Thundathil

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTINA D. THUNDATHIL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1564-MSS-SPF

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

BAY CARE HEALTH CARE D/B/A

WINTER HAVEN HOSPITAL,

CITY OF WINTER HAVEN,

POLICE OF WINTER HAVEN,

POLK COUNTY BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and

POLK COUNTY SHERIFF GRADY JUDD,

Defendants.

________ /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) and Application to Proceed in

District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), construed by the Court as a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Upon due consideration, the undersigned

recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice, and her motion be

denied without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff attempts to sue Defendants United States of America (“United States”), Bay

Care Health Care d/b/a Winter Haven Hospital1 (“BayCare”), City of Winter Haven

(“Winter Haven”), Police of Winter Haven (“Winter Haven Police”), Polk County Board of

1 It appears that Plaintiff is referencing BayCare Healthcare System, a private health system operating

in Central Florida, but it is not entirely clear. See BAYCARE, https://baycare.org/ (last visited Oct. 17,

2025).

County Commissioners (“Polk County Commissioners”), and Polk County Sheriff Grady

Judd (“Sheriff Judd”) for purportedly inferior medical treatment and ostensibly illegal

interactions with Winter Haven Police beginning in 2023, including around the time of

Plaintiff’s suicide attempt in 2024. (Doc. 1).2

Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Claims Confidentiality Statute, 38 U.S.C. §§ 5701, 7332; the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d, et seq.; the

judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455; several criminal statutes including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519,

1001, 242; the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b),

2671-80; the statute that permits remedies for conspiracies to interfere with civil rights, 42

U.S.C. § 1985; Title VII of the Voting Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act

42 U.S.C. § 504; Florida’s Baker Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.4633; Florida’s Health Information

Privacy Law, Fla. Stat. § 456.057; and Florida’s patient’s rights statute, Fla. Stat. § 394.459.4

(Doc. 1).

2 Plaintiff has filed at least two other cases in this District against the United States, the VA, and the

VA Secretary for ADA violations in one instance and the President and VA Secretary for civil rights

violations in the other. Thundathil v. United States of Am, et al., No. 8:24-cv-399, at (Doc. 1) (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 13, 2024); Thundathil v. Trump, et al., No. 6:18-cv-2231, at (Doc. 1) (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2018). It

is unclear how much overlap exists between the instant case and the prior ones because the complaints

were deficient in those matters as well. See Thundathil, No. 8:24-cv-399, at (Docs. 5, 6); Thundathil,

No. 6:18-cv-2231, at (Doc. 5).

3 The Florida Mental Health Act, often referred to as the Baker Act, sets forth the procedures for the

involuntary commitment and examination of those afflicted with a mental illness. See Anderson v.

Snyder, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1086 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)). For simplicity,

the Court refers to this statute as the Baker Act.

4 The Complaint also cites Fla. Stat. § 456.45, but the Court was unable to locate any such statute.

Florida’s Mental Competency database (MECOM) is also claimed to have been violated, but it is

unclear at this juncture precisely what that means to Plaintiff.

II. In Forma Pauperis

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the

commencement of an action without requiring the prepayment of fees or security therefor. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the court must

review the case and dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The phrase

“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” has the same meaning as the nearly

identical phrase in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d

1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in

reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”); Azar v. Nat'l City Bank, 382 F. App’x

880, 884 (11th Cir. 2010).

The pleadings of a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted

by an attorney and must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). But a court does not have

“license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain

an action.” GJR Investments v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998),

overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where a district court

determines from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are baseless or the legal

theories are without merit, the court may conclude a case has little or no chance of success

and dismiss the complaint before service of process. Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th

Cir. 1993).

When considering whether a litigant is indigent under section 1915, the only

determination to be made by the district court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy

the requirement of poverty. Martinez v. Krisi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.

2004). In making this determination, the district court must compare the litigant’s assets and

liabilities. Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). “[C]ourts

will generally look to whether the person is employed, the person’s annual salary, and any

other property or assets the person may possess.” Schneller v. Prospect Park Nursing & Rehab.

Ctr., 2006 WL 1030284, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2006) (citation omitted). Courts may also

consider the income of a party’s spouse and joint assets when determining a party’s motion

to proceed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Jones v. St. Vincents Health Sys., 2007 WL 1789242, at *1

(M.D. Fla. June 19, 2007) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because

the plaintiff’s total monthly household income, which was derived primarily from the

spouse’s income, exceeded joint monthly expenses).

A litigant need not show he or she is “absolutely destitute” to qualify for indigent

status. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. Rather, an application needs only to show that the litigant,

because of poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs while providing necessities

for the litigant and any dependents. Id. “In other words, the statute is not to be construed

such that potential litigants are forced to become public charges or abandon their claims

because of the filing fee requirements.” Id.

In the affidavit in support of her application, Plaintiff attests to a total monthly income

of approximately $4500, comprised of disability benefits. (Doc. 2 at 2). Plaintiff reports that

Nissan owes her $197 and DVA Travel owes her over $500. (Id. at 3). Regarding Plaintiff’s

monthly liabilities, Plaintiff attests to monthly expenses totaling $3626.27. (Id. at 4-5). While

Plaintiff is likely not entitled to in forma pauperis status, the Court proceeds with its analysis of

the Complaint pursuant to section 1915 because it is due to be dismissed.

II. Pleading Deficiencies

The Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. Complaints that

violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b) “are often disparagingly referred to as

‘shotgun pleadings.’” See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th

Cir. 2015). Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rule 10 further

provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized four basic types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a

complaint that contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all

preceding counts; (2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts

not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to separate

into different counts each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint that asserts

multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are

responsible for which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun

pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each

claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

The Complaint embodies these deficiencies. The fifty-four-page pleading is primarily

a stream of consciousness narration of Plaintiff’s grievances against Defendants and other

unnamed parties. (Doc. 1). While the first couple of pages describe the parties and the basis

of the Court’s jurisdiction and venue, the next fifty-two pages are a rambling account of

Plaintiff’s experiences with Defendants and other third parties, her opinions of Defendants

and certain other groups of people, portions of her medical records and summaries of

Plaintiff’s health struggles, and copy-and-pasted text from federal and state statutes,

constitutional provisions, and cases. (Id.).

The Complaint also does not separate into different counts each cause of action or

claim for relief. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. For example, while it appears that there is at

least an attempt to organize the claims with headings, it does little to help. (Doc. 1). Many

of the bolded and underlined headings refer to multiple statutes at once, like “HIPAA

Violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320d Basis for Medical Malpractice Conspiracy,” but the following

paragraphs discuss other laws and facts that lack sufficient context to determine which laws

and facts are relevant. (Id. at 3). In another example, a heading seems to indicate that the

following section concerns religious discrimination, but what follows are claims that certain

of the Defendants apparently forced their religion on Plaintiff and several pages about alleged

wrongdoing related to her medical records. (Id. at 25-30). There does not appear to otherwise

be an attempt to organize the pleading much less number the paragraphs.

Finally, the pleading asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which of

the defendants the claim is brought against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. For instance, there

is a claim for medical malpractice, but it is entirely unclear whether this claim is brought

against all Defendants or just BayCare and, if it is meant to target all Defendants, how the

other Defendants were responsible.

At base, the Complaint does not plead the alleged facts or causes of action in separately

numbered paragraphs and instead scatters the claims and allegations throughout the pleading.

Consequently, the Complaint does not constitute the type of “short and plain statement”

required and leaves the reader “guess[ing] at precisely what [she is] claiming.” Holbrook v.

Castle Key Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 459, 460 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Byrne v.

Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001)). Such deficiencies fail to give Defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.

Yeyille v. Miami Dade Cty. Pub. Sch., 643 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2016).

That Plaintiff is proceeding pro se does not excuse her failure to comply with the basic

pleading requirements set forth in Rules 8 and 10. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Waldman v.

Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curium) (noting that, while “[a] pro se

pleading is held to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney[, it] must

still suggest that there is at least some factual support for a claim”) (citation omitted).

III. Failure to State a Claim

Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, the Complaint fails to state a claim under

many of the statutes cited and sues Defendants who are either immune or cannot be found

liable. First, the majority of the statutes do not appear to provide a private right of action.

The VA Claims Confidentiality Statute, 38 U.S.C. § 5701, requires VA benefits records to

remain confidential and privileged and should not be disclosed absent a specific exception.

Though section 7332 provides that “a failure to comply with the confidentiality provisions of

this statute or any regulation issued pursuant to that statute is subject to criminal sanctions[.]”

Morris v. Nicholson, 2007 WL 2905346, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2007) (citing 38 U.S.C. §

7332(g)). The threshold matter, however, is that neither section 5710 nor section 7332 creates

a private right of action for damages. See id (finding that “[n]othing in section 5710 or section

7332 suggests a congressional purpose of providing a private individual with a remedy in the

form of an action for damages”) (citation omitted); Tilley v. Weiser, 2006 WL 1084270, at *3

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2006) (holding that section 1507 does not establish a cause of action for

the wrongful release of medical records).

The same is true for Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim concerning the privacy of her health

information. Brown v. Columbus Police Dep’t, 2024 WL 345862, at *3 (11th Cir. July 18, 2024)

(“HIPAA contains no express provision creating a private cause of action” because “HIPAA

is to be enforced by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Congress has not

created a private right of action to enforce it.”) (citations omitted). Nor does it appear that

Plaintiff can assert claims under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because, while this section permits a party

to seek a judge’s recusal, it does not create a private cause of action. Makere v. Early, 2022

WL 20509771, at *4 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2022) (citing Owen v. Cole, 2021 WL 1293087, at *2

(S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2021); Cohee v. McDade, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2006); In re

Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873,

881-82 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).

The Complaint also attempts to enforce various criminal statutes like, 18 U.S.C. §§

1519, 1001, and 242, but neither do these create private causes of action. See Smith v. JP

Morgan Chase, 837 F. App’x 769, 770 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming the district court's finding

that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 does not afford a private cause of action and the dismissal of the case

for failure to state a claim); Lichtenberg v. Sec'y of the Navy, 627 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir.

2015) (per curiam) (“Section 1001 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code is a criminal statute prohibiting

knowingly making false or fraudulent statements or concealing information in a matter within

federal jurisdiction. . . . It does not provide a civil cause of action.”) (citation omitted); Cuyler

v. Scriven, 2011 WL 861709, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2011) (finding that section 242 did “not

give rise to a private cause of action”) (citations omitted). The same is true for Florida’s

Health Information Privacy Law, Fla. Stat. § 456.057 does not create a private cause of action.

See Harrod v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2017 WL 11615769, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2017)

(finding that Fla. Stat. § 456.057 did not create a private cause of action) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the above discussed statutes.

Second, the Complaint seemingly fails to state a claim against all Defendants under

section 1983. Section 1983 “affords a ‘civil remedy’ for deprivations of federally protected

rights caused by persons acting under color of state law.” Pollitz v. Halifax Health, 2015 WL

4987732, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2015) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),

abrogated on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)). “To state a claim

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person, under color of state

law, deprived her of a right protected under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Rodriguez v. City of Miami, Fla., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). However, as the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages suits against a state in federal court

absent a waiver of immunity by the state or a valid congressional override.

Congress has not abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity for purposes

of section 1983 suits for damages, and Florida has not waived its immunity

with regard to such suits. The Eleventh Amendment bar also applies to

damages actions brought against state officials in their official capacities

because a judgment against the official in such a suit imposes liability on the

entity that he represents and is effectively a suit against the state itself.

Wusiya v. City of Miami Beach, 614 F. App’x 389, 393 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509,

1512, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). More specifically on the latter point, “[q]ualified immunity

shields public officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged action.” See

Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d

473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016)). “To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] facts

showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

Finally, while section 1983 applies only to state actors, Bivens grants victims of a

constitutional violation by a federal official the right to relief against that official in federal

court. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Kelly v. Serna, 87

F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Here, Defendants Winter Haven, Winter Haven Police, and Polk County

Commissioners, are immune from Plaintiff’s 1983 claims because Plaintiff seeks only

damages. See Wusiya, 614 F. App’x at 393 (citations omitted). And Sheriff Judd, in his

individual capacity, may be entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Echols, 913 F.3d at 1319

(citation omitted). Likewise, section 1983 does not apply to federal actors like the Unites

States, and “a plaintiff may not bring a Bivens action against a federal agency[.]” Horne v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 359 F. App’x 138, 143 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534

U.S. 61, 71 (2001); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994)). Because Plaintiff names no

individual federal officers, she fails to state a Bivens claim. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71 (stating

that Bivens is “solely concerned with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual

officers”).

BayCare is also unlikely to be able to be liable under section 1983 because it is not a

state actor. See Pollitz, 2015 WL 4987732, at *4 (citation omitted); see also Guardino v. Halifax

Health, 2019 WL 469122, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2019) report and recommendation adopted,

2019 WL 462811 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2019) (An “action in accordance with a state’s

involuntary commitment laws is not enough to transform an entity into a ‘state actor’ for

purposes of a section 1983 claim.”). More generally, to the extent the Complaint relies upon

section 1983 to enforce a violation of the Baker Act against Defendants, this is also ineffective.

A plaintiff “may not maintain a section 1983 claim based on a violation of Florida’s Baker

Act, as the Baker Act is not a federal constitution or law of the United States.” Constantino v.

Madden, 2003 WL 22025477 *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.1, 2003) (citing Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d

1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)). As such, the Complaint fails to state a section 1983 or Bivens

claim.

Finally, the pleading does not support a Privacy Act claim against Winter Haven,

Winter Haven Police, Polk County Commissioners, Sheriff Judd, and BayCare because these

are not part of the federal government. “In certain circumstances, the Privacy Act allows an

individual to bring a civil action against a government agency if that agency refuses to correct

inaccurate information in its records. However, this private right of action only applies to

federal agencies.” Hankerson v. United States, 594 F. App’x 608, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 5

U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1); Schwier v. Cox 340 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.2003)). The definition of

“agency” does not include state entities or private parties. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1); Lee v. Monroe

Cnty. Detention Ctr., 2020 WL 6264704, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2020) (“Because the Privacy

Act does not authorize a cause of action against a state agency or state actor, Plaintiff's claim,

to the extent made under § 552a(b) should be dismissed.”); Rabalais v. Ware, 2018 WL 722832,

at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2018) (finding individual defendants could not be held liable under

the Privacy Act because it only applies to the federal government).5

In light of the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be denied without prejudice and her Complaint (Doc. 1) be

dismissed without prejudice. It is further recommended that Plaintiff be allowed to file an

amended complaint, which should set forth the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction and the

factual allegations establishing a claim for relief in this forum. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428

F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity

to amend before the district court dismisses the complaint.”).

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be denied without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to

amend.

5 There are a handful of other statutes and common law causes of action, like the FTCA, Title VII,

the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, negligence, and medical malpractice, that are also cited in the

Complaint. However, the pleading issues leave the Court unable to reach any substantive findings on

whether a claim has been stated under these causes of action. See GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1369

(A court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in

order to sustain an action.”).

3. Plaintiff be allowed to file an amended complaint that sets forth factual

allegations establishing a claim for relief and to file a renewed request to proceed in forma

pauperis.°

4, Plaintiff be advised that failure to file an amended complaint may result in

dismissal of this case with prejudice and without further notice.

IT IS SO REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on October 21, 2025.

4 “L—

SEAN P. FL Fe ~

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations or request an extension of time to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th

Cir. R. 3-1. Failure of any party to timely object in accordance with the provisions of §

636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

° Plaintiff is encouraged to consult the “Litigants Without Lawyer” guidelines on the Court’s website,

located at http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/litigants-without-lawyers.

13