Anthony

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MARIAN ANTHONY, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1548-CAB-AHG

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

13 v.

(1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO

14 FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, in his

DISMISS [Doc. Nos. 14, 17];

Individual and Official Capacity as

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Hearing Officer, Superior Court of

(2) DENYING VARIOUS MOTIONS

16 California; EMILY BRAY, in her

[Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39]

individual capacity,

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Defendants.

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20 On June 17, 2025, Plaintiff Marian Anthony filed a complaint against Defendants

21 Franciso Sanchez and Emily Bray, alleging Section 1983 and civil RICO conspiracy

22 claims. [Doc. No. 1.] The Court dismissed with leave to amend. [Doc. No. 5.] On July

23 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. [Doc. No. 7 (“FAC”).] Defendants Sanchez

24 and Bray filed separate motions to dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 14, 17.] Plaintiff has since filed

25 eight motions, including motions for preliminary injunction, to amend, to strike, and to

26 sanction. [Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39.] For the reasons below, the Court

27 GRANTS the motions to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s various motions.

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1 I. BACKGROUND

2 This action stems from a child custody proceeding in state court. Defendant Sanchez

3 is a Judge of the Superior Court of California, who Plaintiff alleges is supporting fraud by

4 Corina Galvez. [Doc. No. 17-1 at 7; FAC ¶ 6.] It appears Galvez is Plaintiff’s ex-wife or

5 partner. [Id. at ¶ 9.] Defendant Sanchez allegedly suppressed police misconduct,

6 threatened Plaintiff, and engaged in ex parte communication. [Id. at ¶ 10.] Defendant Bray

7 is an attorney representing Galvez in the state proceedings. [Id. at ¶ 7.] Plaintiff alleges

8 that Defendant Bray filed a false affidavit. [Id. at ¶ 11.]

9 Plaintiff brings (1) a Section 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated due

10 process, the Seventh Amendment, and Plaintiff’s “parental rights”; (2) RICO conspiracy

11 claims for mail fraud, false affidavit, and suppression; and (3) a claim for fraud upon the

12 court. [Id. at 4–5.] He seeks an injunction staying state proceedings, a declaratory

13 judgment voiding state orders, and damages. [Id. at 6.] Defendants argue that the

14 complaint is entirely conclusory, fails to remedy the defects found in the initial complaint,

15 and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or lack of subject matter

16 jurisdiction.

17 II. LEGAL STANDARD

18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss based on the court's lack

19 of subject-matter jurisdiction. The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould

20 v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). The party asserting

21 jurisdiction, here Plaintiff, has the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter

22 jurisdiction. Ass’n. of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778–79 (9th Cir.

23 2000). As such, the court cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own

24 subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 95

25 (1998). A defense of lack of “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s

26 power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.

27 625, 630 (2002).

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1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss based on a “failure to

2 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Court evaluates whether a complaint

3 states a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),

4 which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

5 to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does]

6 demand[] . . . more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

8 544, 555 (2007)).

9 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

10 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible

12 when the collective facts pleaded “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that

13 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer

14 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “merely consistent with a

15 defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (internal quotation

16 marks omitted). The Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the

17 complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

18 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998

19 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and construes

20 the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Plaintiff. See

21 Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, as Plaintiff proceeds

22 pro se, the Court construes his complaint liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342

23 (9th Cir. 2010).

24 III. DISCUSSION

25 A. Motions to Dismiss

26 Plaintiff alleges various issues with how Defendant Sanchez conducted a hearing on

27 June 4, 2025, including suppressing evidence, ex parte communications, and “dismiss[ing]

28 diversity issues[.]” [FAC at 3–4.] He also opposes Defendant Sanchez’s denial of

1 Plaintiff’s request for a stay in the state proceedings. [Id. at 4.] Defendant Sanchez argues

2 that he has absolute judicial immunity, and that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred,

3 inter alia, by Rooker-Feldman and the Anti-Injunction Act. The Court agrees.

4 “Judges . . . are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their

5 official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). “This

6 absolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even

7 when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives, or when the

8 exercise of judicial authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” In

9 re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks

10 omitted). Despite suing Defendant Sanchez in his individual capacity, Plaintiff seeks

11 damages for actions Defendant Sanchez took in his official capacity as a judge. [FAC at

12 4–5.] Plaintiff states that “Sanchez’s non-judicial acts . . . negate immunity[,]” but he does

13 not allege any non-judicial acts. [Id. at 5.] Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant

14 Sanchez is immune to any damages liability.

15 Plaintiff also seeks an injunction staying the state court proceedings and declaratory

16 judgment “voiding state orders.” [Id. at 6.] “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars direct

17 federal district court appellate review of state court judicial proceedings.” S. California

18 Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). “If claims raised in the federal

19 court action are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decisions such that the

20 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling . . . then the federal

21 complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Bianchi v.

22 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the Anti-Injunction Act

23 prohibits this Court from enjoining ongoing state court proceedings with limited

24 exceptions, none of which apply here. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive

25 Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970). As Plaintiff seeks to void state court decisions and stay

26 state court proceedings, the Court dismisses his claims against Defendant Sanchez for lack

27 of subject matter jurisdiction and denies Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.

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1 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bray are also dismissed for failure to state a

2 claim. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Bray filed a false and inaccurate affidavit

3 with no further explanation. [FAC at 4.] His claims are entirely conclusory. See Daniels-

4 Hall, 629 F.3d at 998. Moreover, Defendant Bray, as a lawyer in private practice, does not

5 act under the color of state law when representing a party in court proceedings. See

6 Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). A Section

7 1983 claim against her, therefore, is not possible. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the

8 motions to dismiss, [Doc. Nos. 14, 17], and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

9 injunction. [Doc. No. 34.] The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

10 injunction was previously denied without leave to amend. [Doc. No. 5 at 2.] Plaintiff may

11 be subject to sanctions if he continues to file frivolous motions.

12 B. Motions to Strike

13 Plaintiff filed two motions to strike portions of Defendant Sanchez’s motion to

14 dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 20, 29.] Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant Sanchez noting that he

15 had trouble understanding Plaintiff’s complaint, and his argument that Plaintiff’s claims

16 are defective. A court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any

17 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). None of

18 Defendant Sanchez’s submissions qualify as such. The motions to strike are DENIED.

19 C. Motions for Leave to Amend Complaint and File Sur-reply

20 Plaintiff seeks to file a second amended complaint and sur-reply. [Doc. Nos. 21, 27,

21 28.] “A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is

22 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”

23 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff

24 was already given an opportunity to file an amended complaint, and he cured none of the

25 deficiencies in his initial complaint. It is clear to the Court that another opportunity to

26 amend is futile; Plaintiff improperly seeks to contravene settled law to void and enjoin state

27 court judgments and proceedings in a federal district court. The Court DENIES the

28 motions for leave to file a second amended complaint and for an extension of time to file

| complaint. [Doc. Nos. 27, 28.] The Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for leave

2 || to file a sur-reply. [Doc. Nos. 21, 27.]

3 D. Motion for Sanctions

4 Plaintiff seeks to sanction Defendant Sanchez for “frivolous Objection to Judicial

5 || Notice, misapplying law and attaching incomplete minutes. Seeking Safe harbor. Seek fees,

6 strike Objection.” [Doc. No. 35 at 3.] Plaintiff's motion is frivolous and immaterial.

7 || Defendant Sanchez has not engaged in any bad faith or improper conduct. See B.K.B. v.

8 || Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that sanctions are

9 available under the court’s inherent authority “if the court specifically finds bad faith or

10 conduct tantamount to bad faith”). The Court DENIES the motion to sanction.

11 E. Motion for Hearing

12 Plaintiff seeks to have a hearing on all pending motions in this case. [Doc. No. 39.]

13 ||The Court has discretion to decide a motion without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1(d).

14 || With all other motions in the case decided, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for

15 hearing.

16 IV. CONCLUSION

17 For the above reasons, the Court:

18 (1)GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE the motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 14, 17];

19 (2) DENIES the motions to strike, to file an amended complaint, for an extension

20 to file an amended complaint, to file a sur-reply, to sanction, for preliminary

21 injunction, and for a hearing [Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, and 39.]

22 The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

23 It is SO ORDERED.

24 Dated: November 17, 2025 □ Z

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Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

26 United States District Judge

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