of the recorded documents “but not for the truth of the
matters contained therein.” Judgment was entered in favor of Villa
Zinfandel.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Bearman’s Evidentiary Objections to the Recorded Notices and
Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale
Bearman contends the trial court erred in failing to sustain his
evidentiary objections to the recorded notice of default, notice of trustee’s
sale, and trustee’s deed upon sale. In challenging the admissibility of those
documents at trial on hearsay and lack of foundation grounds, he argued that
Poppitt did not have personal knowledge of the factual statements in the
recorded documents, namely the amount of the default. He reiterates this
argument on appeal and contends the trial court should have sustained his
objections to those documents because section 1161a requires an unlawful
detainer plaintiff to establish the truth of the allegations in the recorded
documents. He further claims the documents were not judicially noticeable.
We disagree on both counts.
6
We first dispense with Bearman’s second argument. His assertion that
the recorded documents were inadmissible and not subject to judicial notice
appears to rest on his claim that Villa Zinfandel failed to prove the truth of
the documents’ factual allegations. But the trial court, in taking judicial
notice of the recorded documents, stated it was not taking judicial notice of
the truth of the matters asserted in those documents. This was proper.
While courts cannot take judicial notice of factual representations in recorded
documents, “a court may take judicial notice of . . . a document’s recordation,
the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the
transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally
operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the
document’s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the
legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.”
(Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265,
disapproved of on other grounds in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939, fn. 13; see Yvanova, at p. 924, fn.1 [judicial notice
of the “existence and facial contents” of recorded documents, including notices
of default and a trustee’s deed upon sale, was proper].) Here, Bearman did
not dispute the recorded documents’ authenticity. Thus, the court did not err
in taking judicial notice of the existence and facial contents of the recorded
documents.
We therefore turn to the elements of Villa Zinfandel’s case-in-chief and
whether it was required to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the
recorded foreclosure documents. “An unlawful detainer action is a summary
proceeding ordinarily limited to resolution of the question of possession.”
(Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 973.)
However, a “qualified exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in
7
unlawful detainer is contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a,
which extends the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional
landlord-tenant relationship to include certain purchasers of property.”
(Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255, superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 982, 1011–1012.) Under section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3), an
unlawful detainer action may be filed “[w]here the property has been sold in
accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale
contained in a deed of trust . . . and the title under the sale has been duly
perfected.” (§ 1161a, subd. (b)(3).) Section 1161a therefore provides for “a
‘narrow and sharply focused examination of title’ directed at the formal
validity of the trustee sale.” (Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108
Cal.App.3d 141, 144, quoting Vella, at p. 255.)
Thus, a party who purchases property from the party who bought it at
a trustee’s sale must prove in an unlawful detainer action that the
requirements under section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3) have been satisfied,
“i.e., that the sale was conducted in accordance with section 2924 of the Civil
Code and that title under such sale was duly perfected.” (Stephens, Partain
& Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 953.)
Civil Code section 2924, in turn, sets forth some of the “ministerial
acts” the trustee must perform in conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
(Pro Value Properties, Inc. v. Quality Loan Service Corp. (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 579, 583.) Under Civil Code section 2924, the trustee or its
agents must first record a notice of default. (Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (a)(1).)
Subdivision (a)(1) of Civil Code section 2924 establishes content requirements
for the notice of default, including a statement setting forth the amount
required to cure the default. After three months, the trustee may give notice
8
of sale “in the manner and for a time not less than that set forth in Section
2924f.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Civil Code section 2924f requires the trustee to
post a notice of sale at least 20 days before the date of sale at the property to
be sold and to publish the notice in a local newspaper of general circulation.
(Civ. Code, § 2924f, subd. (b)(2), (3).) The notice must also be recorded and
then mailed to the trustor, and it must contain certain information. (Id.,
subds. (b)(4), (5), (7), (c)(3).)
Bearman does not claim that the Law Offices of Les Zieve failed to
carry out any of the procedures explicitly outlined in Civil Code sections 2924
and 2924f. Indeed, from our review of the limited record before us, it appears
that Poppitt’s testimony and the facts of which the trial court took judicial
notice established the foreclosure trustee’s compliance with Civil Code section
2924, including the recordation, posting, and publication of the required
notices within the statutory timelines. And the recorded trustee’s deed upon
sale indicated that title was perfected. (See Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake
Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479–480.)
As to Bearman’s assertion that Villa Zinfandel was required to prove
the truth of the allegations in the recorded documents, we have found no
authority, and Bearman does not cite any, requiring a plaintiff to prove the
truth of the statements contained in the notices required under Civil Code
section 2924 as part of its case-in-chief under section 1161a, subdivision
(b)(3). The law is to the contrary.
Certain presumptions in favor of the purchaser of the property apply
when establishing that the trustee’s sale was regularly held. Upon
completion of the trustee’s sale and delivery of the deed, a common law
rebuttable presumption arises that the sale has been conducted regularly and
fairly. (Bank of America v. La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 706,
9
713.) It is the burden of the party attacking the sale to “overcome this
common law presumption ‘by pleading and proving an improper procedure
and the resulting prejudice.’ ” (Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76,
86, fn. 4; see Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1238, 1258 [common law presumption can only be rebutted by “substantial
evidence of prejudicial procedural irregularity”].)
There is also a statutory presumption under Civil Code section 2924,
subdivision (c). Where the trustee’s deed “recites that all procedural
requirements for the default notice and sale notice have been satisfied, there
is a statutory rebuttable presumption that such notice requirements have
been fulfilled; as to a [bona fide purchaser], this presumption is conclusive.”
(Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; see
Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 831–832.) “This statutory
presumption was clearly intended . . . ‘ “to ensure that a properly conducted
sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide
purchaser.” ’ ” (Melendrez, at p. 1255.)
The trial court here relied on the statutory presumption in concluding
that Villa Zinfandel produced sufficient evidence that the trustee conducted
the foreclosure sale in accordance with Civil Code section 2924, since the
trustee’s deed upon sale contained the recital required for the presumption to
apply. Moreover, the common law presumption applied because recordation
of the trustee’s deed constituted prima facie evidence of delivery of the deed.
(Evid. Code, § 1600, subd. (a); Butler v. Butler (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 228,
233.) Thus, even if BNYM or Villa Zinfandel were not bona fide purchasers,
Bearman had the burden to prove any irregularities in the conduct of the
sale. While he disputed the amount of the default at trial, he did not cross-
examine Poppitt or produce any evidence. He merely argued that the
10
recorded documents were inadmissible absent evidence of the truth of the
allegations in the documents. This was insufficient to meet his burden to
prove irregularities in the conduct of the sale. (See Kalnoki v. First American
Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 45 [conclusory
allegations that trustee’s deed upon sale falsely recites that the statutory
requirements under Civil Code section 2924 have been met is insufficient to
rebut presumption that the sale was conducted regularly].)
Accordingly, there is no merit to Bearman’s assertion that the trial
court erred in taking judicial notice of the recorded documents and in failing
to sustain his objections to the admissibility of those documents.
B. The Trial Court’s Award of Holdover Damages to Villa
Zinfandel
Bearman next argues that the trial court erred in awarding Villa
Zinfandel damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit of $35,000 for actions
prosecuted as a limited civil action. The court did so because it concluded
that the consolidated action was unlimited. Bearman contends the court’s
reasoning was erroneous because the authority it relied on says nothing
about the classification of a consolidated action, and no party took affirmative
action to reclassify the limited unlawful detainer case. As we will explain,
the trial court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction in awarding Villa
Zinfandel $340,000 in holdover damages based on the law governing the
classification and consolidation of cases and the court’s inherent authority to
adopt appropriate procedures “ ‘in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and
the rules of court.’ ” (People v. Arrendondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 707.)
1. The Law Governing Classification and Reclassification of Civil
Cases
11
A civil case may be classified as a “limited” civil action or as an
“unlimited” civil action. (§§ 85, 88.) Section 85 defines a limited civil case as
one in which the “amount in controversy” does not exceed $35,000, and it
further defines the “amount in controversy” as “the amount of the demand, or
the recovery sought, or the value of the property, or the amount of the lien,
that is in controversy in the action, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, interest, and
costs.” (§ 85, subd. (a).) “A civil action or proceeding other than a limited
civil case may be referred to as an unlimited civil case.” (§ 88.)
“The statutory scheme governing the designation of civil actions makes
clear that ‘a civil case is classified as unlimited by default; extra
requirements must be satisfied to render a case limited.’ ” (County of
Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 298,
308.) Even if a case qualifies as a limited case, the party must explicitly state
that the case is limited in its pleading. (Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
483, 493; see § 422.30, subd. (b) [“In a limited civil case, the caption shall
state that the case is a limited civil case, and the clerk shall classify the case
accordingly.”].)
“The designation of a case as either a limited or an unlimited action has
significant implications because the available relief and applicable
procedures differ as to each. Most significantly, if a case is designated as a
limited civil case, the court has no authority (i.e., jurisdiction) to award a
judgment in excess of $25,000.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275.)
“Once classified as limited or unlimited that classification normally
continues throughout the litigation.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) However, under the reclassification statutes (§
403.010 et seq.), reclassification of a case can be accomplished in several
12
ways, all of which require some affirmative action from the parties or the
court. (§§ 403.020, subd. (a), 403.030, 403.040, subd. (a), 403.050.)
Here, there is no dispute that the unlawful detainer action was
designated a limited civil action at its outset, since the caption in Villa
Zinfandel’s complaint stated the action was a “Limited Civil Case.” There is
also no dispute that Sanchez’s action was an unlimited civil action. He
sought relief not available in a limited action (see Ytuarte v. Superior Court,
supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 275; § 85, subd. (b)), and he did not designate
the action as a limited civil case in his pleadings. After the two actions were
consolidated, no party sought to reclassify the case.
2. The Effect of Consolidation on an Action
If there are pending actions before the court that involve “a common
question of law or fact,” section 1048 permits the trial court to “order a joint
hearing or trial” or to “order all the actions consolidated.” (§ 1048, subd. (a).)
“Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of
consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two
actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or
consolidation for all purposes.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)
When two actions are consolidated “for all purposes,” “the two actions
are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only
one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp.,
Ltd., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1147; see Sanchez v. Superior Court (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 1391, 1396 [“the pleadings are regarded as merged, one set of
findings is made, and one judgment is rendered”].) And “ ‘for the purposes of
all further proceedings, the cases are to be treated as if the causes had been
united originally.’ ” (McClure v. Donovan (1949) 33 Cal.2d 717, 722.)
13
“In other words, the actions are viewed as if the same plaintiff or
plaintiffs had filed a single complaint on joined causes of action against the
same defendant or defendants.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2023),
Pleading, § 360; see, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1168,
1175 & fn. 43 [rejecting argument that jury waivers were ineffective in some
of the consolidated cases in part because the cases had been consolidated for
all purposes]; Committee for Responsible Planning v. City of Indian Wells
(1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 191, 198–199 [appeal dismissed because individual
judgments in consolidated action were “merely interlocutory” due to other
pending claims].)
Here, the trial court consolidated the unlawful detainer action and
Sanchez’s action for all purposes.3 As a result of the consolidation, the trial
court treated the two cases as if they were a single action.
3 Bearman argues that the unlawful detainer action was “merely
stayed” and had different parties than the Sanchez action. To the extent he
is suggesting that consolidation for all purposes was improper here, he
forfeited his right to challenge the consolidation order. He was the party who
moved to consolidate the cases, and it is clear from the record that he
acquiesced to consolidation for all purposes. “[A]n appellant waives [the]
right to attack error by expressly or implicitly agreeing or acquiescing at trial
to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal.” (In re Marriage of
Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501; see, e.g., Dunlap v. Commercial
National Bank of Los Angeles (1920) 50 Cal.App. 476, 481–482 [appellant
could not attack consolidation order on appeal where he consented to
consolidation in the trial court].)
Further, Villa Zinfandel sought holdover damages “at a daily rate”
until the date of judgment. The consolidation order had the effect of
transforming the unlawful detainer claim from an expedited proceeding into
an ordinary civil action, thereby opening Bearman up to greater than
anticipated holdover damages. Had Villa Zinfandel not been misled by the
order consolidating the cases for all purposes, it might have moved to
reclassify its unlawful detainer action as unlimited. Thus, we will presume
consolidation for all purposes was proper in this case.
14
3. Analysis
Prior to rendering judgment, the trial court concluded that the
consolidated action could not be classified as both limited and unlimited
under section 88 since it constituted a single action. The court further
concluded that the consolidated action was an unlimited civil case. We agree
with the trial court’s interpretation of section 88 and conclude that under the
circumstances in this case, the court did not err in awarding Villa Zinfandel
damages above the $35,000 cap applicable to cases designated as limited civil
actions.
As a preliminary matter, neither party cites, and we have been unable
to find, any case that addresses the classification of a consolidated action.
Nor does there appear to be any published cases interpreting section 88 or
the other classification statutes in the context of a complete consolidation.
The cases relied upon by the trial court are distinguishable because they do
not involve the classification of a consolidated action. (See generally Lynch &
Freytag v. Cooper (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 603; AP-Colton LLC v. Ohaeri (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 500.)4 We therefore consider the instant question to be one
of first impression.
4 The trial court cited AP-Colton LLC for its conclusion that even if the
jurisdictional cap on damages applied in the consolidated action, Bearman
was estopped from asserting the cap since he moved to consolidate the cases
and stay the unlawful detainer claim. AP-Colton LLC applied principles of
judicial estoppel, which requires a showing that a party has taken
inconsistent positions in a judicial proceeding. (AP-Colton LLC v. Ohaeri,
supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 507.) Bearman never claimed that the
consolidated action was unlimited or that the jurisdictional cap on damages
no longer applied. To the contrary, he argued in the trial court and on appeal
that consolidation did not convert the unlawful detainer action into an
unlimited action. Without a determination that the action became an
15
In reviewing a trial court’s interpretation of a statute, we apply a de
novo standard of review. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) In
interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative
intent. (Ibid.) We look first to the language of the statute and give effect to
its plain meaning. (Ibid.) Although we look first to the text of the statute, we
also may consider extrinsic aids (ibid.), including the “ ‘maxims of
construction’ ” and “ ‘the reasonableness of a proposed construction’ ”
(MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082, 1083).
Turning first to the statutory text, section 88 provides that “[a] civil
action or proceeding other than a limited civil case may be referred to as an
unlimited case.” (Italics added.) Under the plain language of the statute, a
civil action that has been classified as limited cannot also be classified as
unlimited. As a practical matter, this must be true because many of the
consequences of a “limited” classification are inconsistent with the
consequences of an “unlimited” classification. (See Ytuarte v. Superior Court,
supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274–275.) In particular, the $35,000 cap on
damages either applies or does not apply depending on an action’s
classification. (See ibid.) In short, the statutory language and the
consequences of classification support the trial court’s conclusion that the
consolidated action must be classified as either limited or unlimited; it cannot
be both. (See Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
1108, 1116 [“ ‘ “statutes must receive practical, common sense
construction” ’ ”].)
unlimited action upon consolidation, we cannot conclude that Bearman took
inconsistent positions in the trial court.
16
Bearman argues that the trial court erred in relying on section 88
because the statute does not “state[] that when a limited action is
consolidated with an unlimited action the $25,000 limitation on the limited
action lifted.” Implicit in his argument is that the unlawful detainer action
retained its limited classification after it was consolidated with the Sanchez
action for all purposes. To reach this conclusion under section 88, we would
need to determine that the unlawful detainer case constituted a separate
“civil action or proceeding” for purposes of case classification (§ 88), even after
consolidation.
“The phrase ‘civil action’ is plain and not reasonably susceptible to
more than one interpretation.” (Sampson v. Parking Service 2000 Com, Inc.
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 212, 223.) “In context, the term ‘civil action’
unambiguously refers to a court action.” (Ibid.; see §§ 22, 30 [defining “civil
action”].) “An ‘action’ thus includes all proceedings, at least to the time of
judgment, which are required to perfect the rights [of the parties].” (Palmer
v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 387.) It is not limited to a single cause of
action or claim. (Ibid.; see Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD.,
LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69, 80 [“the complaint in a civil action ‘serves to
frame and limit the issues’ ”], review granted May 14, 2025, S290182.)
For purposes of case classification, then, “civil action or proceeding”
refers to the entire controversy between the parties, including all claims and
cross-claims. (See AP-Colton LLC v. Ohaeri, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 507
[court did not err in awarding landlord damages in excess of jurisdictional
cap, even though landlord originally filed action as a limited action, where
tenants filed a counterclaim for damages in excess of the jurisdictional cap];
Scott v. Allen (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 621, 622 [two causes of action asserted in
complaint “were consolidated for all purposes, including the purpose of
17
determining jurisdiction”].) The language utilized in the classification and
reclassification statutes support this conclusion. (See, e.g., §§ 85, subd. (c)
[stating that one of the conditions for treating a case as a limited civil case is
where “[t]he relief sought, whether in the complaint, a cross-complaint, or
otherwise” is of a certain type]; 403.030 [permitting reclassification of an
action where a party in a limited case “files a cross-complaint that causes the
action or proceeding to exceed the maximum amount in controversy for a
limited civil case”].)
Applying that definition here, we conclude that upon consolidation with
the Sanchez action, the unlawful detainer action was no longer a separate or
distinct “civil action or proceeding” under the classification statutes. As
previously discussed, complete consolidation means the cases that were
consolidated are to be treated as if their causes of action were joined
originally. Thus, Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer complaint gave rise to
one cause of action in the consolidated action, the other being Sanchez’s claim
to set aside the trustee’s deed upon sale. Moreover, since only one judgment
is rendered in a completely consolidated action, the court needed to
determine whether the $35,000 cap on damages applied to the consolidated
action.
The question then is whether the trial court erred in awarding
damages in the consolidated action greater than the $35,000 cap applicable to
limited actions. This is an act in excess of the court’s jurisdiction “if a case is
designated as a limited civil case.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at pp. 274–275.) That did not occur with respect to the
consolidated action. The unlawful detainer action was classified as limited
based on the complaint’s caption stating that the action was a limited civil
case. (See § 422.30, subd. (a); Stratton v. Beck, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p.
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493.) Upon consolidation for all purposes, however, the limited action and
the unlimited action were to be treated as if they were a single civil action
“ ‘for the purposes of all further proceedings.’ ” (McClure v. Donovan, supra,
33 Cal.2d at p. 722.) “Further proceedings” are the proceedings that occur
after consolidation. Villa Zinfandel’s “limited” caption was made only with
respect to its unlawful detainer claim, before consolidation. No pleadings
were filed after consolidation, and it does not appear from the record that
documents filed in the consolidated action included a “limited” caption. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.111(10) [captions in every paper filed in a limited
case must include the words “ ‘Limited Civil Case’ ”], 3.350(d).) Moreover, the
court awarded Villa Zinfandel more than the $35,000 limit only after it
determined that consolidation removed the jurisdictional cap on damages.
Citing some of the reclassification statutes, Bearman argues that
reclassification of the limited unlawful detainer case required a stipulation or
a motion from the parties. To the extent he is suggesting the parties had to
follow the procedures set forth in the reclassification statutes to classify the
consolidated action as unlimited, we disagree.
Under the reclassification statutes, a case will be reclassified if a party
“files” an “amended initial pleading that changes the jurisdictional
classification” of a case (§ 403.020, subd. (a)), if a party “files” a cross-
complaint in a limited case that “causes the action or proceeding to . . . fail to
satisfy the requirements for a limited civil case” (§ 403.030), or if a party or
the court moves for reclassification of a case that “has been classified in an
incorrect jurisdictional classification” (§ 403.040, subd. (a).) Thus, the
reclassification statutes concern situations where the classification of a case
changes upon the filing of a pleading or where a case was misclassified.
Moreover, a party-filed reclassification motion must be filed “within the time
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allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading” or to respond to the
initial pleading. (Ibid.) The parties may also stipulate to reclassification of
the case “within the time allowed to respond to the initial pleading.” (§
403.050, subd. (a).)
By their plain language, the reclassification statutes cannot reasonably
be construed as governing the classification of a consolidated action. (See
MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc., supra, 134
Cal.App.4th at p. 1082 [courts may look to the “ ‘the reasonableness of a
proposed construction’ ” of a statute].) Any change in the jurisdictional
classification of consolidated cases occurs upon complete consolidation, not
upon the filing of pleadings, and not because the actions were misclassified.
Moreover, consolidation may occur after the deadlines for filing, amending, or
responding to a pleading in the consolidated cases have passed. (See Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group
2025) ¶ 12:357 [“There is no deadline for ordering consolidation; indeed, cases
may even be consolidated on the eve of trial.”].) Thus, in many consolidated
cases, the parties will be unable to correctly classify the consolidated action if
the reclassification statutes provide the exclusive procedures for doing so.
The Legislature could not have intended for such an unreasonable result.
(See In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 410 [“courts are obligated to ‘adopt a
common sense construction’ ” and avoid one that would result in
“unreasonable consequences”].)
Bearman does not otherwise point to, and we have not found, any rules
or statutes establishing procedures that courts and/or the parties must follow
to classify a consolidated action.5 Even assuming some affirmative action
5 For the first time in his reply brief, Bearman cites Civil Code section
1952.3, subdivision (a), as support for his assertion that a plaintiff must
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must be taken to classify a consolidated action as unlimited where one of the
cases consolidated was originally classified as limited, “[t]rial courts have
inherent and statutory authority to devise and utilize procedures appropriate
to the specific litigation before them. [Citations.] This authority ‘ “arises
from necessity where, in the absence of any previously established procedural
rule, rights would be lost or the court would be unable to function.” ’ ” (Weiss
v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 863; see People
v. Arrendondo, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 707 [courts may “ ‘ “create new forms of
procedures” in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of
court’ ”].) For example, the court in James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77
Cal.App.3d 169 held that the juvenile court had the inherent power to hold a
competency hearing even though there was no statutory procedure for
determining a juvenile’s competency. (Id. at pp. 175, 177; see also In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 454 [trial court had the inherent authority to hold a
Franklin hearing to preserve evidence where Pen. Code, § 1203.01 did not
prohibit such a hearing].)
Here, on the day of trial, the trial court and the parties discussed “hold
over damages” and “further briefing . . . regarding the issues of jurisdictional
limit.” The court asked for, and received, briefing from the parties on the
issue of whether consolidation had the effect of removing the “limited”
jurisdictional cap on Villa Zinfandel’s claim for holdover damages. Thus, the
court essentially informed the parties prior to judgment that it was
considering whether the consolidated action should be classified as unlimited.
make a motion to classify a limited action as unlimited. That statute does
not concern the classification of a consolidated action and instead addresses
the situation where possession of the property is no longer at issue in an
unlawful detainer action. (Ibid.)
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The procedure the trial court used—raising the issue of classification on its
own and allowing the parties to brief the issue—mirrors the procedure set
forth in section 403.040, subdivision (a), which allows a trial court to
reclassify an action on its own motion “at any time,” so long as the court gives
the parties notice and an opportunity to contest reclassification. (See Stern v.
Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 230.) “It is not only proper but at
times may be necessary for a court to follow provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure which are harmonious with the objects and purposes of the
proceeding although those provisions are not specifically made applicable by
the statute which creates the proceeding.” (Tide Water Associated. Oil Co. v.
Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825.) While there are no statutory
procedures for the classification of a consolidated action, there is also nothing
in the classification or reclassification statutes prohibiting the trial court
from designating a consolidated action as unlimited where the action does not
satisfy the conditions for a limited action under section 85.
In sum, under section 88 and the plain meaning of the term “civil
action,” an action consolidated for all purposes cannot be classified as both
limited and unlimited. In this case, pursuant to its inherent authority, the
trial court properly determined that the consolidated action was unlimited
after providing the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. The court
therefore did not err in awarding Villa Zinfandel damages in excess of
$35,000.
II. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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____________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
HUMES, P. J.
____________________________
BANKE, J.
Villa Zinfandel, LLC v. Christopher Bearman / A171987
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Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Cynthia Pillsbury Smith
Counsel:
John S. Sargetis for Defendant and Appellant.
McCarthy & Holthus, Melissa R. Coutts; and ZBS Law, Bradford E. Klein for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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