The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5371.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-5371
THE STATE EX REL . PAPAGEORGIOU , APPELLANT, v. AVALOTIS
CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Papageorgiou v. Avalotis Corp., Slip Opinion No.
2025-Ohio-5371.]
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in
denying claimant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation
after finding that he had voluntarily abandoned his employment by not
accepting employer’s job offer of light-duty work following work-related
injury—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.
(No. 2025-0429—Submitted August 19, 2025—Decided December 3, 2025.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
No. 23AP-689, 2025-Ohio-846.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Evangelo Papageorgiou, was injured in the course of his
employment with appellee Avalotis Corporation. Appellee Industrial Commission
of Ohio denied Papageorgiou’s request for temporary-total-disability (“TTD”)
compensation, finding that he had voluntarily abandoned his employment with
Avalotis by not accepting its job offer of light-duty work. Papageorgiou filed a
complaint in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the commission to vacate its order and either grant TTD compensation or
hold a new hearing. The Tenth District denied the writ, and Papageorgiou has
appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Papageorgiou suffered a work-related neck injury while operating a
sandblaster on May 25, 2018, and underwent surgery later that day. His workers’
compensation claim was allowed for a “high pressure blast injury with complex
abrasion with embedded foreign bodies right chin and neck; cervical sprain;
cervical strain; [and] head contusion.” Avalotis continued paying his wages from
the date of the injury.
{¶ 3} On June 5, 2018, one of the surgeons who had operated on
Papageorgiou concluded that he could return to light-duty work with a no-heavy-
lifting restriction. A few weeks later, Papageorgiou’s treating physician, Dr. John
L. Dunne, evaluated him and completed a MEDCO-14 Physician’s Report of Work
Ability form (“MEDCO-14 report”), indicating that Papageorgiou was restricted
from bending, squatting, kneeling, twisting, turning, climbing, or lifting more than
10 pounds but that he could occasionally reach above his shoulder and lift up to ten
pounds.
{¶ 4} On June 28, 2018, an Avalotis project manager handed Papageorgiou
a letter offering him light-duty work and advised him to report to a job site the
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January Term, 2025
following day. The offer letter stated that in accordance with Papageorgiou’s recent
medical visit, Avalotis would accommodate his return to work with a no-heavy-
lifting restriction and that his new duties would include any of the following:
“[s]orting hardware associated with the rigging removal,” general-area
housekeeping, “[c]rane/[a]erial lift spotter,” assisting with traffic control, “[p]aint
log recorder,” and managing general inventory.
{¶ 5} Dr. Dunne reviewed the light-duty job offer and agreed in a July 2
letter that Papageorgiou was able to perform the new duties, provided that they
would be performed on the ground and would not involve looking or working
overhead for long periods or lifting more than approximately 20 pounds.
{¶ 6} Papageorgiou, however, did not report to work in the light-duty
position. As a result, Avalotis stopped paying his wages and advised him that his
employment had been deemed abandoned.
{¶ 7} Papageorgiou later requested TTD compensation commencing the
day after his injury. Avalotis opposed the request on the basis that Papageorgiou
had been terminated for refusing light-duty work. After a hearing, a district hearing
officer (“DHO”) for the commission granted Papageorgiou’s request, ordering TTD
compensation to commence after June 28, 2018, based on the DHO’s finding that
Papageorgiou was paid his wages in lieu of TTD compensation from the date of the
injury, May 25, through June 28. The DHO rejected Avalotis’s position that
Papageorgiou had voluntarily abandoned his position by not accepting the light-
duty job offer, because that offer stated only that Avalotis could accommodate the
no-heavy-lifting restriction and did not address the other restrictions identified in
Dr. Dunne’s MEDCO-14 report.
{¶ 8} Avalotis appealed. A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the
commission agreed with the DHO that Papageorgiou was paid wages in lieu of TTD
compensation from the date of his injury through June 28. However, the SHO
denied Papageorgiou’s request for TTD compensation after June 28, finding that
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he had voluntarily abandoned his employment by not accepting the light-duty
position, which his treating physician, Dr. Dunne, had indicated he could perform.
{¶ 9} The commission declined to accept Papageorgiou’s appeal of the
SHO’s order, which thus became the commission’s final order. See R.C.
4121.35(C).
{¶ 10} Papageorgiou filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth
District, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in denying his
request for TTD compensation and seeking an order either granting him TTD
compensation or remanding the matter for a new hearing. A magistrate determined
that the SHO’s order failed to set forth sufficient findings to support the SHO’s
decision, including whether Avalotis had made the light-duty job offer in good
faith. 2025-Ohio-846, ¶ 48-49 (10th Dist.). Therefore, the magistrate
recommended that the Tenth District grant a limited writ remanding the matter to
the commission to issue an amended order. Id. at ¶ 49-50. The commission and
Avalotis filed objections.
{¶ 11} The Tenth District found that the magistrate had misapplied the law,
sustained the objections in part, and denied the writ. Id. at ¶ 12-13. Papageorgiou
has filed this direct appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must show by clear
and convincing evidence that he or she has a clear legal right to the requested relief,
that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that the relator
has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana
Industries, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2021-Ohio-3669, ¶ 10. In a workers’
compensation mandamus appeal, a writ of mandamus may lie when there is a legal
basis to compel the commission to perform its duties under the law or when the
commission has abused its discretion in carrying out its duties. State ex rel. Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-1593, ¶ 9. “Where a commission order
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January Term, 2025
is adequately explained and based on some evidence, even evidence that may be
persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order will not be
disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus.
Comm., 1997-Ohio-181, ¶ 16. However, a writ of mandamus may be issued against
the commission if it “has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.” State ex rel. Gassmann
v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65 (1975).
III. ANALYSIS
{¶ 13} The purpose of TTD compensation is to compensate injured workers
for their loss of earnings while the injury heals. State ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm.,
2024-Ohio-744, ¶ 6. To qualify for TTD compensation, “‘the claimant must show
not only that he or she lacks the medical capability of returning to the former
position of employment but that a cause-and-effect relationship exists between the
industrial injury and an actual loss of earnings.’” State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-2213, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. McCoy v.
Dedicated Transport, Inc., 2002-Ohio-5305, ¶ 35. In other words, it must appear
that but for the work-related injury, the claimant would be gainfully employed. Id.
{¶ 14} R.C. 4123.56(A) provides a formula for TTD compensation based
on a percentage of the employee’s average weekly wage. State ex rel. AutoZone
Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2024-Ohio-5519, ¶ 16. When Papageorgiou was
injured, R.C. 4123.56(A) also provided that payments for TTD compensation “shall
not be made” for the following periods:
[1] when any employee has returned to work, [2] when an
employee’s treating physician has made a written statement that the
employee is capable of returning to the employee’s former position
of employment, [3] when work within the physical capabilities of
the employee is made available by the employer or another
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employer, or [4] when the employee has reached the maximum
medical improvement.
Former R.C. 4123.56(A), 2017 Sub.H.B. No. 27.
{¶ 15} This case involves the third period when payments shall not be paid:
“when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by
the employer.” The Tenth District found that Avalotis offered Papageorgiou a
light-duty position that Dr. Dunne, Papageorgiou’s treating physician, determined
was within his physical capabilities and that Papageorgiou refused the job offer by
failing to show up to work in the light-duty position. Dr. Dunne’s July 2, 2018
letter, the Tenth District concluded, constituted some evidence on which the
commission could properly deny Papageorgiou’s request for TTD compensation
under R.C. 4123.56(A). 2025-Ohio-846 at ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 16} On appeal, Papageorgiou asserts four propositions of law. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that none have merit.
A. Proposition of Law No. 1: Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6)’s Good-Faith-Offer
Requirement
{¶ 17} As his first proposition of law, Papageorgiou asserts that the
commission abused its discretion by failing to consider whether Avalotis’s light-
duty job offer was “a proposal, made in good faith” under Adm.Code 4121-3-
32(A)(6). Papageorgiou is correct that the commission did not explicitly find that
Avalotis extended the light-duty job offer in good faith. But because Papageorgiou
has not established that he properly raised lack of good faith to the commission,
that omission does not constitute an abuse of discretion warranting a writ of
mandamus.
{¶ 18} We have held that R.C. 4123.56(A) “must be read in pari materia
with the Ohio Administrative Code provision that supplements it,” Adm.Code
4121-3-32. State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2007-Ohio-4920,
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January Term, 2025
¶ 13; see State ex rel. Pacheco v. Indus. Comm., 2019-Ohio-2954, ¶ 27. By its
terms, Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B) identifies circumstances when TTD compensation
“may be terminated,” including when the commission finds, after a hearing, that
“the employee has received a written job offer of suitable employment,” Adm.Code
4121-3-32(B)(2)(d). The administrative rule defines “job offer” as “a proposal,
made in good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the
injured worker’s residence.” Adm.Code 4123-3-32(A)(6). “Suitable employment”
is separately defined as “work which is within the employee’s physical
capabilities.” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(3).
{¶ 19} We have also held that whether an employer extended a job offer in
good faith is a factual determination that the commission should make in the first
instance. Ellis Super Valu at ¶ 13-14; Pacheco at ¶ 15-19, 26-28; State ex rel. Ryan
Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, 2021-Ohio-3539, ¶ 8-21. For example, in Ellis
Super Valu, Pacheco, and Ryan Alternative Staffing, we returned the matters to the
commission because the parties in those cases had disputed the employers’ motives
in extending light-duty job offers and the commission either had not decided or had
not sufficiently explained whether those offers were made in good faith.
Specifically, in Ellis Super Valu and Ryan Alternative Staffing, the injured workers
alleged that the job offers lacked good faith because the employers had crafted the
job offers with work shifts that they knew the injured workers could not cover. Ellis
Super Valu at ¶ 1-2, 13; Ryan Alternative Staffing at ¶ 4, 9, 19-20. In Pacheco, the
injured worker alleged that the employer’s offer of a light-duty position lacked
good faith because the position required him to sit idly in public view as if “on
display as a warning to other employees.” Pacheco at ¶ 3-5, 15.
{¶ 20} In his merit brief submitted to this court, Papageorgiou contends that
the commission failed to consider whether Avalotis extended the light-duty job
offer in good faith. But the reason that Papageorgiou advances as why the job offer
lacked good faith is that it identified only one restriction—i.e., “no heavy lifting”—
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
even though Dr. Dunne’s MEDCO-14 report included restrictions on bending,
squatting, kneeling, twisting, turning, climbing, and reaching. Thus, although
Papageorgiou uses lack-of-good-faith language in asserting his first proposition of
law, it is actually a suitable-employment argument. That is, whether the light-duty
job that Avalotis offered was within Papageorgiou’s physical capabilities was an
issue of “suitable employment,” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(3), not whether the job
offer was “made in good faith,” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6).
{¶ 21} In his July 2 letter, Dr. Dunne said that after reviewing Avalotis’s
light-duty job offer, Papageorgiou could perform the duties specified (with noted
restrictions). Relying on Dr. Dunne’s letter, the commission found that Avalotis
had offered Papageorgiou a light-duty position that his physician “sign[ed] off on
and indicate[d] that he would be able to perform.” Therefore, the commission
considered whether the job offer was within Papageorgiou’s physical restrictions—
but that consideration was relevant to whether the job offer constituted “suitable
employment,” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(3), not whether Avalotis extended the job
offer in good faith. Papageorgiou has not presented any argument on appeal to
show a lack of good faith on Avalotis’s part, such as by alleging that Avalotis
created a position with work shifts that it knew he could not cover or that Avalotis
offered a certain position to embarrass him. Nor has Papageorgiou asserted that he
raised such a lack-of-good-faith allegation before the commission.
{¶ 22} The commission does not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly
decide an issue not raised by the party complaining on appeal about the
commission’s purported inaction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v.
Foreman, 1997-Ohio-71, ¶ 20-21 (commission did not abuse its discretion by
failing to initiate an issue that was not raised administratively). If a claimant does
not raise an argument during administrative proceedings, he is barred from doing
so in a subsequent mandamus proceeding. State ex rel. Schlegel v. Stykemain
Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd., 2008-Ohio-5303, ¶ 17-21.
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January Term, 2025
{¶ 23} Here, because there is no indication that Papageorgiou actually
raised a good-faith argument during the commission proceedings, (1) the
commission did not abuse its discretion by not explicitly determining that
Avalotis’s job offer was extended in good faith and (2) the matter need not be
remanded to the commission to make that determination. Accordingly, we reject
Papageorgiou’s first proposition of law.
B. Proposition of Law No. 2: Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b)
{¶ 24} As his second proposition of law, Papageorgiou asserts that
Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b) “makes clear that a treating physician’s indication
that a claimant could return to his former position of employment or other available
suitable employment is only a basis to terminate on-going TTD compensation,” not
a basis to prevent payment of an initial period of TTD compensation. (Emphasis
in original.) Therefore, the commission erred, Papageorgiou contends, by relying
on Dr. Dunne’s July 2 letter to deny Papageorgiou’s first request for TTD
compensation.
{¶ 25} As noted above, Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B) identifies circumstances
when TTD compensation “may be terminated.” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1) and
(2). One such circumstance is when “[t]he employee’s treating physician finds that
the employee is capable of returning to his former position of employment or other
available suitable employment.” Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b). The problem
with Papageorgiou’s argument, however, is that neither the commission nor the
Tenth District explicitly cited Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b) to resolve this matter.
{¶ 26} The Tenth District relied on R.C. 4123.56(A), which states that
“payment shall not be made for the period . . . when work within the physical
capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer.” Because Dr.
Dunne’s July 2 letter indicated that Papageorgiou could perform the light-duty
work, the Tenth District determined that the letter constituted some evidence on
which the commission could rely in denying Papageorgiou’s request for TTD
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compensation under R.C. 4123.56(A). 2025-Ohio-846 at ¶ 10-11 (10th Dist.).
Papageorgiou has not challenged the Tenth District’s reliance on this statutory
language. And to the extent that he believes that Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)(1)(b)
somehow limits the statute’s application, it is well settled that “‘an administrative
rule cannot add [to] or subtract from the legislative enactment’” covering the same
subject matter (bracketed text in original), Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 2012-Ohio-
2187, ¶ 39, quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank
Release Comp. Bd., 2000-Ohio-224, ¶ 30.
{¶ 27} Moreover, we do not interpret Adm.Code 4121-3-32(B)’s language
identifying circumstances when TTD compensation “may be terminated” as
foreclosing the commission from considering those same or similar circumstances
in other scenarios—such as here, when the commission was asked to decide
whether an employee is entitled to TTD compensation after failing to appear for a
light-duty position while receiving wages in lieu of TTD compensation.
{¶ 28} At bottom, Papageorgiou has not proved that Adm.Code 4121-3-
32(B)(1)(b)—or any statute or other administrative rule—clearly prohibited the
commission from relying on the opinion of Papageorgiou’s own treating physician
in deciding Papageorgiou’s request for TTD compensation. Therefore, we reject
Papageorgiou’s second proposition of law.
C. Proposition of Law No. 3: Voluntary Abandonment vs. Refusing
Available Suitable Employment
{¶ 29} As his third proposition of law, Papageorgiou asserts that the
commission abused its discretion by finding that he had voluntarily abandoned his
employment without first considering whether he had voluntarily abandoned the
entire workforce, as required by State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt, 2022-Ohio-
4111. The voluntary-abandonment doctrine, however, is not applicable to the facts
here, and although the SHO found that Papageorgiou had voluntarily abandoned
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January Term, 2025
his position, that finding was inconsequential to the overall decision and does not
amount to an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 30} The voluntary-abandonment doctrine was an affirmative defense to
a claim for TTD compensation.1 See Quest Diagnostics, 2023-Ohio-2213, at ¶ 16.
In February 2019—when the SHO denied Papageorgiou’s application for TTD
compensation—we had recently described the doctrine as follows: “[W]hen a
workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former
position of employment for reasons unrelated to a workplace injury, he is no longer
eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation, even if the claimant remains
disabled at the time of his separation from employment,” State ex rel. Klein v.
Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 2018-Ohio-3890, ¶ 29. We later clarified in
Pratt, 2022-Ohio-4111—the case relied on by Papageorgiou—that despite some of
Klein’s language, we had not meant to change the focus from abandonment of the
workforce to abandonment of the employee’s former position. Pratt at ¶ 21-24.
Even after Klein, the key question remained “whether an injured worker who is no
longer in the former position has abandoned the workforce, not merely abandoned
the former position,” Pratt at ¶ 18; accord id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 31} The defense of voluntary abandonment, however, was and remains
distinct from the defense of refusing available suitable employment. See Ellis,
2007-Ohio-4920, at ¶ 6; Pacheco, 2019-Ohio-2954, at ¶ 24. The latter is a direct
result of R.C. 4123.56(A)’s language prohibiting the payment of TTD
compensation “when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made
available by the employer or another employer.” See Ellis at ¶ 6. This language
1. The General Assembly amended R.C. 4123.56, effective September 15, 2020, by adding division
(F), which expresses “the intent of the general assembly to supersede any previous judicial decision
that applied the doctrine of voluntary abandonment to a claim brought under this section.” The
amendment applies to claims pending on or arising after the effective date, 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. No.
81, § 3, and therefore does not apply to Papageorgiou’s case. See AutoZone Stores, 2024-Ohio-
5519, at ¶ 18.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
was added to R.C. 4123.56(A) “to provide that a claimant who was offered a job
within his or her physical capacities could not receive temporary total disability
compensation if he or she refused that job.” Ellis at ¶ 11. Under those
circumstances, it is the injured worker’s refusal of the job offer of suitable
employment that results in the employee’s loss of wages.
{¶ 32} Papageorgiou contends that there was no evidence indicating he
voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce and that therefore, under Pratt, the
commission erred in finding voluntary abandonment. However, whether
Papageorgiou intended to abandon the entire workforce was not the relevant issue
before the commission, nor is it relevant for purposes of this appeal. Despite the
SHO’s use of the phrase “voluntary abandonment of employment,” the overall
rationale of the SHO’s decision was that Papageorgiou was not entitled to TTD
compensation because he had refused Avalotis’s light-duty job offer. In other
words, the SHO’s finding that Papageorgiou had voluntarily abandoned his position
was inconsequential because the thrust of the decision was that Avalotis had made
work available within Papageorgiou’s physical capabilities—as determined by his
own treating physician—but Papageorgiou refused the job offer of suitable
employment and was therefore not entitled to TTD compensation. Accord State ex
rel. Sebring v. Indus. Comm., 2009-Ohio-5258, ¶ 25-26 (a commission order
mistakenly citing the seminal decision on voluntary abandonment in a case
involving refusal of available suitable employment was inconsequential and not a
basis for issuing a writ of mandamus).
{¶ 33} Because the voluntary-abandonment doctrine was not applicable
here, the SHO was under no obligation to independently consider or determine
whether Papageorgiou had abandoned the entire workforce under Pratt. We
therefore reject Papageorgiou’s third proposition of law.
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January Term, 2025
D. Proposition of Law No. 4: Reliance on Dr. Dunne’s July 2 Letter
{¶ 34} As his fourth proposition of law, Papageorgiou contends that
because Avalotis’s job offer did not set forth the physical requirements for the light-
duty position, the job offer was “legally deficient” and Dr. Dunne had no basis to
conclude that the position was within Papageorgiou’s physical capabilities.
Papageorgiou, however, cites no authority under this proposition of law supporting
the contention that the job offer was “legally deficient.” Because he seeks the
extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, Papageorgiou bears the burden of
establishing that he has a clear legal right to the relief requested and that the
commission had a clear legal duty to provide it. See State ex rel. Byk v. Indus.
Comm., 2025-Ohio-2044, ¶ 39. By not developing this argument on appeal and
supporting it with appropriate legal authorities, he has failed to carry that burden.
{¶ 35} To the extent that Papageorgiou is relying on language within
Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6)’s definition of “job offer,” such reliance is misplaced.
Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) provides:
“Job offer” means a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable
employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker’s
residence. If the injured worker refuses an oral job offer and the
employer intends to initiate proceedings to terminate temporary total
disability compensation, the employer must give the injured worker
a written job offer at least forty-eight hours prior to initiating
proceedings. The written job offer shall identify the position offered
and shall include a description of the duties required of the position
and clearly specify the physical demands of the job. If the employer
files a motion with the industrial commission to terminate payment
of compensation, a copy of the written offer must accompany the
employer’s initial filing.
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(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 36} Papageorgiou has not established that the conditions triggering the
above-italicized language have been met. Specifically, Papageorgiou has not
proved that he orally refused a job offer or that Avalotis intended to initiate
proceedings to terminate TTD compensation. Therefore, to the extent that
Papageorgiou’s fourth proposition of law relies on Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) as
proof that Avalotis’s job offer was “legally deficient,” he has failed to establish that
that language applies to the facts of his case.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 37} For the reasons stated above, Papageorgiou has not established that
he is entitled to relief in mandamus. We affirm the judgment of the Tenth District
Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
__________________
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg, Co., L.P.A., Jerald A. Schneiberg,
Catherine Lietzke, and C. Bradley Howenstein, for appellant.
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Robert J. D’Anniballe Jr., and
Sydney N. Croft, for appellee Avalotis Corporation.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Cindy Albrecht, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
__________________
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