SMALLS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MERKEEMA YVETTE SMALLS, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-4852

:

JUDGE BETSY JO WAHL, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Pappert, J. December 2, 2025

Pro se plaintiff Merkeema Yvette Smalls commenced this action by filing a

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting violations of her constitutional rights

arising from state court child custody proceedings concerning her minor child L.S.

Smalls subsequently filed her Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No.

83) and Amended Complaint,1 (Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 10), in which she asserts

1 An amended complaint, once submitted to the Court, serves as the governing pleading in

the case because an amended complaint supersedes the prior pleading. See Shahid v.

Borough of Darby, 666 F. App’x 221, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“Shahid’s amended

complaint, however, superseded his initial complaint.” (citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs.

LLC v. Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also Garrett v.

Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020) (“In

general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original

pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative

pleading.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175

n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not

mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings”).

Smalls has also filed numerous documents on the docket. To the extent these

submissions include factual allegations or relevant exhibits, they cannot be considered at

this time, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate piecemeal

pleadings or the amalgamation of pleadings, even in the context of a pro se litigant. See

Bryant v. Raddad, No. 21-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021)

(“Allowing a plaintiff to file partial amendments or fragmented supplements to the

operative pleading, ‘presents an undue risk of piecemeal litigation that precludes orderly

resolution of cognizable claims.’” (quoting Uribe v. Taylor, No. 10-2615, 2011 WL 1670233,

claims against Judge Betsy Jo Wahl, Nefertiti C. Jordan, Esquire, and Mikal Coleman.2

For the following reasons, the Court will grant Smalls leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.3 Smalls’s federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Her state law claims will be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but without leave to amend.

I4

Smalls, who resides in North Carolina, alleges that she is the “lawful mother and

custodian” of the minor child, L.S. (AC at 2, 3.) Mikal Coleman is the child’s father,

and the Court infers that he shares custody of the child with Smalls. (Id. at 2.) The

Court further infers that Smalls seeks to amend the current custody arrangement

because she believes her child is at risk while in Coleman’s care. She alleges that “CPS,

hospital, Duke Health records, and photographic evidence confirm the child’s ongoing

endangerment through vaping, firearm exposure, and emotional abuse.” (Id. at 3.)

at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Bart Peterson’s the Mind Tr., No. 16-193,

2017 WL 65310, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2017) (“Piecemeal pleadings cause confusion and

unnecessarily complicate interpretation of a movant’s allegations and intent[] . . . .”).

2 Also pending are the following: Emergency Motion and Petition for Temporary

Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 9), Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 12), Petition for

Equitable Protective Relief (Dkt. No. 20), and Emergency Judicial Notice and Petition for

Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 69). In light of the Court’s disposition of Smalls’s

Amended Complaint, these motions and petitions will be denied as moot.

3 After filing her first Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Smalls filed two

additional Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that contain the same

information as the first. (See Dkt. Nos. 92, 95.) These Motions will be denied as moot.

4 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Smalls’s Amended

Complaint. (Dkt. No. 10). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF

docketing system. Where appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in

Smalls’s pleadings will be corrected for clarity.

Judge Wahl, who is presiding over the custody proceedings, has allegedly stated on the

record that she would “only change the custody order if [Smalls] moved back to

Pennsylvania.” (Id.) Smalls accuses Judge Wahl of participating in ex parte

communications, though she does not describe the contents of those communications

nor the participants, and attributes the Judge’s apparent disinclination to change the

current custody arrangements to bias, though she does not describe any conduct, other

than unfavorable rulings, that would indicate bias. (Id.) Smalls also alleges that

Coleman’s counsel, Defendant Jordan, has misrepresented facts, violated her duty of

candor, and obstructed service. (Id.) Smalls does not identify which facts have been

misrepresented and provides no examples of a lack of candor or incident of obstruction

of service on Jordan’s part. Smalls claims that the Defendants, acting together, have

deprived her of custody of her child and have curtailed her parental rights. (Id.)

Smalls asserts violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, claiming that the

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas lacks jurisdiction over the pending custody matter

under the UCCJEA.5 She also claims that the Defendants engaged in mail tampering

and obstruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1505;6 and asserts violations of

5 The Court understands Smalls to refer to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act, 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §5401, et seq. “The UCCJEA, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

5401, et seq., was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws in 1997 and became effective in Pennsylvania in 2004. . . . One of the main

purposes of the UCCJEA was to clarify the exclusive, continuing jurisdiction for the state

that entered the child custody decree. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422, cmt.; see also Bouzos–Reilly

v. Reilly, 980 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).” Rennie v. Rosenthol, 995 A.2d 1217,

1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).

6 Criminal statutes generally do not give rise to a basis for civil liability. See Brown v. City

of Philadelphia Office of Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(“Brown alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most do not

provide a private cause of action.”); Brown v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Pa., No. 18-747

(E.D. Pa.) (Apr. 9, 2018 Order at 6 (dismissing claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 as “meritless

and frivolous”)), aff’d, 740 F. App’x 239, 240 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Brown v.

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 763 F. App’x 146, 147 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Brown’s

mere citation to various constitutional provisions cannot transform his state law claims into

causes of action ‘arising under’ the Constitution.”). Indeed, the United States Supreme

Court has stated that, unless specifically provided for, federal criminal statutes rarely

create private rights of action. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 377

(1958) (stating that where a statute “contains only penal sanctions for violation of it

provisions; in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, these

sanctions should under familiar principles be considered exclusive, rather than

supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute”); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First

Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We have been quite reluctant to

infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone.”). The fact that a federal

statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a

private cause of action for the injured person. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.

560, 568 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979). The criminal

statutes that Smalls cites do not, in any event, give rise to a civil right of action. See

Thompson v. Michels, 574 F. App’x 196, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that [§ 1341] is a

“criminal statute that does not give rise to a private right of action.”); see also Jones v. TD

Bank, 468 F. App’x 93, 94 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1341 lacks a private right

of action); Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-777, 2013 WL 3443295, at *5 (D.N.J. July

9, 2013), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 148 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1505 does not

confer private right of action).

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132 (“ADA”);7 state law

claims for breach of fiduciary duty and trust rights; violations of § 1983;8 civil rights

conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986;9 fraud on the court; violations of

7 To allege a plausible violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must assert that (1) she is

a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) she is being excluded from participation in or

being denied the benefits of some “services, programs, or activities,” by reason of his

disability; and (3) the entity which provides the service, program or activity is a public

entity. See, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir.1998); Bowers v. National

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475 (D.N.J. 1998); Adelman v. Dunmire, No. 95-

4039, 1997 WL 164240 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997). The proper defendant in a Title II claim is

the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity. See Emerson v. Thiel College,

296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002). Smalls has not alleged that she is a qualified individual

with a disability under the ADA, or that she has been denied access to a service, program,

or activity because of a disability. She has not identified any public entity allegedly

responsible for excluding her from participation in any services, programs, or activities.

Her passing reference to the ADA does not give rise to a plausible claim. See Campbell v.

LVNV Finding, LLC and Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler

Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)) (A “‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential

precepts without more does not bring that issue before the Court in that it provides no basis

for a ruling one way or the other.”); Alexis v. Sessions, No. 18-2099, 2018 WL 5077899, at *2

n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2018). Smalls’s ADA claim will be dismissed.

8 Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but a means of vindicating violations of

federal constitutional and statutory rights committed by state actors. Groman v. Twp. of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995 (citations omitted).

9 Section 1985(3) creates a cause of action against any two persons who “conspire . . . for the

purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. . . .” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3). To state a plausible claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege the following

elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus

designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to

person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1997). Significantly, “‘[t]he [statutory]

language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection . . . means that there must be some

racial . . . invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’” United Bhd.

of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983)

(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). The AC does not include any

allegations suggesting that any of the Defendants were motivated by racial or class based

discriminatory animus and this claim, therefore, is not plausible. Section 1986 is derivative

of § 1985, and, therefore, fails as well. Dennison v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., 268 F. Supp. 2d 387,

402 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).

her “religious freedom and trust interference” under 26 U.S.C § 508;10 and claims based

on judicial bias and engagement in ex parte communications. (Id. at 4.) For relief, she

requests, inter alia, that the Court declare all orders of the Court of Common Pleas void

ab initio,11 enjoin12 the Defendants from enforcing the void orders, issue a writ of

mandamus compelling recognition of federal jurisdiction, issue a stay of custody

transfers, recognize various IRS filings, refer episodes of misconduct to the Department

of Justice, the Judicial Conduct Board, the IRS and other disciplinary bodies, and

award money damages. (Id. at 4-5.) She also seeks a writ of mandamus.13

10 Although Smalls includes a passing reference to “RFRA”, which the Court understands to

mean the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, her citation to 26 U.S.C. § 508 references a

provision of the Internal Revenue Code enacted to prevent abuses of tax-exempt status by

private foundations. Hammond v. U.S., 764 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1985). There appears to be

no application of that provision to the custody dispute and Smalls does not explain how §

508 provides a basis for any claim she may be asserting. RFRA prohibits the federal

government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” unless

“application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and

“is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI,

839 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2016). Smalls also fails to allege any facts about how her

religious exercise was burdened by the federal government.

11 Declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Smalls’s request for this

relief is improper. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not

“meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v. Admin.

Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory

judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the

anticipation of some future conduct.”). See also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL

1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to

define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat

of continuing harm.”).

12 In light of the Court’s disposition of Smalls’s federal claims, and lack of subject matter

jurisdiction over her state law claims, her request for injunctive relief will be denied.

13 Section 1361 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that “[t]he district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or

employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the

plaintiff.” For a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction to compel the action of an

II

The Court will grant Smalls leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it

appears that she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.

Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if

it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d

236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint

contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).

At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se

individual pursuant to § 1361, the individual must be “an officer or employee of the United

States or any agency thereof.” See Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2014).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded, “in determining

whether an individual qualifies as an officer or employee of the United States or any agency

thereof, . . . that Congress, in enacting § 1361 was thinking solely in terms of the executive

branch.” Mendez v. Plaskett, 764 F. App’x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Consequently, courts have held that § 1361 does not confer subject

matter jurisdiction on federal district courts to compel the actions of judges and judicial

employees. See Semper, 747 F.3d at 250-51 (citing Trackwell v. United States Government,

472 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[f]or a district court to issue a writ of

mandamus against an equal or higher court would be remarkable” and holding that the

Supreme Court is not an “‘agency’ within the meaning of § 1361”); Viola v. United States,

No. 17-0856, 2017 WL 4318029, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2017) (holding that district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against federal district court

judge). Smalls has not sought to compel the action of an officer or employee of the United

States or any of its agencies, and therefore this request must be denied for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Section 1651 of Title 28 also confers jurisdiction on a district court to issue a writ of

mandamus “in aid of” its own jurisdiction. Section 1651 is not applicable here since

Smalls’s requested relief is not in aid of our jurisdiction.

complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only

whether the complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible

claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other

grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024).

Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Smalls is proceeding

pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d

Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to

name it.” Id.; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL

379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the

allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant

mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not

require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts

alleged could potentially support.”). However, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Vogt, 8 F. 4th at 185 (quoting

Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules—

they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.

III

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal

court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, create substantive

rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the

Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996);

Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (“Section 1983 is

not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate

violations of federal law committed by state actors.”) (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536

U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47

F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of state law element is a threshold issue; there

is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.”).

A

Smalls asserts claims against Coleman, identified as the father of her minor

child, and Jordan, identified as Coleman’s attorney. (AC at 2.) However, the factual

allegations in her Amended Complaint do not plausibly assert that Coleman and

Jordan are state actors amenable to suit under § 1983. Whether a defendant is acting

under color of state law — i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor — depends on

whether there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that

seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v.

Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To answer that

question, [the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme

Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private

entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state;

(2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state

officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant

in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations and alteration omitted).

Smalls does not allege that Coleman or Jordan exercised powers that are

traditionally the exclusive power of the state, that they acted with the help of or in

concert with state officials, or that the state has so far insinuated itself into a position

of interdependence with Coleman and Jordan that their actions must be recognized as

joint participation in the alleged effort to deprive Smalls of custody of her child and

other parental rights. Rather, the brief and conclusory allegations describing their

conduct relate solely to their involvement in custody proceedings in their capacity as a

parent/litigant and his counsel. In these circumstances, Coleman and Jordan are

private individuals and not a state actors subject to liability under § 1983. See Mikhail

v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 667-68 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 68 (3d Cir.

2014) (dismissing § 1983 claims against wife and her attorneys “because they were not

state actors”); Francisco v. Hertzog, No. 25-1778, 2025 WL 3034699, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct.

30, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s dismissal of father’s 1983 claims

against mother arising from custody proceedings because mother was not state actor);

Humphrey v. Pennsylvania Ct. of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, 462 F. Supp. 3d 532,

536 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claims against mother who gained custody of

child in lawsuit brought by father). Merely resorting to the courts and being on the

winning side of a lawsuit does not make one a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). Accordingly, all § 1983 claims against

Colemand and Jordan will be dismissed with prejudice.

B

Smalls asserts claims against Judge Wahl based on her conduct in the course of

child custody proceedings. These claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity.

Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts

or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete

absence of jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v.

Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302,

303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is

“a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760,

768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter

jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Figueroa v.

Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d

1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without fear of

incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force

even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt,

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) or are taken as a result of a conspiracy with

others. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27.

Although judicial immunity previously applied only to damages claims, “[i]n

1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that ‘injunctive relief shall not be

granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303-04 (quoting § 1983);

Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing

that the 1996 amendment “implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is available in

some circumstances, and then limits the availability of injunctive relief to

circumstances in which declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate”). In the context

of judicial defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

explained that “a judge who acts as a neutral and impartial arbiter of a statute is not a

proper defendant to a Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute.”

Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 440 (3d Cir. 2017). “However, a judge who acts as an

enforcer or administrator of a statute can be sued under Section 1983 for declaratory or

(if declaratory relief is unavailable) injunctive relief.” Id. Here, Smalls does not allege

that Judge Wahl violated a declaratory decree or that declarator relief was unavailable.

Accordingly, any claim for injunctive relief against Judge Wahl is not plausible.

Smalls’s claims against Judge Wahl arise from her involvement in state court

child custody proceedings. She claims that Wahl engaged in ex parte communications,

refused to recuse despite bias, and stated on the record during the custody proceedings

that she would not change the custody order unless Smalls moved from her current

home in North Carolina to Pennsylvania. (AC at 3.) Although Smalls alleges in

conclusory fashion that the Defendants, presumably including Wahl, entered orders

without jurisdiction, (AC at 3), Judge Wahl presided over the described custody

proceedings and had jurisdiction to do so as a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas.

Smalls has not alleged any facts that would support a plausible inference that Judge

Wahl acted in the absence of all jurisdiction. See Lee v. Gallina Mecca, No. 22-2871,

2023 WL 5814783, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (“But even accepting Lee’s allegations as

true, judicial acts that appear to be unfair, malicious, or ex parte are not stripped of

their judicial immunity); Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (finding judges who presided

over protection from abuse, custody, and divorce proceedings were entitled to immunity

because plaintiff did not show an absence of jurisdiction and immunity applied despite

allegations of bad faith and conspiracy); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (“[J]udicial

immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”); Stump, 435 U.S. at

356 (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,

was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”); Dennis, 449 U.S. at 29

(holding that immunity applies even if a judge conspired with litigants). Accordingly,

Smalls’s claims against Judge Wahl must be dismissed with prejudice.

C

Smalls asserts state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty, and claims arising

from alleged fraud on the court and judicial bias. She also claims that the state court

lacks jurisdiction over the underlying custody proceedings under the UCCJEA.

Because the Court has dismissed her federal claims, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over Smalls’s state law claims.

Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” Smalls has not plausibly alleged

the existence of diversity jurisdiction because she has not alleged that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

“As a general rule, [the amount in controversy] is determined from the good faith

allegations appearing on the face of the complaint.” Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. Brown,

131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (“If removal of a civil action

is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332(a), the sum

demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in

controversy”). “The sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently

made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less

than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.” Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d

125, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). Punitive damages “must [also] be

considered in determining the amount in controversy.” Coulter v. Paul Laurence

Dunbar Cmty. Ctr., 685 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). As the

plaintiff, Smalls bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Ben.

Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of establishing

federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”) (further citations

omitted).

Although Smalls requests primarily declaratory and injunctive relief, she also

requests an award of both compensatory and punitive damages. (AC at 5.) She does

not, however, specify the amount of compensatory damages she seeks, and does not

allege that her damages are in excess of the jurisdictional limit. (See AC.) On the face

of her Amended Complaint, the primary focus of Smalls’s civil action is obtaining

amendment of the existing custody order entered by the state court. There are no facts

alleged suggesting that she has suffered any injury giving rise to compensatory

damages in any amount. Even the most liberal interpretation of her pleading cannot

plausibly lead to the conclusion that Smalls is entitled to recover $75,000 in damages,

even if that included punitive damages. As such, she has failed to satisfy her burden to

establish the Court’s jurisdiction, and her state law claims must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunn, No. 11-0102, 2011

WL 184012, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2011) (dismissing complaint that did not allege

amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs for failure to

properly plead existence of diversity jurisdiction).

Smalls will not be granted leave to amend these claims. Instead, she may

pursue these claims in an appropriate state court.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Smalls leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. Smalls’s federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Her state law claims will be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but without leave to amend.

A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.