Davis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00233-MR

JAQUAN M. DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

AREN MESSER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Aren Messer, Tye

Galloway, and Daniel Cox’s Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 29].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated Plaintiff Jaquan M. Davis, proceeding pro se, filed

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly

occurred at the Henderson County Detention Center (“HCDC”) where he is

a pretrial detainee. The Plaintiff’s unverified Complaint passed initial review

on claims that Defendants Messer, an HCDC corporal, and Defendants

Galloway and Cox, HCDC detention officers, used excessive force and were

deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s serious medical need.1 [See Doc. 1:

1 The Plaintiff's Complaint is unverified and therefore cannot be considered on summary

judgment as a forecast of evidence.

Compl.; Doc. 7: Order on Initial Review]. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory

and punitive damages. [Doc. 1: Compl. at 4].

The Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment,

supported by the Defendants’ declarations and excerpts of the Plaintiff’s

deposition.2 [Doc. 29: MSJ]. Thereafter, the Court entered an Order in

accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975),

advising the Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary

judgment motion and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to

the Court. [Doc. 32: Roseboro Order]. The Plaintiff filed an unverified

Response [Doc. 34: Resp.], and the Defendants filed a Reply [Doc. 35:

Reply]. This matter is therefore ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

2 While video footage of the incident in question apparently exists, it has not been filed

with the Court. [See, e.g., Doc. 30-3: Deop. at 30 (referring to the video)].

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the

Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.

App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)

(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The forecast of evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff as the non-moving party, shows the following.

On July 13, 2024, a few days after the Plaintiff entered the HCDC, he

began requesting time outside of his cell. [Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl. at ¶ 4;

see Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 2-5]. The Plaintiff kicked his cell door several times,

starting at around 5:00 p.m.,3 because he wanted to shower and use the

phone. [Id. at ¶¶ 6-8, 10; id. at 6-7, 26]. The Plaintiff was instructed

repeatedly to stop kicking the door and he was cautioned that, if he

continued, his shoes would be confiscated.4 [Id. at ¶¶ 7-11].

Officers Galloway and Cox responded to the Plaintiff’s cell and ordered

him, repeatedly, to hand over his shoes. [Id. at ¶¶ 12-13; Doc. 30-4: Cox

Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6; Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 16-17]. The Plaintiff refused, saying that

he did not want to walk barefoot. [Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 17, 30]. Cox and

Galloway entered the Plaintiff’s cell and repeated the order to hand over his

shoes, and the Plaintiff continued to refuse. [Id.; Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl.

3 The Court relies on the Defendants’ forecast of evidence regarding timing, because the

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony is inconsistent in this regard. [Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 6-7, 14].

4 The Court need not accept the Plaintiff’s contradictory statements in this regard. [See

Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 7 (denying that anyone told him not to kick the door); id. at 11 (“I’m

pretty sure somebody said, ‘Stop kicking the door.’”); id. at 14 (“They said, ‘Stop kicking

the door,’ once”)]; see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

at ¶ 14; Doc. 30-4: Cox Decl. at ¶ 8]. The Plaintiff felt that he was “in the

right,” so he was not going to listen to the officers and he would not have left

his cell even if they had allowed him to keep his shoes. [Doc. 30-3: Depo. at

25-26].

Galloway grabbed the Plaintiff and threw him to the floor. [Id. at 18].

Galloway unsuccessfully tried to gain control of the Plaintiff’s arms, as the

Plaintiff was on his back, pulling away, and tucking his arms under his body.

[Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16; Doc. 30-6: Messer Decl. at ¶ 5]. Cox

punched the left side of the Plaintiff’s face once and the Plaintiff was told to

put his hands behind his back. [Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 8, 18-19]. Corporal

Messer arrived while the Plaintiff was on the floor, refusing to roll to his

stomach. [Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl. at ¶ 18; Doc. 30-6: Messer Decl. at ¶¶

3, 5]. Messer “push[ed] [Plaintiff’s] head into the concrete”5 and said “stop

resisting,” while the Plaintiff “clearly [was] not moving on the ground.” [Id. at

8, 18-20].

Messer, Galloway, and Cox rolled the Plaintiff over and escorted him

to another part of the HCDC where he was secured in a restraint chair. [Id.

5 The Court need not accept Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements with regards to Messer’s

actions. [See, e.g., Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 8, 20 (“[Messer] just slammed my head inside of

the floor;” “[Messer] just throws my head to the side of the concrete;” “[Messer] pushes

my head into the concrete;” “[Messer] just throws my head violently into the ground”)];

see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

at ¶ 6; Doc. 30-4: Cox Decl. at ¶ 10; Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl. at ¶ 19].

None of the Defendants insulted the Plaintiff, kicked him, or used other force.

[Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 20-21].

Once the Plaintiff was secured in the restraint chair, a nurse checked

the Plaintiff and reported no signs of physical injury.6 [Doc. 30-6: Messer

Decl. at ¶ 7; Doc. 30-4: Cox Decl. at ¶ 12; Doc. 30-5: Galloway Decl. at ¶

20]. The Plaintiff sustained a “[w]rist injury” that lasted for a day and “[j]ust

head injuries,” i.e., a swollen forehead, headaches for couple of days, a

“busted lip,” and a bloody nose that subsided when he showered. [Doc. 30-

3: Depo. at 10, 26-29]. The Plaintiff did not seek medical attention for these

injuries. [Id. at 10].

The Plaintiff was placed in lockdown for disrupting jail activities with

regards to this incident. [Doc. 30-4: Cox Decl. at ¶ 12; Doc. 30-5: Galloway

Decl. at ¶ 21; Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 29].

6 The Court need not accept the Plaintiff’s conflicting statements about whether a nurse

saw him while he was in the restraint chair. [See Doc. 30-3: Depo. at 8 (denying that a

nurse looked at him while he was in the restraint chair); id. at 9 (admitting that a nurse

checked his restraints)]; see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use

of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial

detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389

(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force

claim is “solely an objective one.” Id. In determining whether the force was

objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer

knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham,

490 U.S. at 396). Considerations that bear on the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of the force include: the relationship between the need for

the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s

injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force;

the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived

by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id.

Here, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine

dispute of material fact as to the Defendants’ use of excessive force. First,

the forecast shows that there was a legitimate need for the application of

force. The Plaintiff repeatedly refused direct orders to stop kicking his cell

door and to surrender his shoes. It was objectively reasonable for Defendant

Galloway to take the Plaintiff to the floor to preserve order and to compel the

Plaintiff’s compliance. See Scarbro v. New Hanover Cnty., 374 F.App’x 366,

370 (4th Cir. 2010) (the court “must accord due deference to an officer’s

efforts to restrain a detainee when faced with a dynamic and potentially

violent situation; otherwise, ‘we would give encouragement to

insubordination in an environment which is already volatile enough’”)

(quoting Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on

other grounds by Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593 (4th Cir. 2023)).

It was also objectively reasonable for Cox to apply one strike to the

Plaintiff’s face as he struggled against being restrained, and for Messer to

press the Plaintiff’s head to the floor while attempting to safely secure the

Plaintiff. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Reynolds, No. 1:23CV755, 2025 WL

1744291, at *4 (M.D.N.C. June 24, 2025) (granting summary judgment for

defendants who applied two closed fist strikes to Plaintiff’s head and took

Plaintiff to the ground to restrain him was “simply that necessary to [restore

order and] maintain control ... [and] [a]ny use of force immediately ended”

once Defendants placed Plaintiff into restraints).

The relationship between the need and the amount of force that was

used also weighs in favor of the Defendants. The forecast of evidence

demonstrates that the Plaintiff refused several direct orders and that he had

no intention of complying with officers’ verbal demands. [See Doc. 30-3:

Depo. at 24-25]. The Plaintiff’s ongoing defiance left officers with no option

other than to use physical means to compel his compliance. See Grayson,

195 F.3d at 696-97); see, e.g., Dale v. FNU Barnes, 1:23CV373, 2024 WL

4416440 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 2024) (it was appropriate for an officer to use a

baton to place the plaintiff in an arm lock after initial attempts to control the

plaintiff with his hands failed).

The forecast of evidence further demonstrates that the Defendants

attempted to temper their use of force. Physical force was only used after

repeated verbal orders failed. [See Doc. 30-3: at 24-25]. Each Defendant

used force that was minimally required to restore order and they ceased

using force as soon as the Plaintiff was safely secured in a restraint chair.

The forecast of evidence further demonstrates that the Plaintiff sustained de

minimis injuries which required no medical treatment and dissipated within a

matter of days. The evidence, therefore, demonstrates that the Defendants

used force only as necessary to gain control of the defiant Plaintiff and to

restore order.

No reasonable jury could conclude, under these circumstances, that

the Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using minimal

force to extract the Plaintiff from his cell and to secure him in a restraint chair.

See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-96. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment will, therefore, be granted on the Plaintiff’s excessive force claims.

B. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

A pretrial detainee’s claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need is properly brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Short, 87 F.4th at 611. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that:

(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed

a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed

to act to appropriately address the risk that the

condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should

have known (a) that the detainee had the condition

and (b) that the defendant’s action or inaction posed

an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result,

the detainee was harmed.

Id. at 611. Under this standard, “the plaintiff [need not] show that the

defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s serious medical condition

and consciously disregarded the risk that their action or failure to act would

result in harm.” Id. “[I]t is enough that the plaintiff show that the defendant

acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is

either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). It remains, however, insufficient “for

the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to

do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.

Here, the forecast of evidence demonstrates that there was a brief use

of force in which Plaintiff was extracted from his cell and restrained; that a

nurse examined Plaintiff shortly after the incident reported no injuries; that

the Plaintiff did not seek any medical attention; and that the injuries all

subsided within a few days. The Plaintiff has failed to forecast any evidence

that he had a sufficiently serious injury that was obvious or known to the

Defendants, or that they were deliberately indifferent to the same. Summary

judgment will, therefore, be granted on the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

claims.

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, because the Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence

that any Defendant violated his constitutional rights, the Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. As such, summary judgment for the

Defendants would also be proper on this ground.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 29] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to enter a Clerk’s Judgment in favor

of the Defendants and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: November 24, 2025

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge MS

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