United States v. Benjamin Smith

USCA11 Case: 24-11377 Document: 26-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 of 12

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11377

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BENJAMIN SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00305-SEG-CMS-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Following resentencing, Benjamin Smith appeals his

conviction and sentence, arguing that (1) the district court erred on

remand when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment after

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determining that it was outside the scope of this Court’s mandate,

and (2) the district court erred by not orally pronouncing each of

the 13 standard conditions of supervised release or explaining why

the standard conditions were justified in Smith’s case. After

review, we affirm.

I. Background

In 2019, following a trial, a jury found Smith guilty of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He was sentenced under the Armed Career

Criminal Act to 235 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three

years’ supervised release. United States v. Smith, Nos. 20-12609, 20-

12773, 2023 WL 1860518, at *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2023)

(unpublished). We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, but

we concluded that he did not meet the criteria for the armed career

criminal sentencing enhancement. Id. at *8–13. Accordingly, we

vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at *13.

On remand, Smith filed a motion to dismiss the indictment

asserting for the first time that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional

under the Second Amendment analysis established in New York

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Smith

asserted that Bruen overruled or otherwise abrogated our prior

precedent upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). He

further maintained that his challenge was not limited by the scope

of this Court’s mandate on remand because Bruen was “controlling

authority that ha[d] since made a contrary decision of law

applicable to the issue presented.”

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The district court denied Smith’s motion, concluding that it

was beyond the scope of our mandate. The district court

determined that the mandate rule exception that Smith relied on

did not apply because Bruen, the controlling authority in question,

was decided several months prior to our decision in Smith’s initial

direct appeal. The district court reasoned that Smith could have

brought his Bruen challenge based on intervening Supreme Court

precedent in that appeal, but he failed to do so. Accordingly, no

exception to the mandate rule applied. Moreover, the district court

explained that Bruen did “not justify disregarding the mandate

because it [was] not controlling authority that require[d] a contrary

result” as our prior precedent upholding the constitutionality of

§ 922(g)(1) remained valid post-Bruen.

At the resentencing hearing, after listening to the parties’

arguments concerning the appropriate sentence, the district court

imposed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment to be followed

by three years’ supervised release. The district court discussed the

relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it considered and explained the

reasons for the sentence imposed. The district court further

explained that Smith would be required to “comply with the

mandatory conditions of release” as well as “the standard

conditions of supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district

court] and [were] incorporated by reference.” The district court

then reviewed the additional special conditions that Smith would

have to comply with upon release. Smith objected to the

substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the sentencing

guidelines calculation, but he did not raise any challenge to the

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standard conditions of supervised release. The district court then

included the 13 standard conditions in Smith’s written judgment.

This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Smith argues that (1) the district court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment, and (2) the district court erred

by not orally pronouncing each of the 13 standard conditions of

supervised release or explaining why the standard conditions were

justified in Smith’s case. We address each claim in turn.

A. The motion to dismiss the indictment

Smith argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it fell outside

the scope of our mandate. He maintains that he could bring a Bruen

challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on remand because

the nature of the challenge is jurisdictional, and jurisdictional issues

can be raised at any time while a case is pending. With regard to

the merits of his constitutional challenge, he acknowledges that we

have since held that Bruen did not overrule or abrogate our prior

precedent upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the

Second Amendment, see United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 892–

93 (11th Cir. 2025), but he seeks to preserve the merits of the issue

for further review.

We review the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment

based on subject matter jurisdiction grounds de novo. United States

v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied 145 S. Ct.

2706 (2025). “We review de novo the district court’s application of

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the law of the case doctrine.” Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300,

1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).

We affirmed Smith’s conviction on direct appeal, vacated his

sentence, and remanded with directions that the district court

conduct a resentencing. Smith, 2023 WL 1860518, at *13. The

mandate rule is a case-specific application of the law of the case

doctrine. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2007).

The doctrine “operates to create efficiency, finality, and obedience

within the judicial system.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quotations

omitted). When a district court acts under a mandate from an

appellate court, it “cannot vary it, or examine it for any other

purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or

review it, even for apparent error, upon a matter decided on

appeal.” United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir.

1996). Indeed, ruling on matters beyond the scope of a limited

mandate is an abuse of discretion. Id.

The exceptions to the mandate rule require new evidence at

a subsequent trial, an intervening change in controlling law, or a

clearly erroneous decision that would cause manifest injustice. See

United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997).

Smith contends that Bruen qualifies as an intervening change in

controlling law. We disagree. First, Bruen is not an intervening

change in the law because the Supreme Court handed down its

Bruen decision while Smith’s initial direct appeal was pending.

Nothing precluded Smith from bringing a Bruen challenge in the

months between the issuance of Bruen and our decision. See United

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States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

Rather, we have held

that where there is an intervening decision of the

Supreme Court on an issue that overrules either a

decision of that Court or a published decision of this

Court that was on the books when the appellant’s

opening brief was filed, and that provides the

appellant with a new claim or theory, the appellant

will be allowed to raise that new claim or theory in a

supplemental or substitute brief provided that he files

a motion to do so in a timely fashion after (or, as in

this case, before)[ 1] the new decision is issued.

Id. Thus, Bruen is not an intervening change in the law following

our mandate affirming Smith’s conviction and remanding for

resentencing.

Second, even assuming arguendo that Bruen still qualified as

an intervening change in the law even though it issued prior to our

mandate in Smith’s case, “[n]ot just any change in law qualifies as

an exception to the law of the case doctrine.” United States v. Stein,

964 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020). Instead, we “demand an

intervening change in the controlling law that dictates a different

result.” Id. (quotations omitted). Bruen does not dictate a different

result. Prior to Bruen, we had held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional

under the Second Amendment and that “statutes disqualifying

1 In Durham, after the Supreme Court ordered reargument and supplemental

briefing in a case that could have affected Durham’s appeal, Durham promptly

filed a motion to stay before the Supreme Court issued the new decision.

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felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances

do not offend the Second Amendment.” United States v. Rozier, 598

F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010). And in Dubois, we held that Bruen

did not abrogate our decision in Rozier. Dubois, 139 F.4th at 892–

93. Accordingly, Bruen does not dictate a different result in Smith’s

case, and the district court did not err in denying the motion to

dismiss the indictment.

B. The pronouncement of Smith’s sentence

Smith argues that the district court erred by failing to orally

pronounce each of the 13 standard conditions of supervised release

or explain why the standard conditions were justified.

“We [generally] review the terms of . . . supervised release

for abuse of discretion . . . .” United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302,

1304 (11th Cir. 2006). “When a defendant fails to object at

sentencing to the conditions of supervised release, we ordinarily

review for plain error.” United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 838

(11th Cir. 2024). Under plain-error review, “[a]n appellate court

may not correct an error the defendant failed to raise in the district

court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects

substantial rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1241

(11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). “If all three conditions are

met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(quotations omitted).

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Smith argues that he had no opportunity to object to the

conditions of supervised release because the district court did not

orally review each condition and urges us to review his claim de

novo. We disagree. The district court stated at sentencing that

Smith would be required to “comply with the mandatory

conditions of release” as well as “the standard conditions of

supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district court] and

[were] incorporated by reference.” At that point, Smith had an

opportunity to object, request clarification, or otherwise request

that the district court orally pronounce the standard conditions.

Smith, however, did not object or express any desire for

clarification of the standard conditions. Under these

circumstances, “we review his challenge for plain error.” Hayden,

119 F.4th at 838.

Section 3583 of Title 18 of the United States Code imposes

several mandatory conditions of supervised release and provides

that the court may order further conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for 13 standard conditions that

are generally recommended. 2 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), (d). The

2 The standard conditions in the sentencing guidelines include that the

defendant report to the probation office within 72 hours of his release from

prison; “report to the probation officer as instructed” and answer the officer’s

questions truthfully; not leave his district of residence without permission

from the probation officer or the court; reside at a location approved by the

probation officer and notify the probation officer in advance of any change in

residence; allow the probation officer to visit and inspect his residence; work

full time; refrain from associating with other convicted felons or anyone

engaged in criminal activity; notify the probation officer if the defendant is

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Northern District of Georgia has adopted these same mandatory

and standard conditions, and they are listed in the judgment and

commitment order template on the court’s public website. See

United States District Court, N.D. Ga., Judgment in a Criminal Case,

Form AO 245B,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245b.pdf.

Additionally, the Northern District of Georgia’s Probation Office

also lists these conditions on its website. See United States

Probation and Pretrial Services, N.D. Ga., Conditions of Supervision,

https://www.ganp.uscourts.gov/conditions-supervision.

“[A] district court must pronounce at the defendant’s

sentencing hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised

release—that is, any condition of supervised release other than

those mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”

Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246. The failure of the district court to do

so violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process.

Id. at 1247–48. However, this requirement does not require the

district court to orally pronounce each and every individual

discretionary condition. Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838. Rather, the

“district court may easily satisfy this requirement by referencing a

written list of supervised release conditions.” Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at

arrested or questioned by police; refrain from possessing or having access to

guns and ammunition and other dangerous weapons; not agree to act, or

otherwise act, as a confidential source to law enforcement without permission

of the court; as determined by the probation officer, notify certain persons or

organizations that the defendant poses a risk to them; and follow the probation

officer’s instructions related to supervision conditions. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c).

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1246; see also Hayden, 119 F.4th at 838 (“A reference to a written list

of conditions is enough to afford a defendant the opportunity to

challenge the conditions of supervised release, which is all that due

process requires.”).

We conclude that no error, much less plain error, occurred.

Contrary to Smith’s argument, the district court was not required

to orally pronounce each individual standard discretionary

condition. Id. Rather, the district court complied with the oral

pronouncement requirement when it referenced the standard

conditions of supervision, explained that those conditions had been

adopted by the court, and that it was incorporating those

conditions by reference. See id. (“A reference to a written list of

conditions is enough to afford a defendant the opportunity to

challenge the conditions of supervised release, which is all that due

process requires.”); Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246 (“By referencing at

sentencing a written list, the court affords any defendant who is

unfamiliar with the conditions the opportunity to inquire about

and challenge them.”). The district court then included those same

conditions in Smith’s written judgment. Accordingly, there was no

due process violation.

Relatedly, Smith argues that the district court failed to

conduct an individualized assessment and was required to explain

why each of the standard conditions were justified. We disagree.

The district court is required at sentencing to “state in open

court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). “Because § 3553(c) applies to the entire

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sentence, and the term of supervised release is part of that sentence,

§ 3553(c) necessarily applies to the term of supervised release as

part of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th

1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2023). However, “[n]othing in § 3553(c)

requires a district court to make two separate explanations—one

for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of supervised

release.” Id. Rather, “a district court’s reasoning inevitably

supports both the imprisonment and supervised release portions of

the . . . sentence.” Id. at 1276. In other words,

[a] district court need not address each component

separately so long as it gives a sufficient explanation—

that is, so long as the district court sets forth enough

to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.

Id. (alterations adopted) (quotations omitted). Importantly, while

§ 3553(c) may apply to the overall term of supervised release

imposed, we have never held that the district court must articulate

how each individual condition of supervised release is related to

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.3

3 Smith relies on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rogers, 961

F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2020), and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 558–59 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc), for the proposition that

the district court must articulate justifications for each of the conditions of

supervised release and explain how those conditions relate to the relevant

sentencing factors. We note that the Diggles case was about a general

pronouncement of conditions requirement, not about setting forth

justifications for those conditions. 957 F.3d at 563 (“The defendants do not

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Here, the district court complied with the requirements of

§ 3553(c) and our precedent when it acknowledged that it

considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and explained the

reasons for its chosen sentence. The district court’s explanation

was adequate to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments

and the § 3553(a) factors and had a reasoned basis for the sentence

it chose, including the standard conditions of supervised release.

Id.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

assert that the district court failed to justify the conditions it imposed; they

argue only that the court failed to recite those conditions at sentencing.”).

Thus, Diggles does not stand for the justification principle Smith asserts.

Regardless, we are not bound by the Fourth Circuit’s or the Fifth Circuit’s

decisions and neither are the district courts in this Circuit. See Minor v. Dugger,

864 F.2d 124, 126 (11th Cir. 1989). Moreover, we have never held that the

district court must specifically articulate its reasoning or address each of the

sentencing factors to justify any part of the sentence. See United States v. Scott,

426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[N]othing . . . requires the district court

to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a)

factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.”). Rather, as we emphasize

above, the district court’s explanation is sufficient if it is clear that it considered

the relevant sentencing factors together with the parties’ arguments. Id. at

1330. The district court gave such an explanation in this case.