Alaniz

December 01, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JOE ANTHONY ALANIZ, § CIVIL ACTION NO

Plaintiff, § 4:22-cv-01991

§

§

vs § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

§

§

HARRIS COUNTY, et al, §

Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER

ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This action arises from the arrest of Plaintiff Joe

Anthony Alaniz during a protest of the death of George

Floyd. He alleges that Defendants Harris County and

Mark Cannon, a deputy with the Harris County Sheriff’s

office, violated his civil rights when arresting him.

The motion by Harris County for summary judgment is

granted. Dkt 97. The motion by Cannon for summary

judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Dkt 98.

1. Background

Alaniz has or had a brain tumor, making him prone to

seizures. Dkt 104-1 at 3 (Alaniz declaration). He thus

wears an emergency medical alert disability bracelet on

each wrist and often rides his bicycle for therapeutic

purposes. Dkt 104-1 at 3–5.

On May 29, 2020, Alaniz was riding his bicycle in the

downtown area of Houston when he came across a crowd

gathered to protest the recent death of George Floyd.

Dkt 97-4 at 1–2 (internal affairs report). Alaniz stopped

and began filming the incident on his cell phone, streaming

it to Facebook Live. See Dkt 104-5 (cell phone video).

Numerous law enforcement officers, including Cannon,

had been deployed to keep protestors off the nearby

highway and maintain order. See Dkt 98-6 at 6–7 (Oritz

deposition).

Additional video footage from the bodycam of Sergeant

Ana Ortiz shows a contentious encounter between police

and protestors. Dkt 104-6; see also Dkt 104-3 (Cannon

bodycam. Multiple protesters were taken to the ground and

arrested as officers tried to control the crowd. See Dkt

104-6 at 19:57–20:02.

Alaniz asserts that he wasn’t participating in the

protest. See Dkt 104-1 at 3 (Alaniz declaration). Video

instead shows him standing with his bicycle behind officers

filming on his phone. Dkt 104-6 at 20:02:00–10. Ortiz

approached him and told him to move because he was

standing behind officers. Id at 20:03:27–41. Alaniz walked

his bike across the street as he continued to film. Id at

20:03:41–20:04:11.

About seven minutes later, Ortiz ordered Alaniz to

move with the protesters being cleared from the area. Id

at 20:11:15–32. The following then occurred:

o Cannon approached and said, “Do you want to

move your bike or do you want to go with me?”

Id at 20:11:32–40.

o Cannon pointed, directing Alaniz to walk

across the nearby field. Ibid.

o Alaniz walked into the field with his bike. But

he stopped after several steps and continued

filming. Id at 20:11:40–51.

o Officers told him to keep moving. Ibid.

o Alaniz responded, “Relax, I’m not doing

anything.” Id at 20:12:10–15. Ortiz told Alaniz

to move forward multiple times. Id at 20:12:19–

35.

o Cannon then ordered Alaniz to “get on [his]

bike and drive.” Id at 20:12:35–37.

o Alaniz began walking with his bike while

continuing to film. Id at 20:12:35–40.

o Cannon began to count down from five seconds.

Ibid. Alaniz said, “Hold on,” and, “I’m moving.”

Dkt 104-5 at 1:22–30.

o Cannon attempted to handcuff Alaniz and took

him to the ground. Ibid.

o Multiple officers then assisted placing Alaniz

in handcuffs. Dkt 104-3 at 20:12:41–20:13:15.

Alaniz was then transported to the Harris County

Joint Processing Center. Id at 20:16:40–20:17:10. A bicycle,

wallet, and other property belonging to Alaniz were left at

the scene. Dkt 104-1 at 5. No arrest report was generated,

and he was never arraigned. Upon release, Alaniz went to

the hospital and was diagnosed with a “right

acromioclavicular [shoulder] separation.” Dkt 103 at 112

(medical records).

Alaniz filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs

Disciplinary Committee of the Harris County Sheriff’s

Office in June 2020. The Disciplinary Committee

investigated the incident. It partially sustained Alaniz’s

complaint against Cannon, who was reprimanded for

leaving Alaniz’s property at the scene. Dkt 104-4 at 18–19

(letter of reprimand).

Alaniz filed his original complaint in state court in May

2022. He alleged claims under §1983 against Cannon and

Ortiz, along with Sheriff Ed Gonzalez and Deputy Vanessa

Esqueda, for false arrest, excessive force, and failure to

protect from excessive force. Dkt 1-1 at ¶¶61–65. He also

asserted similar claims against Harris County, including

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id

at ¶¶66–71.

Defendants removed. Dkt 1. Cannon moved to dismiss.

Dkt 8. Alaniz amended his complaint. Dkt 12.

Defendants then moved to dismiss all claims against

them. Dkts 15 (Harris County), 16 (Gonzalez) & 19

(Cannon). Alaniz filed no opposition. The motions were

thus granted, and the first amended complaint was

dismissed without prejudice. Dkt 23.

Alaniz filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion

to amend. Dkts 25 & 29. The motion to amend was granted,

but the claims against Esqueda and Ortiz were later

dismissed again for failure to serve them. Dkts 28 & 35.

Alaniz then filed a second amended complaint. Dkt 39.

Defendants again moved to dismiss all claims. Dkts 42

(Harris County), 44 (Gonzalez) & 45 (Cannon). Alaniz

requested that video footage of the incident not be

considered in resolving the motions to dismiss. Dkt 63

(objection by Plaintiff to video supplement to pleadings). It

wasn’t. The motion to dismiss by Harris County was denied

as to the Monell claims under §1983 but granted as to

claims under the ADA and §§1981, 1982 and 1985, which

were dismissed with prejudice. Dkt 54 (minute entry). The

motion to dismiss by Cannon was denied. Dkt 80 (order).

All claims against Gonzalez were dismissed—the official

capacity claims with prejudice, and the individual capacity

claims without prejudice. See Dkts 54 & 80 at 14–15. And

during a motion hearing in April 2025, Alaniz stipulated to

the withdrawal of his claim under §1983 to the extent

proceeding under the First Amendment. Dkt 121 (minute

entry).

Now pending are motions for summary judgment by

Cannon and Harris County. Dkts 97 & 98.

2. Legal standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a court to enter summary judgment when the

movant establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” A fact is material if it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Sulzer

Carbomedics Inc v Oregon Cardio-Devices Inc, 257 F3d 449,

456 (5th Cir 2001), quoting Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc,

477 US 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is genuine if the

“evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v CCC & R Tres

Arboles LLC, 736 F3d 396, 400 (5th Cir 2013), quoting

Anderson, 477 US at 248.

The summary judgment stage doesn’t involve weighing

the evidence or determining the truth of the matter. The

task is solely to determine whether a genuine issue exists

that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Smith v Harris County, 956 F3d 311,

316 (5th Cir 2020). Disputed factual issues must be

resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Little v Liquid

Air Corp, 37 F3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir 1994). All reasonable

inferences must also be drawn in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Connors v Graves, 538 F3d 373,

376 (5th Cir 2008).

The moving party typically bears the entire burden to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Nola Spice Designs LLC v Haydel Enterprises Inc,

783 F3d 527, 536 (5th Cir 2015); see also Celotex Corp v

Catrett, 477 US 317, 322–23 (1986). But when a motion for

summary judgment by a defendant presents a question on

which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to proffer summary judgment

proof establishing an issue of material fact warranting

trial. Nola Spice, 783 F3d at 536. To meet this burden of

proof, the evidence must be both “competent and

admissible at trial.” Bellard v Gautreaux, 675 F3d 454, 460

(5th Cir 2012).

3. Motion for summary judgment by Cannon

Alaniz asserts two claims under §1983 against Cannon

in his individual capacity for excessive force and false

arrest. Dkt 39 at ¶77. Cannon seeks summary judgment on

his affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Dkt 98.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” Pearson v Callahan, 555 US

223, 231 (2009), quoting Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800,

818 (1982). The availability of qualified immunity

ultimately “turns only upon the objective reasonableness of

the defendant’s acts.” Thompson v Upshur County, 245 F3d

447, 457 (5th Cir 2001) (emphasis in original).

“A qualified immunity defense alters the typical

summary judgment burden of proof in that once the

defense is pleaded by an official, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact

issue as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct

violated clearly established federal law.” Hunt v Pierson,

730 F Appx 210, 215–16 (5th Cir 2018), citing Brown v

Callahan, 623 F3d 259, 253 (5th Cir 2010). The plaintiff

bears the burden of negating qualified immunity, but all

inferences are drawn in his favor. Brown, 623 F3d at 253.

Even so, “a plaintiff’s version of the facts should not be

accepted for purposes of qualified immunity when it is

blatantly contradicted and utterly discredited by video

recordings.” Hanks v Rogers, 853 F3d 738, 744 (5th Cir

2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

a. Excessive force

i. Violation of a constitutional right

“A violation of the Fourth Amendment ‘occurs when a

seized person suffers an injury that results directly and

only from a clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable

use of force.’” Spiller v Harris County, 113 F4th 573, 576

(5th Cir 2024), quoting Joseph ex rel Joseph v Bartlett,

981 F3d 319, 332 (5th Cir 2020). “Determining whether

force was excessive or unreasonable is a ‘necessarily fact-

intensive’ and case-specific inquiry.” Spiller, 113 F4th

at 576 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The parties don’t dispute that Alaniz was injured due

to a use of force. At issue is whether that force was clearly

excessive, with the excessiveness itself being objectively

unreasonable. Whether force is reasonable depends on the

Graham factors, being (i) the severity of the crime at issue,

(ii) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and (iii) whether the suspect

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight. Hanks, 853 F3d at 745, quoting Graham v Connor,

490 US 386, 396 (1989). Whether the force deployed was

justified is viewed from “the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene,” taking account of the “individual

interests and the governmental interests at stake.” Barnes

v Felix, 605 US 73, 79 (2025) (citations omitted).

Applying the Graham factors and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to Alaniz, the record contains

disputed issues of material fact as to the reasonableness of

Cannon’s force. Summary judgment is thus inappropriate.

As to severity, the alleged crime was “not severe.” See

Dkt 98 at 20 (Cannon motion). Indeed, it’s unclear whether

any crime was committed at all. In any event, resisting

arrest and/or disobeying a reasonable order to move are

misdemeanors. See Tex Penal Code §38.03; Tex Penal Code

§42.03. And misdemeanors don’t typically support the use

of force. See Trammell v Fruge, 868 F3d 332, 340 (5th Cir

2017). This factor weighs in favor of Alaniz’s argument that

the use of force by Cannon against him was unreasonable.

As to dangerousness, the parties dispute whether

Alaniz posed an immediate threat to the safety of himself

or others. When considering reasonableness, courts must

account for the fact that police officers make split-second

judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving. Graham, 490 US at 396–97. Courts are

thus to “consider the totality of the circumstances as

perceived by a reasonable officer on the scene.” Hatcher v

Bement, 676 F Appx 238, 243 (5th Cir 2017) (internal

quotation omitted).

Cannon emphasizes the tense and chaotic evening in

question. Alaniz admits that he remembered people yelling

at police and multiple protestors being taken to the ground.

Dkt 98-5 at 16, 21 (Alaniz deposition). Ortiz testified that

she was concerned about the safety of motorists, protestors,

and law enforcement that day. Dkt 98-6 at 7 (Ortiz

deposition). Protestors had also been “aggressive” and

“throwing stuff” at officers, thus heightening safety

concerns in general. Id at 12.

Even so, the videos at the time of arrest show that

Alaniz was standing in an open field, filming with his cell

phone, and walking his bike in the direction he’d been

ordered to move. See Dkts 104-5 & 104-6. He wasn’t

immediately adjacent to the street. And he neither verbally

nor physically threatened the officers. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Alaniz, it’s not clear

that a reasonable officer would have perceived immediate

danger warranting force.

As to resistance, fact issues also remain regarding both

Alaniz’s resistance and the proportionality of Cannon’s

response. Officers may “consider a suspect’s refusal to

comply with instructions during a traffic stop in assessing

whether physical force is needed to effectuate the suspect’s

compliance.” Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167 (5th Cir

2009). However, “officers must assess not only the need for

force, but also ‘the relationship between the need and the

amount of force used.’” Ibid.

The parties dispute the extent to which Alaniz

complied with Cannon’s order. The videos show that

Cannon ordered Alaniz to “get on your bike and drive.”

Dkt 104-6 at 20:12:35–37. Alaniz did begin walking in the

direction Cannon ordered him to go. In Alaniz’s view, this

meant he was complying with Cannon’s order. Dkts 105

at 36 & 104-4 at 3. But Cannon argues that he arrested

Alaniz not because he wasn’t moving at all, but because

Alaniz didn’t get on his bike. Dkt 104-2 at 127 (Cannon

deposition). Given the uneven nature of the rocky field and

what was going on around them, it’s unclear whether

riding the bicycle was even possible. Material fact issues

thus remain in this regard.

Most significantly, the parties dispute whether (and if

so, to what extent) Alaniz resisted Cannon’s attempt to

detain and cuff him. Alaniz admits that he “pulled away

from Deputy Cannon” during the attempted cuffing.

Dkt 95-1 at 4. But Alaniz maintains that even if he did pull

his arm away, it constituted passive resistance at most.

Dkt 105 at 34. Use of force isn’t justified where an

individual’s conduct amounts to mere passive resistance.

See Hanks, 853 F3d at 746 (determining plaintiff’s initial

refusals to follow instructions were “at most, passive

resistance” and didn’t justify use of force). Indeed, in

Goodson v City of Corpus Christi, 202 F3d 730, 740 (5th Cir

2000), the Fifth Circuit held that fact issues precluded

summary judgment where the plaintiff pulled his arm

away from arresting officers and was then tackled to the

ground.

But even if Alaniz did pull his arm away from Cannon

in a way justifying some use of force, a fact question

remains regarding the reasonableness of the speed in

which Cannon resorted to taking Alaniz all the way to the

ground. Trammell, 868 F3d at 342 (finding “the quickness

with which the officers resorted to tackling” plaintiff to

weigh “against a finding of reasonableness”).

Taken in the light most favorable to Alaniz, a

reasonable jury could conclude that Cannon’s use of force

was excessive and objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances.

ii. Clear establishment of that right

In a prior excessive-force case, the Fifth Circuit has

said that the second prong of the qualified immunity

analysis is better understood as encompassing “two

separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated

constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of

the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the

defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of that

then clearly established law.” Tarver v City of Edna,

410 F3d 745, 750 (5th Cir 2005). “If officers of reasonable

competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s

rights were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity

remains intact.” Ibid. Said another way, an officer “cannot

be said to have violated a clearly established right unless

the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have

understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v Rickard,

572 US 765, 778–79 (2014).

The same factual disputes prevent finding—at least at

the summary-judgment stage—that Cannon’s conduct did

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known. For

example, in Trammell v Fruge, the plaintiff’s “only physical

resistance to being tackled was his attempt to pull his arm

away.” 868 F3d at 341. The plaintiff was “neither

aggressive nor violent toward officers” and was suspected

of “only a minor offense.” Id at 342. Because a reasonable

jury could conclude the officers’ force was excessive,

summary judgment based on qualified immunity was

inappropriate. Ibid. Likewise instructive is Goodson v City

of Corpus Christi, 202 F3d at 730. Police there ordered the

plaintiff to put his hands on the police car. Id at 734. An

officer then grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, prompting the

plaintiff to pull his arm away, with officers then tackling

him to the ground. Ibid. The Fifth Circuit held on summary

judgment that a fact question remained as to the

reasonableness of force under the circumstances. Id at 740.

Trammell and Goodson are both fair warning that such

conduct may be unconstitutional. For the crime at issue

here wasn’t severe—if existent at all—and no threat of

violence or aggression was apparent from Alaniz. His

physical resistance amounted at most to pulling his arm

away. Yet Cannon responded by taking him quickly and

forcefully to the ground, injuring Alaniz’s shoulder. To be

clear, a jury may yet find that Cannon’s use of force was

reasonable. But it can’t be found reasonable as a matter of

law, given the disputed issues of material fact.

As such, Cannon isn’t entitled to qualified immunity on

the claim for excessive force. Summary judgment will thus

be denied in that respect.

b. False arrest

Alaniz claims that Cannon also violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from false arrest. Cannon

argues that he had probable cause to detain Alaniz and is

thus entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt 98 at 14.

To assert a valid claim under §1983 for false arrest,

Alaniz must show that Cannon “did not have probable

cause to arrest him.” Anokwuru v City of Houston, 990 F3d

956, 963 (5th Cir 2021), quoting Haggerty v Texas Southern

University, 391 F3d 653, 655 (5th Cir 2004) (citation

omitted). “[T]he existence of probable cause for any offense,

including one not charged, is sufficient to defeat a §1983

false arrest claim.” Shemwell v Cannon, 352 F Supp 3d 690,

701 (ND Tex 2019), citing Devenpeck v Alford, 543 US 146,

153–54 (2004). “Probable cause exists when the totality of

the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s

knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a

reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had

committed or was committing an offense.” Haggerty,

391 F3d at 655–56 (quotation omitted).

Pertinent here, Cannon is entitled to qualified

immunity if “a reasonable officer in his position could have

believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and

circumstances of which [he] was aware, there was a fair

probability that [the suspect] had committed or was

committing an offense.” Id at 656, citing Glenn v City of

Tyler, 242 F3d 307, 313 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth Circuit in

Club Retro LLC v Hilton explained the clearly-established

prong in this regard this way:

The Fourth Amendment right to be free

from false arrest—arrest without probable

cause—was clearly established at the time

of [plaintiffs’] arrests. Nonetheless, “[e]ven

law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably

but mistakenly conclude that probable

cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.”

Thus, plaintiffs must allege facts

permitting an inference that defendants

lacked arguable (that is, reasonable but

mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.

568 F3d 181, 206–07 (5th Cir 2009) (citations omitted).

Cannon argues that he had probable cause that Alaniz

was committing the offense of resisting arrest. Dkt 98

at 28. Texas Penal Code §38.03 defines the crime of

resisting arrest and provides in part:

(a) A person commits an offense if he

intentionally prevents or obstructs a

person he knows is a peace officer or a

person acting in a peace officer’s presence

and at his direction from effecting an

arrest, search, or transportation of the

actor or another by using force against the

peace officer or another.

(b) It is no defense to prosecution under

this section that the arrest or search was

unlawful.

In Texas, the act of resisting can supply probable cause

for the arrest itself. Ramirez v Martinez, 716 F3d 369, 376

(5th Cir 2013). And the “great weight of Texas authority

indicates that pulling out of an officer’s grasp is sufficient

to constitute resisting arrest.” Ibid (collecting cases). In

Ramirez, the plaintiff admitted that he “pulled his arm out

of [the officer’s] grasp” during the attempted arrest. Id

at 377. And so, because the officer could reasonably

conclude that a plaintiff committed the offense of resisting

arrest by pulling his arm away, he was entitled to qualified

immunity. Ibid.

The same is true here. Alaniz argues that Cannon

lacked any probable cause for his arrest. Dkt 105 at 41. But

Alaniz admits that he “pulled away from Deputy Cannon

as he tried to cuff [Alaniz].” Dkt 95-1 at 4. Per Ramirez, this

act of pulling away from Cannon during arrest, however

minor, is enough for him to reasonably believe probable

cause existed.

Cannon also argues that he had probable cause that

Alaniz was disobeying a reasonable order to move. Dkt 98

at 28. Given the finding that Cannon had at least arguable

probable cause as to resisting arrest, whether it also

existed for disobeying a reasonable order to move needn’t

be analyzed.

Cannon is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim

for false arrest. Summary judgment will thus be granted in

that respect.

4. Motion for summary judgment by Harris

County

Alaniz asserts §1983 liability against Harris County

for failure to discipline, failure to train, and ratification of

Cannon’s conduct. Dkt 39 at ¶¶78, 87–120. Harris County

seeks summary judgment as to all claims. Dkt 97.

For a municipality to be liable under §1983, there must

be an underlying constitutional violation. See Pineda v City

of Houston, 291 F3d 325, 328 (5th Cir 2002). Almost all of

the arguments by Alaniz against Harris County focus on

false arrest. It has been determined above that there is no

constitutional violation as to false arrest. Related claims

against Harris County must therefore be dismissed on that

basis. Even so, all of Alaniz’s claims against Harris County

will be addressed briefly.

Municipal liability under §1983 doesn’t extend merely

on a respondeat superior basis. Monell v Department of

Social Services, 436 US 658, 691 (1978). The plaintiff must

show “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy

maker can be charged with actual or constructive

knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose

‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” Pineda, 291 F3d

at 328. “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to

distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees

of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal

liability is limited to action for which the municipality is

actually responsible.” Doe v Edgewood Independent School

District, 964 F3d 351, 364–65 (5th Cir 2020) (emphasis in

original), quoting Pembaur v Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 479

(1986).

a. Unconstitutional policy or practice

Alaniz maintains that Harris County is liable for

unconstitutional policies by failing to discipline officers for

arrests made without probable cause, and by “permitting

and encouraging” excessive force. Dkt 105 at 22, 47–48.

Such contention is untenable because Alaniz fails to

establish an official policy or custom, causation, or

demonstrate knowledge by the policymaker.

As to an official policy, a plaintiff may plead one of two

types of policies. One is “a policy statement formally

announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v City of

Wichita Falls, 614 F3d 161, 168 (5th Cir 2010). The other

is “a practice so persistent and widespread as to practically

have the force of law.” Ratliff v Aransas County, 948 F3d

281, 285 (5th Cir 2020) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Alaniz nowhere links his claim to an official written

policy. In fact, Harris County highlights that it had

appropriate written policies regarding use of force and

arrest procedures in place. See Dkt 97-11 (Harris County

Sheriff’s Office Department Policies). And to establish an

official custom, one act alone is not enough; there must be

a “persistent and widespread practice.” Pineda, 291 F3d

at 329. When considering whether a series of incidents

amounts to an official pattern or custom, the “size of a

police department may [also] be relevant.” Peterson v City

of Fort Worth, Texas, 588 F3d 838, 851 (5th Cir 2009).

In Peterson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s

theory because it lacked factual development. Ibid.

Specifically, the court held twenty-seven complaints over

four years insufficient to establish an official custom of

excessive force because the plaintiff failed to provide

evidence as to the size of the police department or the

number of total arrests made in the relevant period. Id

at 851–52; see also Pineda, 291 F3d at 329: “Eleven

incidents each ultimately offering equivocal evidence of

compliance with the Fourth Amendment cannot support a

pattern of illegality in one of the Nation’s largest cities and

police forces.”

Regarding false arrest, Alaniz argues that Harris

County has a policy to review all arrests and yet has never

taken disciplinary action against an officer for arresting

without probable cause. Dkt 105 at 47–48. That failure to

discipline, he says, is the “moving force” behind his injury.

Id at 48. He relies on Exhibit H to show “dozens” of

examples of individuals arrested without probable cause.

Dkts 105 at 47 & 105-1 (exhibit H). And he says that there’s

“not a single instance” of Harris County “disciplining,

training, or retraining its officers” for false arrest. Dkt 105

at 26. In his view, this failure to discipline amounts to an

official, unconstitutional policy.

Harris County objects to the admission of Exhibit H on

hearsay grounds. Dkt 107 at 2; see Dkt 105-1 (Exhibit H).

But counsel for Plaintiff provided a declaration attesting

that the records were derived from the Harris County

Clerk’s office website, establishing authenticity. Dkt 105-1

at 4–5. And, though hearsay, these records appear to fall

within the public-records exception of Federal Rule of

Evidence 803(8). Exhibit H is thus likely admissible.

Even so, Alaniz hasn’t provided necessary context for

Exhibit H to demonstrate that arrests without probable

cause amount to an official custom. He provides neither

evidence of the total number of arrests between 2018 and

2020, nor the size of the police department. Without such

evidence, and as a matter of law, the unexplained “dozens”

of cases he cites cannot amount to an official policy. In

addition, to show that there is not a single instance of

Harris County disciplining its officers after false arrest, he

cites only to Harris County’s own written policies, which

include proper arrest procedures. Dkt 105 at 26. This isn’t

enough to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether failure

to discipline its officers for false arrest is attributable to

Harris County as an official custom.

Regarding excessive force, Alaniz makes the bare

allegation in his “undisputed facts” section that “[Harris

County] has a practice, custom, culture, procedure, and

training of permitting and encouraging excessive force

against suspects, inmates, and persons in their custody.”

Dkt 105 at 22. In support, he again cites to Exhibit H,

which includes only purported arrests without probable

cause. It’s thus irrelevant to the excessive force

accusations. He also cites to Harris County’s written

policies at Exhibit I, which state, “In every situation, the

use of force will be avoided if reasonably possible.” See

Dkt 104-7 at 36. But Alaniz provides no evidence of a

custom regarding excessive force that could be said to

override this written policy.

As to policymaker, a city cannot be liable for an

unwritten custom unless “[a]ctual or constructive

knowledge of such custom” is attributable to a city

policymaker. Webster v City of Houston, 735 F3d 838, 841

(5th Cir 1984). Alaniz hasn’t provided evidence of such

knowledge. He states simply that Ed Gonzalez was the

policymaker at the time, while citing to Webster for the

proposition that “the course of conduct warrants the

attribution to the [City’s] governing body of knowledge that

the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice

of city employees.” Dkt 105 at 48–49, citing 735 F2d at 842.

This in no way connects the actual or constructive

knowledge of any custom (much less add to any proof that

such a custom exists).

As to causation, Alaniz says that the putative custom

of failing to discipline offers the “moving force behind the

pervasive practice by Harris County Sheriff’s officers.”

Dkt 105 at 48. This is also too tenuous to sustain his claim.

For aside from conclusory statements, he provides no

evidence that his injury arose from any failure of Harris

County to discipline other officers. Dkt 105 at 48.

Summary judgment will be entered on behalf of Harris

County as to the Monell theory with respect to

unconstitutional policy or practice.

b. Failure to train

The Supreme Court observes, “A municipality’s

culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous

where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v

Thompson, 563 US 51, 61 (2011). But a decision by a local

government not to train certain employees about their

legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may in some

circumstances rise to the level of an official government

policy for purposes of §1983. Id at 61–62.

To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead that (i) the

training procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were

inadequate; (ii) the policymaker was deliberately

indifferent in adopting the training policy; and (iii) the

inadequate training policy directly caused the plaintiff’s

injury. Conner v Travis County, 209 F3d 794, 796 (5th Cir

2000), quoting Baker v Putnal, 75 F3d 190, 200 (5th Cir

1996).

As to inadequate training, municipal liability doesn’t

attach merely because “a particular officer may be

unsatisfactorily trained” or “an otherwise sound program

has occasionally been negligently administered.” City of

Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 390–91 (1989). The Fifth

Circuit directs with the first element that the focus must

be on the adequacy of the training program in relation to

the tasks the particular officer must perform. Snyder v

Trepagnier, 142 F3d 791, 798 (5th Cir 1998), quoting City

of Canton, 489 US at 390. And so to defeat a motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff must allege with

specificity how the training program is defective in this

regard. Roberts v City of Shreveport, 397 F3d 287, 293

(5th Cir 2005).

Alaniz appears to contend that Harris County failed to

adequately train as to (i) arrest without probable cause,

(ii) use of excessive force, and (iii) recognizing emergency

medical bracelets. Dkt 105 at 45–47. Such vague and

conclusory allegations can’t sustain his claims. Alaniz also

fails to identify specific deficiencies in the training

programs.

With respect to false arrest, Alaniz cites only to the fact

that Cannon said he wasn’t comfortable with the Fourth

Amendment. Dkt 105 at 47. But it’s undisputed that

Cannon did receive training that satisfied state standards.

See Dkts 97 at 16–17 & 97-6 (Cannon training records).

“[I]f training of police officers meets state standards, there

can be no cause of action for a failure to train absent a

showing that this legal minimum of training was

inadequate to enable officers to deal with the ‘usual and

recurring situations’ faced by jailers and peace officers.”

O’Neal v City of San Antonio, 344 F Appx 885, 888 (5th Cir

2009), quoting Benavides v County of Wilson, 955 F2d 968,

973 (5th Cir 1992). Regardless, that an officer expressed

discomfort with the Fourth Amendment doesn’t show that

the training program itself is defective. See City of Canton,

489 US at 390–91: “That a particular officer may be

unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten

liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have

resulted from factors other than a faulty training

program.”

With respect to excessive force, Alaniz doesn’t even

argue that the training is inadequate.

With respect to training regarding medical bracelets,

Alaniz cites no legal authority demonstrating an obligation

for such training or that such training is necessary to

enable officers to “respond properly to the usual and

recurring situations with which they must deal.” See

Dkt 105 at 46; Benavides, 955 F2d at 973, quoting City of

Canton, 489 US at 391.

Alaniz thus fails to identify any specific training

program or show how it is inadequate.

As to deliberate indifference, Alaniz also fails to meet

his burden. This is “a stringent standard of fault,” one

“requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick

563 US at 61 (citation omitted). “Thus, when city

policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a

particular omission in their training program causes city

employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city

may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers

choose to retain that program.” Ibid. A municipality’s

deliberate indifference typically requires a plaintiff to

allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees. Id at 62.

Only as to false arrest does Alaniz even attempt to

provide any evidence of a pattern of purported

unconstitutional conduct. See Dkt 105-1 (Exhibit H). But

even if Exhibit H is accepted as true, it doesn’t reveal any

information about the training that involved officers

received or its inadequacy. It’s also not sufficiently specific

to show that any training itself was inadequate. And in line

with other determination above about pattern, given the

number of arrests that Harris County makes year over

year, Alaniz purporting to point to “dozens” of arrests

without probable cause over multiple years can’t sustain

the allegation that policymakers were deliberately

indifferent to the constitutional rights of its citizens.

If a plaintiff can’t allege a pattern, “it is still possible to

establish deliberate indifference through the single-

incident exception.” Hutcheson v Dallas County, 994 F3d

477, 482 (5th Cir 2021) But that exception is “extremely

narrow” and requires the plaintiff to “prove that the highly

predictable consequence of a failure to train would result

in the specific injury suffered.” Ibid. Such exception is

generally reserved for cases where the municipality

provided no training at all. Id at 483. That isn’t the

situation here. Cannon received extensive training

regarding arrest procedures, search and seizure, use of

force, and first aid. See Dkt 97-6 (Cannon training records).

As to causation, Alaniz again hasn’t shown that

inadequate training was the “moving force” in his injury.

His assertions are conclusory and fail to demonstrate a

causal connection between the purported lack of training

and his injury. Dkt 105 at 46.

Alaniz fails to carry his burden as to all three elements

of his failure-to-train theory. Summary judgment will be

entered in favor of Harris County on such claim.

c. Ratification

Alaniz further alleges that Harris County is liable

because it ratified the “unconstitutional practice of

unlawful arrest without probable cause” by failing to

discipline officers for such conduct. Dkt 105 at 51.

The Fifth Circuit limits the theory of ratification to

“extreme factual situations.” Peterson, 588 F3d at 848.

Under such precedent, this case can’t be considered an

extreme situation. Compare Grandstaff v City of Borger,

767 F2d 161, 168 (5th Cir 1985) (finding ratification where

officers “poured” gunfire onto a truck and killed innocent

occupant), with Snyder, 142 F3d at 798 (declining to find

ratification in case where officer shot fleeing suspect in

back); Peterson, 588 F3d at 848 (declining to find

ratification where officer detained suspect and struck his

knee); World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v Town of

Columbia, 591 F3d 747, 755 (5th Cir 2009) (declining to

find ratification where officer told protesters to leave

intersection).

And regardless, ratification requires the approval of a

policymaker, not mere acquiescence or failure to discipline,

as Alaniz argues here. See Benfer v City of Baytown, Texas,

120 F4th 1272, 1287 (5th Cir 2024), citing Allen v Hays,

65 F4th 736, 749 n 10 (5th Cir 2023) (cleaned up):

“Ratification can suffice for Monell liability only if the

authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision

and the basis for it.”

Summary judgment will thus be entered in favor of

Harris County on the ratification claim.

5. Conclusion

The motion by Defendant Harris County for summary

judgment is GRANTED. Dkt 97.

The claims against it are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The motion by Defendant Deputy Mark Cannon for

summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. Dkt 98.

It is GRANTED as to the claim for false arrest, which is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

It is DENIED as to the claim for excessive force.

SO ORDERED.

Signed on December 1, 2025, at Houston, Texas.

BE.

Hon Charles Eskrifige

United States District Judge

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