finding that the disjunctive language in R.C. 149.43(C) “manifests an intent to afford access to public records, even when a private entity is responsible for the records”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the disjunctive language in R.C. 149.43(C) “manifests an intent to afford access to public records, even when a private entity is responsible for the records”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5280.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-5280
THE STATE EX REL . BROWN v. COLUMBIANA COUNTY JAIL ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Brown v. Columbiana Cty. Jail, Slip Opinion No.
2025-Ohio-5280.]
Mandamus—Public-records requests—Statutory damages—Relator has not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that he successfully transmitted his
requests by either hand delivery or certified mail or that he authorized
another person to act as his agent to submit his requests by email—
Relator’s request for statutory damages denied—Relator’s motion for
contempt and sanctions denied because he has not shown that respondents
disobeyed or resisted this court’s limited writ.
(No. 2023-1218—Submitted February 11, 2025—Decided November 26, 2025.)
IN MANDAMUS.
ON AMENDED MOTION for Contempt and Sanctions.
__________________
DEWINE, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
FISCHER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., concurred
in part and dissented in part, with an opinion.
DEWINE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an original action involving public records. In a previous
decision, we ordered the Corrections Division of the Columbiana County Sheriff’s
Office and Sheriff Brian McLaughlin (collectively, “the sheriff”) to produce certain
records to Terry Brown or to certify that such records did not exist. 2024-Ohio-
4969, ¶ 24. As part of our order, we directed the sheriff to obtain documents from
two nonparties, Correctional Solutions Group, L.L.C. (“CSG”) and Community
Education Centers, Inc./GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), and to provide the records he
obtained from CSG and GEO to Brown. Id. at ¶ 23. We stated that we would defer
our determination of statutory damages until the sheriff complied with the limited
writ. Id.
{¶ 2} A few weeks after we issued our order, the sheriff filed a notice of
compliance with the limited writ. Brown then filed a motion for contempt and
sanctions, arguing that the sheriff has defied our limited writ. For the following
reasons, we deny Brown’s request for statutory damages and his motion for
contempt and sanctions.
I. FACTS AND RELEVANT LAW
{¶ 3} Brown is incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional Institution. In
August 2023, he requested from the sheriff numerous records concerning the
Columbiana County Jail. Brown asserts that he attempted to submit the requests
by hand delivery but was refused. He then tried to send the requests via certified
mail to the warden at the Columbiana County Jail, but they were returned to him
marked not deliverable as addressed. He ultimately submitted the requests via
facsimile. The next day, a third party, Christine Serna, submitted the requests
purportedly on Brown’s behalf via email.
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{¶ 4} The requests at issue can be divided into three categories: (1) records
documenting policies on the intake and booking of inmates at the Columbiana
County Jail (“policy-records requests”); (2) records regarding personnel employed
at the jail between January 1, 2017, and July 1, 2018 (“personnel-records
requests”); and (3) records documenting retention policies.
{¶ 5} In response, the sheriff produced two records, declined to provide
some records because he had previously given them to Brown, and told Brown that
he did not have any other responsive records in his possession. The sheriff
explained that he did not have any other responsive records because such records
would be kept and maintained by CSG, one of the two private jail administrators
that operated the jail during the relevant time period. The sheriff suggested that
any request should be made directly to CSG.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to a contract with Columbiana County, CSG began operating
the jail in January 2022. GEO, the other private jail administrator, operated the jail
between January 2014 and sometime in 2019.
{¶ 7} In most cases, the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, does not apply to
private entities. State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 2006-Ohio-4854,
¶ 26 (“presumption that private entities are not subject to the Public Records Act”).
We have found an exception, however, for certain private entities that are the
functional equivalent of a public office. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus,
Brown could have followed the sheriff’s advice and requested the documents
directly from the private jail administrators. See State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio
v. OneOhio Recovery Found., 2023-Ohio-1547, ¶ 12 (a functional equivalent of a
public office is subject to the Public Records Act). And if they failed to provide
him with public records, he could have instituted a lawsuit directly against CSG
and GEO. See id. at ¶ 34, 42 (granting writ of mandamus ordering functional
equivalent of public office to comply with Public Records Act).
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{¶ 8} Instead of attempting to obtain the documents directly from CSG and
GEO, Brown sued the sheriff and the “Columbiana County Jail” in mandamus. We
dismissed the claim against the Columbiana County Jail on the basis that it is not a
legal entity. 2024-Ohio-4969, ¶ 11-13. Brown did not name CSG or GEO in his
lawsuit.
{¶ 9} We granted Brown a limited writ. Id. at ¶ 24. Because Brown had
not sued CSG or GEO, or asked them for any records, our functional-equivalency
caselaw did not apply. Thus, we could not order the private jail administrators to
respond to Brown’s request. Instead, we relied on a more limited quasi-agency
theory that recognizes that in certain circumstances, records fall within the
jurisdiction of a public entity when they are in the possession of a private entity to
which the public entity has delegated a public responsibility. Id. at ¶ 17-20; State
ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 38-39 (1990).
{¶ 10} Under the quasi-agency theory, records held by a private entity fall
within the jurisdiction of a public entity if “(1) [the] private entity prepares [the]
records in order to carry out a public office’s responsibilities, (2) the public office
is able to monitor the private entity’s performance, and (3) the public office has
access to the records for this purpose.” Mazzaro at 39. Importantly, though, as we
applied the test in our previous opinion in this case, we didn’t require that the sheriff
be able to control the actions of the private entities for the quasi-agency test to be
satisfied. Rather, we proceeded on the basis that it was enough that Brown had
established that the private jail administrators performed “‘a delegated public
duty,’” 2024-Ohio-4969 at ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of
Trustees, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶ 16. Our limited writ required the sheriff to obtain
responsive records from GEO and CSG or to certify that such records do not exist.
Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 11} The sheriff promptly acted to comply with our writ, asking CSG and
GEO to provide records responsive to Brown’s requests. The private jail
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administrators responded with the documents that they were able to locate. The
sheriff forwarded the private jail administrators’ responses to Brown and filed a
notice of compliance with our limited writ.
{¶ 12} Brown then filed a motion for contempt and sanctions (which he
subsequently amended) asserting that the sheriff has not complied with the limited
writ. He also seeks statutory damages. The sheriff filed a response to the amended
motion for contempt and sanctions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Brown Is Not Entitled to Statutory Damages
{¶ 13} To be eligible for statutory damages, a public-records requester must
demonstrate that he transmitted his request by hand delivery, electronic submission,
or certified mail. R.C. 149.43(C)(2).1 The requester bears the burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to statutory damages. State ex rel.
Grim v. New Holland, 2024-Ohio-4822, ¶ 6.
{¶ 14} Brown attests in an affidavit that he attempted to deliver his requests
by hand delivery but was refused. But he does not say to whom he attempted to
hand-deliver his requests. Nor does he explain how he could have hand-delivered
a request to the sheriff when he was incarcerated at the Belmont Correctional
Institution. Additionally, although Brown submitted evidence showing that he
attempted to mail something via certified mail, the mailing was returned to him as
undeliverable. Therefore, Brown has not shown by clear and convincing evidence
that he successfully transmitted his requests by either hand delivery or certified
mail.
1. Effective April 9, 2025, R.C. 149.43 was amended such that a person committed to the custody
of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is no longer eligible to receive an award of
statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C). 2024 Sub.H.B. No. 265. This opinion applies the version
of R.C. 149.43 enacted in 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 45.
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{¶ 15} Brown also faxed his public-records requests to the sheriff. But
public-records requests delivered by fax do not qualify for statutory damages. State
ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 2023-Ohio-1177, ¶ 49.
{¶ 16} Lastly, Christine Serna submitted the records requests to the sheriff
via email. Serna asserted in an affidavit that she acted “with Power of Attorney
and ‘Agent Status’ for Terry Brown” when she submitted the requests via email.
However, Brown has not submitted any documentation showing that he executed a
power of attorney authorizing Serna to act on his behalf. Nor does Serna claim to
be representing Brown as an attorney licensed to practice law. See State ex rel.
Brinkman v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-5063, ¶ 30-31 (the
relator was eligible for statutory damages when his attorney submitted public-
records requests by email on his behalf).
{¶ 17} We have not previously addressed whether someone is eligible for
statutory damages when his nonattorney agent submits a public-records request on
his behalf. However, we need not decide that issue today because Brown has not
shown by clear and convincing evidence that he authorized Serna to act as his agent.
Serna’s conclusory statement that she was acting “with Power of Attorney and
‘Agent Status’ for Terry Brown” is not clear and convincing evidence that Brown
executed a power of attorney authorizing her as his agent.
B. There Is No Basis to Hold the Sheriff in Contempt
{¶ 18} Brown argues that the sheriff should be held in contempt and
sanctioned pursuant to R.C. 2705.02(A) for failing to comply with the limited writ.
R.C. 2705.02 provides that “[a] person guilty of . . . [d]isobedience of, or resistance
to, a lawful writ” may be punished for contempt.
{¶ 19} Brown argues that the sheriff has failed to comply with our limited
writ for (1) policy-records requests, (2) personnel-records requests, and (3) the
records-retention schedule. We address all three categories separately below.
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January Term, 2025
1. The sheriff did not disobey or resist our writ as to the policy-records requests
{¶ 20} Brown argues that the sheriff did not satisfy his policy-records
request Nos. 4, 5, 11, and 12. Brown’s policy-records requests to the sheriff asked
“for public records and policy information relating to Policy information on
Inmate Intake/Booking and Retention of records.” (Boldface, capitalization,
and underlining in original.)
{¶ 21} In Brown’s policy-records request No. 5, he asked for “[a]ny
statistics on how often inmate case files or medical records are lost, stolen, or
misplaced.” The response that the sheriff forwarded from CSG states, “CSG is not
in possession of any statistical data you have requested.” Brown seems to argue
that such statistics must exist because he was told that a portion of his medical file
was misplaced. However, the fact that files may sometimes be misplaced does not
demonstrate that the sheriff maintains statistics on lost, stolen, or misplaced
records.
{¶ 22} Regarding his policy-records request Nos. 4, 11, and 12, Brown
contends that the sheriff improperly denied those requests as overly broad to avoid
disclosing the records, in violation of this court’s order. Brown’s policy-records
request Nos. 4, 11, and 12 requested:
4. Policy information on lost, stolen, or misplaced inmates’
records including medical records.
11. Policy information on how or when to do drug
testing/toxicity testing for inmates showing impairment of drugs,
alcohol, or psychological issues.
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12. Policy information on ordering/issuing a mental health
or psychiatric evaluation for any inmate being booked into the jail
suffering from mental or psychological impairment.[2]
{¶ 23} As to these requests, CSG responded: “The request is overly broad.
CSG is not able to distinguish the information you are requesting.” CSG further
invited Brown to “please be more specific in describing the items” he was
requesting. It also explained that “state law does not require [CSG] to create
information or documents that do not exist.” The sheriff forwarded these responses
to Brown.
{¶ 24} There is no indication that Brown responded to CSG’s request that
he be more specific about what he hoped to find. Instead, Brown moved to hold
the sheriff in contempt. In response to Brown’s contempt motion, the sheriff
continues to try to help Brown obtain records that might be responsive to his
request. He suggests that “Brown is free to narrow or further explain his request in
order to identify any responsive records” and invites Brown “to discuss [with the
sheriff] the outstanding records being sought.”
{¶ 25} A person may be punished for contempt for “[d]isobedience of, or
resistance to, a lawful writ,” R.C. 2705.02(A). So for a show-cause order to be
proper, there must be some evidence that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted the writ
issued by this court. Here, there is nothing in the sheriff’s conduct that would lead
to such a finding.
2. There is a good argument that these requests for policy information do not implicate the Public
Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The act requires a public office, on request, to make available “public
records responsive to the request.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 149.43(B)(1). It does not require the
public agency to respond to general requests for information. State ex rel. Morgan v. New
Lexington, 2006-Ohio-6365, ¶ 30 (“Requests for information . . . are improper requests under R.C.
149.43.”); State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 1997-Ohio-104, ¶ 7 (request improper
because it sought “certain information . . . rather than specific records”). But because the sheriff
has not raised such an argument, we do not consider it here.
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January Term, 2025
{¶ 26} Start with disobedience. Relevant here, Webster’s defines
disobedience as the “refusal to obey or negligence in obeying a command.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002). The sheriff wasn’t
disobedient. We gave him an order, and he sought to carry it out. The sheriff didn’t
disobey our order, nor did he act negligently in carrying it out.
{¶ 27} True, CSG didn’t provide records that the sheriff asked it to provide.
But any fault for that (doubtful though it may be given the vagueness of the
requests) lies with CSG, not the sheriff.
{¶ 28} Next, resistance. The sheriff didn’t resist our order; again, he sought
to carry it out. He asked CSG for the records. He relayed the documents he
received to Brown. And for request Nos. 4, 11, and 12, which CSG says it was
unable to fulfill because of Brown’s vague requests, the sheriff has invited Brown
“to rephrase or resubmit those requests with increased specificity.”
{¶ 29} There is nothing in the sheriff’s conduct that demonstrates
disobedience or resistance to our limited writ as to the policy-records requests.
Thus, there is no basis to hold him in contempt.
2. The sheriff did not disobey or resist our writ as to the personnel-records
requests
{¶ 30} For similar reasons, we reject Brown’s argument that the sheriff
should be held in contempt and sanctioned for failure to satisfy personnel-records
request Nos. 1, 2, 6, and 7.
{¶ 31} In regard to personnel-records request Nos. 1, 6, and 7, GEO—the
private jail administrator responsible for the jail during the relevant time—told the
sheriff in a letter that it did not have any responsive documents. The sheriff
transmitted GEO’s letter to Brown. In doing so, the sheriff complied with our
limited writ. Therefore, Brown’s argument is not well-taken.
{¶ 32} In regard to personnel-records request No. 2, GEO provided records
to the sheriff and the sheriff sent the records to Brown. However, neither Brown
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nor the sheriff filed the records with the court. Brown argues that “respondents”
failed to disclose all the responsive records because the names and positions of
some temporary GEO employees were omitted. However, we are unable to
evaluate this argument because the documents are not in the record. Further, any
omission of employee names was presumably the result of actions taken by GEO,
not the sheriff. Thus, there is no basis to hold the sheriff in contempt.
3. The sheriff had already provided the records-retention schedule to Brown
{¶ 33} Brown argues that he never received a records-retention schedule for
the Columbiana County Jail. Brown admits that he had previously received the
records-retention schedule for the Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office but seems
to suggest that there should be a separate schedule for the jail.
{¶ 34} The sheriff responds that he has already provided to Brown the sole
records-retention schedule he maintains, which is seven pages long and covers jail
records, including the “daily jail activity log.” There is nothing in the record that
would cause us to doubt the veracity of the sheriff’s response.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} We deny Brown’s request for statutory damages. And because
Brown has not shown that the sheriff disobeyed or resisted our limited writ, we
deny Brown’s motion for contempt and sanctions.
So ordered.
__________________
BRUNNER, J., concurring in judgment only in part and dissenting in
part.
{¶ 36} I agree with the majority that relator, Terry Brown, cannot establish
that respondents, the Corrections Division of the Columbiana County Sheriff’s
Office and Sheriff Brian McLaughlin (collectively, “the sheriff’s office”), failed to
comply with our order granting a limited writ of mandamus. I find it unnecessary,
however, to revisit why we initially granted the limited writ under a quasi-agency
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January Term, 2025
theory. Brown filed a viable complaint asserting a valid claim for public records.
As we noted in our previous decision, “[t]he sheriff’s office [did] not dispute that
Brown has a clear legal right to the requested records.” State ex rel. Brown v.
Columbiana Cty. Jail, 2024-Ohio-4969, ¶ 16. Instead, the sheriff’s office argued
that any records beyond those it produced were in the possession of its private jail
administrators. The sheriff’s office argued that the private jail administrators were
the proper parties to respond and could be ordered to do so under the Public Records
Act as the functional equivalent of a public office. But Brown had not sued the
private jail administrators, and we concluded that “[b]ecause quasi-agency
relationships have existed between the sheriff’s office and the private jail
administrators,” the sheriff’s office had a duty to obtain the records or certify that
no additional responsive records exist. Id. at ¶ 2.
{¶ 37} The majority appears to fault Brown for not bringing his mandamus
action against the private jail administrators. See majority opinion, ¶ 7-8. But
private entities and their employees operating in Ohio jail and prison facilities have
routinely pushed back against such lawsuits, arguing that they are not required to
comply with the Public Records Act. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ware v. Pierce, 2024-
Ohio-2663, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Penland v. Aramark, case No. 2024-0918, Aramark’s
8/1/24 motion to dismiss (arguing in part that it was not a public office); State ex
rel. Ellis v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., case No. 2024-1491, Trinity Services
Group, Inc.’s 11/18/24 motion to dismiss (arguing in part that it was not a public
office); State ex rel. Barr v. Securus Technologies, case No. 2023-1069, Securus
Technologies’ 9/22/23 motion to dismiss (arguing in part that it was not a public
office). Brown is not required to seek redress directly against the private
administrators regardless of whether they are the functional equivalents of a public
office.
{¶ 38} The Public Records Act permits a person aggrieved by the failure of
a public office or person responsible for public records to make them available to
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bring a mandamus action against either the public office (in this case, the sheriff’s
office) or the person responsible for the public records (in this case, the private jail
administrators). See State ex rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 39 (1990)
(finding that the disjunctive language in R.C. 149.43(C) “manifests an intent to
afford access to public records, even when a private entity is responsible for the
records”). Brown’s mandamus claim against the sheriff’s office was successful, so
in my view it is unnecessary and overly critical for the majority to reengage in
bureaucratic dogma that we have already dispelled. See Brown, 2024-Ohio-4969,
¶ 17-23. Brown’s decision to file suit against only the sheriff’s office is permissible
under R.C. 149.43 and our precedent.
{¶ 39} I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to deny
Brown’s request for statutory damages based on its view that Brown was required
to establish through documentary proof that he authorized a friend to email the
records requests on his behalf. See majority opinion at ¶ 16. Brown attested that
when his initial attempts to submit his requests by hand delivery and certified mail
were refused, the requests were then sent by fax and by email. He attached to his
complaint an affidavit of Christine Serna averring that she had emailed two public-
records requests for Brown to the sheriff’s office. Brown’s and Serna’s sworn
statements are enough to establish that Brown’s requests were sent via email,
thereby satisfying the delivery conditions in R.C. 149.43(C)(3).
{¶ 40} Our inquiry into whether Brown’s requests were delivered in a
manner specified by the statute should end there. The sheriff’s office did not
contest a damages award on those grounds. The majority explains that “[w]e have
not previously addressed whether someone is eligible for statutory damages when
his nonattorney agent submits a public-records request on his behalf.” Majority
opinion at ¶ 17. But we have not been asked to address that issue here. And even
if this were an issue to consider, written documentation is not required to create
agency authority. See Turner v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2020-Ohio-248, ¶ 17 (10th
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January Term, 2025
Dist.) (an agency relationship may be implied).
{¶ 41} Serna and Brown both appear to be laypersons. Regardless of
Serna’s attempt to use legal terms to explain her relationship to Brown, her affidavit
simply states that she had authority to email the documents on Brown’s behalf and
that she did email them to the sheriff’s office. Without referring to any authority,
policy, or reason, the majority raises and answers its own illusory and unnecessary
inquiry and then concludes that Brown is ineligible to receive damages. I disagree.
{¶ 42} Brown filed this action in September 2023, and he did not receive all
the responsive documents until November 7, 2024. The sheriff’s office opposed an
award of damages only on the grounds that it had initially had a good-faith belief
that it did not have to obtain the records from the private jail administrators and that
following this court’s issuance of the writ, it complied with the court’s order and
obtained the available records from the private jail administrators. The sheriff’s
office argues that it acted in good faith when it directed Brown to contact the private
jail administrators and that it was under the impression that this conduct did not
violate the Public Records Act.
{¶ 43} We may reduce an award of statutory damages if it is shown that
“based on the ordinary application of statutory law and case law as it existed at the
time of the conduct . . . , a well-informed public office . . . reasonably would believe
that the conduct . . . did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation” of the
public office in responding to a public-records request. R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a).
{¶ 44} The sheriff’s office does not cite any case law or other authority that
would have supported its belief that it did not have to obtain the records from the
private jail administrators to respond to Brown’s request. Years before the sheriff’s
office responded to Brown’s request, this court awarded damages in a different
public-records case after finding that a public office was required to obtain public
records held by a private entity under the quasi-agency theory. See State ex rel.
Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶ 13-16, 25-31, 34.
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Therefore, I would find that the sheriff’s office lacked a reasonable basis for its
initial response and that Brown is entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages. See R.C.
149.43(C)(3).
{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s judgment
denying statutory damages. I concur in judgment only as to the remainer of the
majority opinion.
__________________
Terry Brown, pro se.
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, and Zachary
W. Anderson, for respondents.
__________________
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