Trump

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JONATHAN C. RICHARDSON, a/k/a

AUTUMN E. CORDELLIONE,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-863-JTM-AZ

MR. THOMPSON, MS. GOSE, and JANE

DOE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jonathan C. Richardson, a/k/a Autumn E. Cordellione,1 a prisoner without a

lawyer, filed a complaint in the Southern District of Indiana on April 1, 2025 (DE # 1),

that was transferred to this court on October 15, 2025. (DE # 15.) “A document filed pro

se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless,

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

1 Jonathan C. Richardson identifies as transgender and goes by the name Autumn E. Cordellione,

so the court will refer to the plaintiff as Cordellione throughout this order.

Cordellione is currently incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility

(NCCF). Although Cordellione had previously been housed in protective custody at

NCCF, on January 28, 2025, Cordellione was transferred to the Westville Correctional

Facility (WCF) and remained there for about a week.2 The complaint describes WCF as

a “Level 1-R facility (WCA)” having “no security cameras, with no doors on the cells,

understaffed, and populated with mostly gang affiliated prisoners who traffic with

correctional staff in the form of drugs, sex, and money.” (DE # 1 at 2.) Cordellione

claims WCF is “known for its high level of offender on offender assaults and is rife with

drugs.” Id. The complaint alleges the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) Director

of Classification sent Cordellione to WCF with knowledge that:

[P]laintiff who is transgender has been assaulted for being transgender,

has been assaulted (stabbed) for refusing sex with another offender, has a

high profile criminal and civil case that have recently been broadcast

across multiple national and local news media outlets in which they

reported on her criminal history and transgender status, name, as well as

her civil cases’ preliminary injunction for gender affirming surgery.

Id. at 2–3. Immediately upon arrival at WCF, Cordellione was allegedly “assaulted and

raped multiple times over a four day period by 12 gang affiliated offenders; from

January 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st, 2025.” Id. at 3. The rapists told Cordellione they were

doing it because they saw the story on FOX News and stated, “Trump’s president now

2 A certified trust fund account statement attached to the complaint indicates Cordellione

returned to NCCF on February 4, 2025, within days of the transfer. (DE # 1 at 13.) This is consistent with

the trust fund ledgers attached to the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which show the bulk of

Cordellione’s financial transactions occurred at NCCF except for two in late January of 2025 that occurred

at WCF. (See DE #2 at 4–8.)

and we won’t ever get in trouble for fucking you trannies up; we’re patriots and even if

you tell on us, [T]rump will pardon us and probably give us a medal.” Id.

On January 29, 2025, Cordellione reported the assaults to Unit Team Manager

(UTM) Thompson who allegedly responded that he had seen the story on the news, did

not think taxpayers should have to fund gender reassignment surgery, and essentially

blamed the assaults on Cordellione for “dress[ing] like a woman and hav[ing] tits in a

male facility.” Id. at 4. That same day, Cordellione reported the incidents to Officer Jane

Doe who claimed she could not help and would tell the assailants Cordellione was a

”snitch” if the issue were pursued. Id. On January 30th or 31st, Cordellione reported the

assaults to Case Manager Gose, who also refused to help and allegedly responded,

“Your [sic] that trans that won a lawsuit, and now us hard working taxpayers have to

foot the bill, well there are only two sexes, male and female, and God made you a man.

Trump’s putting a stop to all that fag shit.” Id.

Cordellione has sued President Donald J. Trump, the IDOC Director of

Classification, UTM Thompson, Case Manager Gose, and Officer Jane Doe in their

individual capacities for allegedly violating the Constitution and committing the state

law tort of gross negligence. Cordellione seeks compensatory and punitive damages as

well as injunctive relief.

Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Id. at 833. That said, not every such violent altercation violates the

Constitution. Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2023). “Rather, only deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s wellbeing is actionable: a prison official is liable for failing to

protect an inmate from another prisoner only if the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and

citations omitted). Accordingly, when an inmate is attacked by another inmate, the

Eighth Amendment is violated only if “deliberate indifference by prison officials

effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630,

640 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[A] complaint that identifies a specific,

credible, and imminent risk of serious harm and identifies the prospective assailant

typically will support an inference that the official to whom the complaint was

communicated had actual knowledge of the risk.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 481

(7th Cir. 2015). General requests for help, expressions of fear, and even prior attacks are

insufficient to alert guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633,

639–40 (7th Cir. 2008). “[P]risons are dangerous places,” as “[i]nmates get there by

violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008).

In the context of failure to protect cases, the Seventh Circuit has equated

“substantial risk” to risks so great that they are almost certain to materialize if nothing

is done. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th

835, 843 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown and noting that a “bare ‘increased risk’ does not

necessarily correlate to a ‘substantial risk’”). “[A] prisoner normally proves actual

knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about

a specific threat to his safety.” Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). “Exercising

poor judgment . . . falls short of meeting the standard of consciously disregarding a

known risk to his safety.” Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1997).

Cordellione alleges the rapes and assaults—which occurred over the course of

four days and were committed by the same group of twelve gang-affiliated inmates—

were contemporaneously reported to UTM Thompson, Officer Jane Doe, and Case

Manager Gose. Cordellione alleges that they refused to assist in preventing the ongoing

attacks; instead, they allegedly referenced the news stories regarding Cordellione’s

previous lawsuits and expressed their own personal and/or religious beliefs about

transgenderism as reasons for ignoring the requests for help. While further factual

development may show the defendants acted reasonably once they were aware of

Cordellione’s safety concerns, the court must give Cordellione the benefit of the

inferences allowed at this stage. Accordingly, the failure to protect claims against UTM

Thompson, Officer Jane Doe,3 and Case Manager Gose will be allowed to proceed. See,

e.g., Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2020), as amended (July 2, 2020)

3 Cordellione describes Officer Jane Doe as “an officer working on her dorm” on January 29, 2025.

The Warden of WCF will be added as a defendant for the sole purpose of identifying this unknown

defendant.

(allegations that guard took no action after learning of an ongoing threat to plaintiff

prior to him being punched in the head by another inmate “would allow a reasonable

juror to infer, from circumstantial evidence, both that [guard] was ‘aware of facts’

indicating the danger of serious harm to [plaintiff] was not yet over and that [guard]

drew such an inference”).

The same cannot be said of the IDOC Director of Classification. Cordellione

alleges the Director “knowingly sent plaintiff who is transgender” to WCF despite

being aware of the nationwide news stories detailing Cordellione’s criminal and

litigation history and prior assaults. (DE # 1 at 2.) Cordellione does not say where, by

whom, or when those assaults occurred, so the allegations of prior assaults do not allow

a reasonable inference of an individualized risk at WCF. And, although Cordellione

seems to suggest WCF itself is inherently risky,4 that isn’t sufficient to subject the

Director to individual liability. The assertions that WCF is known for a “high level” of

assaults and is “rife with drugs” (DE # 1 at 2) are unsupported by factual details and,

more importantly, do not imply Cordellione was at particular risk. See Thomas, 39 F.4th

at 842 (“[S]imply being housed in the Jail’s general population, even while suffering

from [a “mental condition” that made the inmate “vulnerable”], is not a particular

enough risk in the failure-to-protect context. The unfortunate reality is that jails and

4 WCF is considered a mixed “Minimum and Medium Security” facility. See

https://www.in.gov/idoc/facilities/adult (last visited Dec. 2, 2025). Based on the description in the

complaint (e.g., “no doors on the cells” and the label of “Level 1-R facility (WCA)” (DE # 1 at 2), it may be

inferred that Cordellione was placed in a minimum-security unit along with other similarly classified

minimum-security level offenders. See https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/WCC-Facts-and-Figures-

Brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2025) (“R dorm (WCA) holds 381 minimum security inmates.”).

prisons are dangerous places inhabited by violent people.”) (citing Grieveson, 538 F.3d at

777)). Nothing in the complaint plausibly suggests the Director was aware of any

threats to transgender inmates in general at WCF or a specific risk of substantial harm

to Cordellione based on the media coverage. Thus, the claim against the Director will be

dismissed. See id. at 843 (“[A] valid failure-to-protect claim was not alleged when a

mentally ill detainee was assaulted by another inmate over the detainee’s hygiene

problem because jail personnel—though aware of the hygiene problem—‘had no notice

that he was at risk of assault because of that problem.’”) (quoting Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.

Med. Serv., 675 F.3d 650, 668 (7th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, (2015)).

Cordellione also blames President Trump for the assaults and rapes because

President Trump has “spoken about his extremist rhetoric and transphobic hate

speech.” (DE # 1 at 4.) The complaint claims the speech “emboldened the Defendants,

and the assailants that brutally assaulted and raped plaintiff, not once, but multiple

times to act on their hate and prejudices, constituting the cause in action and his liability

in this case.” Id. Cordellione believes the words were a “motivating factor” and that

President Trump knows “others may act on his words and the plaintiff suffered

violence because of this.” Id.

Even if Cordellione could surpass the limitations set out by Bivens v. Six

Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), First Amendment speech

protections, and presidential immunity issues, a fundamental problem still exists with

regard to this claim—individual liability requires personal involvement. “A defendant

cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation if she did not cause or participate in

the alleged violation.” Moderson v. City of Neenah, 137 F.4th 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2025)

(citation omitted). President Trump is not personally responsible for the operations of

IDOC or the safety of the inmates within its facilities. Speaking generally about

transgenderism on the national stage is not enough to subject President Trump to

individual liability in this situation. These allegations fail to state a claim, so they will be

dismissed.

Finally, Cordellione asserts, without elaboration, that “[a]ll Defendants violated

the plaintiff’s 14th Amendment [rights], discriminating against the plaintiff due to her

transgender status.” (DE # 1 at 4.) This conclusory statement is insufficient to state a

claim. Moreover, the essence of the complaint is that the defendants failed to protect

Cordellione from harm. Why they did so may be relevant later in the litigation, but it

would be redundant as a separate constitutional claim. See, e.g., Conyers v. Abitz, 416

F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] says that the complaint includes other ‘Equal

Protection and Eighth Amendment claims’ related to his Fast of Ramadan claim, but the

free-exercise claim arises under the First Amendment and gains nothing by attracting

additional constitutional labels.”) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, (1989)

(constitutional claims must be addressed under the most applicable provision)).

State Law Negligence

Cordellione claims the defendants “violated Indiana Tort Law, with their gross

negligence and wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s safety.” (DE # 1 at 4.) “A plaintiff

seeking damages for negligence must establish (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the

defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach

of duty.” Wheeler v. State, 180 N.E.3d 305, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Pfenning v.

Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind. 2011)). “Negligence and gross negligence possess the

same elements (duty, breach, and injury), but the two torts have different definitions of

what constitutes a ‘breach.’” Sims v. Humane Soc. of St. Joseph Cnty. Indiana Inc., 758 F.

Supp. 2d 737, 751 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (citing N. Ind. Public Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462,

465–66 (Ind. 2003)).

In the case of ordinary negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a

defendant ‘merely failed to exercise its duty of care,’ while in the case of

gross negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant breached

its duty of care by ‘engag[ing] in a conscious, voluntary act or omission in

reckless disregard of the consequences’ to the plaintiff.

Id. (quoting Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 465).

Cordellione’s claims of gross negligence against the state defendants trigger the

application of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). IND. CODE § 34-13-3 et seq. The ITCA

shields government employees from liability for conduct within the scope of their

employment. See IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(b); see also Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d

636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, there is no remedy against

the individual employee so long as he was acting within the scope of his

employment.”). In order to bring a state law tort claim against a governmental

employee personally, a plaintiff “must allege that an act or omission of the employee

that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee’s

employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the

employee personally.” IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(c). There must be a “reasonable factual

basis supporting the allegations.” Id.; see also Ball, 760 F.3d at 644–45 (noting that federal

pleading standards apply). “The purpose of the ITCA is to ‘ensure that public

employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties

without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made

within the scope of their employment.’” Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 986

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452

(Ind. 2000)). Accordingly, although the act or omission may be alleged to fall under one

of the categories delineated in IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(c), that fact “standing alone is not

dispositive of whether the employee was acting outside the scope of employment.”

Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. 2003).

“When the employee’s conduct is ‘of the same general nature as that authorized,

or incidental to the conduct authorized,’ it is deemed ‘within the scope of

employment.’” Smith, 871 N.E.2d at 986 (quoting Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at

453). This may include “acts that the employer expressly forbids; that violate the

employer’s rules, orders, or instructions; that the employee commits for self-

gratification or self-benefit; that breach a sacred professional duty; or that are egregious,

malicious, or criminal.” Cox v. Evansville Police Dept., 107 N.E.3d 453, 461 (Ind. 2018).

“Even criminal acts may be considered as being within the scope of employment if the

criminal acts originated in activities so closely associated with the employment

relationship as to fall within its scope.” Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 473 (quotation marks

omitted); see also Higgason v. State, 789 N.E.2d 22, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[W]illful or

wanton behavior does not necessarily remove one from the scope of his employment.”)

(quoting Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind. 1993)). Rather, “[t]he critical

inquiry is whether the tortious act arose naturally or predictably from the employment

context.” Cox, 107 N.E.3d at 464.

Whether an act or omission is within the scope of employment for purposes of

ITCA immunity is an affirmative defense. See Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 472 (when no

“scope of employment” allegation is made in the complaint, “a government employee

defendant has a complete defense: the action occurred within the scope of

employment”). Typically, complaints need not anticipate and attempt to plead around

defenses. United States v. N. Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004). However, the

court can dismiss a claim if the defense is apparent on the face of the complaint. See, e.g.,

Holmes v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 141 F.4th 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2025); U.S. v. Lewis, 411

F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (when “complaint itself set[s] forth everything necessary to

satisfy the affirmative defense” it may be dismissed).

Here, it is apparent the correctional officers’ alleged disregard of Cordellione’s

safety concerns fell within the scope of their employment. As noted above, duty is an

element of all negligence claims, and, in this case, that duty to protect Cordellione

existed solely because of their employment. “As a general rule, an individual does not

have a duty to aid or protect another person, even if he knows that person needs

assistance.” Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Props., LLC, 793 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App.

2003). However, incarcerated individuals are owed a unique duty of care by the IDOC

and its employees:

[P]ublic policy considerations require that the DOC not be made an

absolute insurer of prisoners’ safety. Although the DOC is not a

guarantor, neither has it been relieved of all responsibility for safekeeping

its charges. Rather, the DOC’s responsibility takes the middle ground: it

has the duty to take reasonable precautions to preserve the life, health,

and safety of prisoners. Because of the DOC’s unusual ability to control all

aspects of its prisoners’ lives, the DOC’s duty to take reasonable

precautions may include an obligation to control the conduct of third

persons.

Williams v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 142 N.E.3d 986, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), on reh’g (Apr. 8,

2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Correctional officers are tasked

with determining what actions to take—or whether to act at all—in response to an

inmate’s allegations of attacks and/or threats by other inmates. Here, any liability is

based on a failure to act—a duty they hold solely due to their employment. Because the

correctional officers’ alleged failure to act regarding Cordellione’s safety concerns was

within the scope of their employment, they are shielded from personal liability. See, e.g.,

Ball, 760 F.3d at 645 (even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff’s allegations of willful,

wanton, and/or malicious behavior under IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(c) were sufficiently

pled, the claims were properly dismissed because the officer was not “amenable to suit

at all” as he was acting within the scope of his employment); Ellis v. City of Martinsville,

940 N.E.2d 1197, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (complaint for negligence against fire chief

alleged he “exhibited conduct that may be deemed willful and wanton and with

reckless disregard,” but because those facts showed his conduct “was at least incidental

to conduct authorized” in the scope of his employment, the ITCA barred the action

against him as an individual); Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 986 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2007) (affirming judgment on the pleadings dismissing prisoner’s negligence

claims against prison officers for injuries incurred during a cell extraction because

“[e]nforcing discipline and maintaining prison security is clearly within the prison

officers’ scope of employment”). Accordingly, the state law tort claims against the

officers will be dismissed.5

Regarding the Director of Classification, the Director is tasked with overseeing

the classification system and coordinating classification services which include the

placement, security level, and facility assignments of inmates within the IDOC. See, e.g.,

IND. CODE § 11-10-1-1; see also IDOC Policy and Administrative Procedure 01-04-101,

titled “Adult Offender Classification.” As an IDOC employee, the Director has a duty to

take reasonable precautions as to the safety of inmates when authorizing or

coordinating transfers. See Williams, 142 N.E.3d at 1008. Here, the Director is alleged to

have authorized the transfer to WCF with knowledge of Cordellione’s history and the

fact that WCF is generally known for offender violence and drugs. Cordellione claims

this transfer was done with gross negligence in wanton disregard of the consequences,

which resulted in the later attacks.

Even assuming the action could somehow fall outside the Director’s scope of

employment, Cordellione still has not stated a plausible claim. To bring a state law tort

5 Cordellione has sued the state defendants in their individual capacities only. (See DE # 1 at 1.)

The ITCA permits a litigant to sue an individual’s employer in state court. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(b). In

this case, the employer is the IDOC, which is an agency of the state. See Fritz v. Evers, 907 F.3d 531, 533

(7th Cir. 2018) (“[A] state official (in his official capacity) is the state.”). However, in federal court, states

and their agencies enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th

Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment prevents us from adjudicating the state-law claims against the

state officials in their official capacity.”); Burrus v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind., 546 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir.

2008) (“[S]tate agencies, as arms of the state, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Thus, even if any of the state defendants had been named in their official capacities, Cordellione would

not be able to proceed against them here.

claim against the Director personally, there must be a reasonable factual basis

supporting the allegation of willful and wantonness. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(c). In

Indiana, “[t]he elements of willful or wanton misconduct are: (1) the defendant must

have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct

calculated to result in probable injury; and (2) the actor’s conduct must have exhibited

an indifference to the consequences of his conduct.” Ellis, 940 N.E.2d at 1205 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). This is similar to the Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference standard set forth above for the failure to protect claims. As

previously noted, no facts suggest the minimum-security unit at WCF posed a specific

risk to Cordellione, other than the general risk of violence in prisons everywhere.

Simply put, the complaint does not plausibly allege the Director’s decision was made

with wanton disregard of the consequences that befell Cordellione, especially

considering that the officers and officials at WCF were the ones ultimately responsible

for keeping Cordellione safe there. Accordingly, the gross negligence claim against the

Director of Classification will be dismissed. See Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 465; see also

Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (claim must be

plausible on its face and complaint must provide adequate factual content).

It is unclear whether Cordellione is also attempting to sue President Trump for

gross negligence, but it is clear the complaint does not state such a claim. Cordellione

sues President Trump in his individual capacity and again alleges he used “extremist

rhetoric” and “transphobic hate speech” in the national media that “emboldened” the

defendants and inmates and ultimately caused the attacks. (DE # 1 at 4.) The complaint

does not allege President Trump made any specific reference to Cordellione. Again,

setting aside the various other legal impediments to suing the President of the United

States for damages, the complaint does not plausibly allege a cognizable duty. “Absent

a duty, there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach, and whether a

duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide.” Powell v. Stuber, 89 N.E.3d 430,

433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, the court cannot discern any sort of legal duty of care

owed to inmates of a state prison who suffer criminal attacks by other inmates arising

out of the general rhetoric of a national political figure. See Cavanaugh’s Sports B. &

Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield, 140 N.E.3d 837, 844 (Ind. 2020) (critical inquiry regarding duty

is to determine whether the attack was foreseeable, considering the broad type of

plaintiff, the broad type of harm, and whether the [defendant] had reason to expect any

imminent harm”); see also Stratmeyer v. U.S., 67 F.3d 1340, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995) (no duty

owed to ranchers from USDA veterinarian because “the plaintiff must show that the

duty of care running from the government defendant to the plaintiff is not an obligation

to the public at large, but rather an obligation to the plaintiff as a particular

individual.”). The state law tort claim against President Trump will be dismissed.

Injunctive Relief

Cordellione requests both a permanent and preliminary injunction to “[t]ransfer

to a female Institution” because “plaintiff is still suffering and likely to suffer continued

harms.” (DE # 1 at 6.) In the prison context, a court’s ability to grant injunctive relief is

significantly circumscribed. See Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012). As to a

preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

The complaint does not plausibly allege Cordellione is entitled to any injunctive

relief. This screening order allows Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims to

proceed against three individual officers at WCF related to the assaults and rapes that

occurred there over the course of four days in January of 2025. The complaint does not

describe any ongoing violation of federal law at WCF. See Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d

680, 685 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When there is no continuing violation of federal law,

injunctive relief is not part of a federal court’s remedial powers.”).

Moreover, Cordellione has since been relocated to NCCF, so any injunctive relief

claims associated with WCF are moot. See Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir.

1996). If there are ongoing safety issues, those claims must be brought in a separate

lawsuit in the district where Cordellione is currently incarcerated. As it stands,

Cordellione has no chance of success on the merits of an injunctive relief claim in this

case, so any preliminary injunctive relief related to this complaint will be denied.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Jonathan C. Richardson, a/k/a Autumn E. Cordellione, leave to

proceed against Unit Team Manager Thompson, Officer Jane Doe, and Case Manager

Gose in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for failing

to protect Cordellione from the assaults and rapes by other inmates that occurred at the

Westville Correctional Facility between January 28–31, 2025, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment;

(2) DIRECTS the Clerk to add the Warden of the Westville Correctional Facility

in his official capacity as a defendant for the sole purpose of identifying

Officer Jane Doe;

(3) DISMISSES all other claims;

(4) DISMISSES President Donald J. Trump and the Indiana Department of

Correction Director of Classification;

(5) DIRECTS the Clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to

locate and serve process on) the Warden of the Westville Correctional Facility, Unit

Team Manager Thompson, and Case Manager Gose at the Indiana Department of

Correction, with a copy of this order and the complaint (DE # 1);

(6) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,

date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive

service if it has such information;

(7) WAIVES the obligation of the Warden of the Westville Correctional Facility

to file an answer to the complaint;

(8) ORDERS the Warden of the Westville Correctional Facility to appear and

provide the name of the female officer who was working on the dorm and interacted

with Jonathan C. Richardson, a/k/a Autumn E. Cordellione, regarding safety concerns

on January 29, 2025, or file a notice explaining why the name of this individual cannot

be provided, by January 31, 2026; and

(9) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Unit Team Manager Thompson and

Case Manager Gose to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: December 2, 2025

s/James T. Moody .

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT