People v. Jones

2025 IL App (1st) 230635-U

No. 1-23-0635

Order filed December 3, 2025

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit

) Court of Cook County.

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

) No. 20 CR 5853

v. )

)

MAURICE JONES, ) Honorable

) Nicholas Kantas,

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction, where the evidence was sufficient for a rational

trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable

doubt. The trial court did not err when it allowed the detective’s testimony that the

offender seen in the surveillance video was defendant. Defense counsel did not

render ineffective assistance, where defendant is unable to demonstrate prejudice.

The State’s argument during closing violated the motion in limine, but the error was

harmless.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Maurice Jones, was convicted of one count of aggravated

robbery. He now appeals, raising four issues. First, he asserts the evidence adduced at trial was

insufficient to sustain his conviction. Second, Jones contends the trial court erred when it allowed

No. 1-23-0635

a detective to identify Jones as the offender in store surveillance footage, where the detective had

not viewed the footage prior to his arrest nor did he have any prior contact with Jones. Next, Jones

argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel, where trial counsel failed to request Illinois

Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.15B (approved Jan. 26, 2018) (“IPI Criminal No. 3.15B”)

and failed to renew a request to strike testimony. Finally, Jones claims his conviction should be

reversed where the State committed misconduct by violating a motion in limine during closing

arguments. For the following reasons, we affirm. 1

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 25, 2019, an armed man walked into the Family Dollar store at 6540 South

Pulaski Road in Chicago (Family Dollar) and, displaying what appeared to the cashier to be the

handle of a firearm, demanded money from the register. The cashier, Hector Infante, complied

with the man’s request and the offender fled the store.

¶5 Jones was arrested in May of 2020 in connection with the armed robbery and he was

charged with aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(b)(1) (West 2018)). Prior to his jury trial, Jones

filed multiple pre-trial motions, including a motion to bar law enforcement officers and civilians

from identifying Jones on a surveillance video taken of the robbery, a motion in limine requesting

the State be barred from arguing that they “welcome” their burden of proof, and a motion to bar

admission of surveillance footage obtained from a nearby residence.

¶6 A. Motion to Bar Identification

¶7 At the hearing on the motion to bar identification testimony, defense counsel made an oral

amendment, limiting the motion to apply only to Chicago Police Detective Adam Siegel’s

In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this

1

appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

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identification of Jones.

¶8 Detective Siegel, who works on a vehicular hijacking team, testified that he emailed

Detective William Phelan—who was assigned to the instant armed robbery case—on November

2, 2019. Detective Siegel was not initially assigned to the Family Dollar robbery and was assigned

to another undisclosed case. His email to Detective Phelan was in response to a “seeking-to-

identify” bulletin that Detective Phelan had issued on October 31, 2019. The bulletin included two

photographs of the Family Dollar offender—a side profile and an image of the same individual

standing near a white GMC vehicle. Detective Siegel informed Detective Phelan that he believed

the same man was the offender in both the case he was investigating and Detective Phelan’s case.

Detective Siegel did not know the name of the offender and based his observations that they were

looking at a “mutual offender” solely on the individual’s appearance.

¶9 In May 2020, Detective Siegel was contacted by Detective Alfredo Vivas of the SOMEX

unit. 2 Detective Vivas provided Detective Siegel with the name Maurice Jones as the potential

suspect in the case Detective Siegel was investigating.

¶ 10 Detective Siegel first observed the surveillance footage from the October 25, 2019, Family

Dollar robbery while on the stand at the hearing to bar identification. Detective Siegel testified that

he had no prior contact with Jones before the video was recorded and agreed that the person in the

footage was not wearing any disguise. On cross-examination, Detective Siegel clarified that, after

he learned Jones was arrested on May 13, 2020, he spoke with Jones at the police station. Detective

Siegel interviewed Jones for 36 minutes and had an opportunity to observe Jones’s unobstructed

face. He also made an in-court identification of Jones.

2

Siegel testified the SOMEX unit investigates social media accounts.

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¶ 11 The State then published the October 25, 2019, Family Dollar surveillance videos and

Detective Siegel identified the man on the footage as Jones. The court then briefly questioned

Detective Siegel, who agreed that his identification was partially based off his May 2020 interview

with Jones.

¶ 12 Defense counsel argued that pursuant to the five-factor test created by our supreme court

in People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, Detective Siegel should not be able to identify Jones in

the surveillance footage, since he had no prior familiarity with Jones and was not present during

the robbery. Counsel contended that Detective Siegel was no more likely to correctly identify the

suspect from the footage than members of a jury.

¶ 13 The trial court refused to bar Detective Siegel’s identification testimony, finding that

Detective Siegel and Jones were not strangers, as they had previously met and spoke together for

half an hour.

¶ 14 B. Motions in Limine and to Bar Surveillance Footage

¶ 15 Defense counsel filed motions in limine on July 8, 2022. Counsel requested, inter alia, that

the State be precluded from:

“[making] any argument that has the purpose or effect of lessening the importance

of the State’s burden of proof or implying that reasonable doubt is merely a pro forma or a

minor detail, or that, the burden is met in different trials in different courtrooms on a regular

basis, or anything to that effect. The State should further be precluded from stating in its

opening or closing arguments that it “welcomes” its burden of proof of beyond a reasonable

doubt and that it “meets that burden every day in this court.” Such commentary improperly

bolsters the State’s credibility and seems to imply that, since it is able to meet its burden in

other cases, it has met its burden in the present case before the jury. The State should not

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be permitted to mention its success in other cases because said statements/arguments are

highly improper and wholly irrelevant.”

¶ 16 On the same day, Jones filed a separate motion to bar surveillance footage obtained from

the Family Dollar, arguing that the State failed to list as a potential witness anyone employed as

the video technician at the Family Dollar. Further, he argued the State had failed to tender any

reports or information that would support the admission of the surveillance footage.

¶ 17 Several days later, Jones filed a motion to bar residential surveillance footage obtained

from the 6500 block of South Komensky Avenue, arguing a lack of foundation and authentication.

While acknowledging the State could introduce the evidence under the silent witness theory if the

proper foundation was laid, the defense noted that the State provided no indication that the footage,

retrieved from a civilian, could be properly admitted in accordance with People v. Taylor, 2011 IL

110067.

¶ 18 The parties addressed the motions to bar the surveillance footage, with defense counsel

noting that the parties had briefly argued the motions before the prior judge. Defense counsel

mentioned neither the date of the prior hearing nor whether the previous judge had ruled on either

motion. Defense counsel reiterated the arguments made in the earlier motions, and the State

countered that their residential footage witness would be able to properly lay the foundation under

the silent witness theory and that the complaining witness would be able to lay the proper

foundation for the Family Dollar video.

¶ 19 The court noted that the State would be allowed to enter and publish the videos if they were

able to lay a sufficient foundation. Upon further questioning, the State specified that Hector Infante

would be the witness to establish the proper foundation for the Family Dollar footage and that

Kristopher Matyczak would lay the foundation for the residential footage.

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¶ 20 C. Jury Trial

¶ 21 On October 25, 2019, Infante was working as a cashier at the Family Dollar when he was

robbed at gunpoint. Around 11:54 a.m., a man wearing a black sweater, black jeans, and a black

Bulls baseball cap—whom Infante identified in court as Jones—entered the store. He approached

Infante at a cash register and inquired about the store’s cash back policy. Infante informed Jones

that he could give cash back, and they continued to converse while Infante helped another customer

check out. Once the customer finished his transaction, Jones informed Infante that he was robbing

him. Infante observed his manager, Emma Martinez, approaching the register. Infante, who had

been trying to open the cash register, stopped when Martinez walked over.

¶ 22 As Martinez walked away, Infante again attempted to open the register. Jones asked if

Martinez was calling the police, and Infante assured him she was not. Jones then began to pull a

weapon out of his right pocket, exposing the handle and hammer of a black firearm. Infante

remained calm, focused on deescalating Jones, and handed over approximately $220. Jones took

the cash and quickly exited the Family Dollar. Infante had a clear, unobstructed view of Jones’s

face during the duration of the robbery.

¶ 23 Following Jones’s exit, Infante called the police to report the incident. When officers

arrived at the Family Dollar, Infante showed them the surveillance video footage from inside the

store. There were several surveillance cameras in operation inside the store (at the entrance,

registers, and some aisles) and one camera outside the entrance. All the cameras record

continuously and were working properly on the day of the robbery. Infante was able to make a

copy of the surveillance footage for the police officers, and he verified the disk he created.

¶ 24 Defense counsel objected to publication of the video, arguing that Infante did not install

the surveillance cameras, he had failed to testify how he knew the cameras were working properly,

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and he had failed to accurately describe how he preserved the recording. Following brief argument

on the issue, the court found that the State had laid a sufficient foundation for the footage. Infante

viewed the video clips as they were published and identified the individuals captured on video.

¶ 25 On May 11, 2020, police officers came to the Family Dollar and showed Infante a

photographic array. Infante identified a picture of Jones as the man who robbed the store in October

2019.

¶ 26 On cross-examination, Infante clarified that he did not know Jones and had never seen him

before the incident. There was nothing unusual about the way Jones entered the store. The

interaction was at least a minute long and began calmly. Infante did not hear Jones speak to either

the customer in front of him or behind him. Jones had his hands in his pockets, and Infante first

observed the firearm after Martinez walked by, when Jones reached in his right pocket for the

weapon. After he was able to retrieve the money from his register, Jones grabbed the money from

Infante’s outstretched hand and fled the scene. Infante observed Jones as he fled through the

parking lot but he did not see where Jones ran to nor did he see Jones enter any vehicle. When

police officers showed Infante the photographic array, Infante pointed out Jones’s picture “pretty

much right away…I remembered the face and everything.”

¶ 27 Infante agreed that the firearm cannot be seen in the surveillance video and identified three

photographic stills taken from the footage—one depicting Jones’s right hand resting on the

conveyor belt, and two which displayed Jones’s hands out of his pockets. However, Infante

maintained that he saw the butt/handle of a firearm, while conceding he did not know whether it

was a real firearm or if it was loaded. Infante gave the police officers a physical description of the

offender but could only remember describing a younger African American male with short black

hair and a goatee, standing approximately six feet tall, wearing a black hoodie and jeans. Although

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Infante did not provide the offender’s eye color or detail any tattoos the offender may have had,

he denied that this was due to the quick nature of the offense, instead explaining he was not looking

at those attributes.

¶ 28 Emma Martinez, through an interpreter, explained that she was the store manager working

with Infante on October 25, 2019. While she was stocking shelves, she observed a male individual

that “came in through the wrong way” to the checkout line. The man walked directly to the register

where Infante was working. Martinez approached the register to see if Infante needed help.

Martinez observed an African American man, whom she did not recognize, wearing black shoes,

jeans, a black sweatshirt, and a black hat. The man did not appear to be purchasing any

merchandise and had his right hand inside a pocket, but she did not observe a firearm. While she

observed his general appearance, she was scared to study the man’s face. After she approached the

register, she heard the man say, “give me all your fu*** money.” She left the area to call the police,

and when she returned, the man was no longer at the register. Martinez proceeded to lock the

store’s doors.

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Martinez recalled speaking with police officers on the day of the

robbery but could not recall what they asked her or how she responded. She could not remember

if she had told Detective Phelan that she overheard the man say, “give me all your fu*** money.”

¶ 30 Kristopher Matyczak lived in a single-family home on the 6500 block of South Komensky

Avenue in 2019. In April of 2019, Matyczak had four security cameras installed on the exterior of

his residence: one facing 66th Street, one facing Komensky Avenue, one facing his backyard, and

the last camera recording the gangway. The cameras connected to a hard drive located in the

basement of the residence. The installer provided Matyczak with an instruction book and

step-by-step instructions regarding how to operate the security cameras. On October 25, 2019,

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Detective Phelan contacted Matyczak and requested any footage recorded from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m.

that day on his surveillance system. Matyczak noted that his computer’s time stamp was roughly

four hours behind the actual time. In reviewing the requested footage from the 66th Street camera,

Matyczak observed a white SUV pull up aside his house, before a man exited and walked east

toward the Family Dollar.

¶ 31 During a sidebar, defense counsel then renewed its objection to the publication of the

recovered surveillance footage, arguing the State had failed to meet the requirements for the silent

witness theory. The court sustained the objection and allowed the State’s questioning of Matyczak

to continue.

¶ 32 A few minutes later in the footage, Matyczak observed the man jog back to his car and

drive away. Matyczak downloaded the relevant section of the video footage (7:52 a.m. to 7:55 a.m.

on October 25, 2019) and attempted to email it to Detective Phelan. Due to internet complications,

he was unable to successfully send the email until four days later. The State then sought to publish

the surveillance video and defense counsel renewed its objection to admission. The court sustained

the objection. Upon further questioning, Matyczak was unable to recognize the physical CD upon

which the footage was stored. The State requested a sidebar, explaining that although Matyczak

did not recognize the physical CD, it would like to show him the video on the laptop so he could

confirm the authenticity of the video. Defense counsel objected and the court sustained the

objection, noting that it did not believe the State could lay the foundation for the CD so that

Matyczak could be shown the contents.

¶ 33 Following more questioning, defense counsel again requested a sidebar, where she

requested Matyczak’s testimony be stricken as irrelevant. The court denied the motion.

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¶ 34 Detective Phelan met with Infante and Martinez on October 25, 2019, at the Family Dollar

after he was assigned to respond to the armed robbery. He also met with evidence technician

Joseph Scumaci, who processed and photographed the scene of the robbery. Detective Phelan

canvassed the area for additional surveillance cameras and contacted Matyczak to request

surveillance footage. Four days later, Detective Phelan received the requested video from

Matyczak via e-mail. The detective inventoried the video by downloading it and transferring it

onto an “optical disk” with a unique inventory number. Detective Phelan identified the physical

CD, and the State moved to publish the contents.

¶ 35 Defense counsel objected to the admission and publication of the video and the parties held

a sidebar. Counsel argued that a proper foundation had not been laid through the silent witness

theory, as Detective Phelan had not provided any information regarding the reliability or capability

of the cameras, the competency of the operator or the downloading process. The State countered

that Matyczak had laid the proper foundation and the detective was merely connecting the video

from the email to the physical CD. The court ruled that the foundation was insufficient for the

“admissibility and the functioning of the video” and sustained defense counsel’s objection.

¶ 36 Upon further questioning, the State again requested a sidebar. The State reiterated that

Matyczak had laid an appropriate foundation as to the operation of the surveillance system and the

capability of recording. Further, Matyczak testified that he had e-mailed the downloaded

surveillance video to Detective Phelan four days after the robbery. The detective then testified he

received the surveillance video via e-mail four days after meeting with Matyczak. The State

indicated that it could provide the “e-mail itself” as evidence and repeated its belief that proper

foundation had been laid. The court responded that there was no “piece to connect the basic

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fundamentals of the foundation for the evidence” and cautioned the State not to “go down this road

on this video anymore.”

¶ 37 Detective Joseph Foley, who was a Chicago police officer on May 13, 2020, testified he

was working with his partner, Kenny Rzeszutko, when he arrested Jones, whom he identified in

court. At the time of his arrest, Jones was wearing a black Bulls hat with a collared shirt and pants;

the hat was inventoried.

¶ 38 Detective Siegel was assigned to the Family Dollar robbery in approximately October

2019. On May 13, 2020, Detective Siegel interviewed Jones, whom he identified in court, at the

Area 3 detective division. After Detective Siegel administered Jones his Miranda rights, Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Jones was shown a still photograph from the October 25, 2019,

Family Dollar surveillance video. The detective asked Jones if he was the individual in the

photograph, and Jones responded affirmatively. Later, Detective Siegel observed the Family

Dollar video footage from the robbery; he recognized the individual in the video.

¶ 39 Defense counsel objected and another sidebar was held. The court noted that this objection

was subject to the previous motion in limine that a prior judge had already ruled on. The State

clarified that it intended to show the detective the surveillance footage to obtain a Thompson

identification. See Thompson, 2016 IL 118667.

¶ 40 The State then published the video footage, and Detective Siegel identified the suspect in

the video as Jones. On cross-examination, Detective Siegel conceded that (1) he did not generate

the photograph from which Jones identified himself, as he did not watch the surveillance video

until two years later; and (2) the photograph contained no signature or written acknowledgement

that the individual is Jones.

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¶ 41 The parties stipulated that, if Chicago police officer Anthony Martin were called, he would

testify that he responded to the Family Dollar on October 25, 2019, and recovered store

surveillance footage depicting the robbery. Martin then inventoried the video and would testify the

item was in substantially the same condition as when it was recovered. The State then rested and

defense counsel moved for a directed verdict; the court denied the motion.

¶ 42 In discussing jury instructions, defense counsel objected to the State’s requested Illinois

Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 1.02 (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (“IPI Criminal No. 1.02”).

Instead, defense counsel proposed the court allow the modified version of IPI Criminal No. 1.02

that she had submitted, which included a second paragraph relating to officer testimony. The State

objected to the modified instruction, specifically to a portion of the second paragraph citing an

unrelated case, which was remanded due to the State’s improper closing arguments that enhanced

the credibility of a police officer. The court denied the modified version of IPI Criminal No. 1.02.

There were no objections to the other proposed instructions. The jury reconvened and the defense

rested its case.

¶ 43 Following closing arguments, the court instructed the jury. The jury returned a guilty

verdict on the count of aggravated robbery. In a posttrial motion for new trial, Jones argued,

inter alia, that (1) the court improperly denied (a) his motion to suppress the identification made

by Infante and (b) his Thompson motion; (2) the court improperly allowed Detective Siegel to

testify that Jones was the individual on the surveillance footage; (3) he was not proven guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the Court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objections

throughout the trial and during closing. After brief arguments, the court denied the motion.

¶ 44 At sentencing, the court reviewed Jones’s presentencing investigation report and heard

arguments in mitigation and aggravation. The State highlighted Jones’s pending felony cases, as

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well as his ten prior felonies and seven prior misdemeanors. Defense counsel noted that Jones is a

life-long resident of Cook County, who lives with his mother and has one seven-year-old child.

Prior to his arrest, Jones worked full time and earned sanitation and food handling certificates.

Since his arrest, Jones had begun taking subject tests to earn his GED. Defense counsel

acknowledged Jones’s lengthy criminal history but asked the court to impose the minimum

sentence, considering Jones’s lack of violent and weapons-related offenses and the fact that Jones

did not display the firearm in the instant case. Noting the public nature of the daytime robbery,

Jones’s extensive criminal background, and the fact that Jones was alleged to be armed, the court

sentenced Jones to a term of eight years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 45 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 46 On appeal, Jones argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2)

the trial court erred in allowing Detective Siegel to identify Jones as the offender in the Family

Dollar surveillance footage; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a)

request IPI Criminal No. 3.15, and (b) renew the motion to strike Matyczak’s testimony; and (4)

the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it told the jury that it “welcomed” its burden,

in violation of a motion in limine.

¶ 47 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 48 Jones first contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for

aggravated robbery, where the sole eyewitness had an insufficient opportunity to view the hooded

offender.

¶ 49 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their conviction,

the reviewing court considers “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

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beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard “ ‘gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319). Thus, in our review of the evidence, we neither retry the defendant nor substitute our

judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id. A criminal conviction will not be reversed “ ‘unless the

evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s

guilt.’ ” People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 334 (2010).

¶ 50 To prove Jones guilty of aggravated robbery as charged, the State had to establish that he

knowingly took property from the person or presence of another by use of force or by threatening

the imminent use of force, while indicating verbally or by his actions that he was armed with a

firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-1(b)(1) (West 2018). The State was also required to prove not only that

the crime occurred, but also that it was committed by the person charged. People v. Mister, 2016

IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶ 104.

¶ 51 Jones claims that the State’s case hinged upon Infante’s testimony that Jones was the armed

robber. However, he contends, Infante’s identification was inadequate since he had an insufficient

opportunity to view the offender during the robbery. We are unpersuaded by Jones’s argument that

Infante’s identification is unreliable.

¶ 52 The United States Supreme Court, in Neil v. Biggers, laid out five factors for courts to

consider in assessing the reliability of identification testimony. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). These factors

aim to protect defendants from the “likelihood of misidentification.” Id. at 199-200. These factors

include: “(i) the opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime, (ii) the degree of attention,

(iii) the accuracy in reporting prior descriptions of the perpetrator, (iv) the level of certainty at the

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time of identification, and (v) the length of time between the crime and the identification.” People

v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 30 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200). Although the

first factor is the most critical, “no individual factor dictates the outcome.” Id. ¶ 32. Here, after

careful review of the record, and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we

conclude that analysis of the Biggers factors does not undermine the reliability of Infante’s

eyewitness identification of Jones.

¶ 53 Looking at the first Biggers factor—a witness’s opportunity to observe the offender during

the offense—Jones claims Infante was incorrect in his perception that the interaction lasted “about

two or three minutes.” Rather, he states the evidence indicates the confrontation was less than one

minute. We find that this first factor weighs in favor of the reliability of Infante’s identification.

Despite Jones’s claims that the interaction occurred too quickly for Infante to observe the offender,

Infante testified credibly that he observed a man—wearing a black sweater, black jeans, and a

black Bulls baseball cap—enter the Family Dollar. The man approached Infante at the register and

the two men conversed while Infante continued to help another customer. Infante testified that he

had a clear and unobstructed view of the offender’s face during the duration of the robbery. Further,

Infante observed the handle and hammer of a black firearm as the offender began to display a

weapon.

¶ 54 Contrary to Jones’s claims, the video surveillance does not reflect that “the robbery

occurred very suddenly and without warning.” Instead, the offender began the incident by

approaching and speaking with Infante, under the guise that he wanted to know the store’s cash

back policy. The video’s timestamp reflects that the offender entered the store at 11:54:29 a.m.

and did not exit the store until 11:57:00 a.m. While the “active” robbery period may have only

lasted a total of approximately 53 seconds, the offender was in the store for two and a half

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minutes—just as Infante testified to. Moreover, despite Jones’s contentions that Infante’s inability

to describe the offender’s eye color is proof that Infante’s attention was drawn elsewhere, Infante

testified credibly that he had a clear and unobstructed view of the offender’s face during the

duration of the robbery. This testimony is corroborated by the Family Dollar surveillance footage.

Even assuming arguendo that Jones was correct that the total interaction lasted less than 60

seconds, that is still plenty of time for a witness to observe an offender. “ ‘The conditions need not

be perfect and the observation need not be prolonged.’ ” Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B,

¶ 104 (quoting People v. Benson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1005 (1994)). “An identification may be

positive even though the witness viewed the accused for a short period of time, and [t]he

sufficiency of the opportunity to observe is for the trier of fact to determine.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re O.F., 2020 IL App (1st) 190662, ¶ 29.

¶ 55 As to the second factor—the witness’s degree of attention—Infante’s testimony reflected

that he observed the offender as soon as he entered the store. Notwithstanding the other customer’s

presence during the beginning of the encounter, Infante testified credibly that he interacted with

the offender, answered his questions, and calmed him down after Martinez approached. Jones

attempts to discredit Infante’s degree of attention by arguing that witnesses may “tend to focus on

weapons and not on the faces of the offenders.” However, Infante specifically averred that he did

not observe a weapon until after Martinez had approached the register and the offender feared that

she was contacting the police. Even then, Infante briefly saw the “butt end” of the firearm before

the offender concealed it once more within his pocket.

¶ 56 The third Biggers factor—the accuracy of the eyewitness’s prior descriptions—weighs in

favor of finding the identification reliable. Infante first described the offender as an approximately

20 to 25 year old African American male with short black hair, standing roughly six feet to six feet

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and two inches tall, with a slightly grown out goatee and wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, with

dark jeans, and a Bulls baseball cap. Infante’s description of the offender at trial was consistent

with this prior description. Jones puts a heavy emphasis on the fact that the offender was wearing

a baseball cap and hooded sweatshirt and therefore Infante could not have seen the offender’s

hairstyle. As noted above, Infante testified that he had a clear view of the offender’s face during

the entire robbery. Review of the video surveillance supports Infante’s testimony, as the offender’s

face is clearly visible despite his choice of attire (cap and hood).

¶ 57 The fourth Biggers factor—the witness’s level of certainty—additionally weighs in favor

of finding Infante’s identification reliable. While Jones relies upon the fact that courts have found

a low correlation between a witness’s confidence and the accuracy of their identification, the

record in the instant case reveals that Infante’s level of certainty has never wavered. Infante

testified that when the police officers showed him the photographic array months after the robbery,

he was able to point out Jones as the offender “pretty much right away…I remembered the face

and everything.”

¶ 58 The fifth factor—the length of time between the crime and the confrontation—deserves

little weight in this case. While Infante’s photographic array identification of Jones occurred seven

months after the robbery, Infante’s testimony revealed that he picked Jones out of the array “pretty

much right away.” This court has affirmed identifications with a greater time lapse. See e.g.,

People v. Malone, 2012 IL App (1st) 110517, ¶ 36 (identification made one year and four months

after offense). Consequently, after consideration of all the Biggers factors, we are persuaded that

a rational juror could accept Infante’s identification testimony as reliable.

¶ 59 Jones finally points to the State’s lack of proffered physical or forensic evidence connecting

him to the offense. Physical evidence is not necessary to support Jones’s conviction, where the

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jury found Infante’s testimony credible. See People v. Daheya, 2013 IL App (1st) 122333, ¶ 76.

The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support the finding of

guilt. People v. Hill, 2023 IL App (1st) 150396, ¶ 23 (citing People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541

(1999)). Moreover, there was surveillance footage of the incident that was published during the

trial. The jury viewed this footage and had the opportunity to view Jones in court. Jones’s claims

that “the video was blurry” is not borne out by the record. 3 Furthermore, testimony adduced at trial

reflected that Jones identified himself as the offender in a still photograph retrieved from the

surveillance footage.

¶ 60 Infante testified that Jones demanded money from the cash register. After Martinez

approached the scene, Jones asked Infante if Martinez was calling the police. Thus, it is clear Jones

acted knowingly. Fearing Martinez was reporting him to the police, Jones then exposed the handle

and hammer of a black firearm he kept in his pocket. Infante testified clearly and consistently that

he observed the firearm in Jones’s pocket.

¶ 61 From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Jones indicated—through

his actions—that he was armed with a firearm. Once Infante was able to open the cash register,

Jones seized the money from Infante’s hand and fled the Family Dollar. Thus, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that Jones knowingly took the money

from Infante’s register by threatening the imminent use of force, while indicating—by his

actions—that he was armed with a firearm.

In fact, during a pretrial hearing, defense counsel argued that because the video was clear, there

3

was no need to have lay opinion identification testimony regarding it.

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¶ 62 2. Trial Court Error

¶ 63 Next, Jones claims the trial court erred when it allowed Detective Siegel to identify Jones

in store surveillance footage, where the detective had neither viewed the footage prior to Jones’s

arrest nor had any prior contact with Jones. The State counters that the court properly allowed

Detective Siegel’s “lay witness identification” of Jones, where the detective had prior knowledge

of Jones. Alternatively, the State argues that even assuming arguendo the trial court erred, any

error was harmless where it did not affect the verdict.

¶ 64 The supreme court in Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, addressed the admissibility of lay

opinion identification testimony pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The

court held that such testimony is admissible if (a) the testimony is rationally based on the

perception of the witness and (b) the testimony is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s

testimony or a determination of a fact in issue. Id. ¶ 50. The court explained:

“Lay opinion identification testimony is helpful where there is some basis for

concluding the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the

surveillance recording than the jury. A showing of sustained contact, intimate familiarity,

or special knowledge of the defendant is not required. Rather, the witness must only have

had contact with the defendant, that the jury would not possess, to achieve a level of

familiarity that renders the opinion helpful.” Id.

¶ 65 In determining whether to allow lay opinion identification testimony, the trial court

considers the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors: (1) the witness’s

general familiarity with the defendant; (2) the witness’s familiarity with the defendant at the time

the recording was made or where the witness observed the defendant dressed in a manner similar

to the individual depicted in the recording; (3) whether the defendant was disguised in the

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recording or changed his or her appearance between the time of the recording and trial; and (4) the

clarity of the recording and extent to which the individual is depicted. Id. ¶ 51. Where one or more

of these factors is present, there is some basis to conclude that the witness is in a superior position

to the jury to identify the defendant from the footage in question Id. ¶ 49. The absence of any

single factor does not render the testimony inadmissible, as the factors are considered in their

totality. Id. ¶ 51.

¶ 66 The extent of a witness’s prior familiarity with the defendant is a matter of weight rather

than admissibility. Id. ¶ 49. Where the State seeks to introduce a law enforcement officer’s lay

opinion identification testimony, the court should allow the defendant an opportunity to examine

the officer outside the presence of the jury. Id. ¶ 59. This precautionary procedure allows the trial

court to make an informed decision as to whether the testimony’s probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. If the probative value is substantially outweighed,

the testimony may be excluded. Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 67 The decision of whether to allow lay opinion identification testimony is within the

discretion of the trial court and will only be disturbed if that discretion is abused. Id. ¶ 49. A trial

court abuses its discretion only when (1) its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or (2)

no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. People v. Towns, 2020 IL App

(1st) 171145, ¶ 44.

¶ 68 While Jones argues that Detective Siegel had no prior contact with Jones, the record belies

that assertion. Here, the court held a hearing on Detective Siegel’s identification testimony prior

to trial, as Thompson required. Detective Siegel testified that he received a “seeking-to-identify”

bulletin from Detective Phelan, that led him to believe they were seeking the same offender. Once

Jones was arrested on May 13, 2020, the detective interviewed Jones for 36 minutes and had an

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opportunity to observe Jones’s unobstructed face. He also made an in-court identification of Jones.

Detective Siegel agreed that his identification of Jones in the surveillance footage was based at

least partially off his May 2020 interview with Jones. While the detective did not have a familiarity

with Jones at the time the recording was made, the absence of this factor is not dispositive. Though

Jones was not disguised in the surveillance footage, he was wearing a baseball cap and a hood.

Even though the video does at times clearly show the offender’s face, the court found that

Detective Siegel was familiar with Jones and believed there was some basis for concluding that

the witness was more likely to correctly identify Jones from the surveillance recording than the

jury. While we may not have made the same ruling, we cannot say that no reasonable person would

agree with the court’s decision to allow Detective Siegel to give his lay opinion identification

testimony.

¶ 69 In further support of his argument, Jones contends that even the court expressly

characterized Detective Siegel’s testimony as “highly prejudicial.” A thorough review of the

record does not support this contention. While the trial court called the hearing “highly unusual,”

it never opined that the proffered testimony was prejudicial.

¶ 70 Jones additionally argues that the lack of limiting instruction, specifically IPI Criminal No.

3.15B, could have caused the jury to give Detective Siegel’s “testimony more weight and resolved

any doubts it had about Infante’s identification against Jones.” Indeed, Thompson instructs that,

“to lessen any concerns regarding invading the province of the jury or usurping its

function, the circuit court should properly instruct the jury, before the testimony and in the

final charge to the jury, that it need not give any weight at all to such testimony and also

that the jury is not to draw any adverse inference from the fact the witness is a law

enforcement officer if that fact is disclosed.” 2016 IL 118667, ¶ 59.

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¶ 71 Here, the trial court did not instruct the jury with IPI Criminal No. 3.15B at the end of trial,

where it was not requested by counsel. However, the court did instruct the jury prior to the

presentation of any witnesses, informing them that they:

“are the Judges of the facts in this case. You and only you will determine which

witnesses to believe and how much weight to be given to their testimony. I believe that

police officers will testify in this matter. Under the law, the testimony of a police officer is

not to be treated any differently than any other witness. That is a police officer’s testimony

is entitled to no greater weight or lesser weight than any other person’s testimony simply

because of that person’s status as a police officer.”

During jury instructions, the court again stressed that only the jurors were “the judges of the

believability of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them.”

¶ 72 However, even assuming arguendo that the court did err in admitting Detective Siegel’s

identification of Jones, we would find any such error was harmless, as it did not affect the verdict.

“To establish that any error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

result would have been the same absent the error.” People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 121.

When a reviewing court considers if an error is harmless, they “may (1) focus on the error to

determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examine the other evidence in

the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determine whether the

improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or [duplicative].” Id.

¶ 73 Even without the detective’s identification, the evidence against Jones was not closely

balanced. The jury viewed the surveillance footage from the robbery, had an opportunity to view

still images from that footage, observed Jones in court, heard testimony from Infante that Jones

was the offender, and heard testimony from Detective Siegel that Jones identified himself in the

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No. 1-23-0635

still photograph taken from the Family Dollar footage. Based on the record before us, no

reasonable probability exists that the jury would have acquitted Jones absent Detective Siegel’s

surveillance footage identification.

¶ 74 3. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶ 75 Jones next argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel

failed to (a) request IPI Criminal No. 3.15B and (b) renew her motion to strike Matyczak’s

testimony.

¶ 76 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are resolved pursuant to the standard set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant

must establish both “that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant.” People v. Cathey, 2012 IL 111746, ¶ 23. Specifically, a defendant must

show that “counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional

norms and that there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If

a defendant cannot establish prejudice, their ineffective assistance claim necessarily fails. See

People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 31 (failure to establish either prong precludes a finding of

ineffectiveness). A reviewing court must be highly deferential in its scrutiny of counsel’s

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

¶ 77 As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland,

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong

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No. 1-23-0635

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’.” Id.

¶ 78 A reviewing court need not address both prongs of the Strickland inquiry if the defendant

makes an insufficient showing as to one prong. Id. at 697. When a defendant challenges a

conviction, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors,

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL

126291, ¶ 54.

¶ 79 In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance, appellate courts “use a bifurcated standard of

review, wherein we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are against the manifest

weight of the evidence, but make a de novo assessment of the ultimate legal issue of whether

counsel’s actions support an ineffective assistance claim.” People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill. App. 3d 53,

81 (2008). In this case, where Jones’s challenge does not involve findings of fact made by the trial

court, we consider de novo whether Jones has stated a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

See People v. Ortega, 2020 IL App (1st) 162516, ¶ 24.

¶ 80 A. Jury Instruction

¶ 81 Jones contends that he received ineffective assistance through “incomplete performance,”

where counsel failed to request IPI Criminal No. 3.15B. He asserts that no reasonable trial strategy

existed for counsel’s failure and that he was prejudiced, where the evidence was close and the trial

court would have given the instruction if requested.

¶ 82 Jury instructions are essential to “provide the jury with the legal principles applicable to

the evidence presented so that it may reach a correct verdict.” People v. Smith, 2025 IL App (1st)

220116, ¶ 34. In Illinois, it is well settled that trial counsel’s choice of jury instructions is a matter

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No. 1-23-0635

of trial strategy. Id. “Such decisions enjoy a strong presumption that they reflect sound trial

strategy, rather than incompetence, and therefore, are generally immune from claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d

361, 378 (2000)). The failure to request a particular jury instruction, however, may be grounds for

finding ineffective assistance if the instruction was so critical to the defense that its omission

“ ‘den[ied] the right of the accused to a fair trial.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App.

3d 585, 599 (2008)). Jury “[i]nstructions should not be viewed in isolation, but should be

considered as a whole,” to “determine whether they fairly, fully, and comprehensively informed

the jury of the relevant law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ford, 2022 IL App

(1st) 172581, ¶ 51.

¶ 83 IPI Criminal No. 3.15B states:

“You have before you evidence that a law enforcement officer made an

identification of [(the defendant) (an individual) (an object)] from a [(video recording)

(photograph)]. It is for you to determine what weight, if any, should be given to that

evidence. In determining the weight to be given to this evidence, you should not draw any

inference from the fact that the witness is a law enforcement officer.”

Further, the IPI Criminal No. 3.15B committee note indicates that the instruction should be given

“when a law enforcement officer provides identification testimony regarding a video recording or

photograph and the evidence includes that the witness is a law enforcement officer.”

¶ 84 Here, the record indicates that trial counsel did not request IPI Criminal No. 3.15B at the

jury instruction conference. Jones highlights that defense counsel noted, after the Thompson

hearing, that the court should give IPI Criminal No. 3.15B considering the court’s ruling allowing

Detective Siegel’s identification. The trial court informed defense counsel that any jury

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No. 1-23-0635

instructions would be dealt with later. Despite counsel’s statement at the hearing, however, she did

not request the instruction during trial.

¶ 85 However, defense counsel did request a modified version of IPI Criminal No. 1.02. While

there is no copy of the submitted modified IPI in the record, during the discussion on jury

instructions, defense counsel noted they were objecting to the State’s proffered IPI Criminal No.

1.02 where they “had submitted a modified 1.02 that included a second paragraph, specifically in

relation to officer testimony.” The State objected and the court declined to give the requested

modified instruction, noting, “[t]hat’s not going to be admitted. In the event something changes

during arguments that would have highlighted any one officer’s testimony in particular to any

other witness, that being a civilian or some other officer, we can revisit this, but it’s denied as of

now.”

¶ 86 Ultimately, the issue was not revisited. As noted above, however, the court did instruct the

jury prior to the presentation of any witnesses, informing them that they:

“are the Judges of the facts in this case. You and only you will determine which

witnesses to believe and how much weight to be given to their testimony. I believe that

police officers will testify in this matter. Under the law, the testimony of a police officer is

not to be treated any differently than any other witness. That is a police officer’s testimony

is entitled to no greater weight or lesser weight than any other person’s testimony simply

because of that person’s status as a police officer.”

¶ 87 Under these circumstances, we fail to see how the counsel’s choice not to request IPI

Criminal No. 3.15B denied Jones a fair trial. Jones argues he has demonstrated prejudice where

“the evidence that Jones was the offender was close.” In support of this claim, Jones relies upon

his argument that Infante’s identification of Jones was improper.

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No. 1-23-0635

¶ 88 Contrary to Jones’s assertions and as aforementioned, the evidence at trial was not close

and there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had

been reminded at the close of trial that Detective Siegel’s testimony was entitled to the same weight

as Infante’s testimony.

¶ 89 “When the evidence at trial is ‘overwhelming,’ a reviewing court will not be ‘persuaded

that it is reasonably probable that a jury would have acquitted [the] defendant even in the absence’

of counsel's alleged errors.” People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96 (quoting People v.

Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 87). Where there is overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt,

“ ‘[t]he reasonably probable impact of counsel's alleged error is not sufficient to undermine our

confidence in the outcome of the trial’ and, thus, not sufficient to establish the prejudice prong of

the Strickland test.” Id. (quoting Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 87).

¶ 90 Here, the jury viewed the surveillance video for themselves and were able to compare their

observations with Jones in the courtroom. Furthermore, the jury heard testimony that Jones

identified himself as the individual in the still photograph taken from the Family Dollar

surveillance video. In any event, at the beginning of trial, the court gave the jury a proper

instruction on how to evaluate the testimony of a police officer. See People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d

348, 396 (2000) (noting that the court’s admonishment generally cures any prejudice resulting

from improper remarks).

¶ 91 For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that counsel provided constitutionally

deficient assistance. Where Jones is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, his

claim necessarily fails. See Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 55 (noting that “Strickland requires a

defendant to ‘affirmatively prove’ that prejudice resulted from counsel’s errors.”)

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No. 1-23-0635

¶ 92 B. Matyczak’s Testimony

¶ 93 Jones next alleges he received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel failed to renew

her motion to strike Matyczak’s testimony.

¶ 94 “[W]hether to move to strike [testimony] is a matter of trial strategy.” Gunn, 2020 IL App

(1st) 170542, ¶ 118. And “matters of trial strategy are generally immune from claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 117. “The dynamic circumstances of trial with which trial counsel are

frequently confronted—and the instantaneous response to these circumstances counsel is often

required to make—serve to inform the strong presumption that a defense counsel’s trial conduct

was the product of sound trial strategy.” People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 118.

¶ 95 Counsel’s motion in limine sought to bar the admission of Matyczak’s residential

surveillance footage. After that motion was denied, counsel then requested that Matyczak’s

testimony be stricken as irrelevant during a sidebar that occurred while Matyczak was on the

witness stand. The court denied counsel’s motion to strike but sustained counsel’s objection to the

State publishing the video footage through Matyczak.

¶ 96 Counsel again relied upon Matyczak’s inability to lay a sufficient foundation for the video

surveillance during a sidebar held while Detective Phelan was on the stand. The court agreed with

defense counsel regarding Matyczak’s inability to lay a proper foundation and subsequently

sustained counsel’s objection to the State publishing the video footage through Detective Phelan.

Counsel may have weighed the possibility that relitigating the same issue and attacking

Matyczak’s testimony may have opened the door for the State to again attempt to admit the security

footage.

¶ 97 Considering the State’s offer of proof during the sidebar, it is arguable that the State could

in fact have established the proper foundation for the admission of the video footage from

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No. 1-23-0635

Matyczak’s security cameras. As is, counsel’s choice not to request for the third time that

Matyczak’s testimony be stricken reflects that counsel was aware that Matyczak’s testimony was

inconsequential and was not damaging to Jones in any way. Moreover, counsel was successful in

achieving her goal of barring admission of Matyczak’s video footage. Furthermore, there is no

evidence that suggests that if defense counsel had renewed her objection to Matyczak’s testimony,

the trial court would have granted the motion to strike.

¶ 98 Accordingly, we find Jones has failed to rebut the strong presumption that his counsel’s

conduct was the product of sound trial strategy. A defendant must meet both prongs of Strickland

to succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance and, since Jones has failed to meet the first prong,

we need not examine the second. See e.g., Ford, 2022 IL App (1st) 172581, ¶ 53.

¶ 99 4. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 100 Finally, Jones claims that he was deprived of a fair trial when the State committed

misconduct by telling the jury during closing argument that it “welcomed” its burden. He contends

this was in violation of an agreed upon motion in limine. The State counters that Jones has forfeited

this issue for review where defense counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial to

the State’s comments, counsel failed to include the claim in Jones’s posttrial motion, and plain

error does not apply.

¶ 101 Here, Jones admits that defense counsel did not object contemporaneously to the

prosecutor’s remarks. However, he cites the supreme court case of People v. Denson in support of

his claim that the issue is not forfeited, where counsel filed a motion in limine and raised the

violation in a posttrial motion. 2014 IL 116231, ¶¶ 11-13. In Denson, the court unequivocally

stated that in criminal cases, the “court has held consistently that, to preserve an issue for review,

a defendant must raise it in either a motion in limine or an objection at trial, and in a posttrial

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No. 1-23-0635

motion.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 18. The State does not argue that Jones failed to object to

the offending statements by way of a motion in limine. Rather, the State argues that Jones’s claim

in his posttrial motion was insufficient where Jones failed to allege that the State violated the

motion in limine. We find this argument disingenuous, where Jones clearly preserved the issue in

his posttrial motion when he claimed that:

“The Court erred in denying the defense’s objections throughout the State’s initial

closing argument, especially since ASA Kelly violated defense’s motion in limine ¶ 9,

when she argued that it [the State] ‘welcomed’ its burden of proof. A clear violation of the

motion in limine it agreed to abide by during the trial.”

As Jones objected to the admissibility of the contested statement both in his motion in limine and

in his posttrial motion, Jones preserved the issue for review, and “a contemporaneous trial

objection was not also required.” Id. ¶ 24. We now examine whether Jones was deprived of a fair

trial due to the State’s comment.

¶ 102 “Every defendant has the right to a trial free from improper prejudicial comments or

arguments by the prosecutor.” Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 396. Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude

when presenting their closing argument. Id. For a prosecutorial comment in closing argument to

be reversible error, the comment must be both improper and substantially prejudicial. People v.

Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 49. A prosecutor “may comment on the evidence and any reasonable

inferences that arise from it, even if those inferences reflect negatively on the defendant.” Id., ¶ 44.

Prosecutors may also comment on matters implicated by defense counsel. Id. We consider the

comments in closing argument in context of the entire closing argument of both the State and

defendant. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 357 (2003). Since “the trial court is in a better position

than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks made, the regulation of

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the substance and style of the argument is within the trial court’s discretion.” Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at

396.

¶ 103 Here, defense’s motion in limine precluded the State, in relevant part, from making

“any argument that has the purpose or effect of lessening the importance of the

State’s burden of proof or implying that reasonable doubt is merely a pro forma or a minor

detail ***. The State should further be precluded from stating in its opening or closing

arguments that it ‘welcomes’ its burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt and that it

‘meets that burden every day in this court.’ ”

The motion in limine went on to explain that the reasoning behind the preclusion was that

“[s]uch commentary improperly bolsters the State’s credibility and seems to imply

that, since it is able to meet its burden in other cases, it has met its burden in the present

case before the jury, The State should not be permitted to mention its success in other cases

because said statements/arguments are highly improper and wholly irrelevant.”

¶ 104 Jones argues the State violated this motion when, in its closing argument, the State noted:

“So in order to sustain that charge of aggravated robbery, the State had to prove a

number of propositions. We hold the burden of proof in this case, the highest burden in the

legal system and we welcome it. And we’ve met that burden of proof. So let’s take a look

at the propositions that we have to prove to you.

To sustain the charge of aggravated robbery, the State must prove the following

propositions: ***.”

¶ 105 Jones is unable to demonstrate that the State’s remarks constituted reversible error. While

it is clear the State’s comment during closing arguments violated the motion in limine, it is equally

apparent that—taken as a whole—the State’s comment did not violate the purpose behind the

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No. 1-23-0635

motion. In counsel’s own words, the purpose of the motion was to prevent the State from lessening

the importance of its burden, bolstering its credibility, or implying that reasonable doubt is a minor

detail. When the State’s closing argument is looked at comprehensively, it becomes obvious that

the State did not attempt to lessen its burden or imply that reasonable doubt is a minor detail.

Instead, the State sought to explain that it understood the heavy burden it faced. Furthermore, the

prosecutor’s statement was an accurate and reasonable reflection of the law—the State does have

the highest burden, beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 106 In rebuttal, defense counsel repeatedly reminded the jury that “the State has a burden of

proof,” and insisted the jury “[h]old the State to their burden.” This argument served to reinforce

the State’s burden of proof in proving Jones guilty. Moreover, the court gave the jury proper

instructions on the State’s burden of proof. See Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 396 (noting that a trial court’s

admonishments on the law to be applied generally cures any prejudice resulting from improper

remarks). When instructing the jury, the trial court highlighted that the “State has the burden of

proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State

throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence.”

¶ 107 Considering the above, we find that Jones has failed to establish that any prejudice, yet

alone substantial prejudice, resulted from the State’s remarks. The challenged remark was factually

accurate and did not obfuscate the purpose behind defense’s motion in limine. Further, the remark

was cured by the trial court’s proper jury instructions on the law to be applied.

¶ 108 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 109 Based on the foregoing reasons, Jones’s conviction is affirmed.

¶ 110 Affirmed.

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