Zayed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Marwan Zayed,

Plaintiff,

No. 25 CV 9386

v.

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

Village of Lisle,

Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Marwan Zayed owns the Galewood Pub in Lisle, Illinois. He identifies as a

brown Arab American of Middle Eastern descent. Zayed alleges the Village of Lisle

discriminated against him based on race and national origin in denying his

application for a business development grant. The Village moves to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Zayed’s claims are either time-barred or otherwise not

cognizable. [Dkt. 7.]1 The court grants the motion in part as to Counts I, III, IV, and

V and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II, so the case is

remanded to state court.

I. Background2

In February 2021, Zayed executed a lease for commercial space on College

Road in Lisle to open the Galewood Pub. [Dkt. 1 at 7, ¶ 8–10.] When Zayed began

discussing renovation plans and permitting requirements with the Village, no one

informed him of his eligibility for the Village’s Business Development Grant Program,

a program through which the Village offered financial grants to new businesses in

the Village. [Id. at 8, ¶ 12.] Nor, Zayed alleges, did the Village provide him with

guidelines for the process once he became aware of the program and sought an

application. [Id. at 8, ¶ 11–15.] By contrast, he says, the Village proactively offered

this guidance to other business owners. [Id.]

1 Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by

CM/ECF, which may not be consistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.

2 The following factual allegations are taken from Zayed’s complaint [Dkt. 1 at 6–26]

and accepted as true for the purposes of the motion. Smith v. First Hosp. Lab’ys, Inc., 77 F.4th

603, 607 (7th Cir. 2023). In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the court does not

vouch for their accuracy. See Goldberg v. United States, 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).

On July 11, 2021, Zayed applied to the grant program. [Id. at 8, ¶ 14.] Nearly

18 months passed with no word on the application’s status, including any deficiency

in the application, or whether it had been approved or denied. [Id. at 9, ¶ 17.]

At some unspecified point, Zayed submitted a Freedom of Information Act

request to the Village about his application. [Id. at 9, ¶¶ 17–20.] Using the records

produced in response to that, Zayed learned the name of the employee assigned to

evaluate his application and called her. [Id. at 9, ¶ 18.] During their conversation, the

employee told Zayed that she had recommended his application be approved, but she

did not know why the Village had not approved it, though she “believe[d] the Village

just does not like” Zayed. [Id. at 9, ¶ 19.]

Between June 2021 and May 2022, Zayed alleges that the Village’s plumbing

inspector and Building Official inconsistently applied stricter code requirements to

him than to other restaurant owners in the area who were not a member of Zayed’s

protected class. [Id. at 9–10 ¶ 32.] For example, Zayed alleges that Village

representatives informed him that he needed to install a “rigid pipe to act as a sleeve

for the flex line for the soda dispenser,” when this had not been required for other

restaurants, and that he was only permitted to install his preferred style of garage

door at the Galewood once he pointed out that another restaurant in Lisle owned by

someone not within a protected class had been allowed to install a similar door. [Id.]

The “tenor and tone” of these interactions put Zayed “on notice that he, and his

restaurant business, were not welcome in Lisle.” [Dkt. 1 at 6–7, ¶¶ 32–33.]

On December 8, 2022, Zayed received a letter from the Village Manager

explaining that his application “was not eligible for further review.” [Id. at 9, ¶ 20.]

In October 2023, Zayed filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois

Department of Human Rights, alleging that the Village’s denying his application

denied him the full and equal enjoyment of its services on account of his race,

ancestry, and color. [Dkt. 1 at 12, ¶ 34; see Dkt. 10-1 at 9, ¶ 17.]3 In the charge, Zayed

included evidence of comparable and similarly situated business owners to whom the

Village had awarded grant money, but who were not Arab American, of Middle

Eastern descent, or brown skinned. [Dkt. 1 at 12, ¶ 25, 29, 35; see Dkt. 10-1 at 9,

¶ 17.] This included NextStep Property Group, LLC, who applied to the Business

Development Grant Program about five months before Zayed and received approval

3 Zayed attaches to his response brief the dismissal notice on his charge of

discrimination. [Dkt. 10-1.] Generally, a court “may only consider the plaintiff’s complaint

when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501,

505 (7th Cir. 2013). But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) permits a court to consider

certain documents attached to briefs on a motion to dismiss. Id. Such documents “are

considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are

central to his claim.” McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

Because Zayed refers to this administrative charge in his complaint, [Dkt. 1 at 12–14, ¶¶ 34–

43], and because it is central to his tolling and accrual arguments, the court considers it.

within two months for a $85,000 grant. [Dkt. 1 at 9, ¶ 24–27.] Similarly, Little Pops

Pizzeria applied to the program seven months after Zayed and received approval

within one month for a $50,000 grant. [Id. at 9, ¶ 28–31.] Eventually, the Illinois

Human Rights Commission issued its notice of dismissal. [Dkt. 10-1.]

Zayed initiated his lawsuit on June 13, 2025 in the Circuit Court of DuPage

County. [Dkt. 1 at 6.] His complaint alleges violations of the Illinois Civil Rights Act,

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 23/5 (Count I); the due process and equal protection clauses of

Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution (Count II); violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 and § 1983 (Counts III and IV); and finally, a claim under Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Count V). [Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 45–104.]

The Village timely removed the case based on federal question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It now moves to dismiss all five counts under Rule 12(b)(6).

[Dkt. 7.]

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a

plaintiff’s claims. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint’s

factual allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.’” Emerson v. Dart, 109 F.4th 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This occurs when “the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Garrard v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 575 F. Supp. 3d 995,

999 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (quoting Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366

(7th Cir. 2018)). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in

Flores’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Thomas v.

Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir. 2023); Reardon v. Danley, 74

F.4th 825, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2023). However, conclusory allegations are insufficient to

avoid dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Limitations defenses are not often resolved at the motion to dismiss stage

because “a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as

the statute of limitations.” Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559

F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009). Dismissal under such circumstances is appropriate only

where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy

the affirmative defense.” United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005);

see also Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, 875 F.3d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2017) (“dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate if the complaint

contains everything necessary to establish that the claim is untimely.”)

III. Analysis

A. Count III: Section 1981

State actors may not be sued directly under § 1981. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.

Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations

of section 1981 committed by state actors. Id.; Campbell v. Forest Preserve Dist. of

Cook County, 752 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2014). The Village argues that this requires

dismissal of Count III with prejudice, see dkt. 7 at 6, and Zayed, for his part, concedes

that § 1983 is the proper vehicle for the violations he alleges. [Dkt. 10 at 13.]

Amendment would be futile because Zayed already pled a § 1983 claim.4 So, the court

dismisses Count III with prejudice. See Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty.,

Ill., 2013 WL 4560231, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013), aff’d, 752 F.3d 665 (dismissing

§ 1981 claim without permission “to replead under § 1983 because [the plaintiff had]

already done that once in his original complaint and such a claim would be barred by

the statute of limitations”).

B. Counts I, IV, and V: Statute of Limitations

An Illinois Civil Rights Act claim as asserted in Count I “must be brought not

later than 2 years after the violation.” 749 Ill. Comp. Stat. 23/5(b). Neither Title VI

nor § 1983 contain an express statute of limitations, so federal courts have adopted

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Fillmore v. Page,

358 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2004) (as to § 1983); Monroe v. Columbia College Chi., 990

F.3d 1098, 1099 (7th Cir. 2021) (Title VI). In Illinois, the statute of limitations is two

years “after the cause of action accrued.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13–202 (2005); Flynn

v. Donnelly, 793 Fed. Appx. 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2019); Lewis v. City of Chi., 914 F.3d

472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019). A claim accrues “when a plaintiff knows the fact and the

cause of an injury.” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 493

(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007)).

The Village argues that Zayed’s Illinois Civil Rights Act claim, § 1983 claim

and Title VI claim are all time-barred because they began accruing on December 8,

2022, when Zayed received the letter denying his grant application. That denial came

roughly two and a half years before he filed his complaint. Zayed does not seriously

dispute that the two-year limitations period has lapsed for these claims. Instead, he

argues that his claims are subject to various tolling, accrual, and estoppel doctrines.

They are not.

4 “Courts have the authority to dismiss duplicative claims if they allege the same facts

and the same injury.” Barrow v. Blouin, 38 F. Supp. 3d 916, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see Hoagland

ex rel. Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 744

(7th Cir. 2004).

1. Tolling

Zayed first argues that statutory tolling should apply because he needed to

exhaust his administrative remedies—that is, wait for a resolution in his charge of

discrimination before the Illinois Department of Human Rights.5 A statute of

limitations can be tolled when a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative

remedies prior to filing a claim in federal court. Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421

U.S. 454, 465–66 (1975). But when a plaintiff elects to exhaust administrative

remedies but is not required to do so, the statute of limitations does not toll. Id. at

461; see also Pramuk v. Purdue Calumet Univ., 2012 WL 6552920, at *4 (N.D. Ind.

Dec. 14, 2012). That is the case here.

The § 1983 claim does not require administrative exhaustion. See Patsy v. Bd.

of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982); see also Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888,

896 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (as to § 1981). The same is true of his Illinois Civil Rights Act

claim. See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 23/5(b) (“Any party aggrieved by [conduct the statute

prohibits] may bring a civil lawsuit, in a federal district court or State circuit court,

against the offending unit of government”); Weiler v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 86 F. Supp.

3d 874, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2015). And it is true of the Title VI claim. Hewitt v. U.S. Off. of

Pers. Mgmt., 390 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[N]othing in the language of

Title VI [] requires exhaustion.”); Dertz v. City of Chi., 1997 WL 85169, at *10 (N.D.

Ill. Feb. 24, 1997) (“In contrast to Title VII and the ADEA, Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); see also Pramuk,

2012 WL 6552920, at *4.

Next, Zayed argues that equitable tolling should apply because he “diligently

pursued his rights in good faith before the appropriate agencies,” but this misstates

the relevant standard. [Dkt. 7 at 10.] When a statute of limitations is borrowed from

state law, that state’s doctrine of equitable tolling governs. Shropshear v. Corp.

Counsel of City of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Illinois equitable

tolling to a § 1983 claim which “borrowed” the state statute of limitations). Equitable

tolling in this case, then, requires more than diligence and good faith. Rather, (1) the

defendant must have actively misled the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff to have been

prevented from asserting his rights in some extraordinary way; or (3) the plaintiff to

have timely but mistakenly asserted his rights in the wrong forum. Clay v. Kuhl, 727

N.E.2d 217, 224 (Ill. 2000). Because Zayed addresses none of these considerations,

equitable tolling does not apply.

5 Zayed’s complaint and response brief reference cross-filing the charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission and a work-sharing agreement between that agency

and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. [See Dkt. 1 at 13–14, ¶¶ 43–44.] But Zayed

does not allege employment discrimination, so it is difficult to see the relevance of this

argument. In any event, “there is no requirement that plaintiffs submit Title VI claims to the

EEOC before filing a private suit.” Sawyer v. Columbia Coll., 2010 WL 3081260, at *6 (N.D.

Ill. Aug. 5, 2010).

Nor does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allow Zayed’s complaint to

relate back to the charge of discrimination filed on October 3, 2023, as he argues.

[Dkt. 10 at 10.] “Rule 15(c), by its terms, only applies to amended pleadings in the

same action as the original, timely pleading.” Bailey v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 910

F.2d 406, 413 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Grove v. United States, 2022 WL 2457674, at

*4 (S.D. Ill. July 6, 2022) (“[T]he fact that a similar lawsuit was filed in another case

or another jurisdiction—even if it were about the same conduct, transaction, or

occurrence—simply does not provide an anchor to which another federal pleading can

relate back.”); Lucchesi v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 172, 174–75

(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates the relation

back of pleadings only in the context of a single proceeding.”) Here, “original pleading”

refers to the complaint in this case filed in state court on June 13, 2025 before it was

removed to federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (defining

when a civil action commences); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(e) (defining how pleadings must be

filed and served). Filing a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights

therefore did not stop the statute of limitations from running on Zayed’s claims.

2. Accrual

Under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations commences only when a

plaintiff learns that he has been injured and by whom. United States v. Norwood, 602

F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). Here,

that is the date the application was denied in December 2022. Kelly v. City of Chi., 4

F.3d 509, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he date of the alleged constitutional violation—

the revocation of the license—was the date of accrual. The date the consequences of

that violation became painful … was not the date of accrual.”); Amin Ijbara Equity

Corp v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 2015 WL 13547527, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2015), aff’d

sub nom, 860 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that plaintiff’s allegations—of

discriminatory actions that took place before foreclosure proceedings were initiated—

contradicted his arguments that accrual only occurred when a judgment of

foreclosure was entered).

Zayed contends that he could not reasonably have known that the denial was

discriminatory when his application was denied in 2022 “because the Village

concealed comparative data.” [Dkt. 10 at 10.] On his account, accrual could only occur

after he received responses to FOIA requests and after the Illinois Human Rights

Commission denied his charge on March 13, 2025. [Id. at 10–11.] He argues that these

processes are what “revealed that similarly situated non-Arab applicants were

treated more favorably.” [Id.] The court cannot agree.

Begin with the latest accrual date Zayed proposes—March 13, 2025. The

adjudication of his charge of discrimination cannot be the event that revealed to

Zayed that he had been discriminated against by the Village. That argument is

circular: how else could he have filed the charge in the first place?

As to the next accrual date he suggests—when he initiated proceedings before

the IHRC on October 3, 2023—by then, he already alleged “that on December 8, 2022,

[the Village] denied him the full and equal enjoyment of its services due to his race,

Arab (Count A); due to his ancestry, Middle Eastern (Count B); and due to his color,

brown (Count C).” [Dkt. 1 at 12 ¶ 34 (emphasis added); see Dkt. 10-1 at 6–7.]

Regardless of when he received the Village’s FOIA responses, Zayed’s charge included

allegations of “substantial undisputed evidence that [the Village] awarded grant

money to various other entities, none of whom have principals who are in a protected

class but are otherwise similarly situated” to Zayed. [Dkt. 1 at 12 ¶ 34 (cleaned up).]

Indeed, his complaint alleges that conduct by Village representatives between May

and July 2021 “put [him] on notice that he, and his restaurant business, were not

welcome in Lisle.” [Dkt. 1 at 12, ¶ 32.]

As Zayed describes, the “complete and utter lack of communication, concern,

and assistance” for him during that early stage of preparing to open his restaurant

was “indicative of a municipality with a culture that promotes and supports

Caucasian-owned businesses while strongly discouraging and hindering those owned

by people of color.” [Dkt. 1 at 6–7, ¶¶ 32–33.] Perhaps this is true. But because Zayed

alleges that he had reason to suspect the Village was discriminating against him even

before it formally denied his application, the discovery rule cannot save his claims.

Lastly, Zayed argues that because the Village has continued to discriminate

against him—by not reconsidering his application and by applying discriminatory

and more favorable standards to later applicants—the continuing violation doctrine

prevents his claims from accruing. [Dkt. 10 at 11.] This argument falls flat. The

continuing violation doctrine may provide an exception to the statute of limitations

when it “would be unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to perceive offensive conduct

or when the earlier violation may be recognizable as actionable only in light of later

events.” Pitts v. City of Kankakee, Ill., 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001). But it

“applies to injuries that are, by their nature, difficult to separate into discrete

violations.” O’Malley v. Kass Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 3d 935, 939 (N.D. Ill.

2021). That is not the case here, where the Village issued a denial letter on a date

certain.6 “The mere fact” that a defendant “allegedly made a regular habit of [a

violation] is ‘not enough to convert multiple individual violations into one long

continuing wrong.’” Id. (quoting CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redisi, 309 F.3d 988, 992 (7th

Cir. 2002)). Accrual is not delayed simply because the full extent of the injury is not

yet known or predictable. Amin Ijbara, 860 F.3d at 493. So, the continuing violation

doctrine does not apply.

6 While Zayed’s brief suggests that the Village’s discriminatory conduct remains

ongoing because technically, he has never received “confirmation that his Grant Application

was rejected or granted, just that it was not even considered,” [see Dkt. 10 at 11], his

complaint belies this argument. The complaint consistently characterizes the December 2022

letter as a denial of his application. [E.g., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 78, 89, 98.]

3. Estoppel

Finally, equitable estoppel is inapplicable. “In contrast to equitable tolling,

federal courts do not borrow [the] state equitable estoppel doctrine when they borrow

a state statute of limitations; federal courts apply the federal doctrine of equitable

estoppel.” Smith v. City of Chi. Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 1992). Under

federal equitable estoppel principles, the traditional elements are: “(1)

misrepresentation by the party against whom estoppel is asserted; (2) reasonable

reliance on that misrepresentation by the party asserting estoppel; and (3) detriment

to the party asserting estoppel.” Garlovsky v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1084,

1090 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (quoting LaBonte v. United States, 233 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir.

2000)).

In a single undeveloped paragraph, Zayed represents that the Village “misled”

him about “deadlines, concealed facts or acted in a way that delayed [his] discovery

of discrimination,” but he provides no details on how it did so. [Dkt. 10 at 11.] This

argument is too bare to succeed—particularly given how, as discussed above, Zayed’s

allegations reveal that as early as May and July 2021, he believed the Village to be

discriminating against him. In any event, undeveloped arguments are waived. Kyles

v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 236 F.R.D. 400, 402 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

Although dismissal at this early stage of litigation is typically inappropriate

unless “the allegations in the complaint show that the statute of limitations is an

impenetrable bar to recovery,” that is the case here. Fulcham v. Admire, 2025 WL

1511099, at *2 (7th Cir. May 28, 2025) (citing Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42 F.4th

814, 822 (7th Cir. 2022)). Counts I, IV and V and dismissed on timeliness grounds.

C. Count II: Illinois Constitutional Claim

Because all of Zayed’s federal claims are dismissed, only a state law claim

remains under Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. Lacking federal

question jurisdiction, the court would need to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to

keep the action in federal court. District courts “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim … if [it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

here.

Generally, there is a presumption that jurisdiction is relinquished upon

dismissal of all claims over which a court had federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Products North America, Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479–80 (7th

Cir. 2012); Mogan v. City of Chi., 115 F.4th 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2024) (“The district

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claim, given its dismissal of the federal claims.”). In

limited circumstances, the presumption does not apply. Williams Elecs. Games, Inc.

v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2007). Those circumstances include “(1) the

state law claims may not be re-filed because a statute of limitations has expired, (2)

substantial judicial resources have been expended on the state claims, or (8) it is

clearly apparent how the state claims are to be decided.” Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d

981, 990 (7th Cir. 2008).

No such circumstances are present here. The statute of limitations to refile in

state court is not implicated, and substantial judicial resources have not been

expended on the remaining claim. This case is still in its early phases, and resolution

of the state law claim, including whether he is entitled to declaratory or injunctive

relief as he maintains, is a matter best resolved by the state court.”

IV. Conclusion

The motion to dismiss is granted in part. Counts I, III, IV, and V are dismissed

with prejudice as untimely. The court relinquishes jurisdiction over Count II under

§ 1367(c), and remands the case to state court.

Enter: 25 CV 9386

Date: December 3, 2025

Lindsay C. Jenkins

7 In light of this disposition, the court also declines to resolve the Village’s motion to

strike Zayed’s request for punitive damages.