Craven

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

JASON CRAVEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 1:23-CV-00180-JRG-CHS

)

DAVID B. RAUSCH, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Jason Craven challenges the

constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration,

Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (“the Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 to -218 (2024).

Defendant David Rausch, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”), and the

County Defendants, Sheriff Austin Garrett and the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, have filed

motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (hereafter “the Complaint”) [Doc. 73].

[Rausch’s Mot., Doc. 78; Garrett’s Mot., Doc 86]. Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to

file his response to the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 89], which, as a preliminary

matter, is GRANTED.

As the County Defendants point out, a sheriff’s office is not a cognizable legal entity for

the purposes of a § 1983 suit. See Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No.

3:10-CV-0496, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87862, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (collecting cases)

(“[F]ederal district courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly held that police departments

and sheriff’s departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit.”). Because the Sheriff’s Office is

not a proper party to this action, its motion to dismiss will be GRANTED. As discussed below,

Director Rausch and Sheriff Garrett’s motions to dismiss will be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 2012, Plaintiff was convicted of child molestation in Georgia. [Compl., Doc. 73 ¶ 17].

Based on that conviction, he was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, followed by

eighteen years and six months of probation. [Id. 18]. Upon his release from incarceration, Plaintiff

registered with the Georgia Sex Offender Registry (“GSOR”). At some point, he also registered

with the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry (“TSOR”), because he conducted a significant amount

of business in Tennessee. [Id. ¶ 20]. Plaintiff moved from Georgia to Hamilton County, Tennessee

in 2019. [Id.].

In 2022, Plaintiff completed his term of probation, which had been reduced to ten years,

and applied for release from the GSOR. [Id. ¶ 18–19]. The GSOR Review Board conducted an

assessment and found that Plaintiff was at low risk to reoffend. [Id.]. Plaintiff then petitioned the

Superior Court of Dade County, Georgia for removal from the registry pursuant to O.C.G.A.

§ 42-1-19. [Id.]. In December 2022, the Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s petition, thereby

permanently releasing him from the GSOR. [Id.].

After being removed from the Georgia registry, Plaintiff contacted the TBI to request

removal from the sex offender registry in Tennessee. [Id. ¶ 20]. However, in a May 2023 letter,

the TBI denied his request. [Id.; TBI Letter, Compl., Ex. 4]. The letter explained that upon review

of Plaintiff’s documentation, the TBI had now determined that Plaintiff’s Georgia conviction for

child molestation was equivalent to a Tennessee conviction for aggravated sexual battery. [TBI

Letter]. Consequently, Plaintiff had been reclassified as a “violent sexual offender.” [Id.]. Also,

because Plaintiff’s victim was twelve years old or less at the time of his offense, he was now

designated an “offender against children.” [Id.]. Because of these classifications, the letter

explained, Plaintiff is subject to registration and quarterly monitoring requirements for life. [Id.].

If Plaintiff wished to contest the decision he could file a petition in a Tennessee chancery court.

[Id.].

Because of his continuing obligation to comply with the Act, Plaintiff is subject to

“continuous reporting, surveillance, and supervision.” [Id. ¶ 48]. The Act also “severely limits

Plaintiff’s ability to find housing and employment; get an education; travel; engage in speech

activities (including use of the internet); be free from harassment and stigma; and understand what

is required of him under the Act.” [Id.]. Moreover, his status as a registrant “triggers a vast array

of additional obligations, disabilities, and restraints under other federal, state, and local laws, as

well as private policies barring or limiting registrants from access to goods or services available to

the public.” [Id. ¶ 49].

B. Legal Background

Tennessee has had a sex offender registry in some form since 1994, with the current Act

having been adopted in 2004. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 to -218 (2024). Since its enactment,

the current Act has undergone a number of amendments, which have increased the responsibilities

and restrictions placed upon sex offenders. The Court reviews only those aspects of the Act that

are most relevant to the instant case.

1. Classification

Under the Act, adult offenders are divided into two tiers, “sexual offenders,” and “violent

sexual offenders.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-218. These classifications—which have been part of

the Act since 2004—are based solely on an offender’s offense of conviction.1 Id. An offender’s

1 The Tennessee offenses of conviction that qualify an offender as a “violent sexual offender”—such as rape and

aggravated sexual battery— are specifically listed in the Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(31).

classification dictates the minimum length of time he must spend on the registry and the frequency

of reporting. Id. §§ 40-39-204, 40-39-207(a), (g).“Sexual offenders” must report annually in

person and may petition the TBI for termination of registry requirements after ten years. Id. §§ 40-

39-204(c), 40-39-207(a)(1). In contrast, “violent sexual offenders” must report quarterly in person

and comply with the registry requirements for life. Id. §§ 40-39-204(b)(1), 40-39-207(g)(2)(B).

In 2014, the “offender against children” designation was added to the Act. 2014 Tenn. Pub.

Acts ch. 770 § 1, 2. This designation applies to any sexual offender or violent sexual offender

whose victim was twelve years of age or younger. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(10). An offender

against children must comply with registry requirements for life, regardless of whether he has been

classified as a violent sexual offender. Id. § 40-39-207(g)(2)(C).

2. Registration and Reporting Requirements

The Act requires offenders to report a substantial amount of personal information. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-39-203(i). Much of this information is then published on the sex offender registry

website, including the offender’s name, address, employer, vehicle registration and license tag

numbers, a current photo, criminal history, the offense(s) of conviction, and whether the offender

is an offender against children. Id. § 40-39-206(d). In addition to reporting on an annual or

quarterly basis, offenders must update any change to their information within

forty-eight hours. Id. § 40-39-203(a)(4).

Offenders are also required to disclose a complete list of their internet identifiers, which

consists of their “electronic mail address information, including usernames, any social media

accounts the offender uses or intends to use, instant message, other internet communication

platforms or devices, and the offender's username, screen name, or other method by which the

offender accesses these accounts or websites[.]” Id. § 40-39-203(i)(17). This information is

accessible by law enforcement. Id. §§ 40-39-203(i), 40-39-206(d). Upon request, the TBI may

share an offender’s internet identifier information with online businesses that request the

information for the purpose of prescreening users. Id. § 40-39-203(m). An offender must report

new internet identifiers within three days. Id. § 40-39-203(a)(7).

3. Geographical Restrictions and Travel

The Act imposes geographical restrictions, also known as exclusion zones. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-39-211. Under these restrictions, an offender is barred from residing or working within

1,000 feet of any school, childcare facility, public park, playground, recreation center or public

athletic field available for use by the general public. Id. § 40-39-211(a)(1). An offender is also

prohibited from standing, sitting “idly,” or remaining within 1,000 feet of these locations if he “has

reason to believe” minors are present and does not have a “reason or relationship involving custody

of or responsibility for” a minor or “any other specific or legitimate reason for being there.” Id. §

40-39-211(d)(1)(B). Moreover, an offender may not “[b]e upon or remain on the premises of any

building or grounds of any public school [or] public park . . . when the offender has reason to

believe children under eighteen (18) years of age are present.” Id. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(A).

Relevant to travel, an offender must obtain, and carry at all times, a driver’s license with a

code that law enforcement recognizes as designating a sex offender. Id. §§ 40-39-213(a),

55-50-353(a). As part of reporting requirements, an offender must also provide updated

registration information for any vehicle “used or owned” by him and a current photograph of that

vehicle. Id. § 40-39-203(i)(10), (19). And before leaving the country, an offender must provide at

least twenty-one days’ notice, although there are exceptions for emergencies and those who engage

in frequent international travel. Id. § 40-39-204(h).

4. Criminal Liability

The Act imposes significant criminal penalties for noncompliance. To “knowingly” fail to

comply with any requirement of the Act constitutes a class E felony, which is punishable by up to

six years in prison. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-111(b)(5), 40-39-208(a), (b). Those convicted of

violating the Act’s requirements are subject to mandatory minimum sentences and fines of ninety

days and $350 for the first offense, 180 days and $600 for the second offense, and one year and

$1,100 for the third or subsequent offense. Id. § 40-39-208(a)–(e).

C. The Instant Lawsuit

Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action, alleging that the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by

increasing his punishment retroactively (Count I); the Due Process Clause by restricting his ability

to travel (Count II); the Due Process Clause by reclassifying him without a notice or a hearing

(Count III); the Due Process Clause by preventing him from working in exclusion zones (Count

IV); the First Amendment by destroying his online anonymity (Count V, part 1); the First

Amendment by restricting access to places commonly used for speech (Count V, part 2); the Eighth

Amendment by subjecting him to a lifetime registration requirement (Count VI); the Due Process

clause by imposing criminal liability without proof of guilty knowledge (Count VII); and the Due

Process Clause by being unconstitutionally vague and impossible for him to comply with (Count

VIII). [Compl. ¶¶ 113–42]. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against the Defendants, TBI

Director Rausch and Sheriff Garrett, in their official capacities. [Id. ¶¶ 12, 23, 27].

Director Rausch filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. [Rausch’s Mot.; Rausch’s Memo, Doc. 79].

Plaintiff responded in opposition. [Pl.’s Resp. to Rausch’s Mot., Doc. 85]. Sheriff Garrett then

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and adopting

Director Rausch’s arguments regarding why Plaintiff fails to state a claim. [Garrett’s Mot.;

Garrett’s Memo, Doc. 87]. In response, Plaintiff adopted the arguments against dismissal that he

raised in his response to Director Rausch’s motion. [Pl.’s Resp. to Garrett’s Mot., Doc. 91].

Defendants did not file a reply and the time in which to do so has passed.

On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff submitted as supplemental authority the Middle District

of Tennessee’s opinion in Doe v. Lee, No. 3:21-CV-00590, 2025 LEXIS 498679, at *35 (M.D.

Tenn. Nov. 6, 2025).2 [Pl.’s Supp. Auth., Doc. 100].

This matter is ripe for review.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to

dismiss based on the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Here,

Defendants challenge the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on standing and sovereign

immunity. Both of these arguments fail.

A. Standing

Article III standing limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.”

U.S. Const., Article III, § 2. To establish standing, “[1] a plaintiff must have suffered some actual

or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant; [2] the injury must be

‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged action; and [3] there must be a substantial likelihood that the

relief requested will redress or prevent plaintiff's injury.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d

488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must have standing throughout every stage

2 Plaintiff styled this filing as “Plaintiff’s Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction.”

[Doc. 100]. However, the title appears to be an error, since an agreed preliminary injunction was entered in this case

on May 22, 2025 [Doc. 93] and there is no motion for preliminary injunction pending before the Court. Accordingly,

the Court construes the submission as a supplement to Plaintiff’s responses in opposition to Defendants’ motions to

dismiss.

of litigation for each claim and form of relief sought. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279

(2021).

As the Sixth Circuit has explained, Director Rausch is a proper party to be sued regarding

“those portions of Tennessee’s statutes that come under his responsibility or enforcement

authority.” Doe v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2024) (finding that Director Rausch was proper

party to be sued in ex post facto challenge to the Act). Director Rausch’s statutory responsibilities

under the Act include administering the statewide sex offender registry database, Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-39-206(a); maintaining the publicly accessible sex offender registry website, § 40-39-206(d);

classifying offenders, § 40-35-2183; and rendering decisions on offenders’ requests to be removed

from the registry, § 40-39-207. He is also responsible for providing statutorily required notices to

registrants, §§ 40-39-205(a), 40-39- 218(c); developing registration forms and instructions, § 40-

39-205(a); promulgating rules to implement and administer the registry, § 40-39-206(f); and

sharing information with law enforcement regarding potential violations, § 40-39-206(b).

Director Rausch argues that he is not a proper party to be sued because he is not responsible

for enforcing reporting violations or exclusion zones; the TBI is not the designated law

enforcement agency where Plaintiff must report; and Plaintiff cannot show that Director Rausch

is the “but for” cause of any other officer’s conduct. [Rausch’s Memo at 5–6]. However, given

Director Rausch’s integral role in Tennessee’s sex offender registry scheme, Plaintiff’s injuries are

“fairly traceable” to him. 4 And it is sufficiently probable that an injunction against Director Rausch

3 At the time Plaintiff was classified, the TBI was responsible for classifying offenders, although it did not receive

express statutory authority to perform that role until March 2025. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-218.

4 The “traceability” requirement for Article III standing “is not focused on whether the defendant ‘caused’ the

plaintiff's injury in the liability sense.” Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 796 (6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven

harms that flow indirectly from the action in question can be said to be ‘fairly traceable’ to that action for standing

purposes.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003); Parsons v.

United States DOJ, 801 F.3d 701, 713–714 (6th Cir. 2015) (“In the nebulous land of ‘fairly traceable,’ where causation

would provide Plaintiff with at least some redress on his claims. Therefore, Director Rausch is a

proper party to be sued. See Kelly v. Lee, No. 1:18-CV-00170-DCLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

78369, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. May 4, 2020) (finding that because Director Rausch is “intricately

involved in the administration of the Act” he was a proper defendant for Ex Post Facto Clause,

vagueness, and First Amendment challenges to the Act); Doe v. Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69245, at *10-11 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2018) (finding that Director of the TBI

was proper party to be sued on ex post facto and due process challenges to the Act); but see Million

v. Rausch, No. 3:22-CV-453, 2025 LEXIS 58169 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2025) (concluding that

plaintiff had standing to sue Director Rausch on an ex post facto challenge to the Act, but failed to

adequately allege standing for due process claims).

As Sheriff of Hamilton County, Garrett is in charge of the designated law enforcement

agency to which Plaintiff must report to verify and update his information. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-39-202(2), (14). And he is tasked with criminal enforcement of the Act. As such, Plaintiff’s

harms are fairly traceable to Sheriff Garrett and an injunction against Sheriff Garrett could provide

Plaintiff with relief. Sheriff Garrett contends that he cannot provide Plaintiff any redress because

“[t]he Sheriff and the Sheriff’s Office are bound to follow the law as it currently exists.” [Garrett’s

Memo at 9]. However, as discussed below, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a plaintiff may

obtain injunctive relief against an unconstitutional statute by filing suit against an official charged

with enforcing the challenged law. Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412 (6th Cir. 2017). “It does not

matter that the defendant official believes himself to be merely following the letter of a statute.”

means more than speculative but less than but-for, the allegation that a defendant’s conduct was a motivating factor

in the third party’s injurious actions satisfies the requisite standard.”).

Nashville Cmty. Bail Fund v. Gentry, 446 F. Supp. 3d 282, 301 (M.D. Tenn. 2020). Thus, like

Director Rausch, Sheriff Garrett is a proper party to be sued.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants also argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because they are

entitled to sovereign immunity. [Rausch’s Memo at 4–5]. Under the Eleventh Amendment, states

and state officials generally enjoy sovereign immunity from suits by private citizens. Doe v.

Dewine, 910 F.3d at 848. However, the doctrine set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

provides an exception to that rule.

Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, sovereign immunity does not bar “claims

for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal

constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. To determine if Ex parte

Young applies, the Court engages in a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint

alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.”

Id. (citing Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)). A state official

may be sued under the Ex parte Young doctrine if he has “some connection with the enforcement of

the act,” meaning that there must be “a realistic possibility the official will take legal or

administrative actions against the plaintiff's interests.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d

1037, 1048 (6th Cir. 2015). This “connection” requirement significantly overlaps with the standing

requirement for traceability and redressability, discussed above. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 943

F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (observing that “Ex Parte Young and standing analysis

‘significantly overlap.’”).

As a state official, Director Rausch would typically be immune from suit in federal court.

However, the Complaint seeks only prospective relief to remedy alleged ongoing constitutional

harms. And as discussed above in the Court’s standing analysis, Director Rausch has extensive

administrative responsibilities under the Act. Thus, there is a realistic possibility that he will take

administrative actions that are adverse to Plaintiff’s interests. Director Rausch argues that the Ex

parte Young doctrine does not apply because none of the challenged provisions that fall within his

enforcement authority run “contrary to federal law.” [Rausch’s Memo at 5]. However, that is a

merits argument. And “the inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include

an analysis of the merits of the claim.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. PSC, 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). Because

the requirements for the Ex parte Young exception have been met, Director Rausch may be sued

without running afoul of sovereign immunity.

As a county official, Sheriff Garrett would not typically be entitled to sovereign immunity.

Nevertheless, Sheriff Garrett asserts that he is immune from suit because “when Sheriff’s Office

personnel are providing forms, collecting information and following up on violations, they are

acting at the behest of the TBI on behalf of the State, and, therefore, act as an arm of the State and

are protected by the State’s sovereign immunity.” [Garrett’s Memo at 7]. County officials are

entitled to sovereign immunity when they perform non-discretionary functions in compliance with

state mandates. McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Services, LLC, 945 F.3d 991, 995 (6th Cir. 2019). But even

assuming that all of Sheriff Garrett’s registry-related functions are performed as an “arm of the

state,” he can still be sued under the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception

applies to Plaintiff’s suit against Sheriff Garrett because again, the Complaint seeks only

prospective relief for constitutional harms. And as discussed above, Sheriff Garrett is tasked with

substantial enforcement duties, giving him the requisite “connection to the act.”

Because Plaintiff has Article III standing to sue Defendants and they are not entitled to

sovereign immunity, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.

III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

In addition to their challenges based on subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants move for

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When ruling on such a motion, the Court must “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept the well-pleaded factual

allegations as true, and determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Com. Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted).

A. Ex Post Facto (Count I)

Count I alleges that the Act violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws

by increasing the punishment for Plaintiff’s offense. [Compl. ¶ 113]. Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s ex post facto claim fails because every major substantive requirement in the Act—

including the “violent sexual offender” classification—was in effect when he offended in 2011.

[Rausch’s Memo at 6]. In response, Plaintiff asserts that the “offender against children”

designation was not added to the Act until 2014. [Pl.’s Resp. to Rausch at 6]. He notes that this

label appears under his name on the TSOR website. [Id.].

“An ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not

punishable at the time it was committed, or a punishment in addition to that then

prescribed.” Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878). To prevail on an ex post facto claim,

Plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) that the law is enforced against him retroactively and

(2) that the law is punitive, as opposed to civil. Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2016)

(recognizing that “the Constitution’s ban on Ex Post Facto laws does not bar all retroactive

lawmaking, but only retroactive punishment”) (emphasis in original). An “ostensibly civil and

regulatory law,” such as the Act, is not deemed punitive unless “the plaintiff can show by the

clearest proof that what has been denominated a civil remedy is, in fact, a criminal penalty.” Id. at

700 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)).

Traditionally, courts have viewed sex offender registries as civil regulatory schemes, which

do not impose punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06 (finding that Alaska’s

first-generation sex offender registry law was non-punitive and therefore could be enforced

retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998,

1003–07 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to an early version of the Act).

However, in Snyder, the Sixth Circuit held that certain aspects of the Michigan sex offender

registry scheme were punitive and therefore violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied

retroactively: (1) severe restrictions on where offenders can live, work, and “loiter”; (2)

categorizing offenders into “tiers ostensibly corresponding to present dangerousness without any

individualized assessment”; and (3) “time-consuming and cumbersome in-person reporting.”

Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705. Tennessee’s Act is also punitive, to the extent its provisions mirror those

enjoined in Snyder. Doe v. Lee, 102 F.4th at 339.

Here, Plaintiff fails to show that a punitive aspect of the Act has been applied to him

retroactively. When he offended in 2011, the Act already included geographic restrictions and

divided offenders into the categories of “sexual offender” and “violent sexual offender” without

individualized assessment. Also, according to the Sixth Circuit, Snyder does not call into question

Tennessee’s reporting requirements, which are less onerous than those imposed in Michigan. Id.,

n.2.

Plaintiff is correct that the “offender against children” designation has been applied to him

retroactively, thereby satisfying the first prong of an ex post facto claim. But he fails to establish

the second prong—that this change in the law increased his punishment. The lifetime reporting

requirement that goes along with the “offender against children” designation does not increase his

punishment because he is already subject to a lifetime reporting requirement due to his status as a

violent sexual offender. It appears that the only other consequence of the “offender against

children” designation is that the label appears by Plaintiff’s photo on the TSOR website. But

Plaintiff fails to show that this descriptive label adds to his punishment, when by statute, his

conviction for “child molestation” is also listed on the website. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-206(d).5

Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim will be granted.6

B. Eighth Amendment (Count VI)

Next, Plaintiff asserts that his “life sentence” on the registry violates the Eighth

Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. [Compl. ¶¶ 130–131]. Under the Eighth

Amendment, a punishment is cruel and unusual if it “(1) makes no measurable contribution to

acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than purposeless and needless

imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).

5 Notably, in the Middle District of Tennessee, courts have found that being designated an “offender against children”

added to an offender’s ignominy by falsely suggesting that he victimized more than one child. See Doe v. Lee, No.

3:21-CV-00590, 2025 LEXIS 498679, at *35 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2025); Doe v. Lee, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1178

(M.D. Tenn. 2021). Plaintiff has not raised that argument here. But even if he had, the Court does not find it plausible

that the “offender against children” label is punitive in this case, since Plaintiff’s offense of conviction, “child

molestation,” is included with his information on the registry website, indicating that he had a single victim.

6 The Complaint references several other provisions in the Act that post-date Plaintiff’s offense, such as the 21-day

notice requirement for international travel, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-204(h). But Plaintiff has not alleged facts

demonstrating that those requirements are punitive or connected them to his ex post facto claim.

Of course, to implicate the Eighth Amendment in the first place, a law must be punitive.

The analysis of whether a law imposes punishment is the same in the ex post facto and Eighth

Amendment contexts. See M.S. Willman v. AG of the United States, 972 F.3d 819, 825 (6th Cir.

2020) (finding that because the federal sex offender registry law “is not a punishment for purposes

of the Ex Post Facto Clause,” “[i]t follows, therefore, that [the law] is not punishment for purposes

of the Eighth Amendment either”). The plaintiff must show by the “clearest proof” that an

ostensibly civil, regulatory law—such as the Act—is really a criminal penalty. Snyder, 834 F.3d

at 699.

The Supreme Court has made clear that a lifetime obligation to comply with a civil,

regulatory scheme does not constitute punishment. Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. However, in Snyder,

the Sixth Circuit recognized that overly restrictive exclusion zones and classification into tiers of

dangerousness without individualized assessment are punitive. See Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705

(observing that these restrictions were “supported by—at best—scant evidence that [they] serve

the professed purpose of keeping . . . communities safe.”). And it is at least plausible that a lifetime

requirement to comply with those restrictions imposes needless pain and suffering, without making

a measurable contribution to the legitimate goals of punishment. Accordingly, to the extent

Plaintiff asserts that the punitive portions of the Act render his lifetime registration requirement

cruel and unusual, he states a colorable Eighth Amendment claim. See Nunley v. Rausch, No. 3:23-

CV-00100, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 22, 2023) (“[B]ecause TSORA may be deemed punitive . . .

and because . . . Plaintiff has alleged that TSORA is punitive and his punishments are

disproportionate to his crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Court finds that the

complaint states a colorable Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim under Section

1983.”). Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim will be denied.

C. Due Process

1. Procedural Due Process (Count III)

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his procedural due process rights were violated because

the TBI reclassified him as a violent sexual offender and offender against children without notice

or an opportunity to be heard regarding his likelihood to reoffend. [Compl. ¶¶ 118–19]. Defendants

assert that Plaintiff is not entitled to an individualized assessment of his dangerousness because

his classification was based on his offense of conviction, which he already had a procedurally

safeguarded opportunity to contest.7 [Rausch’s Memo at 12].

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §

1. Due process has procedural and substantive components. Bambach v. Moegle, 92 F.4th 615, 624

(6th Cir. 2024). As relevant here, “[p]rocedural due process rights protect individuals from

deficient procedures that lead to the deprivation of cognizable liberty interests.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). To state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege

(1) that he has a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and (2) that

the government deprived him of that interest without adequate process. Fields v. Henry Cnty, 701

F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff fails to show that he was deprived of adequate process. As alleged in the

Complaint, he was reclassified as a violent sexual offender after the TBI determined that his

Georgia child molestation conviction was substantially similar to a Tennessee conviction for

aggravated sexual battery. If those two offenses are comparable—and Plaintiff has not alleged

7 Defendants also maintain that Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is untimely under Tennessee’s one-year statute

of limitations, since he first registered in Tennessee in 2019. [Rausch’s Memo at 13]. However, Plaintiff was not

reclassified as a “violent sexual offender” and “offender against children” until May 2023. [TBI Letter]. Accordingly,

the Court finds that Plaintiff was well within the one-year limitations period when he filed suit in August 2023.

otherwise—he is properly classified as a violent sexual offender under Tennessee’s statutory

scheme. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(1)(C) (listing aggravated sexual battery among those

offenses deemed violent). Further, the only fact that was relevant to Plaintiff’s classification as an

offender against children was the age of his victim, a fact used to establish his conviction.

Because Tennessee classifies offenders based solely on their conviction, Plaintiff’s

likelihood to reoffend was not relevant to his classification. Thus, he is not entitled to a hearing on

that issue. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2003) (“[D]ue process does not

require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.”); Doe

v. Dewine, 910 F.3d at 852–53 (finding that offender was not entitled to a hearing on his lifetime

registration requirement, since present dangerousness was not material to the Ohio sex offender

registration scheme). Plaintiff may be arguing that current dangerousness should be a factor in

determining an offender’s classification. But to the extent he makes that argument, he attempts to

raise a substantive, not procedural due process claim. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at

8 (explaining that a claim arguing that a substantive rule of law is defective must be analyzed in

terms of substantive, rather than procedural due process).

As a matter of procedural due process, this claim fails. Hence, Defendants’ motions to

dismiss Count III will be granted.

2. Substantive Due Process

Counts II and IV, which allege violations of Plaintiff’s fundamental rights to travel and

work, rely on the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. [Compl. ¶¶ 114–17,

120–24]. Substantive due process rights “ensure that—regardless of the procedural protections

available—the government may not deprive individuals of fundamental rights unless the action is

necessary and animated by a compelling purpose.” Bambach, 92 F.4th at 624 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Notably, “[t]he interests protected by substantive due process are . . .

much narrower than those protected by procedural due process,” Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d

240, 249–50 (6th Cir. 2003), extending only to those rights that are “objectively, deeply rooted in

this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither

liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

720–21 (1997) (cleaned up). “A fundamental right will only be implicated by government action

that, at a minimum, significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.” Beydoun v.

Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).

a. Travel (Count II)

Plaintiff alleges that his status as a sex offender registrant severely restricts his ability to

travel, both in other states and abroad. [Compl. ¶¶ 67, 114–15]. Defendants assert that this claim

fails because the Act does not infringe on any fundamental right to travel, and they cannot be held

liable for the laws of other jurisdictions. [Rausch’s Memo at 10–11].

The right to interstate travel has long been recognized as a fundamental right under the

Constitution. Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986). And the Sixth

Circuit has recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel. Johnson v. City of Cincinnati,

310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a fundamental right to “travel locally through

public spaces and roadways”). But a state law only “implicates the right to travel when it actually

deters travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses a classification that

serves to penalize the exercise of the right.” LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). The fundamental right to travel is not implicated if the inconvenience imposed

by a regulation is “incidental and negligible.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges several facts regarding the Act’s effect on his domestic travel.

Specifically, he complains that he must tailor his travel around the Act’s quarterly reporting

requirements; that he must provide complete information on his vehicles each time he updates his

registration information; and that he is required to maintain a Tennessee driver’s license with a

code, alerting law enforcement that he is on the TSOR. [Compl. ¶¶ 68, 75–76]. These requirements

may be inconvenient. But Plaintiff does not allege that their primary purpose is to impede travel.

And he does not allege facts demonstrating that they have deterred him from travelling or penalized

him for doing so.

In addition, Plaintiff complains that he must comply with the Act’s 21-day notice

requirement for international travel, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-204(h). [Id. ¶ 67]. Unlike the

fundamental right to interstate travel, “the ‘right’ of international travel has been considered to be

no more than an aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of [the] Fifth

Amendment.” Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978). As such, regulations burdening this

“right” are only subject to rational basis review. See id. (observing that the “right” to international

travel “can be regulated within the bounds of due process”). That standard is easily met here. Doe

v. Haslam, No. 3:16-CV-02862, 2017 LEXIS 25070, at *51 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2017) (“Insofar

as the Court recognizes a constitutional right to international travel, that right is not so highly

protected that it is violated by the passage of a 21-day notification requirement based on the

important public purposes underlying the Act.”).

Finally, Plaintiff makes several allegations that are directed, not at requirements of the Act,

but at collateral consequences of his status as a sex offender registrant. Specifically, he asserts that

he is burdened by his obligation to comply with the sex offender laws of other states he visits; by

federal sex offender regulations, including a requirement that he obtain a passport indicating his

sex offender status; and by the likelihood that foreign countries will deny him entry. [Id. ¶¶ 69–

74]. However, Plaintiff fails to show why Defendants are proper parties to be sued regarding the

laws and policies of other jurisdictions, over which they have no authority.

Because Plaintiff fails to show the Act burdens his fundamental right to travel, Defendants’

motions to dismiss this claim will be granted.

b. Work (Count IV)

Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Act’s geographical restrictions, Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-39-211(a)(1)—which bar him from working within 1,000 feet of specified locations, such as

schools and public parks—create a “wholesale barrier” to his employment as a construction

manager. [Compl. ¶ 122]. He complains that he has been unable to accept projects within exclusion

zones and had to decline a lucrative position with a company because its office was located in an

exclusion zone. [Id. ¶¶ 64, 121]. Defendants maintain that this claim fails because restrictions on

employment do not implicate a fundamental right and are only subject to rational basis review.

[Rausch’s Memo at 11–12]. The Court agrees.

While the “freedom to choose and pursue a career” is a fundamental right, Wilkerson v.

Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir. 1983), there is no “general right to private

employment,” Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). In other words,

“[l]egislation that bars individuals from pursuing particular careers may infringe on a fundamental

right, but legislation that incidentally makes obtaining private employment more difficult does

not.” Does v. Whitmer, 751 F. Supp. 3d 761, 801–02 (E.D. Mich. 2024). Geographical restrictions

may make it more difficult for Plaintiff to obtain employment. But he has not been barred from

pursuing a career in the construction industry and is free to engage in construction work that is not

located within an exclusion zone. Accordingly, the Act’s geographical restrictions do not infringe

on Plaintiff’s fundamental right to work. Defendants’ motions to dismiss this claim will be granted.

3. Vagueness and Impossibility (Count VIII)

Count VIII alleges that the Act’s many requirements, and in particular the geographical

restrictions, are vague and impossible to comply with. [Compl. ¶¶ 85–94, 134–37]. Defendants

argue that the geographical restrictions are not vague because they are sufficiently clear to give a

person of ordinary intelligence fair notice and to prevent arbitrary enforcement. [Rausch’s Memo

at 15]. Further, Defendants contend that compliance with the Act is not impossible because there

are no conflicting statutory obligations. [Id.].

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded in principles of due process. Belle Maer

Harbor v. Charter Twp. of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The Due Process Clauses

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide the constitutional foundation for the void-for-

vagueness doctrine.”). A law is void for vagueness if it (1) defines an offense in such a way that

ordinary people cannot understand what is prohibited or (2) encourages arbitrary or discriminatory

enforcement. Id. “Vague laws are subject to particular scrutiny when criminal sanctions are

threatened or constitutional rights are at risk.” United States v. Caseer, 399 F.3d 828, 835 (6th Cir.

2005). Moreover, “[h]olding an individual criminally liable for failing to comply with a duty

imposed by statute, with which it is legally impossible to comply, deprives that person of his due

process rights.” Doe v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 3d 722, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2015).

Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that at least one provision of the Act—the geographic

restrictions on loitering—may be unconstitutionally vague. [Compl. ¶¶ 89–90]. That provision

prohibits standing, sitting “idly,” or remaining within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, or other

specified locations if the offender “has reason to believe” minors are present and does not have a

“reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for” a minor or “any other specific

or legitimate reason for being there.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(d)(1)(B). As Plaintiff points

out, it is unclear what a law enforcement officer might consider a “legitimate reason for being

there.” [Id. ¶ 90]. As another court has recognized, it is also unclear where the line would be drawn

between standing or sitting “idly,” as opposed to standing or sitting

“non-idly.” Doe v. Haslam, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25070, at *58–59 (denying motion to dismiss

offender’s vagueness challenge to Act). This lack of specificity in the statute could invite arbitrary

enforcement.

With respect to Plaintiff’s allegation of impossibility, his apparent ability to comply with

exclusion zones for multiple years, without incident, suggests that they are not impossible to

comply with. Nevertheless, the Court accepts as true his allegation that he often cannot know if he

is standing or sitting “idly” within 1,000 feet of a prohibited area, since the property boundaries

are unknown. [Id. ¶ 89]. A more developed factual record will assist the Court in determining the

viability of that claim.

Accordingly, the motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on vagueness and

impossibility will be denied.

4. Criminal Liability without Guilty Knowledge (Count VII)

While Plaintiff’s vagueness and impossibility claim is plausible, his related claim, alleging

that the Act imposes strict criminal liability, is not. Plaintiff contends that the Act—and in

particular the geographical restrictions—violate the Due Process Clause by imposing criminal

liability for passive conduct, without requiring proof that the offender has notice of the duty to

comply. [Compl. ¶ 133]. In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.

225 (1957). [Id. ¶ 132]. Defendants maintain that the Act does not impose strict liability and

Lambert does not apply. [Rausch’s Memo at 13–15].

The Court agrees that Lambert is inapposite here. In that case, the Supreme Court

considered whether a defendant who had no actual knowledge of a city ordinance making it

unlawful for any felon “to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without

registering,” could be convicted for failing to register as required under the ordinance. Id. at 226.

The Court found that the ordinance violated due process as applied because the defendant had no

notice of the registration requirement and the circumstances were not such that they “might move

one to inquire as to the necessity of registration.” Id. at 229. In reaching this conclusion, the Court

reasoned that “[w]here a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof

of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.” Id.

at 229–30. The Lambert decision provides a narrow exception to the usual rule that ignorance of

the law is no excuse.

Unlike the defendant in Lambert, who had no notice of the city’s reporting requirement,

Plaintiff has actual knowledge of his duty to comply with the Act’s geographical restrictions and

other requirements. Indeed, the Act mandates that all offenders receive such notice. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-39-205. Moreover, criminal liability does not attach unless an offender

“knowingly” engages in the conduct that is prohibited by statute. Id. § 39-11-302(b). Thus, the Act

does not impose criminal liability for passive conduct without guilty knowledge. In raising this

claim, Plaintiff may be arguing that despite being aware of the Act’s requirements, he does not

know how to interpret and comply with them. However, to the extent he raises that argument, his

claim is duplicative of the vagueness and impossibility claim discussed above. Defendants’

motions to dismiss Count VII will therefore be granted.

D. First Amendment (Count V)

In his remaining claim, Plaintiff asserts that the Act violates his First Amendment right to

freedom of speech [Compl. ¶¶ 77, 125–28]. He cites two separate grounds for this allegation.

1. Internet Identifier Reporting

First, Plaintiff asserts that the internet identifier reporting requirement violates the First

Amendment, both on its face and as applied.8 [Id. ¶ 127]. Because of this requirement, Plaintiff

asserts, he is unable to engage in anonymous political speech online and fears his online activity

will be monitored by law enforcement. [Id. ¶¶ 78, 80–81]. Defendants contend that the internet

identifier reporting requirement is constitutional because it helps protect the public from sex

offenders, does not prevent an offender from accessing the internet, and makes online identifiers

available to law enforcement, but not the public at large. [Rausch’s Memo at 20–21]. They also

assert that Plaintiff’s facial claim fails because he does not identify a substantial number of

instances where the internet identifier reporting requirement is unconstitutional. [Id. at 20].

The First Amendment protects anonymous speech, including the right to speak

anonymously over the internet. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. DOE, 876 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir.

2017). “As with other forms of expression, the ability to speak anonymously on the Internet

promotes the robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without

fear of economic or official retaliation or concern about social ostracism.” Id. (citing In re

Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). However, like all

First Amendment speech rights, the right to speak anonymously online is not absolute. Content-

neutral regulations—such as the internet identifier reporting requirement—are constitutional if

they satisfy intermediate scrutiny. See Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 2016).

8 Unlike an as-applied challenge—which seeks to invalidate a law as applied to the plaintiff’s particular case—a facial

challenge is an effort “to invalidate the law in each of its applications, to take the law off the books completely.”

Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2009).

To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant

governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the

information.” Id.

While Plaintiff’s factual allegations in support of this claim are somewhat thin, he plausibly

alleges that the internet identifier reporting requirement burdens his political speech and therefore

is not narrowly tailored to him. Further factual development of the record will help the Court

determine whether this reporting requirement satisfies intermediate scrutiny. See Doe v. Haslam,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25070, at *56 (“Even assuming that the Act serves a significant

governmental interest, the Court is unable to conclude that [the internet identifier reporting

requirements are] sufficiently narrowly tailored without the benefit of a full factual record.”);

Jackson v. Rausch, No. 3:19-CV-377, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239259, at *22–23 (E.D. Tenn. Dec.

21, 2020) (“Faced only with the bare allegations of the Amended Complaint and the Act’s

language, the Court is unable to determine the real-world effect of the Act on internet use or the

burden the Act’s restrictions place on Plaintiff’s internet speech, let alone whether the

requirements serve a significant government interest.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s as-applied challenge

will proceed.

With respect to Plaintiff’s facial challenge, Defendants are correct that the Complaint does

not list a substantial number of instances where the requirement violates the First Amendment. See

Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 336 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that to succeed

in a First Amendment facial challenge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a substantial number of

instances exist in which the statute cannot be applied constitutionally.). However, “the distinction

between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect

or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional

challenge.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). Rather, the distinction “goes to the

breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Id. Given

that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an as-applied challenge, the Court will not dismiss the facial

challenge at this time.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment challenge to the internet

identifier reporting requirement will therefore be denied.

2. Access to Places Associated with Speech

Second, Plaintiff alleges that exclusion zones violate his First Amendment rights by

restricting his access to places commonly associated with speech. [Compl. ¶¶ 82, 128]. In support

of this claim, he asserts that he is unable to attend a public meeting at a school or a demonstration

at a park if children are present. [Id. ¶ 82]. However, the Act’s geographical restrictions are not

aimed at suppressing speech. And as Defendants point out, “laws restricting sex offenders’

proximity to schools or parks have been . . . upheld under rational basis review because courts

have found they do not implicate the First Amendment or involve a fundamental right.” Doe v.

Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 702 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing

that exclusion zones serve no rational purpose or that his speech has been unduly burdened by

them. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is based on his lack of access to

locations within exclusion zones, Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to file a response is

GRANTED. The motion to dismiss the Sheriff’s Office is also GRANTED. Defendant Rausch

and Defendant Garrett’s motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause (Count I);

Procedural Due Process (Count III); Substantive Due Process – Right to Travel (Count II);

Substantive Due Process – Right to Work (Count IV); First Amendment – Exclusion Zones

(Count V, part 2); and Strict Liability (Count VII) are DISMISSED. The case will proceed as to

Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of the First Amendment – Internet Identifier Reporting

Requirement (Count V, part 1); Due Process – Vagueness and Impossibility (Count VIII); and the

Eighth Amendment (Count VI).

So ordered.

ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE