The opinion
Filed 11/25/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WONDERFUL NURSERIES, LLC,
F088515
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101649)
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants;
UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
WONDERFUL NURSERIES, LLC,
F088520
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101649)
v.
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD et al.,
Defendants and Respondents;
UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD et al., F088632
Petitioners, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101649)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY,
Respondent;
WONDERFUL NURSERIES, LLC,
Real Party in Interest.
UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA,
F088639
Petitioner,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-24-101649)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY,
Respondent;
WONDERFUL NURSERIES, LLC, et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Bernard C.
Barmann, Jr., Judge. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General,
Mark R. Beckington, Paul Stein, Sebastian Brady, Nicholas R. Green, and Cristina R. B.
López, Deputy Attorneys General, for Agricultural Labor Relations Board et al.
Martínez Aguilasocho Law, Inc., Mario Martínez, Edgar Iván Aguilasocho;
Altshuler Berzon, Scott A. Kronland, Corinne F. Johnson and Jonathan Rosenthal for
United Farm Workers of America.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, David A. Schwarz, Barbara E. Taylor and
Krista L. Landis for Wonderful Nurseries, LLC.
-ooOoo-
2.
INTRODUCTION
In early 2024, the United Farmworkers of America (UFW) sought to be certified
as the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees of Wonderful Nurseries,
LLC (Wonderful), an agricultural company involved in the grape industry in the Central
Valley. The UFW utilized a new statutory procedure contained in Labor Code section
1156.371 in order to seek certification by filing with the Agricultural Labor Relations
Board (ALRB or Board) what is referred to as a “Majority Support Petition” (sometimes
referred to by the parties as an MSP), demonstrating that a majority of Wonderful’s
employees supported unionizing with the UFW as their bargaining representative.
Wonderful vigorously opposes this unionization effort. It filed objections in front
of the ALRB as part of the statutory procedure under section 1156.37, making a plethora
of claims of impropriety by the UFW in its unionization efforts. Wonderful claims to
have submitted a large number of declarations to the ALRB disputing whether various
workers were misinformed or misled, and contesting whether the workers actually
support the UFW acting as their bargaining representative. The UFW, for its part,
allegedly contested the veracity of those declarations, suggesting they were coerced from
workers by management.
We use the words “claims” and “allegedly” here because the administrative
proceeding in which such contested issues are being raised with the ALRB is not yet
before us for review, and, thus, we know neither what the factual findings will be nor
what information will be found in the fully developed record. Instead of waiting for the
statutorily prescribed time for seeking judicial review—or even waiting for the
evidentiary hearings it sought in front of the ALRB to conclude—Wonderful filed a
petition in the superior court contesting the validity of the certification decision.
1Further undesignated statutory citations are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
3.
Wonderful asked the superior court to enjoin the certification proceedings, prevent the
ALRB from continuing with any administrative proceedings regarding certification of the
UFW as the representative for Wonderful’s workers, and declare the underlying statute—
section 1156.37—unconstitutional.
Wonderful filed this petition notwithstanding approximately 50 years of unbroken
precedent finding an employer may not directly challenge a union certification decision
in court except in extraordinarily and exceedingly rare circumstances, which Wonderful
does not meaningfully attempt to show are present here. Rather, if the employer believes
a union has been inappropriately certified as a bargaining representative, its remedy is to
refuse to bargain with it. In the normal course of business, claims are then brought
against the employer for unfair labor practices. In the context of an unfair labor practice
proceeding, the employer can contest the validity of the certification. This procedure has
been upheld not only by the courts of this state interpreting California’s Alatorre-
Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (§ 1140 et seq.;
ALRA or the Act), but by federal courts interpreting the National Labor Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; NLRA) on which the ALRA is modeled. This delayed review
procedure was created intentionally to avoid labor strikes caused when employers sought
to delay union recognition.
Thus, the question we face in this opinion is a preliminary one: whether the trial
court had jurisdiction to even consider this challenge at this time, despite statutory
mandates funneling judicial review of certification decisions to a later point in time, and
even then, to the Court of Appeal in the first instance. Despite apparently recognizing
both the statutory mandate and the precedent upholding it, the trial court concluded it did
have jurisdiction, and proceeded to issue a preliminary injunction staying the ALRB’s
ongoing administrative hearings. We previously issued writs of supersedeas staying
enforcement of that preliminary injunction. We now conclude, in line with both our
Legislature’s command and a long judicial history supporting it, that the trial court lacked
4.
jurisdiction to consider this case. We will therefore remand these matters to the trial
court with directions to dismiss Wonderful’s case.
BACKGROUND
The instant matters before this court arise out of an effort by the UFW to certify a
union at facilities owned and/or operated by Wonderful. UFW filed a so-called Majority
Support Petition pursuant to section 1156.37 in February 2024 seeking to be certified as
the bargaining representative for Wonderful’s agricultural employees. Wonderful filed a
response to the petition for certification with the ALRB. Shortly thereafter, Wonderful
submitted a letter to the ALRB alleging the UFW was engaged in misconduct in relation
to the Majority Support Petition; it submitted declarations from its employees purporting
to identify this misconduct. The ALRB responded to Wonderful, noting that due to the
redactions, it could not discern whether the declarations were signed, nor whether the
declarations were from individuals on the eligibility list forming the underlying basis for
the Majority Support Petition. It noted Wonderful’s allegations were serious, and pointed
Wonderful to section 1156.37, subdivision (f)(1)(D), which allowed for the filing of
objections within five days of certification.
The regional director of the ALRB issued the findings of her investigation into the
Majority Support Petition on March 1, 2024. She concluded the UFW had submitted 423
authorization cards supporting certification of the UFW as the workers’ bargaining
representative. Wonderful supplied information indicating 688 individuals were
purported to be under its employ during the relevant period. Following various concerns
raised by both parties, the regional director added one individual to the employee list who
was inadvertently omitted, removed nine individuals who were inadvertently included,
removed 33 individuals who were deemed to possess supervisory authority and thus were
not properly part of the bargaining unit, and removed seven individuals who lacked a
community of interest with the other employees. Additionally, the regional director
noted the UFW had submitted 181 additional authorization cards during the investigation.
5.
The regional director concluded the petition met the appropriate criteria, that the UFW
had submitted 327 valid authorization cards2 out of a total of 640 employees who worked
during the relevant period, and thus concluded that proof of majority support had been
met according to section 1156.37, subdivision (b). On March 4, 2024, the ALRB
approved the results of the regional director’s investigation and certified the UFW as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of Wonderful’s workers, thus triggering
Wonderful’s duty to bargain with the UFW pursuant to section 1156.37, subdivision (e).
As permitted by section 1156.37, subdivision (f)(1), Wonderful filed a petition
with the ALRB objecting to the certification on March 11, 2024; on the same day, it also
filed a motion for stay of the certification with the ALRB, even though there is no
obvious statutory authority in section 1156.37 for the ALRB to issue a stay. Wonderful
submitted 16 different objections to the certification, including claims that section
1156.37 is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. On March 18, 2024, the
ALRB dismissed 10 of those objections in a reasoned decision and set six of the
objections for further hearing. Concerning the constitutional challenges raised, the
ALRB dismissed these, noting it “may not declare a statute unconstitutional or refuse to
enforce a statute based on a claim of unconstitutionality.” The ALRB’s evidentiary
hearing on Wonderful’s objections began on April 23, 2024.
While the ALRB’s administrative proceedings related to Wonderful’s objections
were ongoing, Wonderful filed a petition for writ of mandate in Kern Superior Court on
May 13, 2024, containing seven causes of action claiming the Majority Support Petition
process violated Wonderful’s due process rights. Wonderful’s petition requested the trial
court to “stay the underlying MSP Proceedings,” “suspend the legal effect” of the
Board’s certification of the UFW as the exclusive bargaining representative of
2We observe the regional director accepted as valid 327 out of 508 authorization cards
submitted, indicating the regional director reviewed and excluded numerous cards for reasons
that are not presently clear.
6.
Wonderful’s workers, and compel the ALRB to “cease and desist from initiating or
continuing any proceedings pursuant to section 1156.37.” It also sought both preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief in the form of a judgment declaring that section 1156.37
violates both the United States and California Constitutions. The specific nature of
Wonderful’s request was reiterated in its prayer for relief, which noted it sought
injunctive relief “restraining the Board from enforcing certification of the UFW vis-à-vis
Wonderful,” in addition to seeking to prevent the ALRB from continuing forward with
any hearings or proceedings related to UFW’s certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative for Wonderful’s employees.
Thereafter, Wonderful filed a motion for preliminary injunction. In opposing the
motion for preliminary injunction, both the ALRB and the UFW noted the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider Wonderful’s petition, given the ongoing administrative
proceedings and the statutory limitations requiring judicial review of union certification
decisions be delayed until a proceeding to enforce an unfair labor practices finding
against an employer. Both the ALRB and the UFW also filed demurrers asserting similar
arguments.
The trial court overruled the demurrers and granted the preliminary injunction
motion, which is currently in front of us on appeal in cases Nos. F088515 and F088520.
The court concluded that, under Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d
781, writ review was available because Wonderful had “alleged ‘substantial’
constitutional claims.” It noted “the Labor Code does specifically prescribe that a
challenge to a Board decision should be through the appropriate court of appeal,” but
nevertheless concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the case because “there is a substantial
facial challenge to the statutory process” that would render it “improper to require the
complaining party to exhaust their administrative remedies.” Both the UFW and ALRB
appealed the issuance of a preliminary injunction, contending that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Separate appeals were filed in cases Nos. F088515 and
7.
F088520, which were ordered consolidated for all purposes in case No. F088515 on
September 23, 2024. The UFW and ALRB also sought writs of supersedeas staying
enforcement of the preliminary injunction order, which were issued by this court on
October 24, 2024.
Additionally, the ALRB filed a petition for a writ of mandate in case No. F088632
on September 12, 2024. The petition sought to have this court direct the trial court to
sustain the demurrers and dismiss the case with prejudice. We consolidated the F088632
and F088515 matters further for purposes of argument and now issue this opinion
addressing all salient matters raised in these several cases. We conclude the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenges raised by Wonderful at this juncture, and
therefore the case must be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standards for Review of Union Certification Decisions
The ALRA was “enacted in 1975 to fill a long-standing void left by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),” which by its terms “excludes agricultural laborers from its
definition of ‘employees.’” (Pasillas v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 156
Cal.App.3d 312, 327; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) [“The term ‘employee’ shall include any
employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer”].)
California’s ALRA is “closely modeled” on the NLRA. (Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v.
Mahony, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 786.) “Indeed the entire ALRA is designed to
provide agricultural workers with protection of their collective bargaining rights
comparable to that provided nonagricultural workers by the NLRA.” (Tex-Cal Land
Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 345.) Thus,
by dint of both judicial logic and legislative direction, federal court interpretations of the
NLRA provide persuasive guidance in interpreting the ALRA, which are considered
binding on the ALRB. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v.
8.
Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 268; § 1148 [“The board shall
follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Relations Act”].)
Before a union may act as the bargaining representative of a group of agricultural
workers under the Labor Code, it must be designated as such by a majority of the workers
in the bargaining unit. (§ 1156, subd. (a) [“Representatives designated by the submission
of authorization cards or other proof of support or selected by a secret ballot by the
majority of the agricultural employees in the bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the agricultural employees in such unit”].) A union may submit
either a petition pursuant to section 1156.3, or a Majority Support Petition pursuant to
section 1156.37. The filing of a petition pursuant to section 1156.3 allows the ALRB to
hold elections amongst the employees of the bargaining unit, if a “bona fide question of
representation exists.” (§ 1156.3, subd. (b).) By comparison, a Majority Support Petition
must demonstrate to the ALRB that support for designating the union as the bargaining
representative already exists, since it must be “supported by a proof of majority support,
through authorization cards, petitions, or other appropriate proof of majority support of
the currently employed employees.” (§ 1156.37, subd. (c).) No such proof is required in
the submission of a petition pursuant to section 1156.3. Once received, the ALRB must
immediately investigate the Majority Support Petition (§ 1156.37, subd. (e)(1)), and if the
submitted proof of majority support is met, “shall immediately certify the labor
organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit” (§ 1156.37, subd. (e)(3)).
Important consequences flow from this certification decision. In particular, it may
be deemed an unfair labor practice for an employer “[t]o refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith with labor organizations certified pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 1156).” (§ 1153, subd. (e).) Indeed, the Majority Support
Petition statute notes that “[a]n employer’s duty to bargain with the labor organization
commences immediately after the labor organization is certified.” (§ 1156.37, subd.
9.
(e)(3).) The occurrence of an unfair labor practice permits the ALRB to issue a
complaint against the offending party (§ 1160.2) and make findings and issue orders
relating to the alleged unfair labor practice (§ 1160.3). The ALRB may order the
offending party “to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice,” and “to take
affirmative action, including . . . making employees whole, when the board deems such
relief appropriate, for the loss of pay resulting from the employer’s refusal to bargain, and
to provide such other relief as will effectuate the policies of this part.” (§ 1160.3.) An
employer who commits an unfair labor practice may be penalized up to $10,000 in
addition to any remedy ordered by the board.3 (§ 1160.10, subd. (a).)
“Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeal
having jurisdiction over the county wherein the unfair labor practice in question was
alleged to have been engaged in . . . by filing in such court a written petition requesting
that the order of the board be modified or set aside.” (§ 1160.8.) “Upon the filing of
such petition, the court shall cause notice to be served upon the board and thereupon shall
have jurisdiction of the proceeding.” (Ibid.) Further, ALRB orders are not immediately
self-executing. After the period in which to challenge the order has expired, if the party
has not voluntarily complied with the order, the ALRB may then apply to the relevant
superior court for enforcement of its order. (§ 1160.8.)
Courts have long held there is no direct review of union certification decisions
under the NLRA or the ALRA. (Boire v. Greyhound Corp. (1964) 376 U.S. 473, 476–
477; Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at pp. 786–788.) Both the
NLRA and the ALRA permit judicial review only of “final orders” of the respective
boards. (29 U.S.C. § 160(f); § 1160.8.) Union certification decisions have been found by
3Certain unfair labor practices not obviously relevant here—specifically those involving
discrimination—may be penalized up to $25,000. (§ 1160.10, subd. (a)(2).)
10.
both state and federal courts not to be such “final orders,” thereby allowing for no direct
judicial review. (Boire, supra, at pp. 476–477; Nishikawa Farms, Inc., supra, at pp. 787–
788.) Instead, an employer who wishes to challenge the union certification must
typically await an unfair labor practices proceeding against it, such as might occur when
it refuses to bargain with the union it claims was inappropriately certified. (Boire, at
p. 477; Nishikawa Farms, Inc., at p. 787.)
“That this indirect method of obtaining judicial review imposes significant delays
upon attempts to challenge the validity of Board orders in certification proceedings is
obvious. But it is equally obvious that Congress explicitly intended to impose precisely
such delays.” (Boire v. Greyhound Corp., supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 477–478.) This delay in
challenging a certification decision prevents employers from engaging in “ ‘dilatory
tactics in representation proceedings’ ” (id. at p. 479) and thereby helps prevent unions
from engaging in preemptive striking in order to gain recognition as the bargaining unit
(id. at p. 478). That the NLRA “on its face” limits judicial review to orders regarding
unfair labor practices and does not provide direct judicial review of certification decisions
is “a purpose and a construction which its legislative history confirms.” (A. F. of L. v.
Labor Board (1940) 308 U.S. 401, 409.)
The ALRA has been similarly interpreted, and an employer who doubts the
certification process of a union may, in the normal course, only challenge that
certification during a proceeding for an unfair labor practice after the employer has
refused to bargain with the union. (Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, supra, 66
Cal.App.3d at pp. 786–788; see R & P Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
(1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 680, fn. 10; Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112, 120–121; Radovich v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 36, 39.) In other words, at both the state and federal
level, the delay imposed on employer challenges to union certification decisions is a
feature, not a bug, of how the NLRA and ALRA are intended to function.
11.
Limited exceptions to this general rule have been recognized both in the federal
and state courts. The Supreme Court has held that, where the NLRB acts in an
“attempted exercise of power that [has] been specifically withheld,” and does so in a
manner that deprives a protected group under the NLRA of a “right” specifically assured
to them by Congress in the NLRA, a district court has jurisdiction over an original suit to
prevent this deprivation. (Leedom v. Kyne (1958) 358 U.S. 184, 189.) Thus, direct
review of a certification decision is permitted where the NLRB has acted “in excess of its
delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.” (Leedom, supra, at
p. 188.)
The primary example of how this exception applies comes from Leedom. In that
case, the Supreme Court was confronted with a statutory provision that prohibited the
NLRB, in determining whether a unit was appropriate for collective bargaining, from
certifying a unit containing both professional and nonprofessional employees “ ‘unless a
majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit.’ ” (Leedom v.
Kyne, supra, 358 U.S. at pp. 188–189.) Thus, the right of professional employees to vote
on the inclusion of nonprofessional employees in the same union was a specific
protection afforded by the NLRA. In Leedom, the NLRB had included both professional
and nonprofessional employees in the bargaining unit in question, while “refusing to
determine whether a majority of the professional employees” would have voted in
support of the same. (Leedom, at p. 189.) Thus, the violation of the law was expressly
clear from the facts of the case,4 and said violation specifically harmed a set of
individuals for whose protection the NLRA was passed, i.e., professional employees.
Subsequent opinions have noted this exception “is a narrow one, not to be
extended to permit plenary district court review of Board orders in certification
4In fact, the violation was so clear the NLRB did not contest that its order violated the
NLRA. (Leedom v. Kyne, supra, 358 U.S. at p. 187.)
12.
proceedings whenever it can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts
before the Board has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law.” (Boire
v. Greyhound Corp., supra, 376 U.S. at p. 481.) As one court has noted, “ ‘[T]o say that
there are possible infirmities in an action taken by the Board by reason of an erroneous or
arbitrary exertion of its authority in respect of the facts before it is not to conclude that
there is jurisdiction in the District Court to intervene by injunction. For such jurisdiction
to exist, the Board must have stepped so plainly beyond the bounds of the Act, or acted
so clearly in defiance of it, as to warrant the immediate intervention of an equity court.’ ”
(McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (D.C. Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 916, 917.)
Similarly, section 1160.8 of the ALRA—which again confines judicial review to
“final orders” of the ALRB—does not bar “all recourse to the superior court” concerning
union certification decisions. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Bd. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 284, 305.) “Instead, such recourse has been permitted in
exceptional circumstances where the prescribed judicial review process was unavailable
or patently inadequate and a significant statutory or constitutional violation was asserted
that warranted such redress.” (Ibid. [collecting cases].) Thus, where the ALRB has
violated “a specific and mandatory provision” of the ALRA for which the act “provides
no means of redress,” a challenge thereto has been held to fall within the equitable
powers of the superior court to address. (Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd., supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 122–123.) The exception permitting
immediate review of union certification decisions is only available in “ ‘extraordinary
circumstances,’ ” and courts are “loath to find exceptions to the rule precluding direct
review of orders in certification proceedings.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v.
Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499, 1500.) Instead, “under the statutory
scheme the employers’ remedy [is] to refuse to bargain with the union and contest the
issues in a subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding.” (Id. at p. 1500.)
13.
“In summary, under both federal and California case law, application of the
Leedom v. Kyne exception to the general rule against direct judicial review is dependent
on three factors, all of which must be present. First, the challenged order must be ‘ “a
‘plain’ violation of an unambiguous and mandatory” ’ statutory provision. [Citations.]
Second, the order must deprive the complaining party of a right assured to it by the
statute. [Citations.] Third, indirect review of the order, through an unfair labor practice
proceeding, must be unavailable or patently inadequate. [Citations.]” (Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502–1503.)5
An example of a situation found to have met these criteria in the context of the
ALRA can be seen in Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 99
Cal.App.3d 112. There, the ALRB was required to make a finding that an employer had
failed to bargain in good faith in order to extend an initial certification decision by up to a
year. (Yamada Brothers, supra, at p. 123.) The ALRB did not make the requisite finding
of a failure to bargain in good faith but nevertheless extended the certification decision
for an additional year. (Ibid.) This was clearly erroneous under the statute. Further,
other statutory provisions prevented the extension decision from being considered in a
later-filed proceeding regarding a failure to bargain by the employer. (Id. at pp. 123–
124.) The sections concerning preparation of the record did not allow for inclusion of
documents related to the extension decision in the record submitted for judicial review,
and the extension decision itself was specifically inadmissible in a future unfair labor
practices proceeding against the employer. (Ibid.) Thus, there was no means by which to
5The superior court presumably believed it had jurisdiction under Leedom v. Kyne
because it noted that, per statute, Wonderful could not directly challenge an ALRB certification
decision, but found it had jurisdiction because Wonderful had alleged a “ ‘substantial’ ”
constitutional claim. This conclusion was in error. The trial court neither identified nor applied
the correct standard for determining when the Leedom exception applies, which requires far more
than simply allegations of a substantial constitutional claim. Were the exception as the trial court
found, it would certainly swallow the rule.
14.
obtain review of the extension decision as part of a future proceeding for an unfair labor
practice.6
2. Application of These Legal Standards Shows the Instant Case Should Be
Dismissed
In the case presently before us, Wonderful largely does not address the main body
of precedent concerning delayed judicial review of union certification decisions.
Wonderful seemingly concedes judicial review of decisions of the ALRB is only
available for final orders. It argues, in fact, that union “certification is a ‘final’ order” of
the ALRB, although it does so without citation to any judicial opinion interpreting the
ALRA or NLRA and without persuasively distinguishing any of the precedents discussed
above finding exactly the opposite. Instead, Wonderful cites to a section of the opinion
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 171,
which held that an administrative order was “ ‘final’ ” when it had been “ ‘formalized and
its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’ ” However, that quotation is
derived from a discussion by the California Supreme Court on ripeness. Ripeness—a
prudential doctrine of jurisprudence intended to prevent courts from issuing advisory
opinions regarding disputes that have not yet actually materialized—is not at issue here.
The certification process is underway, and hearings are or were proceeding at the time of
Wonderful’s suit to address Wonderful’s objections to the Majority Support Petition.
Since Wonderful’s suit sought to block the certification process from proceeding, it is
6It is less obvious whether the employer in Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. met the third criteria, namely, whether the order “deprive[d] the complaining party
of a right assured to it by the statute,” which was not expressly addressed in the opinion. (See
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502–1503.)
However, the relevant statute stated the ALRB “shall determine whether an employer has
bargained in good faith with the currently certified labor organization.” (§ 1155.2, subd. (b).)
The ALRB is only permitted to extend the certification if it determines the “employer has not
bargained in good faith.” (Ibid.) The statute therefore at least contemplates a finding about the
employer’s actions be made by the ALRB. Initial certification decisions, by contrast, require no
findings about the employer’s good faith or lack thereof.
15.
ripe in this prudential sense, because an actual controversy exists: the certification
process is actually occurring, and Wonderful is actually seeking to block it. Indeed,
neither the UFW nor the ALRB squarely raises ripeness here. Rather, they raise
jurisdictional issues based on the statutory limitations for judicial review imposed by our
Legislature and discussed at length above.
Wonderful does at least tangentially interact with the longstanding precedent on
this issue by obliquely suggesting it falls within the Leedom exception recognized in the
case law.7 However, Wonderful fails to actually address the salient criteria for that
exception as articulated by California courts, or explain how it falls within them. Again,
7Wonderful also passingly suggests it falls within an “exception to exhaustion”
recognized by Fay v. Douds (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F.2d 720. In Fay v. Douds, despite a prior
holding of that court limiting review of union certification decisions to unfair labor practice
orders, the court found that if the plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation and “[i]f this
assertion of constitutional right is not transparently frivolous, it gave the District Court
jurisdiction; and, having once acquired jurisdiction, the court might, and should, dispose of all
other questions which arose, even though they would not have been independently justiciable.”
(Id. at p. 723.) This opinion, however, has been roundly criticized both by other federal courts.
(Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v. N.L.R.B. (6th Cir. 1979) 609 F.2d 240, 244–245
[finding Fay v. Douds “is in clear violation of both the expressed Congressional purpose and the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” and declining to follow it]; J.P. Stevens
Emp. v. N.L.R.B. (4th Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 326, 329 [“We have previously considered Fay v.
Douds and found it unpersuasive”]; Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561
F.2d 31, 37 [“Later decisions . . . have questioned the continuing viability of Fay insofar as it
purports to create an exception to the exhaustion requirement for any constitutional claim which
is ‘not transparently frivolous’” (fn. omitted)]; Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Company (5th
Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21, fn. 7 [“[T]here is some question whether our prior decisions have
recognized this exception [from Fay v. Douds], at least where an employer invokes it”].) Even
the courts of the Second Circuit have offered doubt as to its continued viability. (Utica Mutual
Insurance Company v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1967) 375 F.2d 129, 134 [rejecting Fay v. Douds
argument “even if we assume that case to be still authoritative”]; Moshlak v. American
Broadcasting Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 423 F.Supp. 774, 778 [noting “questions . . . have been
expressed as to the continued validity of the Fay v. Douds exception, both in this circuit and in
others”].) This court has similarly questioned its viability. (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v.
Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) Given that Wonderful cites Fay only in
passing and does not develop this argument further, we treat this argument as forfeited. (Cahill
v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘We are not bound to
develop appellants’ argument for them’ ”]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
16.
this requires showing: (1) a plain “ ‘ “violation of an unambiguous and mandatory” ’
statutory provision”; (2) the deprivation by the complaining party of a “right assured to it
by the statute”; and (3) that “indirect review of the order, through an unfair labor practice
proceeding, [is] unavailable or patently inadequate.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1503.) Wonderful does not direct us to an
unambiguous and mandatory statutory provision that was violated; it instead asserts the
statute violates its constitutional rights to due process, which can surely be addressed in a
later proceeding. Nor does it identify the right assured to it by the ALRA of which it has
been deprived.
The only one of these three criteria on which Wonderful touches is whether review
is unavailable. However, even then, Wonderful does not argue that review is actually
unavailable. Instead, Wonderful argues its ability to obtain judicial review “is not within
its control.” This argument is not accompanied by authority saying judicial review must
be within the sole and complete control of the complaining party, lest the Leedom v. Kyne
exception apply. It is true the Supreme Court in Leedom said, while distinguishing
another case, “Here, differently from the Switchmen’s case [Switchmen’s Union v. Board
(1943) 320 U.S. 297], ‘absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts’ would mean ‘a
sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress’ has given professional employees, for
there is no other means, within their control . . . , to protect and enforce that right.”
(Leedom v. Kyne, supra, 358 U.S. at p. 190, italics added.) This sentence from Leedom
simply highlights that the professional employees in that case would never be subject to
an unfair labor practice proceeding and thus would never have any means to contest the
deprivation of their statutorily granted rights. This is not the same as saying the employer
must have sole and complete control over the question of when judicial review occurs.
Wonderful does argue the existence of the mandatory mediation and conciliation
procedure in the Labor Code, which it refers to as MMC, renders judicial review
unavailable. We thus briefly digress into the MMC process. Under the ALRA, when
17.
labor and management fail to successfully reach a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), either can petition the ALRB for an order requiring mandatory mediation and
conciliation of their issues. (§ 1164, subd. (a).) After a mediator is appointed and the
parties have mediated for at least 30 days, the mediator can certify the mediation process
has been exhausted. (§ 1164, subd. (c).) Following such a certification, “the mediator
shall file a report with the board that resolves all of the issues between the parties and
establishes the final terms of a collective bargaining agreement.” (§ 1164, subd. (d).)
This mediated CBA is subject to an internal appeal, and either party may petition the
ALRB, which may direct the order be modified. (§ 1164.3, subds. (a)–(d).)
Once an order regarding a mediated CBA is finally issued by the ALRB, any party
“may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal or the California Supreme
Court.” (§ 1164.5, subd. (a).) “If the writ issues, it shall be made returnable at a time and
place specified by court order and shall direct the board to certify its record in the case to
the court within the time specified.” (Ibid.) The reviewing court may consider whether
the ALRB acted in excess of its power or jurisdiction, whether it has not proceeded in a
manner required by law, and whether the order or decision was obtained by fraud or
abuse of discretion or violates any rights of the petitioner under the Constitution.
(§ 1164.5, subd. (b)(1)–(4).) The mediated CBA remains in force during the pendency of
review unless certain conditions are demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.
(§ 1164.3, subd. (f)(3).)
Wonderful’s argument that judicial review is unavailable due to the MMC process
is nonsensical. The statute setting forth the MMC process clearly states that either
party—which therefore includes Wonderful—can seek judicial review after a final order
by the ALRB has issued. (§ 1164.5, subd. (a).) Thus, the MMC process expressly
includes judicial review. Wonderful states passingly that a challenge under section 1164
et seq. may not include the record of the union certification decision but provides no
authority showing this is the case. Indeed, the relevant statutory section simply states the
18.
court issuing the writ shall specify when and where it is returnable and “shall direct the
board to certify its record.” (§ 1164.5, subd. (a).) Presumably, this includes whatever
record is necessary to resolve the matters for which the writ issued. Nothing in the
statute states the record and review may not include review of union certification
decisions, where appropriate.
Wonderful suggests that, because the union may choose not to pursue MMC and
the ALRB may choose not to charge it with an unfair labor practice, there may be no
opportunity for review of the certification decision. Not only is this pure
hypothecation—the parties’ briefing indicates both an unfair labor practice proceeding
and the MMC process are currently pending, along with hearings on Wonderful’s
objections to certification —it also is not a persuasive reason to create a new exception.
If Wonderful can refuse to bargain with the union following certification and not be
subjected to either an unfair labor practice charge or a mediated CBA, we struggle to
understand what it has to complain about. In such a scenario, it has suffered no concrete
or actual harm because it has given up nothing. It has not bargained with the union. It
has not voluntarily agreed to any CBA. It cannot be directly penalized for refusing to
bargain, because no unfair labor practices proceeding has occurred. And, since no MMC
process was pursued, Wonderful would also not be subject to a mediated CBA. These
are the sole enforcement mechanisms that make certification of a union relevant. If they
are never used against an employer when it refuses to negotiate, it is hard to imagine a
case in which the employer would be able to articulate standing. The employer, having
successfully ignored the union and suffered no repercussions, would have suffered no
concrete injury and any dispute would likely be hypothetical. Regardless, this is not the
case here.8
8Wonderful does submit a request for judicial notice of certain documents suggesting the
UFW’s request for an MMC process has been withdrawn, purportedly because Wonderful
advised it would be shutting down its operations of these facilities within the next year. It does
19.
The main thread of Wonderful’s argument, and what it spends the bulk of its
briefing arguing, is that it should not be subject to administrative exhaustion requirements
in order to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, because doing so
would be futile since the ALRB has no authority to find a statute unconstitutional.
However, this argument quite misses the point. Wonderful’s suit is not being dismissed
because it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, although this may also be true. It
is being dismissed because it does not challenge a “final order” within the meaning of
section 1160.8, which is what authorizes “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a “final order of the
board” to “obtain a review of such order.”9 In such a situation, where our Legislature has
directed decisionmaking to another body, a suit challenging those decisions falls outside
of the jurisdiction of the superior courts except as provided for by statute. (See Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025)
not appear any party objects to these requests, and we will take judicial notice of exhibits A and
B of the request for judicial notice filed by Wonderful on April 1, 2025, as well as the exhibit
submitted on April 23, 2025, by the UFW, which is a similar document. However, as stated
above, even if we assume the MMC process is not proceeding, we do not see why this would
warrant creating a new exception. If Wonderful is shutting down these operations and will not
be subject to a mediated CBA, and is also refusing to bargain with the UFW, it is difficult to see
how it will be harmed by the union certification decision in a way that cannot be addressed in a
future unfair labor practices proceeding.
We decline to take judicial notice of the remaining exhibits submitted by Wonderful in
the same request that relate to a different lawsuit filed by Wonderful employees against the UFW
and ALRB, as well as yet another lawsuit Wonderful has filed in federal court. Those lawsuits
are not relevant to the issues before the court at this time.
9This is also why Wonderful’s argument that “there is no doubt” it could “have brought a
facial constitutional challenge had it not asserted objections in post-certification proceedings
before the Board” (italics and boldface omitted) is wrong. If Wonderful filed suit to challenge
the certification of the UFW as the bargaining representative of its employees—regardless of
whether it was participating in proceedings before the Board—it would still not be allowed to
proceed, because the suit would be seeking to challenge a nonfinal order of the board within the
meaning of section 1160.8.
20.
¶ 3:123.2, p. 34 [“Superior courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in controversies that, by
statute, are to be heard by other tribunals”].)10
In response to this, Wonderful argues it is not challenging the certification
proceeding at all; it is challenging the constitutionality of section 1156.37. We find this
unpersuasive, fundamentally incorrect and, frankly, a confusing distinction to attempt to
make. Wonderful may well be challenging the constitutionality of section 1156.37, but it
is doing so by challenging the certification of the UFW as the bargaining representative
for its employees. Were it otherwise, Wonderful would likely lack standing, although
that is not a question that we need to reach here.
Moreover, it is plainly apparent from the petition that Wonderful is challenging
the specific decision to certify the UFW as the bargaining representative for its workers.
Wonderful’s petition describes the ongoing certification process in excruciating detail.
The petition notes the UFW began collecting signatures from its workers in an effort to
file a Majority Support Petition in May 2023. Wonderful claims a specific UFW vice-
president led meetings in which “misrepresentations were made to workers to induce
them to sign authorization cards.” This vice-president signed the Majority Support
Petition under penalty of perjury, which purportedly contained further
misrepresentations. Wonderful alleges the UFW encouraged Wonderful’s employees to
forge signatures of other employees. According to Wonderful, the UFW also told
employees they were required to sign on to the Majority Support Petition in order to
obtain a $600 payment that was already due to them through a program by the United
10The affirmative defense of failing to exhaust administrative remedies may, of course,
still arise later. For instance, the general rule is that “ ‘[a]dministrative agencies must be given
the opportunity to reach a reasoned and final conclusion on each and every issue upon which
they have jurisdiction to act before those issues are raised in a judicial forum.’ ” (Hill RHF
Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 479.) If Wonderful were to
raise a new issue when seeking review of the certification order that was not raised with the
ALRB, the other parties might reasonably object that Wonderful had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies on that issue.
21.
States Department of Agriculture. Wonderful claims its employees felt harassed,
threatened, or intimidated by the UFW.
The petition includes 10 pages of allegations concerning the potential deleterious
effects and legal consequences of certification of the UFW as the bargaining unit for
Wonderful’s employees. These sections of the petition allege variously that both
Wonderful and its employees will be subject to any number of evils caused by union
certification: they will be compelled to associate with others they dislike (such as the
UFW); ironically, that “certification impairs the ‘fundamental right’ of farm workers to
organize and to freely choose their bargaining representative” (boldface and some
capitalization omitted); their freedom to contract will be destroyed; their fundamental
property interests will be impaired; and they will be forced to contract whether they wish
to bargain or not. Wonderful’s first cause of action alleges due process requires a right
for Wonderful to be heard before the UFW is certified as the union for its employees.
Ultimately, Wonderful’s petition requests (1) injunctive relief “restraining the
Board from enforcing certification of the UFW vis-à-vis Wonderful”; as well as an order
(2) directing the ALRB to “stay the underlying MSP proceedings, In the Matter of
Wonderful Nurseries LLC (Employer), and United Farm Workers of America
(Petitioner), ALRB Case No. 2024-RM-002”; (3) requiring the ALRB to “suspend the
legal effect of the ‘Certification of Investigation of Validity of Majority Support Petition
and Proof of Support’ ”; and (4) forcing the ALRB to “cease and desist from initiating or
continuing any proceedings pursuant to section 1156.37.”
In light of this specific and detailed petition, and despite Wonderful’s arguments
to the contrary, Wonderful clearly challenges the ALRB’s decision under section 1156.37
to certify the UFW as the bargaining representative of its employees. Just as the court
held in Nishikawa Farms, Inc.—that “a certification order under section 1156.3 of the
ALRA is not a ‘final order’ of the board”—we find a certification order under section
1156.37 is not a “final order” of the board. For similar reasons, we therefore conclude
22.
such an order “is not normally subject to judicial review except as it may be drawn in
question by a petition for review of an order . . . restraining an unfair labor practice.”
(Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 788.) No such order
restraining an unfair labor practice has been issued, and therefore this certification order
is not subject to judicial review, unless an exception applies.11 As above, while
Wonderful does argue the Leedom v. Kyne exception applies, it fails to make any
persuasive showing of the criteria necessary to meet that exception. It has not shown
“ ‘ “a ‘plain’ violation of an unambiguous and mandatory” ’ statutory provision,” or that
it has been deprived of a “right assured to it by the statute,” or that “indirect review of the
order, through an unfair labor practice proceeding, [is] unavailable or patently
inadequate.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1503.) Absent this, we find, based on and in line with the longstanding precedent in
this area of law, that the superior court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case.
Wonderful alternatively argues that, even if it is challenging the validity of the
certification decision, it “is not challenging any specific agency action or the manner in
which the agency exercised its authority. It challenges the source of the putative
authority under which the agency acts.” (Italics and boldface omitted.) This, Wonderful
maintains, separates its challenge from other cases: it is bringing a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of section 1156.37, not an as-applied challenge. Again, we find this
11 This also distinguishes this case from Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1129, in which this court concluded that it could hear a
challenge related to the decertification of a union, because it was “inextricably intertwined and
virtually indistinguishable” from the unfair labor practices proceeding with which it had been
consolidated. (Id. at p. 1223; see id. at pp. 1219–1225.) Indeed, the remedy imposed for the
unfair labor practices violation was, specifically, the invalidation of the decertification election.
(Id. at p. 1222.) The facts of that case, which were repeatedly referred to in the opinion as both
“unusual” and “unique,” are simply inapposite to this case, which does not involve a
decertification election or a certification decision which is “inextricably intertwined and virtually
indistinguishable” from the remedy for unfair labor practices being simultaneously imposed.
(See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, at pp. 1219–1225.)
23.
unpersuasive. Wonderful cites no authority holding a facial constitutional challenge to a
certification decision need not proceed through the standard path for judicial review,
whereas an as-applied challenge must.12 This court has previously observed with
approval that one seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a certification proceeding
must either proceed through section 1160.8 following a final order of the ALRB, or
through the narrow, recognized exception thereto. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 308–309 [explaining
how the plaintiff’s claims fell within the recognized exception].) Other courts are in
agreement, even where facial constitutional challenges were alleged. (Squillacote v. Int’l
Broth. of Teamsters, Local 344, supra, 561 F.2d at p. 40 [“The Union’s claim that
§ 9(b)(3) [of the NLRA] unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of associational rights
is neither an assertion of a clear violation of right nor one that could not be judicially
determined if an exception from normal exhaustion requirements is not granted”]; see
Pacific Maritime Ass’n v. National Labor Relations Bd. (9th Cir. 2016) 827 F.3d 1203,
1210–1212 [concluding the district court lacked jurisdiction over a facial challenge to a
nonfinal NLRB ruling on a certification decision because the case did not fall within the
Leedom v. Kyne exception].) There is no authority supporting the claim that some
constitutional challenges may be immediately brought to contest union certification
decisions, without fitting into a recognized exception.
Wonderful also contends, albeit obliquely, that section 1160.8 violates article VI,
section 10 of the California Constitution, which generally grants original jurisdiction to
the superior courts. Although the argument is not phrased this directly, we understand
Wonderful to be arguing that section 1160.8 is violative of article VI of the California
12 This case is also obviously distinguishable from structural challenge cases such as
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. (2010) 561 U.S. 477, 490–
491, in which the litigants challenged the very existence of the Board itself. As explained at
length, Wonderful is challenging the certification decision made by the ALRB, not the existence
of the ALRB.
24.
Constitution because it strips the jurisdiction of the superior courts to hear certain causes
of action, and does so without other constitutional authority supporting it. However, we
have already determined this is not what section 1160.8 does in Gerawan v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Bd., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at page 303. That case concerned a
constitutional challenge on jurisdictional-stripping grounds to section 1164.9, which
stated: “No court of this state, except the court of appeal or the Supreme Court . . . shall
have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the board.”
We observed that the California Supreme Court had already upheld the constitutionality
of section 1160.8 in Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.,
supra, 24 Cal.3d 335. (Gerawan, at p. 303.) The ALRB argued in Gerawan that, by
analogy, section 1164.9 must be constitutional as well. (Gerawan, at p. 303.) However,
as we previously explained, sections 1164.9 and 1160.8 are distinguishable, because the
former clearly and expressly strips jurisdiction from the superior court, whereas section
1160.8 “does not purport to strip the superior court of jurisdiction.” (Gerawan, at
p. 303.) Indeed, as we noted in Gerawan and have already discussed above, the two are
distinguishable because section 1160.8 “has never been construed as barring all recourse
to the superior court.” (Gerawan, at p. 305.) Wonderful, which cites Gerawan
extensively in its briefing, presumably recognizes our prior holding on this issue but does
not seek to explain why the Gerawan decision was wrongly decided.13
In closing, we note an almost identical situation was heard by this court almost 50
years ago in United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268. There,
the employees of a rose grower, Mount Arbor Nurseries, voted to unionize, and the UFW
was certified by the ALRB as the employees’ bargaining representative. (Id. at p. 270.)
No collective bargaining agreement was reached in the first year, and the UFW requested
13This distinction was also noted in Communities for a Better Environment v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Com. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 786, 806, another
case on which Wonderful relies heavily.
25.
an extension of its certification to continue bargaining. (Ibid.) Mount Arbor Nurseries
filed a declaratory relief action seeking to resolve whether it was required to continue
bargaining with the UFW, alleging irregularities with the union elections. (Ibid.) The
UFW demurred, asserting the court lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory relief action
because it challenged union certification. (Ibid.) The trial court overruled the demurrer,
and the UFW filed a writ petition with this court seeking to determine whether the trial
court had jurisdiction to hear the case. (Ibid.)
We concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction, noting that unfair labor practice
proceedings were the “basic method of dispute resolution” embodied in both the NLRA
and ALRA. (United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 271.)
An unfair labor practice proceeding “also provides the means by which the employer may
challenge the propriety of elections conducted by the Board. If the employer feels that
the Board has improperly certified a union as the employees’ bargaining representative,
its remedy is to refuse to bargain with the union, whereupon the Board will initiate unfair
labor practice proceedings against it. At this time the validity of the union’s claim to
represent the employees may be contested. The Act provides that review of the Board’s
rulings is by the court of appeal.” (Ibid.)
This court found the ALRB “has exclusive primary jurisdiction over all phases of
the administration of the Act as regards unfair labor practices.” (United Farm Workers v.
Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 271.) We found this specifically included
claims regarding whether a union was appropriately certified: “Whether real parties have
a duty to bargain with the UFW is incident under the Act to many possible future unfair
labor practices and is inseparable therefrom.” (Id. at p. 272.) “If every time an incident
or condition precedent were involved in an alleged unfair labor practice and any party
could first obtain declaratory relief in the superior court instead of from the Board, the
Board would be replaced by ad hoc determinations by already overcrowded courts. The
legislative effort to bring order and stability to the collective bargaining process would be
26.
thwarted.” (Ibid.) We noted the same was true of federal district courts under the
NLRA. (United Farm Workers, supra, at pp. 272–273.) We observed exceptions did
exist, as discussed in Nishikawa Farms, Inc. and Leedom, but concluded those
circumstances did not apply in that case. (United Farm Workers, at pp. 273–274.) We
stated that “the Legislature, confronted with violence in the fields, sought peace and
stability in agricultural relations by adoption of the Act. That Act established a
centralized expert agency with a primary jurisdiction over agricultural labor disputes.
With limited exceptions not applicable to the facts of this case, the judiciary enters the
scene only after the Board has passed on a labor relations question, and then only for
limited purposes of review.” (Id. at pp. 276–277.) Thus, we reversed the trial court and
directed it to enter an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. (Id. at
p. 277.)
Thus, to summarize, decades of precedent from this court, other California courts,
and federal courts interpreting an analogous statute show an employer may not challenge
a union certification decision outside of an unfair labor practices proceeding, except in
unusual circumstances. This is because, under the ALRA, a certification order from the
ALRB is not a “final order” within the meaning of section 1160.8. Instead, Wonderful
must wait until the prescribed statutory point to challenge certification, of which there are
at least two: either after a final order concerning unfair labor practice issues or after the
MMC process. Neither has occurred here. Whether Wonderful has a constitutional right
to all of the process to which it believes it is entitled must wait for resolution at the
appropriate time.14 Wonderful has not shown it falls within the Leedom v. Kyne
exception allowing a premature challenge to the certification decision. The superior
court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.
14At this point, we take no position on the merits of any of Wonderful’s constitutional
arguments related to section 1156.37.
27.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons given above, the order granting a preliminary injunction is
reversed. Let a writ issue to the Kern Superior Court directing it to vacate its orders
issuing a preliminary injunction and overruling the demurrers in case No. BCV-24-
101649, and issue orders denying the preliminary injunction, sustaining the demurrers
filed by the UFW and the ALRB, and dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction.15
The UFW and the ALRB shall recover their costs in all matters resolved by this opinion.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.278, 8.493.)
PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
FAIN, J.*
15Further leave to amend the petition is not warranted, regardless of the present state of
any MMC or unfair labor practice proceedings, because those statutes clearly direct review in the
first instance to the Court of Appeal and/or Supreme Court. (See §§ 1160.8, 1164.5.)
Obviously, since our decision does not reach the merits of the case, dismissal should be without
prejudice to Wonderful raising its due process issues at the appropriate time and in the
appropriate proceeding.
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
28.