Devincenzo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEANA DEVINCENZO, : NO. 1:24-CV-00371

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (CAMONI, M.J.)

CATHERINE HERSHEY SCHOOLS :

FOR EARLY LEARNING, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Catherine

Hershey Schools for Early Learning’s (“CHS”) motion for summary

judgment. Doc. 36. Plaintiff Deana Devincenzo opposed, and CHS

replied. Docs. 42, 44. The Court has carefully considered the parties’

submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons below, the Court

grants in part and denies in part CHS’s motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

Devincenzo alleges employment discrimination claims under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) against

CHS. Amended Complaint, Doc. 20 at 1.

1. CHS, the Hershey Center, and Devincenzo’s

employment

CHS is a non-profit corporation established to provide education to

children who are economically disadvantaged. Def.’s Statement of

Material Facts (“SMF”), Doc. 38 ¶¶ 1–2; Pl.’s Response SMF, Doc. 43

¶¶ 1–2. In October 2023, CHS opened the Catherine Hershey Schools for

Early Learning, Hershey (“Hershey Center”), an education center in

central Pennsylvania established to provide free schooling, nutritious

meals, and transportation to enrolled children. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 2, 4, 6; Doc. 43

¶¶ 2, 4, 6.

Before officially opening its doors in 2023, the Hershey Center

began hiring employees from July 2022 to prepare them to work with

children. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 9–10; Doc. 43 ¶¶ 9–10. Devincenzo was one such

employee. She was hired to work as a Health Services Manager (“HSM”)

from September 6, 2022, to February 15, 2023. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 12–13; Doc. 43

¶¶ 12–13.1 Devincenzo has a master’s degree in nursing, leadership, and

1 Devincenzo argues that both the Hershey Center and CHS employed

her under a joint employer theory. Pl.’s Br., Doc. 42 at 11.

management, which exceeded the listed job qualification for the HSM

position. Doc. 43 at 12; Def.’s Ex. N, Doc. 38-1 at 180–81.

2. Key employees at CHS and the Hershey Center

Many names of employees appear throughout this case. The Court

identifies only the following individuals who are pertinent to addressing

the instant motion:

1. Senate Alexander, executive director at CHS. Doc. 38 ¶ 8; Doc.

43 ¶ 8.

2. Shaun Turner, CHS enrollment management and family

success director. Doc. 38 ¶ 43; Doc. 43 ¶ 24.

3. Elizabeth Kroutch, human resources director at CHS.

Kroutch Tr., Doc. 42-13 at 12:3–4.

4. Megan Ribbans, human resources manager at CHS. Ribbans

Tr., Doc. 42-12 at 14:19–22.

5. Anna Papero, center director at the Hershey Center. Doc. 38

¶ 35; Doc. 43 ¶ 35.

6. Melissa Ilski, center director at the Hershey Center. Doc.

42-13 at 61:22–23; Doc. 43 ¶ 42.

7. Steven Metzger, former teacher’s assistant at CHS. Metzger

Cert., Doc. 42-5 ¶¶ 2–3.

8. Melissa Harper, infant toddler lead teacher at CHS. Harper

Tr., Doc. 42-24 at 12:9–14.

B. Disputed Facts

The parties primarily dispute three issues: (1) which entity

employed Devincenzo (CHS or the Hershey Center); (2) how her

employment ended (termination or resignation); and (3) whether she

suffered discrimination based on race and disability. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 10–12,

42–44, 50; Doc. 43 ¶¶ 10–12, 42–44, 50.

1. Devincenzo’s employer

CHS contends that the Hershey Center, during its pre-opening

stage, hired Devincenzo. Doc. 38 ¶¶ 9, 12, citing Def.’s Ex. K, Doc. 38-1

at 138. Devincenzo disagrees, asserting that the Hershey Center was not

“open or operating at the time [she was] hire[d].” Doc. 43 ¶ 10, citing

Alexander Tr., Doc. 42-17 at 12:12–16. She further maintains that CHS

paid and raised her salary, required her to follow its policies and

procedures, and exercised control over her daily employment activities.

Doc. 43 ¶¶ 12, 32, first citing Paystub, Doc. 42-7 at 2; and then citing

CHS employee handbook, Doc. 42-8. As further discussed in the Court’s

analysis, Devincenzo asserts a joint employer theory of liability, arguing

that CHS was a co-employer with Hershey Center. See Pl.’s Br., Doc. 42

at 11.

2. How Devincenzo’s employment ended (termination

or resignation)

CHS asserts that Devincenzo resigned from her position. Doc. 38

¶ 33. It maintains that it offered Devincenzo transition assistance, at

which point Devincenzo resigned. Def.’s Br., Doc. 37 at 20. It also points

to a resignation letter that Devincenzo signed and dated. Doc. 38 ¶ 45,

citing Def.’s Ex. L, Doc. 38-1 at 140.

Devincenzo contends that she was terminated. Doc. 43 ¶ 33, citing

Devincenzo Tr., Doc. 42-2; id., citing Doc. 42-13. Devincenzo testified that

she was first informed of her termination via a phone call with Ribbans,

CHS’s HR manager, and Melissa Ilski, the Hershey Center director. See

Doc. 42-2 at 164:10–18. After that phone call, Devincenzo received an

email from Ribbans which provided termination instructions, including

returning physical equipment, submitting a resignation letter, and

signing a separation agreement. Id. at 166:14–25, 167:7–14. Devincenzo

followed the instructions and returned her computer and badge, along

with a resignation letter, but declined to sign the separation agreement

which would have given her transitional assistance in exchange for a

general release of claims. Id. at 166:22–25. Responding to CHS’s counsel

asking why she submitted a resignation letter if she was in fact

terminated, Devincenzo explained, “I believe I was just trying to, could

have been erroneous on my part, trying to make it better so it doesn’t look

like I was terminated.” Id. at 167:3–5.

Kroutch, CHS’s HR director, confirms Devincenzo’s testimony.

Kroutch testified that CHS was “parting ways” with Devincenzo and

indicated that she would be terminated if she did not resign. Doc. 42-13

at 65:10–20. But to help Devincenzo from a career perspective to allow

her to say she “technically resigned,” CHS offered to accept a resignation.

Id.

3. Whether Devincenzo suffered discrimination

Finally, the parties dispute the merits of Devincenzo’s employment

discrimination claims. The main dispute involves whether Devincenzo

made a complaint based on race discrimination in early February 2023.

Def.’s Reply Br., Doc. 44 at 5–6; Doc. 42 at 6. Devincenzo testified to

calling a meeting with Turner, Ilski, and Kroutch, in which she

complained of discrimination based on race. Doc. 42-2 at 130:23–25 (“Yes,

I did call the meeting to express . . . I was being discriminated based upon

the race.”). CHS maintains that the meeting was called to discuss

Devincenzo’s job performance issues. Doc. 44 at 7–8.

C. Procedural History

On March 1, 2024, Devincenzo filed a complaint against CHS and

Milton Hershey School (“MHS”). Doc. 1. The parties later stipulated to

Devincenzo filing an amended complaint. Doc. 18. After Devincenzo filed

an amended complaint against the Defendants, the parties stipulated to

dismissing MHS as a defendant. Docs. 20, 26. In the Amended Complaint

against CHS, Devincenzo alleged the following claims: (1) Title VII race

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment; (2) Section

1981 race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment; (3)

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) disability discrimination,

retaliation, and failure to accommodate; and (4) Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (“PHRA”) race discrimination, disability discrimination,

retaliation, hostile work environment (race), and failure to accommodate.

Doc. 20 ¶¶ 41–67.

Following discovery, CHS moved for summary judgment. Doc. 36.

The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 42, 44. The parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all

proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Doc. 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” when “a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is

“material” only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.

2006), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputes over irrelevant or

unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine

dispute exists such that summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Once the movant

adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324.

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court

may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of

the evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.

2004), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, “[a]ll facts and inferences

are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Boyle

v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). Credibility

determinations are “the province of the factfinder.” Big Apple BMW, Inc.

v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The court's

role, at the summary judgment stage, is “to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There can be “no

genuine issue as to any material fact,” however, if a party “fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court first examines the threshold question, whether CHS is

an employer under Title VII and § 1981, before addressing the merits of

the Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.

A. Whether CHS was the Plaintiff’s employer under the

theory of joint employer liability2

CHS argues that summary judgment is warranted because it is not

Devincenzo’s employer. See Doc. 37 at 11–13. It reasons that it is a

separate, legal entity distinct from Devincenzo’s actual employer, the

Hershey Center. Id. Devincenzo contends that CHS was also her

employer. Doc. 42 at 11.

At this stage, the Court evaluates whether the nonmoving party,

Devincenzo, has submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue

for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Construing all facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to Devincenzo, the Court finds that

Devincenzo has established a genuine dispute of material facts as to

whether CHS was Devincenzo’s co-employer. Boyle, 139 F.3d at 393.

2 Under Title VII and § 1981 employment discrimination claims, two

entities can be treated as joint employers of one employee. Faush v.

Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 212–14 (3d Cir. 2015). The Court

also applies the joint employer test to the PHRA claim because it

interprets PHRA claims coextensively with Title VII. See Peterkin v.

Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 21-490, 2021 WL 2400753, at *10 n.84

(E.D. Pa. June 11, 2021), citing Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179

n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).

1. Standard for joint employer theory of liability

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognizes the existence

of joint employers when “two [corporations] control, in the capacity of

employer, the labor relations of a given group of workers.” NLRB v.

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).

The joint employer theory accepts business entities as “in fact separate

but that they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential

terms and conditions of employment.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus,

“the proper inquiry under Title VII for determining employer status looks

to the nature of the relationship regardless of whether that party may or

may not be technically described as an ‘employer.’” Graves v. Lowery, 117

F.3d 723, 728 (3d Cir. 1997).

The Third Circuit applies the factors in Nationwide Mut. Ins. v.

Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to determine whether two entities may be

liable under Title VII as co-employers. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc.,

808 F.3d 208, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2015). Although Darden provides a list of

factors, the Third Circuit has generally focused on: (1) which entity paid

the employees’ salaries; (2) hired and fired them; and (3) had control over

their daily employment activities. Id. at 214; see Hollinghead v. City of

York, 11 F. Supp. 3d 450, 463 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that courts in the

Third Circuit will apply three factors to determine joint employer

liability). The inquiry under these factors is not which of two entities

should be considered the employer of the person in question, but whether

two entities may be “co-employers” or “joint employers.” Faush, 808 F.3d

at 215, citing Graves, 117 F.3d at 727.

2. Application of Faush factors

Under the three Darden factors underscored in Faush, there is a

genuine dispute as to whether CHS is an employer. Devincenzo easily

meets the first factor because she has submitted evidence that CHS paid

her salary. Doc. 43 ¶ 12, citing Doc. 42-7 at 2. And CHS has not disputed

this. See generally Docs. 37, 44.

a. Hiring and firing

The second factor is less straightforward, but it also favors

Devincenzo. CHS has submitted a new hire email that specifies

Devincenzo was hired for the HSM position at the Hershey Center. Def.’s

Ex. K, Doc. 38-1 at 138 (“Congratulations on being hired for the [HSM]

position at Catherine Hershey School for Early Learning, Hershey.”).

That fact does illustrate that Hershey Center employed Devincenzo, but

Plaintiff does not contest that. Doc. 42 at 14–15. Devincenzo, instead,

maintains that CHS was her “joint employer” because “both [Hershey

Center and CHS] controlled aspects of her employment.” Id. at 14. And

the Third Circuit undoubtedly recognizes that theory of liability.

Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1123; Graves, 117 F.3d at 728.

To demonstrate that CHS hired her, Devincenzo submits evidence

of CHS issuing a welcome letter. Pl.’s Ex. H, Doc. 42-9 at 2. While not

dispositive, “employee expectations are . . . relevant to [the joint

employer] analysis.” Graves, 117 F.3d at 728–29. In its reply brief, CHS

attempts to discredit the welcome letter, emphasizing that it “actually is

the first page of the employee handbook distributed to all Hershey Center

employees.” Doc. 44 at 3. No matter. Devincenzo, in fact, incorporates this

very fact in her argument to establish that CHS exercised control over

her employment. See Doc. 42 at 12–13 (“[Plaintiff] was issued a

Defendant handbook and required to abide by Defendant’s policies and

procedures.”). Further, CHS avers that it raised Devincenzo’s salary in

the first few weeks of her employment, and cites to an email from

Kroutch, its HR director. Doc. 38 ¶ 49, citing Def.’s Ex. S, Doc. 38-1 at

193. No Hershey Center personnel are included in the email chain that

CHS cites to illustrate that it raised Devincenzo’s salary, and it is

undisputed that Kroutch is a CHS HR director. Drawing all reasonable

inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, a rational factfinder could consider CHS

as the entity that paid and hired Devincenzo.

As to whether CHS terminated the employment, Devincenzo also

submits sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue. She points the Court

to Kroutch’s deposition testimony. Doc. 43 ¶ 33, citing Doc. 42-13.

Drawing reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, the testimony

demonstrates that Kroutch, as HR director for CHS, participated in and

signed off on Devincenzo’s termination. Doc. 42-13 at 12:2–4, 63:4–25; see

Smith v. Syncreon.US, Inc., No. 22-744, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167905,

at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2024) (giving weight, under the joint employer

test, to an employer’s ability to end a plaintiff’s employment even though

it did not in fact terminate the plaintiff). The Court, therefore, finds a

genuine issue as to whether CHS hired and fired Devincenzo.

b. Control over daily employment activities

The final factor asks whether CHS had control over Devincenzo’s

daily employment activities. Faush, 808 F.3d at 214. The court in Faush

found that many factors could demonstrate level of control over daily

employment activities. It found in favor of the employee-plaintiff because

the alleged co-employer entity: (1) had the employee-plaintiff working

on-site; (2) gave the employee-plaintiff assignments; (3) directly

supervised the employee-plaintiff; (4) provided site-specific training; (5)

furnished any equipment and materials necessary; and (6) verified the

number of hours he worked on a daily basis. Id. at 216. The Faush court,

however, held that even absent some of the above factors, courts may still

find a sufficient level of control for a co-employer status at summary

judgment. See id. at 217, citing Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926

F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Even when confronted with stronger evidence

against the purported employee, we have held that a rational jury could

find the existence of a common-law employment relationship.”). Here,

Devincenzo marshals enough evidence to meet several of the factors that

demonstrate that CHS controlled Devincenzo’s daily employment

activities.

For instance, CHS leadership testified that the Hershey Center did

not open until over a year after Devincenzo was hired. Doc. 38 ¶ 10, citing

Doc. 38-1 at 8 (Alexander Tr. at 12), 36 (Turner Tr. at 41). And during

that time, CHS leadership met weekly with Devincenzo, working as a

team to think about how health services models “get put in place at a

daily level at [CHS].” Doc. 38-1 at 32 (Turner Tr. at 24:21-25, 25:1-8). She

was also directly supervised by CHS personnel for at least three months

during those weekly meetings, and received direct assignments and

feedback. Id. at 32–33 (Turner Tr. at 25:19-25, 26:1-11. This level of

control suffices, at this stage, to demonstrate that CHS exercised control

over Devincenzo’s daily employment activities. See Faush, 808 F.3d at

218 (finding that although the employee-plaintiff was not paid by the

alleged co-employer entity, the fact that employee-plaintiff worked under

the direct supervision and control of the co-employer who gave

instructions on the details of the work, sufficiently demonstrates co-

employment status).

While the Third Circuit has held that a modicum of control alone

is insufficient to establish co-employer status, that holding has been

applied when there existed a “mound” of counter-evidence against a

finding of joint employer. Bird v. Mastery Charter Sch., No. 24-2228, 2025

U.S. App. LEXIS 10363, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (finding a “modicum

of control” insufficient to outweigh a mound of counter-evidence against

finding that defendant is a co-employer). For instance, the plaintiff in

Bird could not establish the first two factors in Faush. Id. at *3 (finding

that defendant did not hire or fire the plaintiff and did not pay her).

Having some evidence of control as the only factor weighing in the

plaintiff’s favor, the Bird court did not find the defendant a joint

employer, emphasizing that no one factor is decisive in the co-employer

analysis. Id., citing Faush, 808 F.3d at 214.

Here, unlike the Bird plaintiff, Devincenzo establishes the first two

Faush factors and submits sufficient evidence to establish that CHS

controlled her daily employment activities. First, Devincenzo submits

CHS’s handbook which detailed CHS’s policies and procedures that she

was required to follow. Doc. 42 at 12. CHS does not dispute this fact but

contends that it “weigh[s] against a finding that CHS is a joint employer.”

Doc. 44 at 4. Not so. CHS’s handbook plainly states that “the policies,

procedures and programs set forth in this Handbook apply, not only to

all CHS Central Office employees, but likewise across the board to each

ECEC location and all employees.” Pl.’s Ex. G, Doc. 42-8 at 5. A

reasonable factfinder could conclude that Devincenzo being covered by

CHS’s policies and procedures tends to demonstrate CHS’s control over

her employment. Graves, 117 F.3d at 728–29 (finding as significant to the

joint employer analysis that plaintiffs-employees were covered by

employer’s policies and procedures).

Second, CHS leadership testified that the Hershey Center did not

open until over a year after Devincenzo was hired. Doc. 38 ¶ 10, citing

Doc. 38-1 at 8 (Alexander Tr. at 12), 36 (Turner Tr. at 41). Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, the Court finds that a

rational factfinder could infer that in the first year before Hershey Center

officially opened, CHS exercised control over Devincenzo’s employment.

Third, when Devincenzo submitted a discrimination complaint

against her supervisor, it was CHS’s executive and HR directors, and not

Hershey Center’s leadership, who met with Devincenzo and sent her a

letter informing her of the investigation. See Doc. 42-13 at 22–23; Def.’s

Ex. Q, Doc. 38-1 at 189.

Mindful that, at this stage, this Court “may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence,” it finds that

Devincenzo has created a genuine dispute as to whether CHS exercised

control over her daily employment activities and thus was her employer.

Marino, 358 F.3d at 247.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment as it pertains to whether CHS was Devincenzo’s employer.3

B. There is a genuine dispute as to Devincenzo race

discrimination claim.

When, as in this case, a plaintiff does not provide direct evidence of

discrimination, the three-part framework established in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) governs the Court’s inquiry

under Title VII.4 Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425–26 (3d Cir.

2013). The McDonnell Douglas framework provides:

First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employee's rejection.” [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

3 CHS cites to only one case to support its non-employer argument. See

Doc. 37 at 12–13, citing Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball

Offs., 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013)); Doc. 44 at 2–5 (citing no cases).

The Covington court found that a defendant-employer “may fairly be

identified as Covington’s employer,” because he paid the plaintiff, which

is “one of the principal indicia of an employer-employee relationship.” Id.

Devincenzo has established that CHS paid her salary. Doc. 43 ¶ 12. Thus,

CHS’s only cited precedent undermines its argument.

4 On summary judgment, the Court analyzes Devincenzo’s race

discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, and PHRA under the same

framework. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir.

1999) (noting that on summary judgment, the standards governing

federal claims under Title VII and section 1981 are the same as that

under a state PHRA claim).

802]. Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the

plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons

offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a

pretext for discrimination.

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). In applying

this framework, the Court must “examine the evidence of record in the

light most favorable to [Devincenzo,] as the party opposing summary

judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in her favor.” Stewart v.

Rutgers State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (“This standard is

applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where

intent and credibility are crucial issues”) (citation omitted). Because

Devincenzo has adduced sufficient evidence to allow a rational factfinder

to conclude that she has established a prima facie claim of race

discrimination and has rebutted CHS’s non-discriminatory reason by

demonstrating pretext, the Court finds that Devincenzo’s race

discrimination claims survive summary.

1. Prima facie case

To make out a prima facie claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that “(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was

qualified for the position he held; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse

employment action; and (4) the circumstances of the adverse employment

action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Jackson v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 218 F. Supp. 3d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa.

2016) (citation omitted).

Here, the parties do not dispute Devincenzo’s membership in a

protected class. Doc. 37 at 15 (“Plaintiff is a member of a protected class

as an African American.”). CHS, however, contests the second factor,

arguing that Devincenzo “was not qualified for the HSM position.” Id.

But CHS’s job description for the HSM position required only a bachelor’s

degree in health services and nursing. Pl.’s Ex. LL, Doc. 42-39 at 2 (HSM

job description); Doc. 38-1 at 181 (showing same). Devincenzo has a

Master of Science degree in nursing. See Resume, Doc. 42-3 at 4.

Devincenzo, therefore, easily qualifies. Whether an individual is

subjectively proficient at a job is one thing, whether she is objectively

qualified for it is another. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d

724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We determine a plaintiff’s qualifications for

purposes of proving a prima facie case by an objective standard.”).

CHS also disputes whether Devincenzo suffered an adverse

employment action because after it “made a business decision to part

ways with Plaintiff and, as a professional courtesy, offered her transition

assistance. . . . It was at that point that Plaintiff resigned her

employment.” Doc. 37 at 20. The Court recognizes that “different

inferences might be drawn from the evidence presented in the record,”

Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 286 (3d Cir. 2000), but

on summary judgment, the Court’s role is not to act as a factfinder. Id. It

must draw all reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, and in doing

so, the Court finds that it would be reasonable to infer that CHS

terminated Plaintiff.

To determine whether an employee was forced to resign, courts

consider, among other factors, whether she was threatened with

discharge or she was encouraged to resign. See Mcilmail v. Pennsylvania,

381 F. Supp. 3d 393, 404–05 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (examining factors

applicable to constructive discharge doctrine). Here, CHS convened to

discuss Devincenzo’s performance issues and determined to “part ways.”

Doc. 37 at 20. Kroutch further confirmed that CHS was “parting ways”

with Devincenzo, indicating that she would be terminated if she did not

resign. Doc. 42-13 at 65:10–20. Any remaining doubts as to Devincenzo’s

resignation letter are resolved in her favor because Kroutch confirmed

that to help Devincenzo from a career perspective, CHS—after resolving

to terminate Devincenzo—offered to accept a resignation to provide her

with a “soft landing.” Id.; see also Doc. 42-2 at 65. As such, a reasonable

inference in Devincenzo’s favor establishes that she was terminated and

thus suffered an adverse employment action. See Mcilmail, 381 F. Supp.

at 406 (finding as sufficient to demonstrate a claim of constructive

discharge where a plaintiff showed that he might be terminated if he did

not resign); see also Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d

Cir. 1999) (“Employee resignations . . . are presumed to be voluntary[,]

. . . until the employee presents evidence to establish that the resignation

. . . was involuntarily procured.”).

Under the final prong, Devincenzo has submitted “evidence

adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based

on an illegal discriminatory criterion.” Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc.,

191 F.3d 344, 356 (3d Cir. 1999). Although Devincenzo need not prove

that she was replaced by someone outside of her member class, id., such

evidence is sufficient to establish an inference of discrimination. See

Marzano v. Comp. Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 1996) (“It is

sufficient to show that the Plaintiff was discharged, while the employer

retained someone outside the protected class”) (citation modified). Here,

Devincenzo has established an inference of discrimination by proving

that CHS hired a white individual as her replacement. Doc. 42-4 at 9.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, the Court finds

that she has established a prima facie case of employment

discrimination. Jones, 198 F.3d at 412 (“At the prima facie case stage of

the analysis, we merely determine whether a plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence so that we should consider a defendant’s proffered

reasons for its decision.”)

2. CHS’s non-discriminatory reason

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the

burden of production shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue.”

Jones, 198 F.3d at 412, citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d

1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). “The employer satisfies its burden of

production by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit

the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the

unfavorable employment decision.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763

(3d Cir. 1994). Here, CHS has articulated a non-discriminatory reason

for terminating Devincenzo because it “determined that Plaintiff’s skills

and abilities were not aligned with those necessary to perform [her] role.”

Doc. 37 at 19. CHS supports its assertion by submitting deposition

testimonies from its management. E.g., Doc. 38 ¶ 25, citing Doc. 38-1 at

93–95 (Ribbans Tr. at 36–38). Taking CHS’s evidence as true, it permits

the conclusion that CHS terminated Devincenzo for a nondiscriminatory

reason. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.

3. Pretext analysis

“Once the employer answers its relatively light burden by

articulating a legitimate reason for the unfavorable employment

decision, the burden of production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must

now show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s

explanation is pretextual.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.

At trial, Devincenzo must convince the factfinder “both that the

reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Jones,

198 F.3d at 412–13 (emphasis in original), quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). At summary judgment, a plaintiff

must demonstrate a pretext for discrimination by presenting evidence

from which a reasonable factfinder could “either (1) disbelieve the

employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious

discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or

determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Johnson v. FedEx, 996 F.

Supp. 2d 302, 319 (M.D. Pa. 2014), quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.

On summary judgment, the Court finds that, viewing all the facts

and drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, Devincenzo has produced sufficient evidence to allow a

factfinder to conclude she has discredited CHS’s reason for her

termination by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Under the

summary judgment standard, the record, viewed in its entirety, could be

found to undermine CHS’s explanation that it terminated Devincenzo for

poor job skills and performance.

First, the “Defendant[] state[s] that no formal discipline was issued

to Plaintiff during her employment.” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrogatories,

Doc. 42-4 at 8. Second, at least two former co-workers, Metzger and

Harper, vouch for Devincenzo’s professionalism and competency.

Metzger Aff., Doc. 42-5 ¶¶ 6–9; Doc. 42-24 at 22:17–25, 23:1–11

(describing Devincenzo as “[v]ery capable, knowledgeable, [and]

intelligent.”). This evidence suffices for the purpose of summary

judgment to raise an inference that CHS’s proffered reason for

terminating Devincenzo was pretextual. Accordingly, the Court finds

that Devincenzo’s race discrimination claims survive summary

judgment.

C. Devincenzo’s remaining claims

Devincenzo’s remaining claims (retaliation, hostile work

environment, and disability discrimination) fail to survive summary

judgment.

1. Retaliation claims

A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must first establish a prima

facie case by showing: “(1) [that she engaged in] protected employee

activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or

contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal

connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s

adverse action.” Daniels v. Schl Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.

2015), quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir.

2007). The Court finds that Devincenzo has failed to make out a prima

facie case of retaliation.

Devincenzo fails to overcome several hurdles. To begin with, it is

unclear whether Devincenzo engaged in a protected employee activity by

making a complaint on February 2, 2023. Devincenzo has no evidence

supporting her version of the events other than her own testimony. Doc.

43 ¶¶ 43, 69, 90, 108, citing Doc. 42-2. To be clear, “self-serving”

testimony may be utilized by a party at summary judgment. Waldron v.

SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 501 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324. But such evidence “does not suffice to create a material dispute of

fact where [it] is impeached by a well-supported showing to the contrary.”

Gonzalez v. Sec’y of DHS, 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012), quoting United

States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993). Here,

Devincenzo’s version of the events, that, at a meeting thirteen days prior

to her termination, she reported racial discrimination to CHS’s HR

personnel, is unsupported by the record. In fact, Devincenzo’s own email

sent to CHS the day after the alleged meeting mentions nothing about

discrimination, let alone racial discrimination. Pl.’s Ex. X, Doc. 42-25 at

2. Instead, it supports CHS’s version of the events, that the meeting was

held to address Devincenzo’s poor job performance. In the email,

Devincenzo writes:

Yesterday when Shaun stated, “You do not want to

learn,” it stung. Please reach out to Jane Humphries to see

my zest and drive to overcome my situation. I do want to

learn. I am open to learning. I learn every day. I participate.

I am present. I enjoy learning! I enjoy it so much that I take

what I have learned and implement it into my office.

Id.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, the Court

finds that Devincenzo can neither establish a protected act, nor draw a

causal connection between the alleged act and her termination. Nor can

Devincenzo do so with the discrimination complaint filed and resolved in

November because her termination was three months later. “Although

there is no bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive

temporal proximity, a gap of three months between the protected activity

and the adverse action, without more, cannot create an inference of

causation and defeat summary judgment.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish

Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Court

will grant CHS’s motion for summary judgment as to Devincenzo’s

retaliation claims.

2. Hostile work environment claims

Next, Devincenzo contends that she was “subjected to ongoing

racially discriminatory treatment by members of [CHS]’s management.”

Doc. 42 at 30. Devincenzo points to three main incidents: (1) the one-time

reading of the “biased, insensitive, discriminatory,” book that had been

read in Devincenzo’s presence; (2) mistreatment by Anna Papero; and (3)

being “yelled and screamed at,” for her complaints of race discrimination.

Doc. 43 ¶¶ 49–51, 68, 70. Drawing all reasonable inferences in

Devincenzo’s favor, the three incidents, viewed as a whole, do not rise to

the level of an intentional, severe, or pervasive racial discrimination.

To succeed on a claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must

prove that: (1) the plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of

her race; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the

discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination

would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in that position; and (5)

the existence of respondeat superior liability. Kunin v. Sears Roebuck &

Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether an

environment is hostile, the Court must consider the totality of the

circumstances including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its

severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere

offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706

F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2013), quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.

17, 23 (1993). Moreover, the Court must not parse out each event and

view them separately, but rather as a whole to determine whether the

acts that collectively form the continuing violation are severe or

pervasive. Id.

Here, Devincenzo’s evidence, viewed as a whole, does not establish

a continuing pattern of violations that are severe or pervasive. First, as

Devincenzo points out, at least one co-worker also found the reading of

“Visiting Day” by Jacqueline Woodson offensive. Doc. 43 at 20. But

Devincenzo fails to allege how that reading was meant to intentionally

discriminate against her, based on her race, or that it was pervasive. To

the contrary, Devincenzo admits that the book was read “to all employees

involved in . . . training.”5 Doc. 38 ¶ 47; Doc. 43 ¶ 47. Second, as noted

5 At the time of Devincenzo’s employment, Devincenzo was “one of three

African Americans on the Center’s five-person management team.” Doc.

38 ¶ 28, citing Doc. 38-1 at 46–56 (Papero Tr. at 27–37). Devincenzo also

submits no evidence to suggest her other black co-workers were

discriminated against by the reading of “Visiting Day.” Although

Devincenzo is not required to demonstrate the discrimination against

other black co-workers, the “key focus of the prima facie test is always

whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others

because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Cooper v. Pa.

Human Rels. Comm’n, 578 F. Supp. 3d 649, 662 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (citation

before, Devincenzo’s claim that she brought up racial discrimination in

the meeting on February 2, 2023, is contradicted by her own email, in

which she appears to plead her case about her ability to learn and

perform her job while mentioning nothing about discrimination. See Doc.

42-25 at 2. Third, Devincenzo alleges that she was “yelled and screamed

at,” during the meeting on February 2, 2023 (Doc. 43 at 23), but again

submits no evidence to suggest the yelling was racially motivated. See

Doc. 42-25 at 2. Devincenzo’s own email to CHS’s management suggests

that the alleged yelling was in regard to her work performance. Id.

(“Yesterday when Shaun stated, ‘You do not want to learn,’ it stung.”).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Devincenzo’s favor, the Court

does not find that the evidence Devincenzo submitted rises to severe or

pervasive discrimination. At most, the evidence amounts to “isolated

incidents that the Supreme Court . . . cautioned should not be severe or

pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment” Caver v. City

of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 263 (3d Cir. 2005), citing Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); see also Cooper v. Pa. Human Rels.

modified). Evidence of broader racial discrimination, while not necessary,

would be relevant.

Comm’n, 578 F. Supp. 3d 649, 666 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (finding no pervasive

racial discrimination even though a plaintiff was subject to animosity

because the claim rested on “isolated comments” and the proof fell short

of “racially rooted hostility specifically targeting the plaintiff that the law

forbids.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant CHS’s motion for summary

judgment as to Devincenzo’s hostile work environment claims.

3. Disability claims

Devincenzo’s last claim also fails on summary judgment because

she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on

disability. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA and PHRA, the plaintiff must show: “(1) [s]he is a disabled person

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to perform

the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable

accommodations by the employer; and (3) [s]he has suffered an otherwise

adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Taylor v.

Phoenixville Schl. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999), quoting Gaul v.

Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).

CHS argues that Devincenzo cannot establish the third element of

her prima facie case of discrimination because CHS had no knowledge of

Devincenzo’s disability. See Doc. 37 at 30–33; Doc. 44 at 13–15.

Devincenzo’s only argument in opposition is that she “was terminated

within months of disclosing her mental health conditions to Defendant

and requesting accommodations.” Doc. 42 at 32. She maintains that

because she was terminated within months of disclosing her disability,

that “timing, in and of itself,” establishes disability discrimination. Id. It

does not.

Causation between a protected activity (Devincenzo disclosing her

disability and requesting an accommodation) and an alleged retaliatory

action (termination) may be proved by inference when: (1) a short period

of time separated an aggrieved employee’s protected conduct and an

adverse employment action; and (2) the decision maker had knowledge of

the protected activity. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351

(3d Cir. 2006). In the context of establishing temporal proximity, the

Third Circuit has considered a “short period of time” as less than three

months. Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 190 (3d Cir. 2005).

Here, even assuming Devincenzo has established the first two

elements of her disability discrimination claim, she has clearly failed to

establish causation. To support her causation argument, Devincenzo

cites to various pages of her deposition transcript. Doc. 42 at 32, citing

Doc. 42-2 at 127:20–25, 128:1–16, 163:10–12, 158:15–25, 164:10–15.

None of those pages, however, discuss her being discriminated against

for having a disability. Her first citation is to a meeting held in early

February 2023, which Devincenzo contends was to discuss

discrimination. Doc. 42-2 at 127:20–25. But she never testified that she

was somehow discriminated against for her disability. Id. In fact,

Devincenzo testified that she called “the meeting to express the

discriminatory behavior in which I felt I was being discriminated based

upon the race.” Id. at 130:23–25. Devincenzo, understandably, did not

cite to that testimony in support of causation.

The only other evidence Devincenzo directs the Court to consider is

when she requested to work from home on the day she was terminated.

Id. at 158:15–25. Devincenzo testifies that “[t]o work from home was a

one-time occurrence.” Id. at 158:24–25. But again, Devincenzo does not

testify that her request to work from home had any relation to a

disability. See id. at 158:19–20 (“I needed to work from home that

particular day.”). Construing all facts and reasonable inferences in

Devincenzo’s favor, the Court does not find that Devincenzo has

established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The Court,

therefore, will grant CHS’s motion for summary judgment as to

Devincenzo’s disability claims.6

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part CHS’s

motion for summary judgment.

Date: November 21, 2025 s/Sean A. Camoni

Sean A. Camoni

United States Magistrate Judge

6 There may also be a question as to whether Devincenzo has proven the

existence of a disability. See Pl.’s Ex. FF, Doc. 42-33 at 2 (showing one

page of an unidentified medical record and treating provider, listing

posttraumatic stress disorder as an ongoing health issue). CHS, however,

failed to raise this argument, and, given the reasoning above, it would

not change the analysis.