Michael D. Brown

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2025-126

MICHAEL D. BROWN,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

__________

Docket No. 14660-22L. Filed December 4, 2025.

__________

Steven Ray Mather and James M. Mather, for petitioner.

Kevin W. Coy, Michelle A. Monroy, and Jeremy R. Eggerth, for

respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MORRISON, Judge: On June 7, 2022, the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) Independent Office of Appeals (Appeals) issued a Notice of

Determination sustaining proposed levies to collect from petitioner

income tax for 2009, 2011, and 2014 and amounts of “Addition to

Tax/Penalty” for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. 1

On June 30, 2022, petitioner filed a timely Petition for review of the

Notice of Determination. We have jurisdiction to review the Notice of

Determination under section 6330(d)(1).

This case is before us on petitioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed June 27, 2025. The sole remaining issue is whether

petitioner’s offer-in-compromise of April 19, 2018, was deemed accepted

1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Served 12/04/25

2

[*2] by operation of section 7122(f). Section 7122(f) provides that an

offer-in-compromise “shall be deemed to be accepted” if it “is not rejected

by the Secretary [of the Treasury] before the date which is 24 months

after the date of the submission of such offer.” In another case involving

petitioner, we issued an opinion holding that the same offer-in-

compromise was not deemed accepted by operation of section 7122(f).

Brown v. Commissioner, 158 T.C. 187, 194 (2022), aff’d, 116 F.4th 861

(9th Cir. 2024). That opinion is binding precedent. See Analog Devices,

Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 429, 443 (2016). We will

therefore deny petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and instead

award summary judgment to respondent. We withhold the decision in

this case to allow for further proceedings to determine which state

petitioner resided in when he filed the Petition.

Background

The following facts and other matters are undisputed.

On November 9, 2017, the IRS issued a Letter 3172, Notice of

Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing, to petitioner

informing him that a federal tax lien had been filed to secure his tax

liabilities for tax years 2009 and 2010. Brown, 158 T.C. at 189.

Pursuant to section 6320(a)(3)(B) and (b)(1), petitioner requested a

collection-due-process (CDP) hearing with Appeals. Brown, 158 T.C.

at 189.

On April 19, 2018, petitioner submitted an offer-in-compromise to

the IRS. Id. By this offer-in-compromise, petitioner offered to pay

$320,000 in satisfaction of his liabilities for 2009, 2010, and other tax

years. Id. 2

On November 5, 2018, the Laguna Niguel branch of the IRS

issued a letter to petitioner stating that it was returning his offer-in-

compromise because of pending investigations regarding his tax

liabilities. Id. at 190–91.

On August 26, 2019, the IRS issued a notice to petitioner stating

that it proposed a levy to collect the following liabilities: income tax

liabilities for the 2009, 2011, and 2014 tax years and additions to tax

and penalties for the 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010

2 The summary-judgment papers show that the other tax years were 2001–07

and 2014.

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[*3] tax years. Pursuant to section 6330(a)(1) and (b)(1), petitioner

requested a CDP hearing with Appeals.

On August 12, 2020, Appeals issued petitioner a Notice of

Determination regarding the lien-filing CDP hearing, sustaining the

filing of the lien. Brown, 158 T.C. at 191–92.

On August 31, 2020, as permitted by section 6330(a)(3)(B),

petitioner timely petitioned the Court regarding the August 12, 2020,

Notice of Determination regarding the lien-filing CDP hearing. Brown,

158 T.C. at 192. The case was assigned Docket No. 11519-20L.

On June 7, 2022, Appeals issued a Notice of Determination

regarding the proposed-levy CDP hearing, sustaining the proposed

levies.

On June 23, 2022, the Tax Court issued an opinion in Docket No.

11519-20L (the case about the lien-filing CDP hearing) denying

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment filed in that case. Brown, 158

T.C. 187. The Tax Court held that the April 19, 2018, offer-in-

compromise was rejected by the Secretary of the Treasury on

November 5, 2018, when it was returned to petitioner by the Laguna

Niguel branch of the IRS, and that therefore it was not deemed accepted

by the IRS by operation of section 7122(f). Brown, 158 T.C. at 192–99.

After further proceedings, the Tax Court in Docket No. 11519-20L

entered a decision for the Commissioner.

On June 30, 2022, petitioner filed a Petition for review of the

June 7, 2022, Notice of Determination regarding the proposed-levy CDP

hearing. The case (which is the instant case) was assigned Docket No.

14660-22L. Among the issues raised by the Petition was whether

petitioner’s April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise was deemed accepted by

the IRS by operation of section 7122(f). This was the exact same offer-

in-compromise that the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187, had

held was not deemed accepted by the IRS by operation of section 7122(f).

Again, this was the opinion in the lien-filing CDP case, Docket No.

11519-20L.

On August 29, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit issued a plurality opinion in the lien-filing CDP case, Docket

No. 11519-20L. Brown v. Commissioner, 116 F.4th 861. The plurality

opinion was written by Judge Wardlaw. Id. Agreeing with the

reasoning of the Tax Court opinion, Judge Wardlaw opined that the

return of the April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise by the IRS Laguna

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[*4] Niguel branch was a rejection under section 7122(f). Brown v.

Commissioner, 116 F.4th at 871. In a concurring opinion, Judge Lee

wrote that the 24-month limitation in section 7122(f) does not apply to

the offer-in-compromise because it was submitted as part of a CDP

hearing. Brown v. Commissioner, 116 F.4th at 875 (Lee, J., concurring).

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bumatay wrote that the officer handling

the CDP hearing would have had to return petitioner’s offer-in-

compromise in 24 months for the section 7122(f) period to close. Brown

v. Commissioner, 116 F.4th at 888 (Bumatay, J., dissenting). The Ninth

Circuit entered a decision affirming the Tax Court decision, and the Tax

Court’s decision is now final.

On April 23, 2025, the parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues

stating that the only issue remaining in this case is whether “petitioner’s

offer in compromise was accepted by operation of I.R.C. § 7122(f)” and

that the same issue was presented in the case at Docket No. 11519-20L.

The Stipulation of Settled Issues also stated that the parties dispute

whether petitioner lived in Texas when he filed his Petition.

On June 27, 2025, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment contending that the April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise had

been deemed accepted by the IRS as a matter of law because it had not

been rejected within 24 months. Anticipating that respondent would

argue that petitioner’s contention was barred by collateral estoppel,

petitioner argued that respondent’s collateral-estoppel argument should

be rejected in part because petitioner resided in Texas when he filed the

Petition in the instant case.

On July 28, 2025, respondent filed an Objection to the Motion for

Summary Judgment. Respondent contended that the IRS returned the

April 19, 2018, offer-in-compromise on November 5, 2018, a date which

was within the 24 months allowed under section 7122(f), and that

therefore the offer-in-compromise was not deemed accepted by section

7122(f). Respondent argued that this proposition is compelled under

stare decisis by the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187.

Respondent made three arguments in the alternative to this stare

decisis argument. First, respondent contended that the Tax Court

opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187, collaterally estops petitioner from

arguing that the offer-in-compromise was deemed accepted by operation

of section 7122(f). Relatedly, respondent disputed that petitioner

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[*5] resided in Texas when he filed the Petition. 3 Second, respondent

contended that section 7122(a) prohibited the IRS from accepting the

offer-in-compromise even apart from the effect of the Tax Court opinion

in Brown, 158 T.C. 187. Third, respondent contended that Appeals did

not err in its handling of the offer-in-compromise because the offer-in-

compromise had been made in the CDP hearing regarding the lien filing,

not in the CDP hearing regarding the proposed levy, and because the

offer-in-compromise had been “closed” on November 5, 2018. Finally,

respondent contended that summary judgment in favor of respondent is

proper under Rule 121(g)(1).

On August 11, 2025, petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s

Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner contended that

respondent is not entitled to summary judgment under Rule 121(g)(1).

Petitioner also contended that various facts asserted in respondent’s

Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment (which are related to

respondent’s alternative arguments) are unsupported. However,

petitioner acknowledged that the “issues in our case are the same as in”

the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187.

On September 10, 2025, respondent filed a Sur-Reply to

Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Objection to Motion for Summary

Judgment.

Discussion

Rule 121(a)(1) provides that a party may move for summary

judgment on all or any part of the legal issues in controversy.

Rule 121(a)(2) provides that the Court will grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 121(c)(1) provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot

be genuinely disputed (or is genuinely disputed) must support the

assertion by (a) citing particular materials in the record, including

affidavits, declarations, and stipulations, or (b) showing that the

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine

dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to

support the fact. Rule 121(c)(2) provides that a party may object that

3 Later, in a September 10, 2025, Sur-Reply to Petitioner’s Reply to

Respondent’s Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, respondent observed that

the Notice of Determination in the instant case was sent to an address in Nevada,

which is in the Ninth Circuit.

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[*6] material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a

form that would be admissible in evidence. Rule 121(c)(3) provides that

the Court need consider only the cited materials but that it may consider

other materials in the record. Rule 121(c)(4) provides that an affidavit

or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on

personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the

matters stated.

Rule 121(d) provides that when a motion for summary judgment

is made and supported as set forth in Rule 121, the nonmovant must

respond by setting forth specific facts and supporting those facts as

required by Rule 121(c) to show that there is a genuine dispute of fact

for trial. Rule 121(f) provides that if a party fails to properly support an

assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of

fact, the Court may (1) give an opportunity to properly support or assert

the fact, (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion,

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials

(including the facts considered undisputed) show the movant is entitled

to it, or (4) issue any other appropriate order.

Rule 121(g) provides that “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable

time to respond, the Court may . . . (1) grant summary judgment for a

nonmovant.”

The sole remaining issue is whether “petitioner’s offer in

compromise was accepted by operation of I.R.C. § 7122(f).” We agree

with respondent that the Tax Court opinion in Brown, 158 T.C. 187, has

resolved the identical issue. See Analog Devices, 147 T.C. at 443

(affording precedential weight to the Court’s prior reviewed and division

opinions). Petitioner has provided no compelling reason to depart from

that precedent. We therefore hold that the April 19, 2018, offer-in-

compromise was not accepted by operation of section 7122(f). Our

holding does not depend on any disputed facts. It is therefore

appropriate to deny petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Furthermore, the issue of whether the April 19, 2018, offer-in-

compromise was accepted by operation of section 7122(f) is the only

remaining challenge petitioner still raises to the Notice of

Determination of June 7, 2022. Having rejected this challenge on

undisputed facts, it is appropriate for us to award summary judgment

to respondent on the question of whether the Notice of Determination of

June 7, 2022, should be sustained. See Rule 121(g)(1).

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[*7] We need not reach respondent’s three alternative arguments

against petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, including the

argument that collateral estoppel bars petitioner from raising the

section 7122(f) issue. According to petitioner, proper analysis of

respondent’s collateral-estoppel argument would require us to

determine the default venue for any appeal in this case, which would

mean resolving petitioner’s assertion that he resided in Texas when he

filed his Petition. See § 7482(b)(1)(G)(i) (providing that a decision of the

Tax Court in a CDP case may be reviewed by the circuit in which is

located the legal residence of the taxpayer if the taxpayer is an

individual); id. subsec. (b)(2) (providing that, notwithstanding the rules

of subsection (b)(1), decisions of the Tax Court may be reviewed by any

circuit designated by the Secretary of the Treasury and the taxpayer in

writing). As stated above, we need not address respondent’s collateral-

estoppel argument. However, determining petitioner’s state of

residence would assist the parties and the U.S. court of appeals in

resolving any appeal of our decision. We will therefore withhold our

decision to allow for further proceedings to determine petitioner’s state

of residence when he filed his Petition. 4

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order will be issued.

4 Our decision will sustain the Notice of Determination of June 7, 2022.