Ledezma

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOE LEDEZMA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01585-BTM-MMP

CDCR #H-84273,

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ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION

Plaintiff,

13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA

v. PAUPERIS AND (2) DISMISSING

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COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

15 STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

M. RAMIREZ, Reviewing Authority;

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

16 M. PALMER, Reviewing Authority,

AND 1915A(b)

17 Defendants.

[ECF No. 3]

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20 Plaintiff Joe Ledezma, who is proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Richard J.

21 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights

22 Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1), together with a Motion

23 to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 3). Ledezma claims two prison grievance

24 officials at RJD refused to timely process his grievances requesting a kosher or religious

25 meat alternative diet accommodation after he converted to Judaism. See Compl. at 2‒5.

26 Ledezma seeks both compensatory and punitive damages, attests to have exhausted his

27 administrative remedies before filing suit, and requests to be provided a kosher diet. Id. at

28 6.

1 For the reasons explained, the Court grants Ledezma leave to proceed IFP, but

2 screens his Complaint sua sponte and dismisses it for failing to state a claim upon which

3 § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

4 I. IFP MOTION

5 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

6 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee.1 See

7 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee at the

8 time of filing only if the court grants the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

9 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 14051 (9th Cir. 2007); cf.

10 Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP

11 application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s]

12 [a]re paid.”).

13 “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive

14 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act]

15 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of

16 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the

17 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767

18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for

19 collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)).

20 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of

21 all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account

22 statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding

23 the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

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1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55.

27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14

(eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to

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1 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “shall assess and when

2 funds exist, collect, … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the

3 average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the

4 prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly

5 payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s

6 account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). Thus, while

7 prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the statutory filing fee in one

8 lump sum, they nevertheless remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly

9 payments. See Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2);

10 Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

11 Here, Ledezma’s IFP motion complies with both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). In

12 support, he has submitted two copies of his California Department of Corrections and

13 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Inmate Trust Account Statement Report. See ECF Nos. 2, 4; see

14 also S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The certified statement submitted

15 in support of his July 24, 2025 IFP motion shows Ledezma maintained an approximate

16 average monthly balance of $1,092.12 in his prison trust account, and had approximately

17 $1,345.50 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the 6-month period

18 immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. At the time of filing, however,

19 Ledezma’s available balance had decreased to $374.12. See ECF No. 4 at 2, 4.

20 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Ledezma’ Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3)

21 and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $269.10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). This

22 initial fee need be collected only if sufficient funds are available in Ledezma’s account at

23 the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event

24 shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

25 criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to

26 pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

27 § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based

28 solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

1 ordered.”). The CDCR must thereafter collect the full balance of the $350 total fee owed

2 in this case and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court as provided by 28 U.S.C.

3 § 1915(b)(2).

4 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

5 A. Standard of Review

6 Because Ledezma is a prisoner and proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires an initial

7 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the

8 Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is

9 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are

10 immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

11 § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc));

12 Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

13 § 1915A(b)).

14 “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v.

16 Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,

17 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)

18 (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in

19 the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) together require a complaint to “contain

21 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

22 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);

23 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

24 In addition, in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief,

25 the Court may consider exhibits attached to his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A

26 copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all

27 purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

28 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426

1 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be

2 considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.)).

3 B. Factual Allegations

4 Ledezma claims that after his wife converted to Judaism, he too embarked on a

5 “spiritual journey” to convert and comply with the “laws set forth in the Torah pertaining

6 to the type of foods to be consumed.” See Compl. at 3. To that end, Ledezma claims to

7 have submitted two “CDCR 3030 Religious Meat Alternative or Religious Kosher Diet

8 Request Forms” via the institutional mail, one in April 2024, and another on July 20, 2024,

9 but he “received no reply.” Id. at 3, see also ECF No. 1-2 at 1‒3, 5.

10 On September 19, 2024, after waiting a “reasonable amount of time” without a

11 response to his July 20, 2024 request “to be added to the kosher meals list,” Ledezma filed

12 a CDCR 602 grievance claiming that the failure to provide him with a “religiously

13 mandated diet” impeded his right to practice his religion and to “comply with [his] religious

14 beliefs.” See Compl. at 3; see also ECF No.1-2 at 5‒6, 10-11. Ledezma further claims that

15 by “just ignoring [his] requests,” failing to perform their “assigned duties,” and “through

16 the manipulation of [] grievance procedures,” Defendants Palmer and Ramirez, whom he

17 identifies as RJD’s grievance “reviewing authorities,” deprived him of his “choice of

18 religion” and “treat[ed] [him] differently than other inmates” in the same facility who

19 “request[ed] a religiously mandated diet.” See Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1-2 at 10‒11, 14‒15.

20 Ledezma claims the “continual refusal to provide [him] the same religiously mandated diet

21 [] provide[d] [to] numerous other inmates who practice Judaism at th[e] same facility”

22 constituted “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment, violated his right to

23 equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and resulted in a violation of his right

24 to “religious freedom.” See Compl. at 4‒5.

25 C. Discussion

26 The Court has reviewed Ledezma’s Complaint and for the reasons explained below,

27 finds that it fails to state a plausible claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

28 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d

1 at 1121, 1123.

2 1. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim

3 “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States

4 by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids government from ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of

5 religion.” Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 2024). “Inmates clearly retain

6 protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall

7 prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348

8 (1987) (citation omitted).

9 “In ruling on a prisoner’s First Amendment free exercise claim, [the Court must]

10 first determine whether the challenged prison policy or practice substantially burdened the

11 prisoner’s free exercise of his or her religion.” Long, 91 F.4th at 1337; see also Jones v.

12 Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A person asserting a free exercise claim

13 must show that the government action in question substantially burdens the person’s

14 practice of her religion.”). “‘A substantial burden . . . places more than an inconvenience

15 on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to

16 their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior

17 and to violate his beliefs.’” Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031‒32 (brackets and citation omitted).2

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2 If a prisoner establishes a substantial burden, the Court must apply the “four factors set forth in [Turner

20 v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)] to determine whether the burden was ‘reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.’” Long, 91 F.4th at 1337 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The four Turner factors

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that bear on whether a legitimate penological interest exists are: “(1) whether there is a valid, rational

22 connection between a state interest and the prison regulation [or restriction]; (2) whether prisoners have

an alternative method of engaging in religious practice; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted

23 constitutional right would have on guards and other inmates; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives to

the challenged regulation” or restriction. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing

24 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89‒90). However, while the weighing of these factors will be required before

Ledezma can prevail on the merits of any free exercise claim, the Court finds the Turner analysis

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premature at the initial pleading stages. See Salazar v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV-15-09003-MWF-

26 JC, 2016 WL 11746844, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“Whether the [alleged constitutional

deprivations] are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s

27 claim, not whether they have stated a claim.”) (citing Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir.

2008) (noting that questions going to the merits of First Amendment claim are not appropriately resolved

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1 Additionally, a prisoner must allege that (1) his “‘proffered belief [is] sincerely held’; and

2 (2) ‘the claim [is] rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns.’”

3 Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d

4 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994)); Fuqua, 120 F.4th at 1352 (“An inmate asserting a Free Exercise

5 claim must first show that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief that was impinged

6 by government action.”). The Ninth Circuit has “consistently held that the failure to

7 provide food consistent with a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs constitutes a

8 substantial burden on the prisoner’s free exercise.” Long, 91 F.4th at 1337 (citing Shakur

9 v Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 881‒82 (9th Cir. 2008)).

10 Ledezma sufficiently alleges he has a sincerely held religious belief, and that as part

11 of his conversion to Judaism, he must comply with the laws of the Torah governing the

12 “type of foods to be consumed, [and] how they are to be consumed, prepared and kept.”

13 See Compl. at 3. He further contends the failure to provide him with a kosher diet imposed

14 a substantial burden on the practice of his faith. Id. at 4. He fails to allege, however, that

15 either Defendant Ramirez or Palmer, who he identifies merely as the “reviewing

16 authorities” responsible for processing his CDCR inmate grievances inquiring into the

17 status of his July 20, 2024 CDCR 3030-R Religious Meal Alternative or Religious Kosher

18 Diet Request, may be held liable for causing any First Amendment violation. See Harper

19 v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the

20 plaintiff must [] demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the

21 claimed injury.”); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry

22 into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

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any decision on the application of Turner to the facts at issue in this case [at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage]);

26 Sims v. Biter, No. 1:14-CV-00131 AWI, 2015 WL 269215, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015) (“The Turner

analysis is beyond the scope of a 12(b)(6) motion.”), aff’d, No. 15-15895, 645 Fed. Appx. 555, 2016 WL

27 1128109 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2016); Hightower v. Tilton, No. C08-1129-MJP, 2012 WL 1194720, at *7

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012) (“[I]t is inappropriate to require a complaint to address [Turner] factors at the

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1 individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

2 deprivation.”). A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

3 section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or

4 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of

5 which [the plaintiff] complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

6 Here, while Ledezma identifies Ramirez and Palmer as the “reviewing authorities”

7 responsible for processing his CDCR 602 grievances, he fails to include in his pleading

8 any facts sufficient to plausible suggest either Ramirez or Palmer were the persons

9 ultimately responsible for processing his religious diet requests or determining whether he

10 qualified for a religious meal accommodation in the first place. See Thomas-Weisner v.

11 Gipson, No. 3:19-CV-01999-JAH-BGS, 2020 WL 6271207, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2020)

12 (dismissing prisoner’s free exercise claims religious meal accommodation claims sua

13 sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) where his complaint failed to

14 allege “Defendants were members of the RCC,” or “played any direct role in the decision

15 to deny or remove Plaintiff from the RMA [Religious Meal Alternative Diet Program].”).

16 Instead, Ledezma contends only that Ramirez and Palmer failed to properly respond to the

17 grievances he filed inquiring as to the status of the religious meal diet requests he “sent in

18 thorough [RJD’s] institutional mail.” See Compl. at 2, 3; ECF 1-2 at 5‒8, 10‒11, 13‒15.

19 In short, while Ledezma has a First Amendment right to “be provided with food

20 sufficient to sustain them in good health [and] satisfy[y] the dietary laws of [his] religion,”

21 McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987), he enjoys no constitutional right to

22 an effective grievance or appeal procedure. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

23 Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also George v. Smith,

24 507 F.3d 605, 609‒10 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that only persons who cause or participate

25 in civil rights violations can be held responsible and that “[r]uling against a prisoner on an

26 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation”); Shehee v. Luttrell,

27 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that prison officials whose only roles involved

28 the denial of the prisoner’s administrative grievances could not be held liable under

1 § 1983). “[W]here a defendant’s only involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional

2 conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s

3 behalf to remedy alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active

4 unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983.” Wright v. Shapirshteyn, No. CV 1-06-

5 0927-MHM, 2009 WL 361951, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009).

6 Pursuant to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.6,“[a]ny incarcerated person who claims

7 to require a religious diet consisting of either the Religious Meat Alternate or Religious

8 Kosher Diet Programs shall be responsible for completing and signing a CDCR Form 3030-

9 R (07/24), Religious Meat Alternative or Religious Kosher Diet Request, . . . and

10 submitting it to any Chaplain, or an RRC [Religious Review Committee] (RRC) designee.”

11 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.6(a) (emphasis added). As noted above, Ledezma claims

12 to have completed and submitted his CDCR Form 3030 “through the institutional mail

13 service,” but he does not further allege to have addressed his request to a chaplain or RRC

14 designee.3 See Compl. at 3. Nor does Ledezma claim either Defendant Ramirez or Palmer

15 were chaplains, members of the RRC, or in any way responsible for approving or denying

16 his request for a religious diet. See Thomas-Weisner, 2020 WL 6271207, at *4. In fact,

17 Ledezma’s exhibits show Ramirez determined that while Ledezma had failed to submit a

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3 “Incarcerated persons may request participation in the RK [Religious Kosher] Diet Program in

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accordance with Title 15, section 3054.6.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.5(b). “Only Jewish inmates,

22 as determined by a Jewish Chaplain, may participate in the JKDP [Jewish Kosher Diet Program].” Cal.

Dept. Corr. & Rehab., Operations Manual, Ch. 5, Art. 51, § 54080.14 (“Institution Religious Diet

23 Program”), (2024). “The Chaplain or designated representative of the Religious Review Committee

(RRC) shall: (1) Interview the incarcerated person requesting the religious diet program by utilizing

24 CDCR Form 3030-E (Rev. 07/24), Religious Meat Alternate or Religious Kosher Program Interview[…]

[and] (2) Determine the incarcerated person’s religious diet eligibility for placement into the appropriate

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[Religious Diet] program. The Chaplain may approve the request or refer it to the RRC for

26 determination.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.6(b) (emphasis added). “Only the RRC may deny the

CDCR Form 3030-R, Religious Meat Alternative or Religious Kosher Diet Request.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

27 15, § 3054.6(d) (emphasis added). “The RRC shall be comprised of designated chaplains, and a

correctional captain or their designee.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210(d).

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1 “GA-22” Request for Interview with a chaplain, a chaplain was nevertheless assigned to

2 interview him, evaluate his CDCR 3030 Request, and to submit it to the Religious Review

3 Committee (RRC) for review on March 26, 2025. See ECF No. 1-2 at 14‒15.

4 Critically, Ledezma does not explain what the chaplain or the RRC ultimately

5 decided with respect to his request for a kosher diet; nor does he name the chaplain or any

6 RRC designee as a party. Instead, he seeks to sue only the grievance officials assigned to

7 respond to his CDCR 602 appeals complaining of a delay in responding to his religious

8 diet request. See ECF No. 1-2 at 5‒6. The Ninth Circuit has held that correctional

9 institutions may require an inmate to complete an application in order to receive kosher

10 meals without violating the First Amendment. See Resnick v. Adams, 348 F. 3d 763, 771

11 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is

12 appropriate for prison authorities to deny a special diet if an inmate is not sincere in his

13 religious beliefs.”)). Delays inherent in processing religious meal requests, as Ledezma

14 appears to attribute to inmate appeals reviewers Ramirez and Palmer, do not by themselves

15 violate a prisoner’s right to free exercise. See e.g., Green v. Paramo, No. 18-CV-00480-

16 BAS-AGS, 2018 WL 6062359, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018) (five-month delay in

17 processing religious diet application not unconstitutional); Taylor v. Pelican Bay, No. C

18 07-639 MHP (PR), 2010 WL 2671989, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (two-month delay in

19 processing religious diet not unconstitutional even after plaintiff was previously approved

20 for a religious diet at another prison and required to participate in verification process); see

21 also Woods v. Paramo, No. 3:17-CV-02595-CAB-WVG, 2019 WL 3532831, at *6 (S.D.

22 Cal. Aug. 2, 2019) (finding RJD’s Jewish chaplain entitled to summary judgment with

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4 “[W]hen [an] inmate or parolee seeks a response to an issue related to his or her confinement,” he may

26 “request interviews with staff and/or request items and services via a CDCR Form 22, Inmate/Parolee

Request for Interview, Item or Service.” Cal. Dept. Corr. & Rehab., Operations Manual, Ch. 5, Art. 52

27 § 54090.4 (“Written Request Process”) (2024). After completing the CDCR Form 22 describing his or

her request, “[t]he inmate shall deliver or mail via institutional mail the completed form to any staff

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1 respect to prisoner’s free exercise claim based on thirty day delay in receipt of kosher diet).

2 For these reasons, the Court finds Ledezma fails to state a plausible free exercise

3 claim as to either inmate grievance reviewers Ramirez or Palmer. See Watison, 668 F.3d

4 at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121, 1123.

5 2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

6 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from

7 denying “equal protection of the laws” to any person within its jurisdiction. U.S. CONST.

8 amend. XIV, § 1. It provides that states must treat all similarly situated people in a

9 protected class, including religion, equally. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; see also Freeman v.

10 Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee

11 ensures that prison officials cannot discriminate against particular religions.” (internal

12 citations omitted)). The Equal Protection Clause does not, however, require that “all

13 prisoners must receive identical treatment and resources.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of

14 Corrs. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Instead, to state

15 a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Ledezma must allege

16 that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based

17 upon membership in a protected class.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.

18 2013) (internal citation omitted); Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123.

19 Here, Ledezma claims only that “Donovan Correctional Facility” has “continued to

20 refuse to provide [him with] the same religiously mandated diet [it] provide[s] numerous

21 other inmates who practice the same religion,” and has “treat[ed] Plaintiff differently than

22 other inmates who practice Judaism at th[e] same facility.” Compl. at 5. As was true with

23 respect to his free exercise claim, however, Ledezma fails to allege inmate grievance

24 reviewers Ramirez or Palmer were the persons responsible for processing his CDCR 3030

25 Kosher Diet Request, for determining whether he qualified, or for causing him to be treated

26 differently. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[In] § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

27 must plead that each Governmental-official defendant, through the official’s own

28 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

1 Further, while the Equal Protection Clause does protect prisoners from intentional

2 discrimination on the basis of religion, Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737, Ledezma fails to include

3 any further factual allegations to plausibly suggest Defendants Ramirez or Palmer

4 reviewed, delayed, or denied his CDCR 602 grievances with the intent or purpose of

5 discriminating against him because of his faith. Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030. “Intentional

6 discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected

7 status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in

8 original). Ledezma must plead intentional discrimination with respect to each named

9 defendant. See OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that

10 “invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment Free

11 Exercise Clause” requires specific intent); see also Royzman v. Lopez, No. 21-CV-1429-

12 BAS-AHG, 2023 WL 2026537, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2023) (dismissing Jewish

13 prisoner’s equal protection claims involving denial of tefellin where “[t]he only allegations

14 as to [the Defendant] [was] that he interviewed Plaintiff following the filing of [an]

15 administrative grievance, asked Plaintiff questions relating to his grievance, and informed

16 Plaintiff that he would communicate any further issues.”). He has not, and instead contends

17 only broadly that he was treated differently—suggesting that his rights were violated

18 simply because he knows other inmates in his housing facility have been approved for

19 kosher meals. See Compl. at 5. “To infer intentional discrimination from these minimal

20 allegations is too far a leap.” Royzman, 2023 WL 2026537, at *9.

21 Therefore, the Court also dismisses Ledezma’s equal protection claims pursuant to

22 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm,

23 680 F.3d at 1121, 1123.

24 3. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

25 Finally, to the extent Ledezma claims the refusal to provide him with a religiously

26 mandated diet amounts to cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth

27 Amendment, he also fails to state plausible claim for relief. See Compl. at 5.

28 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment

1 and conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

2 2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual

3 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)

4 (citations omitted). A prisoner’s claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

5 violation, however, unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

6 civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

7 indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

8 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)).

9 Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. Hoptowit

10 v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v.

11 Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). “Food is one of life’s basic necessities,” and the

12 government is obligated to provide those in its custody “with adequate sustenance on a

13 daily basis.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812‒14 (9th Cir. 2009). “The Eighth

14 Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health;

15 it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th

16 Cir. 1993). Thus, the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation is critical in

17 determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a

18 viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).

19 “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of an Eighth

20 Amendment violation. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

21 As pleaded, Ledezma’s Complaint fails to include any facts whatsoever to suggest

22 either Defendant Ramirez or Palmer deprived him of any of life’s minimal “necessities.”

23 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. His exhibits show he requested a specific kosher diet religious

24 accommodation in July 2024, but Ledezma does not allege any facts to plausibly suggest

25 he was deprived of food, adequate nutrition, or any other any basic human need at any

26 time. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8‒9. And while the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to

27 furnish meals with adequate nutrition, Ledezma fails to allege either Defendant Ramirez

28 or Palmer denied him food sufficient to sustain his health. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246.

1 Without more, the lack of access to a specific religious diet does not violate the Eighth

2 Amendment. See Kidwell v. Collins, No. 1:22-CV-00709-JLT-CDB PC, 2023 WL

3 9549913, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2023); Buskirk v. Johnson, No. CV 21-9065-MWF

4 (JEM), 2023 WL 6851734, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s lack of access to a

5 specific religious diet was not an unconstitutional condition of confinement that violated

6 the Eighth Amendment” where the mainline diet Plaintiff did receive was not inadequate),

7 report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6851737 (June 27, 2023); White v. Krantz,

8 No. 1:20-cv-00892-NONE-GSA-PC, 2021 WL 4206545, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2021)

9 (finding plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations that he

10 was denied a kosher diet for 50 days and occasionally was not provided a sack lunch after

11 religious fasts); Monson v. Steward, No. 2:15-cv-00513-PK, 2017 WL 2882709, at *8 (D.

12 Or. July 6, 2017) (“The denial of a kosher diet simply does not rise to the level of

13 ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’”); Burton v. Clark, No. 1:09-cv-00061-DLB

14 (PC), 2009 WL 3254897, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009) (holding plaintiff failed to state an

15 Eighth Amendment claim based on allegations he received food that was “inadequate . . .

16 to his religious beliefs”).

17 Further, Ledezma does not allege facts sufficient to show that either grievance

18 reviewer Ramirez or Palmer acted with “deliberate indifference” to a serious risk to his

19 health or safety when they reviewed his CDCR 602 grievances complaining of delay and/or

20 a or lack of response to his CDCR 3030 religious meal requests. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

21 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298‒99. Thus, the Court also dismisses Ledezma’s Eighth

22 Amendment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1). See Watison,

23 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121, 1123.

24 III. CONCLUSION

25 For the reasons discussed, the Court:

26 1) GRANTS Ledezma’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

27 (ECF No. 3).

28 2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

1 || Ledezma’s trust account the $269.10 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available

2 || at the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the full $350

3 ||owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding

4 || month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in his account exceeds $10

5 || pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

6 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff

7 ||Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, via

8 || U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov; and

9 4) GRANTS Ledezma forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in

10 || which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted.

11 Ledezma’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his

12 || original pleading. Any Defendant not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended

13 || Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc.

14 ||v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended

15 || pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir.

16 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an

17 ||amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

18 If Ledezma fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter

19 final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon

20 || which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and his

21 failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v.

22 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of

23 opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the

24 || complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”’).

25 IT IS SO ORDERED.

26 || Dated: December 2, 2025 Tit

27 Honoris Barry Ted Mh pa

28 United States District Judge

15