H.H.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

H.H., ET AL., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) NO. 3:25-cv-01360

v. )

) JUDGE RICHARDSON

MARGIE QUIN, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs, H.H. (“Plaintiff H.H.”), Kelli Hewitt (“Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt”), James Hewitt

(“Plaintiff James Hewitt”), and Lacey Perry (“Plaintiff Perry”), initiated this lawsuit by filing a

complaint (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”) in this Court, naming as Defendants Margie Quin

(“Defendant Quin”),1 Cole Law Group (hereinafter sometimes “Defendant CLG” or “CLG”),

Andrew Goldstein (“Defendant Goldstein”), and Leen Heresh (“Defendant Heresh”). Filed with

the Complaint is the declaration of Plaintiff H.H. (Doc. No. 1-2, “H.H. Declaration”), the

declaration of Plaintiff H.H.’s former counsel, Carly Gresham (Doc. No. 1-3, “Gresham

Declaration”), the declaration of Plaintiff Kelli Hewitts’s and James Hewitts’s counsel, Ashley

Abraham (Doc. No. 1-4, “Abraham Declaration”), and the declaration of Plaintiff Perry (Doc. No.

1-5, “Perry Declaration”).

Now pending before the Court is a “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. No.

3, “Motion”) filed by Plaintiffs in connection with the Complaint. Supporting the Motion is a

memorandum of law (Doc. No. 3-1, “Memorandum”). Via the Motion, Plaintiffs seek a temporary

1 Defendant Quin is sued only in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services.

restraining order (“TRO”) that would temporarily restrain Defendant Quin2 “as Commissioner of

. . . [the] Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, her officers, agents, servants, employees,

attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them,” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2), from,

among other things, “(a) forcing, coercing, or manipulating [Plaintiff] H.H. to sign any

immigration documents without the presence of his chosen counsel; (b) threatening [Plaintiff] H.H.

with deportation, placement disruption, or any other retaliatory consequences for exercising his

legal rights; (c) unlawfully denying [Plaintiff] H.H. access to legal counsel of his choice; (d) falsely

imprisoning [Plaintiff] H.H. through physical restraint or preventing him from leaving meetings;

and (e) systematically excluding family members or support persons requested by [Plaintiff] H.H.

if not otherwise excluded by court order.” (Doc. No. 3 at ¶ 7). Also via the Motion, Plaintiffs

request a “hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief at the Court’s earliest convenience.”

(Id. at 3). Plaintiffs have also filed a proposed order (Doc. No. 1-1, “Proposed Order”) reflecting

the specifics of the injunctive relief they seek via the Motion.3

2 Although the Motion contemplates “Defendants” being restrained, the Proposed Order makes clear that

the relief sought is only against Defendant Quin “as Commissioner of . . . [the] Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services, her officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert

or participation with them.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2).

3 Plaintiffs move the Court for a “Temporary Restraining Order . . . pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65.” (Doc. No. 3 at 1). Notably, however, where Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 refers to TROs, it refers only

to TROs issued “without written or oral notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), which the

Court in this footnote will call an “ex parte” TRO (since “ex parte” means “on one side only; by or for one

party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application of one party only.” Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p.

76.). Rule 65 prescribes rules for the issuance and duration of an ex parte TRO. It does not mention, let

alone set any rules for, TROs that are not ex parte; to the extent that temporary injunctive relief that is not

issued ex parte is properly called a TRO, such a TRO is simply not within the scope of Rule 65.

Here, Plaintiffs have provided Defendants “notice of this motion through electronic service.” (Doc. No.

3 at 1). In theory, this would mean that Plaintiffs’ Motion is not an ex parte TRO as contemplated by Rule

65. Nevertheless, the Court will treat Plaintiffs’ Motion as properly brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 for

two reasons. First, although the Court need not delve herein into how or why this is the case, parties and

courts have been known to speak as if a motion can be one for a TRO within the scope of Rule 65 (and not

a preliminary injunction, which is governed by other provisions of Rule 65) even if it is made with notice

to the opposing party. E.g., In re Reynolds, No. 23-22086, 2023 WL 11853230, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.

For the reasons described below, the Court will (via separate order) GRANT the Motion

for the reasons and with the caveats set forth herein.

ASSERTED FACTS4

1. Parties5

Plaintiff H.H. is “an individual resident of Tennessee.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 1-2

at ¶ 2). Plaintiff H.H. is originally from Haiti, and after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, he was brought

to the United States. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1; Doc. No. 1-5 at 2). Plaintiff H.H. “turn[ed] eighteen on

November 26, 2025.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 26; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 1, 3).6 Plaintiff H.H. “resides with

his sister [Plaintiff] Perry.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 26; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 2.). Previously, Plaintiff H.H.

was legally adopted by Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff James Hewitt. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 27; Doc.

No. 1-2 at ¶ 4). Plaintiff H.H. currently has “legal immigration status in the United States,” (Doc.

Sept. 1, 2023) (A temporary restraining order is a temporary order entered in an action, often without notice

. . . .”). And second, although Defendants have been put on “notice of the motion through electronic

service,” (Doc. No. 3 at 1), the Court’s decision here comes before Defendants have responded to the

Motion and before the Defendants would necessarily would have had a full opportunity to respond to the

Motion.

Accordingly, the Court will continue its analysis as if Plaintiffs’ Motion is properly brought under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 65.

4 The following asserted facts, unless somehow qualified herein (as for example by “Plaintiffs allege that”),

are taken as true for purposes of the Motion (though not necessarily for any future purposes in this

litigation), because they are either: (1) (a) evidentially supported (typically via an averment one of the

declarations) at least to some degree by Plaintiff; and (b) plausible; or (2) subject to judicial notice.

In the Asserted Facts section, the Court endeavors to cite first to an allegation of the Complaint where

possible, and only after citing the relevant allegation of the Complaint (and quoting therefrom as necessary),

then citing the portion of the relevant declaration supporting the cited allegations.

5 The Court notes that although some of the allegations in the Asserted Facts section are not directly

supported by a specific averment in a declaration, the Court accepts these allegations as true for the purposes

of the instant Motion either because they are generally supported as being true in the full context of the

declarations or because they are subject to judicial notice.

6 This means, of course, that the events described below occurred while Plaintiff H.H. was a minor.

No. 1 at ¶ 28; Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 3), and Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff James Hewitt “filed a

petition for his permanent residency in May 2024.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 28; Doc. No. 1-6).

Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt “is an individual resident of Tennessee with a primary residence in

Pulaski, Tennessee. She is the mother of [Plaintiff] H.H., . . . as well as the following minors: R.J.

(16), W.H. (15), R.M. (13), and B.M. (12).” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 16) (stating the age of each minor in

parentheses). Plaintiff James Hewitt “is an individual resident of Tennessee with a primary

residence in Pulaski, Tennessee. He is the father of [Plaintiff] H.H., . . . as well as the following

minors: R.J. [ ], W.H. [ ], R.M. [ ], and B.M. [ ].” (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and James

Hewitt “were arrested on charges of labor trafficking and animal [ ] charges in Giles County,

Tennessee,” and these “charges stem from allegations not involving [Plaintiff] H.H. or any of their

minor children.” (Id. at ¶ 29). “As a condition of their bond, [Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff

James Hewitt] have been prohibited from having any contact with their children since early July

2024.” (Id. at ¶ 30).

Plaintiff Perry “is an individual resident of Tennessee with a primary residence in

Frankewing, Tennessee. She is currently the caregiver to [Plaintiff] H.H. along with four . . . minor

children[, namely] R.J. [ ], W.H. [ ], R.M. [ ], and B.M. [ ].” (Id. at ¶ 18).7 Plaintiff Perry is the

daughter of Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and James Hewitt. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1; Doc. No. 1-5 at 1).

Defendant Quin “is the appointed Commissioner for the Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services [(“DCS”)].” (Id. at ¶ 19).

7 This allegation is further supported by the Abraham Declaration, which describes “the children”—whom

the Court understands to mean Plaintiff H.H., R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.—as being in Plaintiff Perry’s

“care and home.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 32)

Defendant CLG “is a Tennessee professional corporation with a principal place of business

in Brentwood, Tennessee.” (Id. at ¶ 20). DCS has contracted with Defendant CLG. (Id. at ¶ 5).8

Defendant Goldstein “is an individual resident of Tennessee.” (Id. at ¶ 21). He is an

attorney at Defendant CLG. (Id. at ¶ 35; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 10).

Defendant Heresh “is an individual resident of Tennessee.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 22). She is an

attorney at Defendant CLG. (Id. at ¶ 35; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 10).

2. Factual Background

a. November 10, 2025 Haitian Consulate Meeting

On November 10, 2025, Plaintiff H.H. “attended a meeting with the Haiti[an] Consulate

accompanied by Alexis McDaniel [(“McDaniel”)], his DCS social worker.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 32;

Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 7). When Consulate staff questioned Plaintiff H.H. “about his upbringing and

why his parents were taken from him,” McDaniel “interrupted before [Plaintiff H.H.] could answer

and directed the Consulate to address their questions to her instead.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 32; Doc. No.

1-2 at ¶¶ 8-9)

b. November 17 2025 Meeting at Cole Law Group

On November 17, 2025, “DCS required [Plaintiff] H.H. to attend a meeting with Defendant

Andrew Goldstein and Defendant Leen Heresh at the Cole Law Group.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 35; Doc.

No. 1-2 at ¶ 10). Upon Plaintiff H.H.’s arrival, “immigration papers, identified only as ‘JIS forms,’

were already laid out on the table, ready for his signature.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 36; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶

12).9 At the meeting, Defendant Goldstein and Defendant Heresh “pressure[ed] . . . Plaintiff H.H.”

8 Although not explained explicitly in the Complaint, the Court understands that CLG “contracted” with

DCS to assist DCS with certain matters, including the matter described herein involving Plaintiff H.H.’s

immigration status.

9 The “JIS forms” at issue here are not defined in the Complaint. Nevertheless, the Court herein will refer

to the immigration documents at issue in this action as “JIS forms” for the sake of brevity and consistency.

to sign the JIS forms, “without adequately explaining what they were or allowing him time to read

them.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 37; No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 12-13). These forms would have required Plaintiff H.H.

to “allege parental abuse and neglect to obtain immigration benefits.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 75; Doc.

No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 7-8). These are allegations that Plaintiff H.H. “does not wish to make,” and Plaintiff

H.H. “worries that signing the documents will harm his parents.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 75; Doc. No. 1-

4 at ¶¶ 7-8).

Ultimately, at the November 17, 2025 meeting, Plaintiff H.H. “declined to sign documents

he did not understand.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 39; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 14).

c. November 18 2025 Zoom Meeting

On November 18, 2025, a zoom meeting was held between representatives from Litson

Law Office (representing Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff James Hewitt in the criminal case

against them), Brent McKamey and McDaniel from DCS, and Plaintiff H.H.’s guardian ad litem

Lucy Hensen (“Hensen”). (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 15-16). During this meeting, McDaniel informed

the representatives from Litson that if Plaintiff H.H. refused to sign the JIS forms, DCS “will

consider removing [Plaintiff H.H.] and the . . . four minor children [R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.]

from [Plaintiff Perry’s] care.” (Id. at ¶ 17).

d. November 19 2025 Meeting with DCS

On November 19, 2025, Plaintiff H.H. “appeared in court for a hearing,” with his sister

Ashlee Hewitt. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 40; Doc. No. 1-5 at 3). Prior to the hearing, McDaniel and Hensen

took Plaintiff H.H “into a private room,” excluding Ashlee Hewitt from the meeting. (Doc. No. 1

at ¶¶ 40-41; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 17). There, McDaniel and Hensen pressured Plaintiff H.H. into

signing the same JIS forms involved in the November 17, 2025 meeting at CLG. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶

42-44; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 18). McDaniel and Hensen “threatened” that Plaintiff H.H “would be

deported to Haiti if he did not sign the documents.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 44; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 20).

After multiple requests, Ashlee Hewitt was allowed to rejoin Plaintiff H.H. in the meeting. (Doc.

No. 1 at ¶ 45; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 22). Plaintiff H.H. did not sign the documents, but McDaniel told

Plaintiff H.H. that “he had until the following morning to make up his mind because another

meeting was scheduled with Defendant Goldstein for November 20, 2025.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 46-

47; Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶ 24).

On the evening of November 19, 2025, Hensen called Ashley Abraham (“Abraham”), one

of the attorneys from Litson Law Office representing Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff James

Hewitt in the criminal case proceeding against them. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 48; Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 22).

On the call, Hensen requested that Abraham “pressure” Plaintiff H.H. to sign the JIS forms,

claiming that they were Plaintiff H.H.’s “only chance to avoid deportation upon turning eighteen.”

(Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 49; Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 22-23).

Also on the evening of November 19, 2025, at the request of Plaintiff H.H., Plaintiff Perry

and Ashlee Hewitt “contacted immigration attorney Carly Gresham [(“Gresham”)], who agreed to

represent [Plaintiff] H.H. and accompany him to the November 20 meeting at Cole Law Group

with Defendant Goldstein.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 53; Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 1-2; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 25-26).

e. November 20, 2025 Meeting at Cole Law Group

On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff H.H. arrived at CLG with Gresham “for the scheduled

meeting with Defendant Goldstein and Defendant Heresh.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 55; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶

28). Upon arrival, Defendant Goldstein took Gresham “into a different room, leaving [Plaintiff]

H.H. alone.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 56; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 30). Defendant Goldstein then told Gresham

that “she had to leave and that she was trespassing,” then called Brentwood Police to arrest

Gresham. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 57-58; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 31-32). “As [CLG] employees began to

force [ ] Gresham out of the building,” Plaintiff H.H. “stood up to leave” with Gresham. (Doc. No.

1 at ¶ 59; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 33). However, as Plaintiff H.H. attempted to leave, “Defendant[]

Goldstein and [Defendant] Heresh and others blocked the door. Defendant Goldstein physically

held the door shut from the outside, preventing H.H. from leaving.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 60; Doc. No.

1-2 at ¶ 34 ).

After Gresham was removed, Defendant Heresh “attempted to coerce [Plaintiff] H.H. to

sign the [JIS forms].” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 66; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 36). Plaintiff H.H. refused to sign the

documents “that day.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 67; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 37).

f. DCS Plans to Remove Plaintiff H.H., R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M. From Plaintiff

Perry’s Home.

Following the November 20, 2025 meeting at CLG, “DCS set a meeting for Monday,

November 24 at 8:30 AM to ‘discuss moving the children from the Hewitt-Perry home.’” (Doc.

No. 1 at ¶ 69; Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 30). Thus, “DCS . . . started the process of removing [Plaintiff

H.H., R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.] from [Plaintiff Perry’s] home” because of Plaintiff H.H.’s

refusal to sign the JIS form. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 71-72; Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶¶ 30-32). McDaniel also

informed Abraham of this meeting, characterizing it as “an unplanned placement stability meeting

. . . to discuss moving the children from the Hewitt-Perry home.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 31).

3. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Based on the forgoing, Plaintiffs bring four claims.

Count I is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983 claim”) claim brought by Plaintiff Kelli

Hewitt, Plaintiff James Hewitt, and Plaintiff Perry (collectively, “Count I Plaintiffs”) against

Defendant Quin10 for violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

10 The Court understands that when Plaintiffs refer to Defendant Quin, Plaintiffs are actually referring to

Defendant Quin’s agents, employees, and staff acting on behalf of her in her official capacity

U.S. Constitution. Via Count I, Plaintiffs allege that the Count I Plaintiffs “have a constitutional

right to decisions about the care, custody, and control of Plaintiff H.H, as well as [the] minor

children R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.,” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 82), and that Defendant Quin “acting under

color of law, seeks to remove [Plaintiff] H.H., R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M. from the Hewitt-Perry

family due to [Plaintiff] H.H.’s refusal to sign a false immigration application.” (Id. at ¶ 86).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Quin’s “threat of removing Plaintiff H.H. and [the four] minor

children R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M. from Plaintiff [ ] Perry’s care [due to] [Plaintiff] H.H.’s refusal

to sign a false immigration application violates due process because it furthers no legitimate

purpose, much less a compelling governmental interest,” (id. at ¶ 88), and that such conduct

“shocks the conscience and demonstrates [Defendant Quin’s (and her staff’s, agents’ and

employees’)] deliberate indifference to the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due

process.” (Id. at ¶ 90). Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Quin’s conduct violated the Count I

Plaintiffs’ “due process rights to family unity.” (Id. at ¶ 89).

Count II is also a § 1983 claim against Defendant Quin for violation of due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike Count I, though, Count II is brought by Plaintiff H.H.

Via Count II, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiff H.H. has a constitutional right to fundamental fairness

in proceedings related to his living placement and immigration status,” and that “[t]his right

protects him from being coerced to sign any documents that affect his immigration status or being

removed from his family’s care due to his refusal to sign any documents that affect his immigration

status.” (Id. at ¶ 94). In particular, Count II alleges that Defendant Quin “acting under color of law,

attempted to coerce Plaintiff H.H. numerous times to sign a false immigration application stating

that he was abused and neglected by his parents, Plaintiff[] Kelli Hewitt and [Plaintiff] James

Hewitt.” (Id. at ¶ 96). Count II also alleges that Defendant Quin’s “threats to coerce Plaintiff H.H.

to sign a false immigration form violate due process because they further no legitimate purpose,

much less a compelling governmental interest,” that Defendant Quin’s “conduct shocks the

conscience and demonstrates [Defendant Quin’s (and her staff’s, agents’ and employees’)]

deliberate indifference to the violation of Plaintiff H.H.’s constitutional right to due process,” and

that “[t]hese actions violated Plaintiff H.H.’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.” (Id. at ¶¶ 100-02).

Plaintiffs also bring two state law tort claims. One (Count III) is a claim for false

imprisonment against Defendant CLG, Defendant Goldstein, and Defendant Heresh. The other

(Count IV) is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant CLG,

Defendant Goldstein, and Defendant Heresh.

Via the Motion, Plaintiffs seek an order restraining Defendant Quin11 “as Commissioner

of . . . [the] Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, her officers, agents, servants,

employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them,” (Doc. No. 1-1

at 1-2), from, among other things, “(a) forcing, coercing, or manipulating [Plaintiff] H.H. to sign

any immigration documents without the presence of his chosen counsel; (b) threatening [Plaintiff]

H.H. with deportation, placement disruption, or any other retaliatory consequences for exercising

his legal rights; (c) unlawfully denying [Plaintiff] H.H. access to legal counsel of his choice; (d)

falsely imprisoning [Plaintiff] H.H. through physical restraint or preventing him from leaving

meetings; and (e) systematically excluding family members or support persons requested by

[Plaintiff] H.H. if not otherwise excluded by court order.” (Doc. No. 3 at ¶ 7). Beyond this relief,

11 As noted in a footnote above, although the Motion refers to “Defendants” being restrained, Plaintiffs’

proposed order (Doc. No. 1-1), makes clear that the relief sought is only against Defendant Quin “as

Commissioner of . . . [the] Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, her officers, agents, servants,

employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2).

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order (Doc. No. 1-1) also includes a provision restraining Defendant Quin

(and her agents, employees, and the like) from:

. . . removing or threatening to remove [Plaintiff] H.H. from his current kinship

placement with his sister [Plaintiff Perry], or removing or threatening to remove his

minor siblings R.J. (16), W.H. (15), R.M. (13), and B.M. (12), from that same

placement, where such removal is based on: (a) his refusal to sign immigration

documents without legal counsel; (b) his exercise of his constitutional right to

counsel; or (c) his pursuit of this legal action; Defendant[] shall not threaten such

removal or separation as a means to coerce [Plaintiff] H.H.’s compliance with their

demands regarding immigration paperwork.

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 3-4).

LEGAL STANDARD

Those seeking a TRO (or, for that matter, a preliminary injunction) must meet four

requirements.12 They must show a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the

12 Published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are factors

rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the

possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors).

See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent

with other (including more recent) Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court cases (including Winter)

that describe these as all being requirements (i.e., things that must be established. See, e.g., id. at 328, 329

(Nabaldian, J., concurring) (noting that “[Winter]'s language seems clear—a plaintiff must establish the

factors” and questioning “whether the balancing analysis itself aligns with Winter.”).

Notably, other courts have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather than as

factors. E.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d

357, 363 (5th Cir. 2003); Southern Poverty Law Ctr. v. United States Dep't Homeland Sec., Civil Action

No. 18-760 (CKK), 2020 WL 3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); Transatlantic, LLC v. Humana, Inc.,

8:13–CV– 1925–T–17TBM, 2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013).

The Court believes that it needs to choose between the two approaches—even if the substance or the

outcome of the Motion does not turn on such choice—because the approach does dictate how a court goes

about explaining its analysis and decision on a motion for preliminary injunction. And the Court believes

that it should follow the latter line of cases, i.e., those that treat the standard as involving requirements

rather than factors.

First, explaining and applying the standard in terms of requirements is substantially more straightforward

than the alternative—which is to explain that the four items are factors to be balanced, except that, well,

that's only partially true because actually irreparable harm is a requirement (but also, if it exists, then a

factor to be balanced along with the other factors) and likelihood of success (at least to some minimal

extent) is also required. D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, although

the extent of an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is

mandatory.”); S. Glazer's Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir.

2017) (noting that it is reversible error for a district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is

absence of the injunction; the balance of equities favors them; and that the public interest favors

an injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v.

Louisville-Jefferson County, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiffs seeking a TRO may not merely rely on unsupported allegations but rather must

come forward with more than “scant evidence” to substantiate their allegations.13 See, e.g.,

Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); Cameron v. Bouchard,

815 F. App’x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no

evidentiary showing on some elements of their claim, but instead made mere allegations regarding

the treatment of COVID-19 in prisons); McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012)

(upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a “small showing” of

evidence); United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915,

*1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations);

simply no likelihood of success on the merits (quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th

Cir. 2010))). Second, it is easier to articulate a conclusion as to whether requirements are satisfied (which

is done in simple yes/no, or satisfied/unsatisfied, terms) than to articulate the outcome of some so-called

“balancing” of (mismatched) factors. This is especially true given that case-specific balancing apparently

is based in part on some inscrutable sliding scale of required likelihood of success on the merits that depends

on the strength of the other three factors. See, e.g., In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th

Cir.1985) (“[T]he degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other

factors.”).

The Court notes that herein it quotes some case law that refers to these items as “factors” and describes

them in language that befits factors more than requirements—as for example by referring to the issue of

whether issuing the injunction would harm others (factor-style language) rather than the requirement that

the balance of equities favors the movant, or the issue of where the public interest lies (factor-style

language) rather than the requirement that the public interest favors an injunction. In so doing, the Court is

confident that the astute reader readily will be able to translate the factor-style language into the

corresponding language of requirements for purposes of following the Court’s analysis herein. The Court

also notes that even in some opinions where the court clearly treats the four items as requirements, the court

therein at times refers to them as “factors.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (N.D.

Tex. 2016).

13 When courts refer to this principle, usually it is in connection with a motion for a preliminary injunction

rather than a motion for a TRO. But it has been stated in connection with a motion for a TRO, e.g., Dates

v. HSBC, 721 F. Supp. 3d 616, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2024), and the Court believes that it applies to a motion for

a TRO just as it applies to a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Boulding v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11,

2008), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich.

May 15, 2008) (“Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary

injunction]. Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations do not suffice.” (citations omitted)). In deciding a

motion for a TRO, a court may consider the entire record, including affidavits and other hearsay

evidence. Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);

J.S.R. by & through J.S.G. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018). In conducting

the TRO analysis, the Court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint but rather may rely

on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent

injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive

proceeding. Express Franchise Servs., L.P. v. Impact Outsourcing Sols., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d

1368, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Action NC v. Strach, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016)

(explaining that district courts in appropriate circumstances rely on hearsay or other inadmissible

evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is warranted).

ANALYSIS

As noted, a party seeking grant of a TRO must show: (1) whether the movant has

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of relief; (3) whether the balance of equities favors the movant; and (4)

whether the injunction would serve the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. In their Motion and

Memorandum, Plaintiffs restrict their analysis of the TRO requirements detailed above to Count I

and Count II, thus forgoing any reliance on Counts III and IV as grounds for a TRO. The Court

will do likewise.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To obtain a TRO, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits

of their claims. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits on Count I, though not Count II

a. Count I

Via Count I, Plaintiffs bring a claim for violations of the parental due process rights of

Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt, Plaintiff James Hewitt, and Plaintiff Perry. Plaintiffs characterize this

parental due process right as “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the

care, custody and control of children.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 11) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.

57, 66 (2000)). Following Plaintiffs and the case law discussed below, the Court will do the same.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving

“any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment

has both a substantive due process component and a procedural due process component. Howard

v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996). The substantive due process component “protects

specific fundamental rights of individual freedom and liberty from deprivation at the hands of

arbitrary and capricious government action.” Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir.

1988). “When reviewing a substantive due process claim, [a court] must first craft a ‘careful

description of the asserted right,’ Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), and then determine

whether that right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty,’ such that it can be considered a ‘fundamental right.’” Doe v. Michigan

Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).

With respect to this parental due process right, Courts have time and again recognized it

is a fundamental right. See e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It is clearly

established that the Constitution recognizes both a protectable procedural due process interest in

parenting a child and a substantive fundamental right to raise one’s child.”); Cwik v. Dillon, No.

C-1-09-669, 2010 WL 5691404, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (“It is well established that the

right of a parent to make decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children is a

fundamental right”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-00669, 2011 WL 379039

(S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2011); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (describing “the

fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their

child”). Accordingly, “the Fourteenth Amendment, through Substantive Due Process, provides

parents with a right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children.”

Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 493 Fed. App’x 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at

66).

As the Sixth Circuit has noted “available case law suggests that a state actor’s conduct

affecting this right must ‘shock the conscience’ to be actionable under § 1983.” Ghaith, 493 Fed

App’x at 738 (citing Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011)). To

shock the conscience, “the challenged action” must be “so ‘egregious’ that it can be said to be

‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” Ewolksi v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir.

2002) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). “[T]he ‘shocks the

conscience’ standard sets a high bar . . .. Conduct shocks the conscience if it violates the decencies

of civilized conduct. Such conduct includes actions so brutal and offensive that they do not

comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 589

(6th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Presumably this standard is intended as an objective one—in that it

asks the adjudicator to determine not whether his or her conscience is shocked, but rather whether

some hypothetical reasonable person’s conscience would be shocked. And yet there is a sense in

which this standard is nevertheless subjective and unpredictable,14 not least because the notion of

“shocking” the “conscience” is amorphous and can be perceived by different persons in different

ways.15 See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2014) (referring to the

“amorphous ‘shocks the conscience’ standard”), vacated on other grounds, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

It is also relevant to the “shocks the conscience” inquiry “‘whether [a] government actor

was pursuing a legitimate governmental purpose[,]’ Range, 763 F.3d at 589, and whether that

interest outweighed the deprivation of the parental liberty interest in this instance.” Siefert v.

Hamilton Cnty., 951 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Kottmyer v. Mass, 436 F.3d 684, 690

(6th Cir. 2006)). See also Wells v. Ponder, No. 4:23-CV-00027, 2025 WL 2599538, at *6 (E.D.

Tenn. Sept. 8, 2025) (“In the child removal context, whether a ‘government actor was pursuing a

legitimate governmental purpose’ and ‘whether that interest outweighed the deprivation of the

14 For example, one court was faced with the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts

(“UNIDROIT Principles”), “a collection of commercial laws that list various internationally recognized

defenses to contract claims, including unequal bargaining power.” Singh v. Carnival Corp., No. 13-20414-

CIV, 2013 WL 12139415, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2013), aff'd, 550 F. App'x 683 (11th Cir. 2013).

Commenting on a reference in the UNIDROIT Principles to “disequilibrium . . . in the circumstances so

great as to shock the conscience of a reasonable person,” the court aptly noted:

Of course, a “disequilibrium . . . so great as to shock the conscience of a reasonable

person,” while clothed in the language of an objective standard, is hardly, in practical

application, capable of objective ascertainment across the 148 countries [implicated]. What

shocks the conscience in one country is not necessarily the same as what shocks the

conscience in another country.

Id. at *5.

15 This is true even for two persons who agree that the conduct at issue was wrongful; one person might

conclude that the conduct at issue was shocking to a reasonable person’s sensibilities, while another might

find the conduct distasteful, alarming, or offensive to a reasonable person’s sensibilities but not “shocking”

of a reasonable person’s “conscience.”

parental liberty interest in this instance’ are relevant to the inquiry.” (quoting Siefert, 951 F.3d at

767)).

That is to say, reasonable minds can disagree regarding the application of this standard in

a particular case. One jurist might find that a reasonable person’s conscience would be shocked by

the conduct at issue, while another jurist may find to the contrary. This reality makes the

undersigned jurist loath to find at this early juncture that the facts as a matter of law would not

shock the conscience of a reasonable person.

In part for this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs here have shown a likelihood of

success (even if it is a bare likelihood) on the merits by pleading and showing through declarations

that DCS’s or DCS agents’ conduct violated the parental due process rights of Plaintiff Kelli

Hewitt, Plaintiff James Hewitt, and Plaintiff Perry. Here, according to the factual allegations

accepted as true for instant purposes, DCS or DCS agents have threatened to remove Plaintiff H.H.

and four minor children (R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.) from the home of Plaintiff Perry if Plaintiff

H.H. did not sign the JIS forms. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 71 85, 88, 89; Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 17). State

officials’ use of minors’ custody as a bargaining chip to force an individual to sign immigration

documents that he has time and again indicated he did not want to sign at least arguably would

“shock the conscience” of a reasonable person, especially given the current absence of any

indication of a compelling state interest at this juncture to justify DCS’s or DCS agents’ conduct

here. Thus, at this stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a bare likelihood of

success on the merits as to Count I.

b. Count II

With respect to Count II, Plaintiffs bring a claim for a violation of Plaintiff H.H.’s due

process right to fundamental fairness. “The Supreme Court has recognized the due process rights

of minors in the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process.” John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233

(6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1989)). “[T]he applicable due

process standard in juvenile proceedings . . . is fundamental fairness.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,

403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). Fundamental fairness includes affording juveniles “notice of charges,

right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-

examination.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 363 (1984) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57

(1967)).

Here, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on

the merits of Count II. Leaving aside what the Court thinks of what DCS or its agents did or did

not do with respect to Plaintiff H.H., the Court does not find that the right to fundamental fairness

had yet attached such as to constrain DCS’s or its agents’ conduct regarding Plaintiff H.H. Based

on the record before the Court, the Court cannot yet conclude (by inference or otherwise) that

Plaintiff H.H. was in the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile process such as to trigger the right to

fundamental fairness. Aside from the November 19, 2025 hearing (the substance of which is not

at issue here), no adjudicatory proceeding had been commenced against Plaintiff H.H. Rather, it

appears that Plaintiff H.H. instead had a series of meetings with DCS regarding his immigration

papers. Standing alone, this is not enough to implicate Plaintiff H.H.’s right to fundamental

fairness. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits with respect

to Count II.

2. Irreparable Harm

Because Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of one of their claims,

Count I, the Court next must examine whether Plaintiffs have shown that irreparable harm will

occur absent the requested TRO. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Irreparable harm must be “both certain

and immediate,” not “speculative or theoretical.” Nacco Materials Handling Grp., Inc. v. Toyota

Materials Handling USA, Inc., 246 Fed. App’x 929, 943 (6th Cir. 2007); Mich. Coal. of

Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991).

To assess whether Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement, the Court starts by noting why the

requirement of irreparable injury exists: “If the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable

injury, there’s no need to grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.” D.T., 942 F.3d

at 327.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that irreparable harm will occur absent a

TRO.16 Absent a TRO, it is likely that DCS or its agents’ will continue to try to force Plaintiff

“H.H. to sign the [JIS forms],” thereby making “allegations of abuse against his adoptive parents

[(Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt and Plaintiff James Hewitt)] that he does not support or believe but that

16 As noted above, the Count I Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to their

claims in Count I, but Plaintiff H.H. has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to his

claim in Count II. In the discussion that follows, the Court nevertheless discusses harms that would result

to Plaintiff H.H absent a TRO. The Court recognizes that it is uncertain whether the Court is permitted to

consider harms to Plaintiff H.H. because Plaintiff H.H. has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits as to his claim in Count II. It is generally clear that harm to non-parties is insufficient to

demonstrate irreparable harm. See Great Lakes Higher Edu. Corp. v. Cavazos, 698 F. Supp. 1464, 1475

(W.D. Wisc. 1988) (stating that the burden to demonstrate irreparable harm “is not satisfied by harm to a

third party” (citing Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d 255, 259 n.4 (7th Cir. 1980)); Am.

Dairy Queen Corp. 621 F.2d at 259 n.4 (expressly holding that “‘the no adequate remedy at law/irreparable

injury’ prerequisite is not satisfied by the harm that may befall a nonparty.”); Corral v. Cuyahoga Cnty.,

No. 1:24-CV-1559, 2024 WL 4475458, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17) (“A temporary restraining order should

not be granted if substantial harm will be caused [only] to others.”). It is less certain whether harm to a

party that has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its own claim may nevertheless

serve to demonstrate irreparable harm with respect to those parties that have demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits as to their claims. However, some case law suggests that harm suffered by parties

that have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims may be used to show irreparable

harm with respect to those parties that have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their

claims. See Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 542, 546 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the

“irreparable[-]harm prong of the injunctive[-]relief calculus only concerns harm suffered by the party or

parties seeking injunctive relief” (emphasis added)); CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc.,

48 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that demonstrating the irreparable injury element “requires a

showing of irreparable harm to the movant rather than to one or more third parties.”). In light of this case

law, the Court at this juncture, while acknowledging that this area of law is uncertain, will consider the

harms to Plaintiff H.H. (as a party and movant), as well as the harms to the Count I Plaintiffs, that would

result absent a TRO in its analysis of irreparable harm.

could impact their criminal case.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 16). As Plaintiffs argue, the consequence of

Plaintiff H.H. signing these JIS forms “once they are submitted to immigration authorities,” are

“irreparable.” (Id. at 17) Plaintiff H.H. would be unable to “retract allegations of abuse once they

are made under penalty of perjury,” or “recover the immigration options he may forfeit by signing

documents he does not understand.” (Id. at 17). Likewise, without the TRO, Plaintiff H.H. likely

will feel continued pressure to sign the JIS forms to ensure that he and the four minors may

continue to reside with Plaintiff Perry without interference by DCS.

Moreover, the seemingly impending removal of Plaintiff H.H. and four minors from the

home of Plaintiff Perry for an indeterminate amount of time as a result of Plaintiff H.H.’s refusal

to sign the JIS forms constitutes, at least at this juncture, irreparable harm such as to justify the

Court issuing a TRO. Cf. Gabriel v. Lavison, No. 2:22-CV-00006-TL, 2022 WL 566601, at *1

(W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding irreparable harm arising from removal of minor from

“habitual residence in Mexico and retaining the child in” Washington state); Brown v. Jones, 473

F. Supp. 439, 448 (N.D. Texas) (finding that where plaintiffs stood to lose custody of a child

permanently, injury would be “great and immediate.”).

Thus, Plaintiffs have satisfied the second requirement necessary for a TRO to issue.

3. Balance of Equities and Whether a TRO Would Serve the Public Interest

A plaintiff seeking a TRO must also establish that the balance of equities tips in his favor

and that the TRO is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Where, as here, the government,

or government actors or agents, are the defendants, the “‘two remaining . . . factors — whether

issuing the [TRO] would harm others and where the public interest lies — merge.’” L.W. by and

through Williams v. Skrmetti, 83 F.4th 460, 512 (6th Cir. 2023) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting

Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023)), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Skrmetti,

605 U.S. 495 (2025).

Here, these last two factors also favor the Court granting a TRO. The Court here cannot

conclude that issuing a TRO—a TRO that would be in effect for a mere 14 days—would harm

Defendants or other third parties or otherwise cut against the public interest. Here, the issuing of a

TRO would simply preserve the status quo for 14 days, leaving Plaintiff H.H. and the [four] minor

children in place at Plaintiff Perry’s residence for the duration of the temporary restraining order,

and merely prevent DCS from continuing to pressure Plaintiff H.H. with respect to the JIS forms.

See API Tech. Servs., LLC v. Francis, No. 4:13-CV-142, 2013 WL 12131381, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec.

4, 2013) (noting that the purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo). Moreover, although the

“public has a strong interest in protecting the welfare of all children,” Ferguson v. Cnty. of Los

Angeles, No. LA CV-12-06865-JAK (EX), 2013 WL 12638555, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2013),

the Court here cannot identify any harm to the welfare of the four minor children if they remain at

Plaintiff Perry’s residence. Indeed, the Abraham Declaration provides that up until the present

dispute, McDaniel and Hensen had informed Abraham that “the children were doing great in

[Plaintiff Perry’s] care and home.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at ¶ 32).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that the balance of equities

tips in their favor and that the TRO is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

Plaintiffs having met, at least at this juncture, the four requirements for the Court to enter

a TRO, the Court will enter Plaintiffs’ proposed TRO at Docket No. 1-1.

4. Bond Or Security Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides that the “court may issue a preliminary injunction or a

temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers

proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined

or restrained.” In the Sixth Circuit, “the district court possesses discretion over whether to require

the posting of security” when entering a TRO. ARH v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., 714 F.3d

424, 431 (6th Cir. 2013).

Here, the Court cannot find a reason to require the posting of a security. The Court, at this

juncture, cannot deduce any costs or damages that may result to Defendants as a result of Plaintiffs’

proposed TRO. Accordingly, the Court will not require Plaintiffs to post security.

5. Plaintiffs’ Requested Hearing

Via the Motion, Plaintiffs also request that the Court “[s]et a hearing on Plaintiffs’ request

for injunctive relief at the Court’s earliest convenience.” (Doc. No. 3 at 3). As shown by its analysis

above, the Court does not find that a hearing is necessary to determine the merits of Plaintiffs’

Motion. Accordingly, the Court will deny as moot Plaintiffs’ request for a hearing. To the extent

that Plaintiffs later request relief in the form of a preliminary injunction, or to transform the TRO

into a preliminary injunction, the Court may grant a request for a hearing on such request if it

deems a hearing necessary.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons described herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion will be GRANTED, with

the caveats set forth above (including that the request for a hearing is denied as moot). The Motion

will be granted via an order (to be entered separately) substantially in the form of the Proposed

Order (Doc. No. 1-1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

CLL Richardson —

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE