Haar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

JEREMY MARTIN HAAR, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1129

)

ERIC WALTERS, WARDEN, FCI )

Pekin, )

)

Respondent.

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Petitioner Jeremy Martin Haar’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Haar is serving a 180-month federal imprisonment sentence imposed by the

District Court for the Central District of California. At the time he filed this petition, he

was imprisoned at FCI Pekin in Pekin, Illinois.2 His current projected release date is July

23, 2033. See Find an inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (Reg. No. 08518-509)

(last visited Oct. 30, 2025).

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Respondent’s brief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2248

(“The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show

cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent

that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.”).

2 While Haar has now been transferred out of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, the Court

maintains jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Petition. See In re Hall, 988 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 2021).

After his conviction, Haar entered the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) on

August 29, 2022, and was placed at FCI Schuylkill in Gordon, Pennsylvania. Haar signed

an Intake Screening Form on August 29, 2022 indicating that he had received “A

BUREAU OF PRISONS ‘ADMISSIONS AND ORIENTATION BOOKLET’ DEFINING

[HIS] ‘RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES’ AND THE ‘PROHIBITED ACTS AND

DISCIPLINARY SEVERITY SCALE.’” Haar also received a copy of the FCI Schuylkill

Inmate Admission & Orientation Handbook. The inmate handbook contained the rules

for inmate calling, including that inmate telephone calls were subject to monitoring; that

each inmate was allowed to have thirty approved numbers on his phone list; and that

any “[t]hird party telephone contact,” including three-way calls, was prohibited.

Haar was transferred to FCI Lewisburg on March 7, 2023, and placed in

administrative detention. He stayed there for less than a month—leaving FCI Lewisburg

on April 3, 2023. The relevant disciplinary proceedings occurred during this short stay at

FCI Lewisburg.

On March 25, 2023, Haar made a phone call using the inmate telephone system.

He first called someone on his approved telephone list. Then, after talking to that person

for a few minutes, Haar said, “Call Mom please, so I can try to talk to her.” When the first

person had trouble finding the needed phone number, Haar provided it—a different

number on his approved list. The first person then called that number, and the three

individuals (Haar and the other two) continued talking for the remainder of the call.

After the call, a BOP employee prepared an incident report reciting the above facts

and adding that “Inmate Haar has circumvented the phone monitoring procedures by

conducting a 3-way call.” A different BOP employee gave the incident report to Haar on

March 26, 2023, at 1530 hours. The incident report also advised Haar of his rights. (Doc.

10-2 at 11).

The Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) held a hearing on March 27, 2023, at 1150

hours. At this hearing, Haar told the UDC that “I never got a handbook[.] I don[‘]t know

the rules.” (Doc. 10-2 at 10). The UDC referred the matter to the Discipline Hearing Officer

(DHO). At that time, the hearing officer gave Haar notice of his rights at the DHO

discipline hearing and Haar acknowledged receipt of the notice in writing. (Doc. 10-2 at

12).

Haar’s DHO hearing was held on March 28, 2023, at 1530 hours, before DHO Brian

Chambers. Haar waived his rights to a staff representative and waived his right to call

witnesses. (Doc. 10-2 at 14). The DHO Report summarized Haar’s statement and said that

“he is not disputing the accuracy of Section 11 of the incident report in this case.” Id. He

further explained what happened:

I normally call home when I know both my mom and dad are going to be

there. This time my mom wasn’t home when I called so I asked my father

to call her so I could talk to both of them. I know I shouldn’t have done it,

but I only get one telephone call each month in the SHU (Special Housing

Unit) and I wanted to talk to both of my parents.

Id. However, in his Petition, Haar disputes that he actually said “I know I shouldn’t have

done it” as part of his statement. (Doc. 1 at 7).

After considering the evidence from the incident report and Haar’s statement, the

DHO concluded Haar “committed the prohibited act of Use of the Telephone for Abuses

Other Than Illegal Activity Which Circumvent the Ability of Staff to Monitor Frequency

of Telephone Use, the Content of the Call, or the Number Called, Code 297.” (Doc. 10-2

at 15–16). The DHO highlighted that “[t]hree-way or third-party telephone calling is

prohibited, as the potential exists for inmates to place these three-way or third-party calls

to numbers not on their approved telephone lists . . . .” Id. Further, three-way calling

“hamper[s] the ability of staff to properly monitor inmate telephone calls, as even though

staff may be able to monitor all parts of the telephone call, monitoring of the call becomes

more complex as the staff member monitoring the call has to pay attention to multiple

parties speaking during the call, as opposed to solely the inmate and the initial call

recipient.” Id. “Moreover,” the DHO added, “the identities of the third parties are

ordinarily unknown, and may not be on the inmate caller’s approved contact list.” Id. In

addition to other sanctions, the DHO revoked 27 days of good conduct time.

Haar received a copy of the DHO’s report and was notified of his appeal rights on

April 13, 2023. Respondent does not contest that Haar exhausted available administrative

remedies at the BOP.

Haar filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

while housed at FCI Pekin on March 27, 2024. (Doc. 1.) In the Petition, Haar raises four

grounds for relief: (1) his disciplinary proceedings did not comply with due process

because he did not receive notice of the charge at least twenty-four hours before the DHO

hearing; (2) his decision maker was impartial, (3) he was not provided with fair notice of

the rule banning three-way calling; and (4) the Prohibited Act 297 is unconstitutionally

vague and does not specifically identify the conduct that violates it. Haar seeks

expungement of the incident report and restoration of his good-conduct time.

Respondent filed a response in opposition to the Petition. (Doc. 10). Haar filed a

reply wherein he concedes he received timely notice of the charge and but argues his

remaining three claims have merit. (Doc. 15).

II. DISCUSSION

Challenges to the denial of good conduct time, are properly brought in a § 2241

petition. Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1994). Federal prisoners have a

statutory right to good conduct time and the loss of such credits affects a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 448 (1985); see also Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). Due process

requires that prison administrators cannot revoke good time credits without “(1) advance

written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with

institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied

on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 563-67). Further, the findings must be made by an impartial decisionmaker, Wolff, 418

U.S. at 570–71, and “supported by some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454–55.

The record shows, and Haar now does not contend otherwise, that he was given

advance written notice of the disciplinary charges, an opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence in his defense, and a written statement by the factfinder

of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Instead, Haar argues

he was denied due process because his decisionmaker was impartial, he was not given

fair notice of the rules at the institution, and at the Prohibited Act 297 is unconstitutionally

vague. However, as explained below, the Court finds Haar’s disciplinary proceedings

complied with the minimal due process standards and the rule is not unconstitutionally

vague.

A. Impartiality

Haar’s alleges the DHO was not impartial because he said he “didn’t care” in

response to Haar’s explanation that he did not know three-way calls were against the

rules and that his specific conduct did not disrupt the monitoring of the call at issue since

both numbers were on the approved list. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Haar alleges the DHO told him

that “since the [disciplinary infraction] was written in the first place” it meant Haar “was

obviously guilty” and the DHO said Haar was “guilty no matter what.” Id. Haar also

alleges that the DHO told him he never believes inmates because they lie. Id. Finally, Haar

claims the DHO made up Haar’s statement in the report where it said he knew he

shouldn’t have done the three-way call. Id.

While Haar was entitled to an impartial decisionmaker, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570–71,

“the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high” because “[a]judicators are

entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th

Cir. 2003) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475

U.S. 813, 821 (1986)). “To overcome that presumption, [a prisoner] need[s] to present clear

evidence of bias.” Nelson v. Stevens, 861 F. App’x 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2021). Bias can be

shown where the adjudicator was “substantially involved in the investigation of the

charges against an inmate.” Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the DHO is not permitted

to “predetermine the hearing outcome” notwithstanding the evidence. Prude v. Meli, 76

F.4th 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding summary judgment was not warranted on the issue

of bias where there was significant evidence in the record that the DHO predetermined

the inmate’s guilt before the hearing without consideration of any evidence, told

petitioner that he was not allowed to present any evidence, and started the hearing by

telling the inmate that his “hands [were] tied” on the discipline to be ordered, which was

the exact punishment later ordered).

In some contexts, some of the alleged comments the DHO said could demonstrate

that the DHO predetermined the hearing outcome. However, the Court finds that within

the context of the charge, the statements are not evidence of bias. Haar’s infraction was

straight-forward and he never disputed that a three-way call was placed. In similar cases,

courts have found that commenting on guilt after viewing strong video evidence “was

inappropriate” but “reflect[ed] confidence in the strength of the video evidence rather

than proof of a biased or preordained decision without consideration of the evidence.”

Gaines v. Pretorius, No. 2:24-CV-00557-JMS-MG, 2025 WL 1312252, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 6,

2025). The same is true here. If made, the DHO’s comments that Haar “was obviously

guilty” and “guilty no matter what” were inappropriate, but were made after reading the

charge and the plain evidence that Haar violated the rule.

Moreover, the Court does not find the DHO’s other comments to be evidence of

bias. Haar alleges that the DHO said he “didn’t care” about Haar’s rationale for making

the three-way calls and about Haar’s arguments his specific conduct did not disrupt the

monitoring of the call at issue since both numbers were on the approved list. However,

regardless of whether the DHO “cared” about Haar’s explanations, they did not impact

the result of the disciplinary hearing. Finally, Haar’s allegation that the DHO incorrectly

quoted Haar in the report as stating he knew he shouldn’t have done the three-way call,

if true, is also not clear evidence of bias as it is, in essence, irrelevant: Haar’s guilt did not

depend on whether he had knowledge that he should not have made the call.

Accordingly, the Court does not find that the DHO’s alleged comments are clear evidence

of bias sufficient to overcome the presumption of an adjudicator’s impartiality.

B. Fair Notice

Haar next argues that he was not provided with fair notice of the rule banning

three-way calling. Haar alleges that he “was never provided a copy of the rule book upon

arrival at the institution” and did not attend an admission and orientation session at “the

facility.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) While it appears undisputed that Haar did not receive a copy of

the rule book or attend an admission and orientation session at FCI Lewisburg during his

one month stay there in March 2023, he did receive fair notice of the BOP’s rules on

August 2022 at FCI Schuylkill. Specifically, Haar signed an Intake Screening Form on

August 29, 2022 indicating that he had received “A BUREAU OF PRISONS

‘ADMISSIONS AND ORIENTATION BOOKLET’ DEFINING [HIS] ‘RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES’ AND THE ‘PROHIBITED ACTS AND DISCIPLINARY SEVERITY

SCALE.’” Haar also received a copy of the FCI Schuylkill Inmate Admission &

Orientation Handbook. The inmate handbook contained the rules for inmate calling,

including that inmate telephone calls were subject to monitoring; that each inmate was

allowed to have thirty approved numbers on his phone list; and that any “[t]hird party

telephone contact,” including three-way calls, was prohibited.

Haar does not explain why he believed the rules would be different at FCI

Lewisburg versus FCI Schuylkill. Furthermore, the BOP Admissions and Orientation

Booklet contained the prohibits acts and disciplinary severity scale of the BOP, which

plainly applied to both BOP facilities. As Respondent argues “Haar’s departure from FCI

Schuylkill and his one-month stay at FCI Lewisburg did not eliminate his knowledge of

the telephone prohibitions or excuse his non-compliance.” (Doc. 10 at 20). The Court does

not find any basis to hold that due process requires each institution to give him a rule

book. See Chambers v. Ciolli, No. 20 CV 50135, 2021 WL 4192079, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,

2021) (finding that inmate was aware of BOP rules despite not being given a new rule

book after entering a new institution). If Haar failed to learn the rules (or if he believed

they should not apply to him for whatever reason), this failure cannot be blamed on a

lack of fair notice.

C. Facial Vagueness Challenge

Finally, Haar brings a vagueness challenge. Vagueness principles extend to prison

regulations. Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2006). A regulation must be

sufficiently definite so “that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited”

and “ establish standards to permit enforcement in a nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory

manner.” Id. at 783 (quoting Fuller by Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61,

251 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir.2001)). However, prison officials are accorded greater flexibility

“to ensure order and safety in a prison population.” Id. at 783–84. “[T]he fact that [a]

regulation provides some latitude to prison officials in defining [prohibited conduct]

does not render it void for vagueness.” Id. at 783. Moreover, an inmate “who engaged in

behavior unmistakably proscribed by a disputed regulation cannot mount a facial

challenge.” Isby-Israel v. Finnan, 347 F. App’x 253, 255 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Vill. of Hoffman

Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982)).

Haar argues that “[Prohibited Act] 297 is vague as it is to[o] broad and does not

specifically state what conduct violates that rule.” (Doc. 1 at 8.)3. Haar provides no further

discussion explaining why he believes the rule is vague. Prohibited Act 297 prohibits:

Use of the telephone for abuses other than illegal activity which circumvent

the ability of staff to monitor frequency of telephone use, content of the call,

or the number called; or to commit or further a High category prohibited

act.

BOP Program Statement 5270.09 at 48. While Prohibited Act 297 provides some latitude

to prison officials, it is sufficiently definite. The rule allows the BOP to address creative

attempts to “circumvent the ability of staff to monitor frequency of telephone use, content

of the call, or the number called.” Id. And, even if there could be some circumstances

where the rule could be applied vaguely, prohibiting three-way calling is a not a vague

application of the rule: adding a third party plainly “circumvent[s] the ability of staff to

monitor…the number called,” and likely the “content of the call” as well. Accordingly,

Haar’s vagueness challenge fails as well.

3 Haar also states that the rule is problematic because “[t]he BOP allows several different rule violations

to fall under that one code.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Grouping multiple violations under one rule does not relate to

whether the rule is vague. To the extent that Haar takes issue with the formatting of the BOP’s rules, he

does not state a constitutional issue

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment in

favor of Respondent and CLOSE the case.

Signed on this 25th day of November 2025.

/s/ Colleen R. Lawless

Colleen R. Lawless

United States District Judge