ALEXANDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CLIFTON ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-5-MW-MJF

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff is an alumnus of Florida State University (“FSU”). Doc. 13.

Plaintiff alleges that FSU violated the Lanham Act—specifically 15

U.S.C. § 1125—when it terminated its “Alumni Email for Life” program.

Doc. 13. Because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity, and

because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the District Court should grant FSU’s motion to dismiss this

civil action.

BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil

action against FSU. Doc. 1. Plaintiff claimed that FSU’s decision to end

its “Alumni Email for Life” program by May 2025 constituted a “violation

of Federal Trade Commission regulations pursuant to deceptive practices

and false advertising.” Id. Because the complaint was a so-called

“shotgun pleading,” the undersigned struck the complaint and provided

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Doc. 6.

On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc.

13. Plaintiff asserts that in the late 2000’s FSU “began advertising an

‘Alumni Email for Life’ program.” Id. at 4. In 2012, Plaintiff enrolled at

FSU and received a free email account. FSU decided to end its “Alumni

Email for Life” program and confirmed that Plaintiff would lose access to

his free alumni email account in May 2025. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that

FSU’s actions violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Although a Plaintiff may assert

several distinct claims under § 1125, Plaintiff does not specify in his

complaint the type of claim he is attempting to assert against FSU.

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction against Defendant to prevent

Defendant from deleting his “Alumni Email for Life” account and

damages of $50,000. Doc. 13 at 6.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claim is Barred by Sovereign Immunity

The District Court should dismiss this civil action because

Plaintiff’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states may

assert sovereign immunity to civil actions against the State and its

agencies unless Congress has abrogated the State’s immunity. See Hans

v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304,

1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Additionally, a plaintiff may overcome

the sovereign immunity bar under the narrow exception set forth in Ex

parte Young if he sues a state official for prospective injunctive relief to

remedy ongoing violations of federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908).

State universities—such as FSU—“are ‘arms of the state’ and thus

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Page v. Hicks, 773 F.

App’x 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373,

1378 (11th Cir. 1990). In other words, FSU “receives the same Eleventh

Amendment protection from suit in a federal court as the state itself.”

Wang v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 2017 WL 1155889, at *4 (S.D. Fla.

Mar. 27, 2017).

Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity from suits arising

under 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and Florida has not waived its immunity to such

suits. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,

527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999). Furthermore, because FSU is not a state official

but rather an “arm of the state,” the Ex parte Young exception does not

apply to Plaintiff’s claim against FSU. Page, 773 F. App’x at 518; Eubank

v. Leslie, 210 F. App’x 837, 844 (11th Cir. 2006); Camm v. Scott, 834 F.

Supp. 2d 1342, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

Because FSU is entitled to sovereign immunity as recognized by the

Eleventh Amendment, the District Court should dismiss this civil action

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125

There is a second, independent reason for the District Court to

dismiss this civil action: Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

1. Plaintiff Failed to Identify the Precise Claim Asserted

“The Lanham Act was intended to make ‘actionable the deceptive

and misleading use of marks,’ and ‘to protect persons engaged in . . .

commerce against unfair competition.’” Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth

Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §

1127). Section 1125 of Title 15 of the United States “goes beyond

trademark protection.” Id. Section 1125 creates a cause of action for—

among other things—trademark infringement, trademark dilution, false

designation of origin, false advertising, false description of goods and

services, false representation of goods and services, and cybersquatting.

Because § 1125 is a broad provision that creates multiple causes of

action, a plaintiff who asserts a claim pursuant to § 1125 must specify

the type of claim he seeks to assert. Synergy Real Est. of SW Fla., Inc. v.

Premier Prop. Mgmt. of SW Fla., LLC, 578 F. App’x 959, 961 (11th Cir.

2014). Absent such specificity, to ascertain a plaintiff’s intent, courts

would be forced to resort to guesses, and courts “should not have to guess

at the nature of the claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires clarity in pleading. Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff apprise the court and the defendant

the type of claim asserted and the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).

Because Plaintiff did not specify—or otherwise allege facts

indicating—the type of claim he attempts to assert under § 1125, the

District Court should dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See Black Diamond Land Mgmt. LLC v. Twin

Pines Coal Inc., 707 F. App’x 576, 579 (11th Cir. 2017).

2. Plaintiff Fails to State a False Advertising Claim

Even if the undersigned ventured a guess that Plaintiff is

attempting to assert a false advertising claim, Plaintiff fails to state such

a claim. To state a claim of false advertising under 15 U.S.C.

§1125(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff must allege six essential elements:

1. the defendant made a statement;

2. the defendant’s statement was false or misleading;

3. the statement deceived, or had the capacity to deceive,

consumers;

4. the deception had a material effect on the consumers’ purchasing

decision;

5. the misrepresented service affects interstate commerce; and

6. the plaintiff has been, or likely will be, injured as a result of the

defendant’s false or misleading statement.

Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1196

(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order v. Fla.

Priory of Knights Hospitallers, 702 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012));

Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d

1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002).

As to the sixth element, a plaintiff must allege “an injury to a

commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused

by the defendant’s misrepresentations.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static

Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140, (2014); Black Diamond

Land Mgmt. LLC, 707 F. App’x at 580. But Plaintiff does not allege that

he suffered an injury to a commercial interest in sales. Nor does he allege

that he suffered an injury to his business reputation.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that his

injury is limited to FSU’s termination of Plaintiff’s email account and

Plaintiff’s disappointment in obtaining a degree from FSU. The Lanham

Act is not a balm to assuage disappointment. “A consumer who is

hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product . . . cannot invoke

the protection of the Lanham Act.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc, 572 U.S. at 132.

Because Plaintiff fails to allege an injury to a commercial interest

in sale or business reputation caused by the allegedly false

advertisement, Plaintiff fails to state a false advertising claim under the

Lanham Act. For this reason too, the District Court, should dismiss this

civil action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and

2. DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida this 27th day of October 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive

matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these

proposed findings and recommendations must be filed

within fourteen days of the date of the report and

recommendation. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s

internal use only and does not control. An objecting

party must serve a copy of its objections upon all other

parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate

judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a

report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th

Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.