Reese

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT WINCHESTER

KENNETH REESE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-CV-065-DCLC-MJD

)

OFFICER KIRBY, COFFEE COUNTY )

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and COFFEE )

COUNTY JAIL, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, a Coffee County Jail inmate, filed a pro se complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 arising out of an attack on him by other inmates in 2022 [Doc. 1], as well as an amended

complaint [Doc. 20], both of which are now before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, this

action will be DISMISSED without prejudice because the complaints are time-barred.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim

for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard the Supreme Court set

forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive a PLRA initial review, a complaint

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible

claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief

“above a speculative level” fails to state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However,

courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than lawyer-

drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person

acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. ALLEGATIONS

In his complaint, which he signed on July 22, 2025 [Doc. 1 p. 11], and his amended

complaint, which he filed on November 10, 2025 [Doc. 20 p. 2], Plaintiff states that on September

1, 2022, while he was on protective custody and should not have been around other inmates,

Defendant Officer Kirby purposely allowed “max inmates” out during Plaintiff’s recreation, and

these inmates assaulted him and caused him serious injuries [Doc. 1 p. 4, 5, 7; Doc. 1-1 p. 1; Doc.

1-2 p. 1; Doc. 20 p. 1]. Plaintiff also states that in September 2022, he filed grievances and appeals

about this incident, but the only relief he received was being moved to a different cell [Doc. 1-1 p.

1–2; Doc. 1-2 p. 1]. Plaintiff further asserts that for “over a year” prior to filing his complaint, he

asked for a § 1983 complaint packet, but “the jail would never let [him] have it” [Doc. 1-2 p. 2].

C. Analysis

First, it is apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint that his claims are time-barred,

as Plaintiff states that the assault underlying his complaints occurred on September 1, 2022 [Doc.

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1p. 4], which is nearly three years before he filed his original complaint on July 22, 2025 [Id. at

11].

District courts apply state statutes of limitations § 1983 claims. Harris v. United States,

422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983

actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3).

Federal law governs when the statute begins to run. Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s

Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Under federal law, a cause of action

accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the injury forming the basis of the claim is

discoverable, Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Sevier v.

Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)), or when the cause of action is complete, Dibrell v.

City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021) (acknowledging that the “standard” rule is

that the limitations period starts “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action”)

(citation omitted).

The statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner plaintiff exhausts his available

administrative remedies. See Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000). Additionally,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available where a plaintiff demonstrates “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). But this equitable tolling generally

“applies only when a litigant’s failure to meet a legally mandated deadline unavoidably arose from

circumstances beyond the litigant’s control.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of

Art, Inc., 209 F. 3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000). “Absent compelling equitable considerations, a

court should not extend limitations by even a single day.” Id. at 561. It is appropriate for a district

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court to dismiss claims that are time-barred at screening. Norman v. Granson, No. 18-4232, 2020

WL 3240900, at * 2 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2020) (affirming district court’s dismissal of time-barred

claims at screening).

As set forth above, record establishes that Plaintiff finished pursuing his available

administrative remedies in September 2022, which nearly three years before he filed his initial

complaint in this case on July 22, 2025. As such, is apparent from the face of the complaint that

Plaintiff’s claims are untimely by approximately twenty-two months.

Also, while Plaintiff also states in a letter he filed with his complaint that he attempted to

obtain a complaint packet for more than a year before he filed his complaint in this action, but the

jail would not provide him with one, this conclusory statement is insufficient to entitle him to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, as it does not establish that Plaintiff diligently pursued

his rights but an extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing this action.

Specifically, Plaintiff does not state when he first requested a complaint packet, or how many times

he did so. But most notably, Plaintiff does not indicate that he did not have access to paper and

writing utensils, such that he was unable to timely request a § 1983 complaint from the Court or

to file a § 1983 complaint with the Court without using a form, as many prisoners routinely do.

Moreover, it is apparent that, if that were the case, Plaintiff would have stated it in his

complaint. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that “when

a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to

assume that those facts do not exist” (quoting O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir.

1976))).

Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff

demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. It is apparent from the face of Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint that his

claims are time-barred, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is entitled to

equitable tolling;

2. Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; and

3. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good

faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

SO ORDERED. AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

ENTER:

s/Clifton L. Corker

United States District Judge

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