King-Malone

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

PARIS C. KING-MALONE, ) CASE NO. 5:25 CV 1776

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

)

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

LOUIS O. KING JR., et al., ) AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

Pro se Plaintiff Paris C. King-Malone filed an Amended Complaint in this action

asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the

Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. She

challenges her 2015 Dissolution of Marriage granted by the Cuyahoga County Domestic

Relations Court on May 26, 2015, King v. King, No. DR-15-356450 (Cuyahoga Cty Dom. Rel.

Ct. May 26, 2015) and her 2024 conviction in the Cleveland Municipal Court on misdemeanor

charges of criminal trespass, persistent disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest, City of Cleveland

v. King, No. 2023-CRB-005251 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Sep. 18, 2024). She names forty-eight

Defendants, including Judges, Prosecutors, Court Clerks, Private Attorneys, Municipalities,

Private Parties, a Guardian Ad Litem, Public Officials, and Private Security Guards. She asks

this Court to declare her dissolution of marriage and her conviction to be void, and enjoin the

Defendants from enforcing them. She also seeks monetary damages.

Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. No. 3). That

Application is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s pleading is difficult to decipher. It is largely devoid of facts and composed

almost entirely of legal conclusions. The pleading suggests that she is attacking two state court

judgments. The first judgment she challenges is her dissolution of marriage issued in 2015.

King v. King, No. DR-15-356450 (Cuyahoga Cty Dom. Rel. Ct. May 26, 2015). The second

judgment is a 2023 Municipal Court conviction on misdemeanor charges of criminal trespass,

persistent disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest, City of Cleveland v. King, No. 2023-CRB-

005251 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Sep. 18, 2024).

Plaintiff does not provide much information about her dissolution of marriage. She

indicates it was filed in Cuyahoga County. The Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court

docket indicates that Plaintiff and her former spouse Louis King, Jr., filed a Petition for

Dissolution of Marriage on March 27, 2015. King v. King, No. DR-15-356450 (Cuyahoga Cty

Dom. Rel. Ct. May 26, 2015). To petition the court for a dissolution of marriage, both parties

must sign and attach to the petition a mutually signed separation agreement that provides for

division of all property, and resolves all issues related to child custody and support. Ohio

Revised Code § 3105.63. Judge Cheryl Karner was assigned to the case. Judge Karner granted

the dissolution of marriage on May 26, 2015. Over ten years later, on August 6, 2025, Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Declare the Judgment to be Void for Lack of Jurisdiction. Id. Because Judge

Karner died in 2023, Judge Tanya R. Jones was assigned to the case. Judge Jones denied the

Motion on August 12, 2025. Plaintiff objects to Judge Jones’s assignment to the case claiming

her substitution as Judge was not journalized. (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 772). She claims that

both spouses lived in Summit County, but they filed the case in Cuyahoga County. Finally, she

claims that she “was incapacitated by mental illness, unrepresented, and without a guardian ad

litem.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 772). She contends that “[a]ny decree entered against her was

void.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 772). She asserts that her ex-husband Louis King “instigated”

the dissolution and attorneys Fine and Knox proceeded with the dissolution “despite lacking

jurisdiction.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 775). She indicates that the Guardian ad Litem

Christina Eloff “produced a biased report weaponizing Plaintiff’s disability.” (Doc. No. 20 at

PageID #: 776). She states, without explanation, that Judges Rintala, Stahl, and DiDonato

Heimbaugh enforced the dissolution in Summit County. She contends her ex-husband’s mistress

Robyn Siverd benefitted from the “unlawful proceedings.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 775). She

indicates the Stow Municipal Court ordered an eviction that was related to her dissolution of

marriage.

Plaintiff also attacks her 2024 conviction on misdemeanor charges. The Cleveland

Municipal Court docket indicates misdemeanor charges of criminal trespass, persistent

disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest were filed against Plaintiff on July 7, 2023 for an incident

that took place at University Hospitals on July 3, 2023. City of Cleveland v. King, No. 2023-

CRB-005251 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Sep. 18, 2024). The case proceeded to trial. The jury found

Plaintiff not guilty of criminal trespass, but guilty of persistent disorderly conduct and resisting

arrest. The Municipal Court sentenced her to one year of active community control sanctions

with counseling.

Plaintiff appealed her conviction. The Eighth District Court of Appeals provides some

context for the charges. City of Cleveland v. King, No. 114464, 2025 WL 2475869 (Ohio 8 Dist.

App. Ct. Aug. 28, 2025). On July 3, 2023, University Hospitals police were dispatched to the

main campus emergency room because two people with gunshot wounds were en route.

Hospital policy requires that the emergency room go on “soft lockdown” when the emergency

room treats gunshot victims. During a soft lockdown, only patients may enter the emergency

room. This is to make sure no one has followed the ambulance to try to “finish the job.” Id. at

*2. Security officers are stationed outside the door to prevent entrance by anyone who is not a

patient. A man approached the door and indicated that he was the father of the gunshot victim.

Officers barred his entrance explaining the policy. Plaintiff’s mother was a patient in the

emergency room; however, she and the Plaintiff were standing outside of the hospital when the

man approached. They overheard the officer’s conversation with the father and began arguing

with the officer on the father’s behalf. Plaintiff’s mother eventually was permitted to return to

the emergency room to get her test results, but Plaintiff, who was not a patient, was told she had

to wait outside. Plaintiff’s mother attempted to drag Plaintiff through the door with her but

Plaintiff’s entrance was blocked by Officer Gill. Plaintiff became physically aggressive with

Officer Gill. It took several officers to restrain her. The officers then escorted her to the security

office in University Hospitals where her information was obtained and she was released. A

criminal complaint was filed against her four days later on July 7, 2023 in the Cleveland

Municipal Court. She was found not guilty of criminal trespass but guilty of disorderly conduct

and resisting arrest.

Plaintiff claims her conviction is void. She states that Officer Gill does not hold an Ohio

Police Officers Training Commission certificate. She contends he was impersonating a peace

officer. She claims he used force to arrest her which makes her arrest unlawful and void. She

sues Officers Tomm, Sedivy and Huling because they participated in her attest. She sues UH

Employee Brittany White stating she “ratified and supported” her arrest. She claims Chief

Kobak, University Hospital Police Department and University Hospitals Cleveland Medical

Center are liable because they employ Gill and ratified his conduct. She names the City of

Cleveland, the Cleveland Police Department and the City of Cleveland Law Department for

prosecuting her. She alleges probation officer Jennifer threatened her with a warrant if she did

not report for probation even though she filed an appeal. She claims her public defenders would

not raise her claims of “nullity.” She contends that Supreme Court disciplinary Counsel

dismissed her complaints against judges. She alleges that Judge Cassidy presided over her

criminal case, and excluded her service animal. She claims Court Clerks Buenger, Kurt, and

Byrd “obstructed filings and enforced void decrees.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 776). She

contends the current Cleveland Mayor and the former Cleveland Mayor hired Officer Gill after

he resigned from University Hospitals.

Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, and 42 U.S.C. §

1985. She contends generally that the “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process by enforcing void decrees and convictions.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #:

782). She also generally asserts that the “Defendants intentionally treated Plaintiff, a black,

disabled, indigent woman differently from others without rational basis.” (Doc. No. 20 at

PageID #: 783). She asserts claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) against the City of Cleveland, the Cleveland Municipal Court, “Probation,” and Judge

Cassidy stating that they denied her accommodation of having her service animal present. She

asserts claims for denial of her Fourth Amendment rights asserting that her arrest was unlawful

because the Officers were “impersonators.” She also claims they used excessive force to secure

her arrest. She includes a claim for Malicious Prosecution against Prosecutor Jordan, Prosecutor

Fisher, Officer Gill, University Hospital Employee White and Judge Cassidy. She asserts that

Officers Gill, Tomm, Sedivy, and Huling, Judge Cassidy, Probation Supervisor Jennifer and

Prosecutors Jordan and Fisher retaliated against her for her mother’s protected speech in

criticizing the hospital soft lockdown policy. She asserts generally that the “Defendants formed

an enterprise and conducted affairs through racketeering: mail/wire fraud, obstruction, extortion,

intimidation.” (Doc. No. 20 at PageID #: 784). Finally, she states, “All Defendants conspired to

deprive Plaintiff of equal protection, motivated by racial and disability animus.” (Doc. No. 20 at

PageID #: 785). She asks this Court to declare her dissolution of marriage and her criminal

conviction to be void, expunge her conviction, and enjoin the state courts from enforcing those

judgments. She also seeks monetary damages.

II. Standard of Review

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is

required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.

City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or

fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions

are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual

allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more

than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis

As an initial matter, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to declare a state court

judgment to be void, and enjoin its enforcement. United States District Courts do not have

jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions even if the request to reverse the state court

judgment is based on an allegation that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Federal appellate review of

state court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of

certiorari. Id. Under this principle, generally referred to as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a

party losing his case in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate

review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based on the party’s claim that the

state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99

(6th Cir. 2012).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions

interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44

S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). This statute was enacted to prevent “end-runs around state court

judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that judgment to file a writ of certiorari with

the United States Supreme Court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the negative

inference that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested in the United States Supreme

Court, then such review may not occur in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S.

at 283-84; Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children and Family Services, 606 F.3d 301,

308-311 (6th Cir. 2010); Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008).

Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine with narrow application. It does not bar federal

jurisdiction “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously

litigated in state court.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293; Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99. It also

does not address potential conflicts between federal and state court orders, which fall within the

parameters of the doctrines of comity, abstention, and preclusion. Berry, 688 F.3d 299. Instead,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state court

initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment

itself, and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re Cook, 551

F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court

must look to the “source of the injury the Plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick

v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic, 606 F.3d

at 310. If the source of the Plaintiff's injury is the state-court judgment itself, then the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other

source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the Plaintiff asserts an independent claim.”

Id.; see Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368-69. In conducting this inquiry, the Court should also consider

the Plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, No. 09–3998, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1 (6th

Cir. May 27, 2011).

Here Plaintiff asks this Court to declare the dissolution of marriage to be void and enjoin

the enforcement of that judgment. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant that

relief.

In addition, Defendants King, Jones, Fine, Know, Eloff, Rintala, Stahl, DiDonato

Heimaugh, Siverd, and the Stow Municipal Court are named only in connection with the

dissolution of marriage. Plaintiff has not stated any actual legal claims in connect with her

challenge to her dissolution of marriage. She states that she was denied due process but this

claim is premised on the Court also finding that the state court judgment is void. As stated

above, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to make this determination. She asserts no

other cognizable claims against these Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiff’s dissolution of marriage was granted in 2015. Ohio’s two year statute

of limitations for bodily injury applies to §1983 claims. LRL Properties v. Portage Metro

Housing Authority, 55 F. 3d 1097 (6th Cir. 1995). This action filed ten years later is well beyond

the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Furthermore, just as this Court cannot declare a state court civil judgment to be void, it

cannot declare a state court criminal conviction to be void in a civil rights action. To obtain

relief from a state court conviction, Plaintiff’s sole remedy is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

Similarly, Plaintiff cannot bypass the habeas corpus remedy by challenging a conviction

in a civil rights action that seeks only damages. Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). A

claim for damages that calls into question the validity of a conviction or sentence that has not

been invalidated is not cognizable in an action for damages. Therefore, before the Court can

entertain a claim for damages, the Court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence. If it would, the

Complaint must be dismissed unless the Plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated. Plaintiff’s claims for damages for denial of due process, unlawful

seizure and excessive force all seek damages for events that were integral to Plaintiff’s

conviction. In fact, her claim for denial of due process and unlawful seizure are both premised

on her assertion that her conviction is void. Her conviction, however, has not been overturned

on appeal or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. She cannot proceed

with these claims for damages.

Plaintiff failed to state a claim of malicious prosecution. To succeed on a malicious

prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, Plaintiff must plead and prove the following: (1) a criminal prosecution was

initiated against her and that the defendant “ma[d]e, influence [d], or participate[d] in the

decision to prosecute; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) “as

a consequence of a legal proceeding,” Plaintiff suffered a “deprivation of liberty,” as understood

in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal

proceeding must have been resolved in the Plaintiff's favor. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294,

308-310 (6th Cir. 2010). The criminal proceedings were not resolved in Plaintiff’s favor. She

was convicted of two of the three charges. This also means there was probable cause for her

prosecution. She also failed to allege facts to suggest that she was deprived of her liberty after

the initial seizure. She was released after her information was obtained by the officers. She has

not established the elements for a malicious prosecution claim.

In addition, Plaintiff’s equal protection, retaliation, civil RICO, ADA and 42 U.S.C. §

1985 causes of action fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They are stated

entirely as legal conclusions with no supporting facts or explanation Legal conclusions are not

sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff had stated a viable claim that was supported by factual

allegations, most, if not all, of the Defendants are not subject to suit. Judges Jones, Rintala,

Stahl, Didonato Heimbaugh, Cassidy, Taylor, Steinhauer, Seifert, Sheehan, Forbes, and Keough

are absolutely immune from suits for damages based on actions and decision they made in the

course of presiding over a case. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105

F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Prosecutors Piatt, Dever, Jordan, Fisher and Bevans Walsh are

also absolutely immune for actions taken in the course of presenting the State or City’s case.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir.

1993). Nonjudicial officers, like Court Clerks, clerk's office employees, victim advocates, and

Guardian ad Litems whose official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process,

are also entitled to absolute immunity for federal law claims involving their quasi-judicial

conduct. See Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding clerk of court was

entitled to immunity for issuing an arrest warrant); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir.

1984)(finding that a Guardian ad Litem is an integral part of the judicial process and entitled to

absolute immunity from the plaintiff's claims). Court Clerks Buenger, Kurt, and Byrd, and

Guardian ad Litem Eloff are absolutely immune from suit for damages. The State of Ohio, its

agencies (the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission) and its officers sued in their official

capacities (Dave Yost) are absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

The Cleveland Police Department, Cleveland Law Department, Cleveland Probation

Department and University Hospitals Police Department are not sui juris meaning they are not

legal entities that can sue or be sued. Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App'x 426, 435

(6th Cir. 2014). The Cleveland Police Department, Law Department and Probation Department

are all sub-units of the City of Cleveland. University Hospitals Police Department is a sub-unit

of University Hospitals. They are not separate legal entities under Ohio law that can be sued.

Similarly, King, Fine, Knox, and Siverd, are private parties, not government actors.

Claims may only be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state or local governments and their

officers or employees. Private parties are not subject to suit under § 1983 except in rare

circumstances which are not applicable here.

University Hospitals is also a private entity, not a municipality or government agency. It

cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is not clear from the Complaint whether the security officers employed by University

Hospitals are private parties or state actors for purposes of § 1983. Under § 1983, Plaintiff must

show that she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, by someone

acting “under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

155 (1978); Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir.2003) (en banc); Wolotsky v.

Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). Generally, to act under color of state law, the person

taking the action must be a state or local government entity or official. A private person acts

under color of state law when his or her conduct is “fairly attributable to the state.” Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 947 (1982). “The Supreme Court has developed three tests

for determining the existence of state action in a particular case: (1) the public function test, (2)

the state compulsion test, and (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus test.” Chapman, 319 F.3d

at 833 (citing Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335). See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (public

function); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (state compulsion test); Burton

v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (symbiotic relationship or nexus test).

The public function test applies here. “In order for a private actor to be deemed to have

acted under color of state law, it is not enough to show that the private actor performed a public

function.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App'x 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2006)(citing Rockwell

v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir.1994)). Instead, the private party must perform a

public function which has traditionally and exclusively been reserved to the State. Id. (citing

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). This test is difficult to satisfy. Id.

Many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, but very few have been

exclusively reserved to the State. Id. (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d

1442, 1456 (10th Cir.1995); see also Chapman, 319 F.3d at 833-34 (explaining that “the public

function test has been interpreted narrowly”). “Only functions like holding elections, exercising

eminent domain, and operating a company-owned town fall under this category of state action.”

Chapman, 319 F.3d at 833-34 (internal citations omitted). In short, “a State normally can be

held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided

such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to

be that of the State.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 52 n. 10 (1988).

Private security officers act under the color of state law where they are “endowed by law

with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers.” Romanski v. Detroit

Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005). Generally, this requires two things: (1) that a

government entity grant authority to a private security force; and (2) that the authority include at

least one power exclusively reserved for the state. Id. Private security guards become state

actors, for the purpose of §1983’s public function test, only with some sort of state or municipal

authorization of plenary police powers. Id., see also Lindsey v. Detroit Entm't, LLC, 484 F.3d

824, 829–30 (6th Cir. 2007) (casino security guard did not act under color of state law where the

guard was not licensed under state law and, thus, did not have plenary arrest authority). In cases

where “the private [guards] have some police-like powers but not plenary police authority,”

including “cases in which a private institution's security employees have been dispatched to

protect the institution's interests or enforce its policies,” the guards likely will not be state actors.

Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637-38.

Here, Plaintiff provides very little information about the security officers. She states that

Gill is not a certified or trained police officer and is merely a private security officer. She

provides no information on Tomm, Sedivy, Huling or Kobak. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

to suggest that the Defendants were endowed with plenary police powers and that they exercised

those powers.

Furthermore, even if these officers could be considered to be state actors for purposes of

§ 1983, the only claims asserted against them are those for use of excessive force and unlawful

arrest. As discussed above, both claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486

(1994). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts regarding the incident. She alleges no facts

that even suggest what force was used against her or how that force was excessive in light of her

behavior. There is no suggestion of how Tomm, Sedivy, Huling, Kobak, or White participated in

the incident. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against these Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges no facts and asserts no viable legal cause of action against King,

Fine, Knox, Caligiuri, Yost, University Hospitals, Eloff, Siverd, Jones, Rintala, Stahl, Didonato

Heimbaugh, Piatt, Dever, Buenger, City of Cleveland, Probation Officer Jennifer, the Cuyahoga

County Public Defender’s Office, Sweeney, the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission, the

City of East Cleveland, Shabazz, Morgan, the Stow Municipal Court, Taylor, Summit County,

Cuyahoga County, Kurt, Byrd, Jordan, Fisher, Bevan Walsh, Steinhauer Seifert, Sheehan,

Forbes, and Keough. Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8 requires a Plaintiff to submit a short, plain

and concise statement of his or her claims and relief. To meet the minimum notice pleading

requirements of Rule 8, the Complaint must give the Defendants fair notice of what the

Plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds upon which they rest. Bassett v. National

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). This Complaint does not contain

sufficient facts regarding these Defendants to suggest what they may have done to connect them

to any of the legal claims Plaintiff listed in her Complaint. Without any indication of their actual

role in the incidents described and an actual connection to an asserted legal claim, Plaintiff fails

to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 3) is

granted, and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Plaintiff’s Motion for

temporary restraining order and Motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 4), Motion for

temporary restraining order and Injunctive Relief (Doc. No. 16), Motion to expedite ruling on in

forma pauperis status and for prompt issuance of summonses and U.S. Marshal Service (Doc.

No. 21), Motion for ADA Reasonable Accommodations (Doc. No. 25), Motion for leave to file

Second Amended Complaint, Motion to correct defendant name, and Motion to file exhibits

under seal (Doc. No. 29), and Motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 31) are denied.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could

not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: November 21, 2025

_/s/ John R. Adams_______

JOHN R. ADAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE