The opinion
Filed 12/3/25 Munson v. City of Eureka CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHAEL MUNSON et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
A172094
v.
CITY OF EUREKA et al., (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CV2301627)
Defendants and Respondents;
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on November 5, 2025, be modified as
follows:
On page 2, line 4 of the first paragraph the word “reptation” is deleted
and replaced with the word “repetition.”
This modification does not change the judgment.
Dated:_____________ _____________________
Miller, Acting P. J.
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Filed 11/5/25 Munson v. City of Eureka CA1/2 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHAEL MUNSON et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
A172094
v.
CITY OF EUREKA et al., (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CV2301627)
Defendants and Respondents;
Plaintiffs Michael Munson and Michelle Constantine Blackwell
proposed an initiative for the ballot in the City of Eureka (City). On
September 28, 2023, the City notified plaintiffs that its examination of the
initiative petition signatures was complete. At its October 17, 2023 meeting,
the city council voted to place the initiative on the November 2024 ballot.
The initiative was subsequently rejected by the voters at that election.
Meanwhile, plaintiffs had filed this action against the City, alleging it
violated the Elections Code by taking action on the initiative at its October
17, 2023 council meeting instead of its earlier October 3, 2023 meeting.
Plaintiffs do not contend any “serious harm” resulted from this, beyond the
purported technical violation of the law. The trial court sustained the City’s
demurrer without leave to amend on multiple grounds, including mootness,
and dismissed the action with prejudice.
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On appeal, plaintiffs concede the issue is moot but argue the trial court
should have exercised its discretion to decide an otherwise moot issue
because it raises a matter of substantial and continuing public interest
capable of reptation yet evading review. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs were the official proponents of an initiative for “changes to
the City’s General Plan relating to residential housing and public parking in
the City’s downtown area.” They submitted an initiative petition with
signatures to the city clerk on August 28, 2023.
Elections Code section 9210, subdivision (b),1 requires an election
official to examine and determine the number of signatures affixed to an
initiative petition. On September 28, 2023, the City notified plaintiffs that
examination of the petition signatures was complete and the matter would be
placed on the next regular city council agenda for its October 17,2023
meeting. Sections 9114 and 9115, subdivision (f), require an election official
to certify the results of the examination “at the next regular meeting of the
board.”
On October 3, 2023, plaintiffs sent a letter to the City contending that
its “impending failure” to certify the results at its council meeting later that
same evening would violate section 9115. The City responded that it could
not put the matter on for October 3rd because that agenda had already been
published, and section 9115 could not be reasonably interpreted to conflict
with agenda notice requirements under the Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et
seq.). (Gov. Code, § 54954.2. subd. (a)(1) [posting of agenda “at least” 72
hours before regular meeting]; id. § 54953.7 [providing for requirements
beyond “minimum standards” in Brown Act that allow “greater access” to
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Elections Code.
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meetings]; Eureka Mun. Code, § 30.01, subd. (D) [requiring publication of
agenda “on the Wednesday prior to the regular Council meeting”].) The
Wednesday prior to the October 3rd council meeting was September 27th.
Plaintiffs’ letter acknowledged “the Brown Act’s notice and agenda
requirements present a potential obstacle in this regard,” but pointed out the
City could add to its agenda after posting if there was a “need to take
immediate action.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (b)(2).) The City responded
that there was no such need.
The day before the October 17, 2023 council meeting, plaintiffs filed
this action. While the amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint
originally asserted four causes of action, plaintiffs subsequently waived three
of those claims and proceeded with only a single cause of action seeking
declaratory relief that the City violated the Elections Code when it failed to
certify the initiative at the October 3, 2023 meeting.
After the October 17, 2023 meeting, the City filed a demurrer. The City
argued that plaintiffs’ remaining claim was moot because the initiative had
been certified and the council had voted to place the initiative on the
November 2024 general election ballot. The City also argued that plaintiffs
had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, and that there
was no harm.
Plaintiffs opposed the demurrer, arguing that even if the claim was
rendered moot by the council vote to place the initiative on the ballot, an
exception to the mootness doctrine applied here because their claim raised
“important questions affecting the public interest that are capable of
repetition yet evading review.”
The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend,
finding the amended petition “fails to state a claim on which relief can be
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granted because (1) the facts do not support the allegation that the City
violated the law; (2) the issues raised are moot; and (3) there is no harm on
which to base relief.” The trial court dismissed the amended petition with
prejudice on September 20, 2024. The initiative was rejected by voters in the
November 2024 election.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
As a general rule, “ ‘ “the duty of this court, as of every other judicial
tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board
of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) “[A] moot case is one
in which there may have been an actual or ripe controversy at the outset, but
due to intervening events, the case has lost that essential character and,
thus, no longer presents a viable context in which the court can grant
effectual relief to resolve the matter.” (Association of Irritated Residents v.
Department of Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1222.)
“The general rule regarding mootness, however, is tempered by the
court’s discretionary authority to decide moot issues.” (Building a Better
Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867.)
Such an exercise of discretion may occur where the case poses an issue of
“ ‘ “substantial and continuing public interest” ’ ” that is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (Citizens Oversight, Inc. v. Vu (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 612,
615 (Citizens Oversight).)
Here, the trial court sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to
amend and dismissed the action with prejudice upon finding the issue raised
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by plaintiffs’ remaining cause of action was moot. The parties agree that the
de novo standard of review applies to a judgment of dismissal after a
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.2 (Schifando v. City of Los
Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Brown v. County of Los Angeles (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 320, 322.)
We agree with plaintiffs that, under certain conditions, California
courts have considered election procedure disputes even after an election has
taken place because they raise issues of substantial and continuing public
interest. (Gebert v. Patterson (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 868, 871–872 (Gerbert)
[constitutional challenge to ordinance requiring prepayment of fee before
publication of argument in voter handbook]; Eblovi v. Blair (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 310, 311 [question of statutory interpretation regarding who can
submit arguments on municipal initiative measure for ballot pamphlet];
Election Integrity Project California, Inc. v. Lunn (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 443,
445–446 [determination of area “ ‘sufficiently close’ ” for observers to watch
ballot processing]; Weber v. Superior Court (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 342, 350
[question of whether independent nomination rules are applicable to party
nomination]; Citizens Oversight, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 615
[determination on ballots as exempt from disclosure under California Public
Records Act]; Patterson v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 22, 26
[question of whether city attorney has the authority to delete ballot
2 Neither party has argued that the abuse of discretion standard
applies instead. (Cf. Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29
Cal.4th 164, 172 [“ ‘ “[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion
to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency
would normally render the matter moot” ’ ”].) We need not and do not
address this issue because, while we exercise our independent judgment here,
we would reach the same result under either standard.
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arguments from voter pamphlet as “ ‘false, misleading, or inconsistent’ ”];
San Diego Public Library Foundation v. Fuentes (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 711,
718 (San Diego Public Library) [evaluation of procedures by election officials
to validate initiative petition signatures].)
We are not persuaded, however, that the conditions here give rise to
the same type of “ ‘ “substantial and continuing public interest” ’ ” present in
these election cases. (Citizens Oversight, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.)
The plaintiffs in Citizens Oversight, for example, sought a declaration that
they could inspect and copy ballots cast by registered voters during a
presidential primary election. (Ibid.) The appellate court explained that
“[p]ublic disclosure of ballots is an important issue of public interest” and,
because the registrar was authorized to recycle ballots after an election, the
issue was likely to recur yet to evade review. (Ibid.) Here, unlike Citizens
Oversight, plaintiffs do not contend any “serious harm” resulted from the
initiative being certified on October 17, 2023 instead of two weeks earlier, on
October 3, 2023. This is not surprising, as the certification and council vote
to place plaintiffs’ initiative on the ballot still occurred over a year before the
actual election.
Nor are we persuaded that plaintiffs have presented an issue of
“general” or “broad” public interest. (Gebert, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 872;
San Diego Public Library, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 722.) In San Diego
Public Library, the plaintiffs challenged determinations invalidating
initiative petition signatures based on street name errors, dating errors, and
admitted registrar errors. (San Diego Public Library, at pp.720-721.) The
appellate court concluded the case presented an issue of public interest “on
matters requiring uniform application of the law throughout the state.” (Id.
at p. 724.) Here, in contrast, plaintiffs’ remaining cause of action depends on
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an interpretation of state election law and its interplay with a particular local
law. Plaintiffs take the position that the phrase “next regular meeting” in
sections 9114 and 9115, subdivision (f) imposes a requirement without any
consideration of the City’s deadline for agenda publication under its
municipal code. (Eureka Mun. Code, § 30.01, subd. (D).) Plaintiffs have not
argued, in their opposition to the demurrer or in their briefing on appeal, that
this issue applies more generally or broadly to other elections boards in the
state.
Finally, plaintiffs’ claim raises an issue that is highly factual in nature.
The City sent notice regarding completion of its petition signature
examination on September 28, 2023. It just so happened that September 28
was one day after the City’s municipal code deadline to publish the agenda
for its October 3, 2024 council meeting. (Eureka Mun. Code, § 30.01, subd.
(D).) When matters arise before the City’s agenda notice and publication
deadlines, there is no such timing issue. Courts decline to exercise their
discretion to resolve moot issues where, as here, they are “ ‘ “fact-specific” ’ ”
or “ ‘dependent upon the specific facts of a given situation.’ ” (MHC
Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
204, 215.)
For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in
sustaining the City’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the
action with prejudice upon finding plaintiffs’ remaining claim was moot.
Given this conclusion, we need not and do not address the parties’ arguments
regarding the alternative bases for demurrer and dismissal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
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_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A172094, Munson, et al. v. City of Eureka et al.
8