Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EASTERN DIVISION

ERIKA M., No. ED CV 25-01283-DFM

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Erika M. appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying her

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the agency’s denial

of benefits and dismisses this action with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income on March 21, 2023, alleging disability beginning October 31,

1 The Court partially redacts Plaintiff’s name in compliance with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the

Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial

Conference of the United States.

2021. See Dkt. 11, Administrative Record (“AR”) 1022-31.2 Both claims were

denied initially on March 28, 2023, see AR 866-85, and upon reconsideration

on February 8, 2024, see AR 886-909. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested and

received a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on September 4,

2024. See AR 830-68. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 3,

2024. See AR 23-47.

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),

416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since October 31, 2021, the alleged onset date. See

AR 28. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of

“systemic lupus erythematosus with inflammatory arthritis, migraine

headaches, obesity, major depressive disorder, panic attack disorder,

posttraumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder.” AR 29. At

step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See

AR 31.

After considering the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, as defined in 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with several additional limitations. See

AR 33. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any

past relevant work. See AR 40. At step five, considering Plaintiff’s documented

vocational background and the opinion of a vocational expert, the ALJ found

that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

2 Citations to the AR are to the record pagination. All other docket

citations are to the CM/ECF pagination.

that Plaintiff could perform, including collator operator, assembler small

products II, and sub-assembler. See AR 41-42. Consequently, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff was not disabled from October 31, 2021, through the date of the

decision. See AR 42.

The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. See AR 7-13.

Plaintiff then sought judicial review from this Court. See Dkt. 1.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court will set aside a denial of benefits only if “it is etther not

supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v.

Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under the

substantial-evidence standard, the district court looks to the existing

administrative record and determines “whether it contains sufficient evidence

to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.

97, 102 (2019) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). “Substantial” means “more than

a mere scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). This

threshold “is not high” and “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the

hearing up close.” Id. at 103, 108. “Where evidence is susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Il. DISCUSSION

The parties dispute whether the ALJ properly: (1) considered Plaintiff's

combination of impairments in determining the RFC and (2) considered

Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. See Dkt. 15, Plaintiff's Opening Brief

(“PL.’s Br.”); Dkt. 16, Defendant’s Brief (“Def.’s Br.”); Dkt. 17, Plaintiffs

Reply Brief (“Reply”).

A. RFC Determination

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial

evidence. See Pl.’s Br. at 4-11.

A claimant’s RFC is the most they can still do despite his or her physical

or mental limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); Laborin v.

Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017). In determining a claimant’s

RFC, an ALJ must assess all relevant evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),

416.945(a); Laborin, 867 F.3d at 1153. The ALJ must discuss significant and

probative medical evidence and, if she rejects or discounts it, explain why. See

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding federal

courts “demand that the agency set forth the reasoning behind its decisions in a

way that allows for meaningful review”). The ALJ need not consider or

include alleged impairments that have no support in the record. See Osenbrock

v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff offers three points of error. First, Plaintiff argues that it “is

unclear what substantial evidence the ALJ relied upon in assessing” her RFC.

See PI.’s Br. at 5-6. The Court disagrees. The ALJ discussed significant and

probative medical evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's lupus with inflammatory

arthritis, migraine headaches, obesity, and psychological issues. See AR 36-38.

The ALJ subsequently discussed the prior administrative medical findings and

opinions, ultimately finding the opinions of the State agency medical

consultants to be partially persuasive, and the opinions of Beth Bathgate,

M.D., and M. Waber, D.O., to be unpersuasive. See AR 38-39. Plaintiff's

suggestion that the ALJ “effectively rejected” the opinions of the State agency

medical consultants by adding additional limitations is not well-taken.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding in the RFC that she

“requires a single-point cane for walking distances greater than 30 yards” is not

supported by substantial evidence. See Pl.’s Br. at 6-8 (citing AR 33). Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ ignored evidence showing that she requires a cane for

all ambulation and uses a walker. See id. at 8. To the contrary, the ALJ

acknowledged Plaintiff's testimony that she needed a cane and, at times, a

walker to ambulate. See AR 36. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's testimony

regarding ambulation was inconsistent with the evidence, rejecting “the

assertion that a walker was required for ambulation.” Id.

In support, Plaintiff points to an August 25, 2023 comprehensive

physical therapy evaluation indicating that she could ambulate 75 feet (25

yards) with a single-point cane. See Pl.’s Br. at 8 (citing AR 4054-89). But that

opined limitation is nearly identical to the 30-yard limitation that the ALJ

adopted in the RFC. Plaintiff also points to a February 20, 2024 visit where she

was prescribed a walker for chronic bilateral knee pain. See Pl.’s Br. at 8 (citing

AR 6878-81). In that telephone visit, however, Plaintiff merely requested a

durable medical equipment referral for a walker due to her knee pain. See AR

6880 (“Pt requesting DME for walker due to chronic knee pain.”). This 1s the

only reference to a walker cited by Plaintiff in her entire medical history.

Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings of improvement ignored

the fact that her symptoms waxed and waned. See PI.’s Br. at 8-10. As an

example, Plaintiff acknowledges that medication helped her pain but asserts

that “does not mean she was capable of functioning physically on a sustained

basis, five days a week.” Pl.’s Br. at 9. But Plaintiff does not cite to any record

evidence that undercuts or calls into question the ALJ’s RFC analysis. At best,

Plaintiff has offered an alternative interpretation of the record, which is an

insufficient basis for reversal. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680-81.

Remand is not warranted on this claim of error.

B. Subjective Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons to

reject her statements. See PI.’s Br. at 11-17.

1. Applicable Law

The ALJ applies a two-step analysis to assess a claimant’s credibility for

symptom severity. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017).

Once the claimant “has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged,” then, absent evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony 1s not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722

(9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in

Social Security cases.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted). The ALJ’s

findings “must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude

the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and

did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Brown-

Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (citation omitted). However, “an ALJ is not required

to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be

available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.”

Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). The clear and convincing “standard isn’t whether

our court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough

that it has the power to convince.” Id.

2. Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ accurately summarized Plaintiff's testimony as follows.

The claimant reported symptoms arising from lupus, numbness,

joint pain, extremity pain, vertigo, urinary tract infection, cysts,

rheumatoid arthritis, liver and kidney issues, dyslexia,

posttraumatic stress disorder, blood clots, lupus, and personality

disorder primarily limited the claimant’s ability to work.

The claimant testified that she had good days and bad days. The

claimant testified that she had difficulty walking and used a cane

or walker to move around... . The claimant testified that she had

a history of carpal tunnel syndrome and trigger finger surgery. The

claimant testified that she continued to have hand problems, such

as dropping items. The claimant testified that she had shoulder

pain and had difficulty reaching. The claimant testified that she

had ankle and knee pain. The claimant testified that her ankle pain

worsened after 10 minutes of walking. The claimant testified that

she felt sleepiness, sickness, and fatigue. The claimant further

suggested in the function report that difficulty with muscle and

joint pain, hand pain, swelling, right eye issues, and hip pain

limited the claimant’s ability to work and perform activities of

daily living.

AR 34 (citations omitted).

3. Analysis

The ALJ partially discredited Plaintiffs allegations at the second Trevizo

step, finding that her medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that her “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

reasons explained in this decision.” AR 34. Specifically, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff's statements were inconsistent with the medical evidence, her

activities of daily living, and improvement with treatment. See AR 35-36.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s assessment of her mental impairments has

no relation to her physical impairments. See Pl.’s Br. at 13-14. Plaintiff's

suggestion of error is unclear, as the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's physical

impairments a few pages later. Regardless, the ALJ’s finding is supported by

substantial evidence. “When objective medical evidence in the record is

inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed

weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498.

The ALJ cited specific, clear, and convincing examples to establish that

Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence.

Plaintiff testified that she experienced anxiety every day for several hours and

had trouble with focus and concentration. See AR 856-57. But as the ALJ

noted, mental status examinations in February, March, and April 2024 were

unremarkable, with each showing that Plaintiff had normal appearance,

speech, thought process, thought content, alertness, orientation, memory,

insight, judgment, impulse control, and intelligence. See AR 6879, 6960, 7000.

Plaintiff does not refute the ALJ’s mental status findings.

Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental health testimony

conflicted with the record evidence indicating her improved condition. See AR

35. “Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not

disabling” for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits. Warre v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that

symptoms may wax and wane during progression of mental disorder but that

“evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can

undermine a claim of disability”). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff frequently told

treatment providers that she was generally doing good and getting better. See

AR 2061 (“doing good”), 3887 (feeling down but doing better), 5621 (“doing

good”), 5781 (some anxiety and depression but “doing alright” and “better”),

5887 (“feeling good”), 6954 (“doing way better”), 6995 (“doing better”).

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that her testimony was

inconsistent with her daily activities. See Pl.’s Br. at 14-15. “Engaging in daily

activities that are incompatible with the severity of symptoms alleged can

support an adverse credibility determination.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d

1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014). Daily activities may form the basis of an adverse

credibility determination if they “contradict [a claimant’s] other testimony” or

if the claimant “is able to spend a substantial part of his [or her] day” doing

things “transferable to a work setting.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Even if

the claimant experiences some difficulty or pain, her daily activities ‘may be

grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they

contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.’” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499

(citation omitted).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities of preparing meals,

cleaning, washing dishes, and doing laundry were “specifically inconsistent”

with her subjective complaints about hand pain, fatigue, weakness, and

chronic pain. AR 35. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s finding is

not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff testified that she performs some

basic chores “when she feels good.” AR 843-84. In response to the ALJ’s

question, Plaintiff clarified that if she pushes herself to clean, it will take her

“two or three days to recover from the swelling and the joint pain.” AR 845.

And with respect to the laundry, Plaintiff testified she can only “start

something,” with her son needing to take the clothes out and to a dryer. See

AR 845. Plaintiff’s statements that she can perform some minimal number of

daily activities is not inconsistent with her testimony regarding her limitations.

The ALJ next found that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her ability to

ambulate were inconsistent with the evidence and observations of others. See

AR 36. Plaintiff argues, as she did with respect to her RFC, that the ALJ erred

by “merely reciting medical evidence.” Pl.’s Br. at 15. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff testified that she had pain with ambulation and needed a cane, and,

with increasing frequency, a walker to ambulate. See AR 851. However, the

record evidence largely indicated that Plaintiff had a steady, independent gait.

See AR 2264, 5726-27. And, as the Court noted above, Plaintiff’s only

evidence of her need for a walker is a telephone visit where she requested one

from her provider. See AR 6880 (“Pt requesting DME for walker due to

chronic knee pain.”).

Last, Plaintiff asserts that none of the ALJ’s cited references address her

allegation of hand pain, fatigue, or chronic pain. See Pl.’s Br. at 15-16.

However, the ALJ did address those allegations, see AR 34, ultimately crafting

an RFC that accounted for many of those limitations, see AR 33. Furthermore,

the ALJ found that some of Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her physical

impairments were inconsistent with her improved condition. See AR 36.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s citations all pertain to her “mental health” but

that is not accurate. For instance, the ALJ noted that in August 2021,

Plaintiff’s systemic lupus erythematosus was “mild” and she had “normal CBC

and CMP readings.” AR 2373. The ALJ also noted that in January 2022,

Plaintiff’s lupus was mild. See AR 2281. The ALJ’s explicit findings

undermine Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ ignored her physical issues.

“Ultimately, the ‘clear and convincing’ standard requires an ALJ to

show [her] work,” which the ALJ did here. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499. “Not

every reason need be supported by substantial evidence, but the ‘ultimate

credibility determination’ must be.” Baker v. Saul, 836 F. App’x 526, 530 (9th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155,

1162 (9th Cir. 2008)).

The ALJ gave at least two clear and convincing reasons, supported by

substantial evidence, for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Because the ALJ

gave multiple legally sufficient reasons to support the overall credibility

determination, any errors in the additional reasons given were harmless. See

Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that an error is

harmless if it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”

(citation omitted)); see also Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir.

2017) (explaining that a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on

account of a harmless error” (citation omitted)). Overall, the ALJ’s reasoning

sufficed to show that she did not arbitrarily discredit Plaintiffs allegations. See

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493.

Remand is not warranted on this claim of error.

IV. CONCLUSION

The agency’s denial of benefits is affirmed and this action is dismissed

with prejudice.

Date: December 1, 2025 3 ' {

DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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