Bartlett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

TERRY WAYNE BARTLETT PLAINTIFF

ADC #134693

V. Case No. 4:25-CV-00037-BSM-BBM

DEXTER PAYNE, Chief Director, ADC;

and LONA MCCASTLAIN, Chairman,

Arkansas Parole Board, ADCC DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to

United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections,

Judge Miller may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all the

evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of

fact.

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 16, 2025, Plaintiff Terry Wayne Bartlett (“Bartlett”), a prisoner in the

Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that ADC Director Dexter Payne and Chairman of the Arkansas Parole

Board Lona McCastlain violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 2). Before Bartlett may

proceed with this action, the Court must screen his claims in accordance with the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

II. ALLEGATIONS

Bartlett claims that the ADC failed to provide him a parole hearing in violation of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 2 at 3). Specifically, according to Bartlett, his

“Release Date/Transfer eligibility Date” was October 10, 2023, but the ADC scheduled

him to appear before the Parole Board on January 23, 2024—106 days after his

release/transfer date. Id. at 4–5. Bartlett also vaguely alleges that Defendants denied him

“equal treatment/equal protection due process requirements under state law.” Id. at 3–4.

Bartlett sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (Doc. 2 at 2). For

relief, he requests damages, a court order mandating that “all ADC inmates be given a

parole hearing on or before [their] projected release/transfer eligibility dates,” and a

resentencing in his state court case. Id. at 6.

III. SCREENING

To survive pre-service screening under the PLRA, a “complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[L]abels and conclusions,” a

1 The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or a

portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). When making this determination, the Court must accept the truth of the

factual allegations contained in the complaint, and it may consider the documents attached to the complaint.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “naked assertions devoid

of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to plead a plausible claim. Id. And,

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). However, “[a] pro

se complaint must be liberally construed,” and courts “should construe the complaint in a

way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up; citations omitted); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(citation omitted).

Liberally construing his Complaint, Bartlett brings due process, equal protection,

and official-capacity claims against the Defendants. For the following reasons, however,

Bartlett’s allegations fail to state any plausible claim for relief.

A. Due Process

First, Bartlett attempts to bring a due process claim against Defendants for failing

to schedule a timely parole hearing. To state a § 1983 due process claim, a prisoner such

as Bartlett must have a protected “liberty interest.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2003). However, a prisoner does

not have a Fourteenth Amendment due process “liberty interest,” in: (1) the possibility of

parole, (2) a conditional release before the expiration of a valid sentence, or (3) in the

determination of a specific parole eligibility date. Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802,

808 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480, among others); Adams v. Agniel, 405

F.3d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that an inmate has no constitutionally protected

liberty interest in the possibility of parole); Smith v. Norris, 40 Fed. Appx. 305, 305 (8th

Cir. 2002) (holding that an inmate has “no federal right to have specific release and parole

eligibility dates calculated”). The Eighth Circuit has held, however, that if a state law “uses

mandatory language and imposes substantive limits on the discretion of state officials,” it

can support the creation of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Snodgrass v.

Robinson, 512 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325,

328-29 (8th Cir. 1993)); see also Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 989 (8th Cir. 2008).

As relevant here, Arkansas parole statutes do not establish any right to parole capable of

supporting a due process claim. Hamilton v. Brownlee, 237 Fed. Appx. 114, 115 (8th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (holding that Arkansas parole statutes do not create protectible liberty

interest in discretionary parole decisions).

Resultantly, Bartlett does not have any liberty interest associated with his parole or

a parole hearing, and he fails to state a due process claim based on his allegedly untimely

parole hearing. It is recommended, therefore, that Bartlett’s due process claims be

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

B. Equal Protection

Bartlett also vaguely alleges that Defendants denied him “equal treatment/equal

protection due process requirements under state law.” (Doc. 2 at 3–4). To state a plausible

equal protection claim, a complaint must contain facts suggesting that a prisoner was

treated differently from similarly situated inmates based on a suspect classification or a

fundamental right, or without a rational basis for the disparate treatment. See Patel v. U.S.

Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815–16 (8th Cir. 2008); Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d

983, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2008). Because Bartlett does not allege that he is a member of a

protected class or that his fundamental rights have been violated, he must show that

Defendants systematically and “intentionally treated [him] differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Nolan,

521 F.3d at 989–90. “The heart of an equal protection claim is that similarly situated classes

of inmates are treated differently, and that this difference in treatment bears no rational

relation to any legitimate penal interest.” Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir.

1998). Equal protection analysis begins with whether the inmate has shown that he has

been treated differently from others who are similarly situated. Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d

936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999).

To the extent Bartlett even intended to plead an equal protection claim, he does not

explain whether or how he has been treated differently than others who are similarly

situated. And without more, Bartlett fails to state an equal protection claim. Any such claim

should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

C. Official Capacity

Bartlett also sues all Defendants in their official capacities. (Doc. 46 at 2). To plead

a claim against Defendants in their official capacities, Bartlett must allege facts showing

that the purported constitutional violations were the result of an official ADC policy, an

unofficial custom, or a failure to train. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d

1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). Bartlett does not make any such allegations. Moreover, absent

a viable underlying constitutional violation, Bartlett cannot maintain an official-capacity

claim. Whitney v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018).

Accordingly, as presented, Bartlett fails to state a plausible official-capacity claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of Bartlett’s Complaint, (Doc. 2), the Court finds that

Bartlett fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Bartlett’s Complaint, (Doc. 2), be DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Court RECOMMEND that the dismissal count as a “strike” for the

purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

3. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma

pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommended Disposition and the

accompanying judgment would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2025.

Yet a Utove-

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE