Roesch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

________________________________________

JOSEPH ROESCH,

Plaintiff,

v. 9:22-cv-1365

(ECC/DJS)

DR. CYNTHIA PROVOW, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________________

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge1

MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Joseph Roesch filed this civil rights action alleging violations of his

constitutional rights relating to his involuntary medication at the Oakview Treatment Center of the

Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) where he is a civil detainee. Amended Complaint,

Dkt. No. 21.

Defendant Alyssa Luley, CNYPC’s Director of Risk Management, filed a motion to

dismiss the claims against her arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim or, in the alternative,

that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 58. The motion was referred to U.S. Magistrate

Judge Daniel J. Stewart who issued a Report-Recommendation, recommending that Defendant

Luley’s motion be denied. Dkt. No. 84. Defendant Luley filed objections to the Report-

Recommendation, described as an appeal, but properly referring to objections and the standard of

1 This case was reassigned to the undersigned from Senior United States District Judge Thomas J.

McAvoy.

review in the filing itself. Dkt. No. 86. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the

Report-Recommendation and denies Defendant Luley’s motion to dismiss.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue,

2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper objection is one that

identifies the specific portions of the [report-recommendation] that the objector asserts are

erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp.

2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Properly raised objections “must be specific and

clearly aimed at particular findings in the” report. Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F.

Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). Findings and recommendations as to which

there was no properly preserved objection are reviewed for clear error. Kruger, 976 F. Supp. 2d at

296 (citation omitted). After conducting the appropriate levels of review, the Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate

Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

II. DISCUSSION

Judge Stewart liberally construed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to allege that Defendant

Luley interfered with the appeal process by not forwarding Plaintiff’s appeal of his care and

treatment to the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health (Commissioner), “attempted to hide

the facts of [the] investigation,” and “acted to hide facts by refusing to turn over documentation.”

Dkt. No. 12 at 4 (citing AC ¶¶ 45, 50, 51-54). Judge Stewart recommended denying Defendant

Luley’s motion to dismiss. Regarding her argument that she had no personal involvement based

on the state regulations regarding the appeal process, he concluded that Plaintiff’s specific

allegation that Luley involved herself in the appeal process precluded dismissal. Id. at 5.

Regarding her argument that she would be entitled to qualified immunity because there is no

clearly established law regarding the regulatory appeal process or redaction of an investigative

report, Judge Stewart found that Luley had not established the defense of qualified immunity at

this stage of the litigation given Plaintiff’s allegations that Luley both interfered with the

processing of the appeal and falsified and hid relevant records. Id. at 6.

Defendant Luley raises four objections to the Report-Recommendation which the Court

reviews de novo. First, she argues that Judge Stewart “erred by disregarding [her] citation to” state

regulations requiring the Director of the Facility to transmit an appeal. Dkt. No. 85 at 2. In

addition, she takes the position that the Court is not required to accept as true the allegation that

Luley “did not forward plaintiff’s appeal to the commissioner,” because it is contradicted by the

judicially noticeable fact in the state regulations that the Director of the Facility “shall forthwith

transmit” the appeal. Id. at 3.

Although this argument may be persuasive at a later stage of the litigation, on this motion

to dismiss the Court must accept as true all of the allegations in the Amended Complaint and give

Plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from its well-pleaded

allegations. The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that Luley “did not forward plaintiff’s

appeal to the commissioner.” AC ¶ 45. At this early stage of the litigation, the regulations

requiring the Director to transmit the appeal cannot defeat this allegation. For example, Plaintiff

may support his allegation with facts establishing that Luley involved herself in the appeal process

despite the regulations. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss suggests that

Plaintiff may be able to establish facts supporting this allegation. See Dkt. No. 62 at 1-2

(explaining that Plaintiff sent his appeal to the Director, and Luley, not the Director, intercepted it

and responded).

Second, Luley argues that Judge Stewart “erroneously relied on assertions drawn from

Plaintiff’s memorandum of law—rather than the amended complaint itself—to conclude that [she]

‘actively interfered with the processing of that appeal.’” Dkt. 85 at 3 (quoting Dkt. No. 84 at 6)

(emphasis removed). Judge Stewart concluded that Plaintiff specifically alleges that Luley

involved herself in the appeal process citing to (1) the allegation in the Amended Complaint that

Luley “did not forward plaintiff’s appeal to the commissioner,” and (2) Plaintiff’s Response to the

Motion to Dismiss. As explained above, the specific allegation that Luley “did not forward

plaintiff’s appeal to the commissioner,” is a sufficient basis to deny the motion to dismiss to the

extent it relies on a lack of personal involvement. It is therefore unnecessary for the Court to

address this objection. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff’s Response articulates ways that

Plaintiff may be able to prove this allegation during the litigation.

Finally, Luley argues that Judge Stewart defined the clearly established law “at too high a

level of generality” and that he did not identify any specific binding precedent clearly establishing

that Luley’s alleged conduct of “failing to forward an appeal and redacting an investigative report

in her role as Director of Risk Management” was unlawful. Dkt. No. 85 at 4-5. As Judge Stewart

explained, motions to dismiss asserting qualified immunity normally fail at this stage of the

litigation because the “facts supporting the qualified immunity defense must appear on the face of

the complaint.” Dkt. No. 84 at 5-6 (quoting Pourkavoos v. Town of Avon, 823 F. App’x 53, 59

(2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and alterations omitted)). Accepting as true the allegations that

Luley did not forward the appeal and that she falsified or hid relevant departmental records, there

are insufficient facts to conclude that she is entitled to qualified immunity. AC ¶¶ 50-52. During

the litigation, Luley may establish that the factual allegations are untrue or that she acted

reasonably under the circumstances, but the qualified immunity defense does “not appear on the

face” of the Amended Complaint, and Luley’s motion is therefore denied.

The Court reviews the remainder of the Report-Recommendation for clear error and having

found none, adopts the remainder of the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

HI. Conclusion

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 84, is ADOPTED; and it is

further

ORDERED that Defendant Luley’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 58 is DENIED. As such,

the Court will overrule Defendant’s objections and adopt the Report-Recommendation for the

reasons stated therein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2025 ; / ——— —

Elizabeth C. Coombe

U.S. District Judge