Caldwell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

SAMUEL WALTER CALDWELL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:24-CV-06051-SOH-MEF

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SYRNA BOWERS,

Omega Unit, Arkansas Division of Community Correction;

MEDICAL SERVICES MGR DANA HAYNES, Omega Unit;

RN KELLY AUNSPAUGH, Omega Unit;

TRANSPORT OFFICER LAMKINS, Omega Unit;

TRANSPORT OFFICER NAVA, Omega Unit; and

APRN STRICKLAND, Omega Unit DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Samuel Walter Caldwell, a prisoner, has filed the above-captioned civil rights

action generally claiming that he received constitutionally deficient medical care while in the

custody of the Arkansas Division of Corrections (“ADC”) at the Omega Unit (“ADC-Omega”).1

(ECF No. 17). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 3). Pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States

District Judge, referred this action to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and

Recommendation on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, Deputy Director Syrna Bowers,

Transport Officer Lamkins, and Transport Officer Nava (the “ADC Defendants”). (ECF No. 40).

Plaintiff filed a response. (ECF Nos. 48, 58). The ADC Defendants subsequently filed a

supplement to their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 78). Because no further response or reply is

1 Plaintiff has remained in the custody of the ADC throughout these proceedings. He is currently

an inmate of the Cummins Unit (“ADC-Cummins”) in Grady, Arkansas. (ECF No. 50).

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necessary, this matter is, therefore, now ripe for the Court’s consideration. For the reasons

described below, it is RECOMMENDED that the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

40), as supplemented (ECF No. 78), be GRANTED. The claims against the ADC Defendants

should, therefore, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) asserts three claims for relief relating to

the medical care he received for a bone infection in his leg while incarcerated at ADC-Omega

Unit.3 (ECF No. 17). First, Plaintiff says that he was examined by an outside physician, Dr.

Stombaugh, on February 5, 2024, in preparation for surgery on his bone infection. Plaintiff says

that Dr. Stombaugh recommended that he receive a high protein diet and take antibiotics while

waiting for the surgery to prevent the spread of the infection and to facilitate healing after the

surgery. Because Plaintiff anticipated that the medical professionals at the ADC would not follow

Dr. Stombaugh’s recommendations, he asked Transport Officers Lamkins and Nava to write them

down, but they refused to do so. When he returned to the ADC, Defendants APRN Strickland

and RN Aunspaugh declined to follow Dr. Stombaugh’s recommendations and would not confirm

those recommendations with Transport Officers Lamkins and Nava. Plaintiff identifies Medical

Defendants APRN Strickland and Aunspaugh, and ADC Defendants Lamkins and Nava as

defendants to this claim in their individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 17 at 4-6).

Second, Plaintiff says that he did not receive his prescribed antibiotics, or the high protein

2 This section only describes the docket entries relevant to the Court’s consideration of the pending

Motion to Dismiss.

3 This Court previously denied Plaintiff’s subsequent motions to further amend the SAC (ECF No.

60, 71). (ECF No. 76). The SAC, therefore, remains the operative pleading in this case.

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diet as recommended, and while he submitted multiple grievances about these issues, the

grievances were deemed “without merit” without reaching the substance of his concerns. He says

that he requested the antibiotics be made available at the “PM pill call” or “OPM,” but that request

was denied. Plaintiff identifies ADC Defendant Deputy Director Syrna Bowers and Medical

Defendant Medical Services Manager Dana Haynes as defendants in their individual and official

capacities. (ECF No. 17 at 6-9). Finally, with respect to claim three, Plaintiff says that he was

not transported for his surgery on April 8, 2024, due to a scheduling “oversight,” even though

ADC officials knew about the surgery for almost two months, providing them with ample

opportunity to arrange and coordinate his transport for the surgery. Plaintiff also says that starting

April 15, 2024, dressing changes were to be increased to twice per day, but medical providers

failed to provide AM dressings on April 16, April 25, April 27, April 28, May 5, May 7, and May

11. Plaintiff says that he saw a new nurse on May 11, 2024, who expressed concern that his

surgery had been delayed. Plaintiff identifies Medical Defendants APRN Strickland, Dana

Haynes, and Kelly Aunspaugh, and ADC Defendant Syrna Bowers as defendants to this claim in

their official and personal capacities.4 (Id. at 9-12).

The ADC Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s lawsuit by filing a Motion to Dismiss.

4 The Motion to Dismiss does not concern the claims against the Medical Defendants (Medical

Services Manager Dana Haynes, RN Kelly Aunspaugh, and APRN Strickland). (ECF No. 40).

Notably, however, following the bankruptcy proceedings of Wellpath, LLC, and consistent with

the Bankruptcy Court’s order confirming the company’s Plan of Reorganization, see In re

Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 24-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tx. May 1, 2025) (ECF No. 2596), this Court

recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against Wellpath, LLC, and the claims against the individual

Medical Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed. (ECF No. 75). Judge Hickey

approved those recommendations without objection. (ECF No. 79). Wellpath, LLC has,

therefore, been terminated as a defendant to this action and the official capacity claims against the

individual Medical Defendants have been dismissed without prejudice.

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(ECF No. 40). The ADC Defendants assert three arguments in support of their Motion to Dismiss:

(1) they are entitled to sovereign immunity in their official capacities; (2) plaintiff has failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity for

claims brought against them in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 41). In his first Response,

Plaintiff says that he cannot properly respond to the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because

his legal paperwork was not returned to him after he was transported to a different ADC Unit

following his surgery. (ECF No. 48). He asks the Court to deny the ADC Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, and to grant summary judgment in his favor. Id. After the ADC Defendants

indicated that they had located and returned to him most of his legal paperwork, this Court granted

Plaintiff an extension of time to supplement his original response. (ECF No. 57). Plaintiff

subsequently filed an additional response, agreeing that Defendants Lamkins and Nava should be

dismissed from this action, but also arguing that the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with

respect to Defendant Bowers should be denied because she is at the top of the grievance procedure

and could have resolved his concerns. (ECF No. 58).

Before this Court had an opportunity to consider ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the

Medical Defendants filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy and Notice of Stay indicating that Wellpath,

LLC, had filed for bankruptcy relief in the Southern District of Texas and that the Bankruptcy

Court had entered an order staying all lawsuits in which Wellpath, LLC is named as a defendant,

including any claims against non-Debtor defendants. (ECF No. 63). Consistent with the

Bankruptcy Court’s order, this Court entered an order staying and administratively terminating

this case pending resolution of Wellpath’s bankruptcy proceedings. (ECF No. 64).

Approximately five months later, Wellpath, LCC, filed a status report with the Court

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explaining that the Bankruptcy Court had confirmed the company’s Plan of Reorganization, see In

re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 24-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tx. May 1, 2025) (ECF No. 2596). (ECF

No. 64). Following this notice, this Court reopened these proceedings and first addressed the

status of Plaintiff’s claims against the Medical Defendants given the details contained in the Plan

of Reorganization. (ECF Nos. 66-70, 73-75, & 79). After determining that the claims against

the individual Medical Defendants in their individual capacities shall proceed (ECF No. 75 & 79),

the Court turned to the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and provided them with the

opportunity to supplement their Motion to Dismiss given the time that had elapsed since they filed

their original motion. (ECF No. 77). The ADC Defendants filed a supplement, reiterating their

position that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against the ADC Defendants and

pointing out that Plaintiff does not object to dismissal of the claims against Transport Officers

Lamkins and Nava. (ECF No. 78). Because the supplement does not articulate any new

arguments, the Court did not request any further response from Plaintiff, concluding that none was

warranted or appropriate. The Court turns now to the substance of the ADC Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to present “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will

liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support

his claims. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

ANALYSIS

The ADC Defendants request dismissal of the claims against them on several grounds:

(1) sovereign immunity precludes Plaintiff’s claims against the ADC Defendants in their official

capacities for money damages; (2) Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible claim for relief against

the ADC Defendants; and (3) the ADC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims

brought against them in their individual capacities. (ECF Nos. 40, 41). Because the Court agrees

that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against the ADC Defendants, the ADC

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted on that basis. The undersigned, therefore, does

not consider the ADC Defendants’ alternate bases for dismissal.

Plaintiff claims that the Defendants failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate

medical care. The Court views this claim as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Andrews v. City of West Branch, Iowa,

454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006). “Prison officials or their agents violate the eighth amendment

if they commit ‘acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to [an

inmate’s] serious medical needs.” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Deliberate indifference includes both a subjective

and objective component: “The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that he suffered from objectively

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serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded

those needs.” Id. (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). Further,

to show deliberate indifference, “[t]he prisoner must show more than negligence, more than even

gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.

1995)).

A. ADC Defendants Lamkins and Nava

Plaintiff identifies ADC Defendants Lamkins and Nava as defendants only as to Claim

One. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff asserts that ADC Defendants Lamkins and Nava accompanied him

to a medical appointment with Dr. Stombaugh, overheard Dr. Stombaugh’s treatment

recommendations, but failed to write them down upon his request and did not relay this information

to the ADC medical providers. (Id. at 4-6). The ADC Defendants contend that Plaintiff has

failed to assert a plausible constitutional violation against Lamkins and Nava. (ECF No. 41).

Indeed, in his supplemental response, Plaintiff appears to agree, and rightly so. (ECF No. 58).

Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition—namely, a bone infection requiring antibiotics and a high protein diet—and that

Defendants Lamkins and Nava were aware of that condition because they accompanied him to a

medical appointment with an outside medical provider to address that condition, Plaintiff has

asserted no facts establishing that they were deliberately indifferent to his condition. Indeed,

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Lamkins and Nava were aware that Plaintiff was not being

provided with either antibiotics or a high protein diet, contrary to Dr. Stombaugh’s treatment

recommendations. Rather, it appears that Defendant Lamkins and Nava were merely responsible

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for transporting Plaintiff to his medical appointment with Dr. Stombaugh—and there are no facts

suggesting that Defendants Lamkins and Nava had any involvement in his medical care when

Plaintiff returned to the Omega Unit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (to establish a plausible § 1983

claim, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). To the extent that Plaintiff faults the Medical

Defendants for failing to confirm Dr. Stombaugh’s treatment recommendations with Defendants

Lamkins and Nava, such an allegation does not implicate what Defendants Lamkins and Nava

purportedly did (or failed to do) in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Mayorga v.

Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to,

and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”). Further, while Plaintiff contends that

Defendants Lamkins and Nava did not memorialize Dr. Stombaugh’s treatment recommendations

in writing or provide that information, unsolicited, to the ADC medical providers, he does not

assert any facts describing how this purported failure implicates a constitutional right. Put

differently, Plaintiff does not describe how Defendants Lamkins and Nava violated a constitutional

right in refusing to write down Dr. Stombaugh’s treatment recommendations or communicating

those treatment recommendations to ADC medical providers when they were not otherwise

responsible for his medical care. The undersigned, therefore, agrees with the ADC Defendants

and finds that Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible claim that Defendants Lamkins and Nava

violated his constitutional rights. His § 1983 claims against Defendants Lamkins and Nava

should, therefore, be dismissed.5

5 Plaintiff concedes that Defendants Lamkins and Nava should be dismissed from this action

because they were not personally involved in his medical care at the Omega Unit. (ECF No. 58).

He asks, however, that they provide him with statements concerning what they witnessed and

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B. Defendant Deputy Director Syrna Bowers

This leaves ADC Defendant Deputy Director Syrna Bowers. In the SAC, Plaintiff

identifies Bowers as a defendant as to Claim Two, which alleges that his grievances were found to

be without merit and that his request to receive his antibiotics at “PM pill call” or “OPM” was

denied, and Claim Three, which asserts that he was not initially transported for surgery as

scheduled and that medical professionals did not change his dressings, as ordered. (ECF No. 17).

These claims against Defendant Bowers fail as a matter of law as explained below.

First, Plaintiff argues in his unsworn response to the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

that Defendant Bowers discussed Dr. Stombaugh’s prescriptions for antibiotics and a high protein

diet in a phone call with ADC medical providers. (ECF No. 58). In considering a motion to

dismiss, however, the court “accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Because this unsworn allegation

is found outside the pleadings, it is not presumed to be true or considered in the Court’s analysis

of the ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Setting this allegation aside, Plaintiff asserts no facts

in the SAC establishing a plausible inference that Defendant Bowers herself was personally

involved in any aspect of Plaintiff’s medical treatment, including decisions related to when he

heard during his February 5, 2024, medical appointment with Dr. Stombaugh. Id. Plaintiff

claims these statements are essential to his case and that their original statements were lost (along

with some other legal paperwork) when he was transferred to a different unit. Id. Discovery,

however, has not yet commenced in this action. Plaintiff’s request is, therefore, not ripe. To the

extent that Plaintiff intends to renew this request during discovery, he is cautioned that he should

first endeavor to obtain the requested information on his own without court intervention.

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received his antibiotics or when medical professionals changed his leg dressings. (ECF No. 17).

Further, to the extent Plaintiff endeavors to attach liability against Defendant Bowers given her

role as a supervisor, vicarious liability, that is, the legal theory that a supervisor is responsible for

the torts of her subordinates, does not apply to § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[E]ach

government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).

Rather, “a supervising officer can be held liable for an inferior officer’s constitutional violation

‘only if he directly participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise

the offending actor caused the deprivation.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997)). Here, Plaintiff alleges no facts

in the SAC establishing that Defendant Bowers was either personally involved in his medical care

or that she was responsible for training or supervising the Medical Defendants. (ECF No. 17).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Bowers for

failure to provide him with constitutionally adequate medical care. This claim should, therefore,

be dismissed, as well.

Finally, recognizing that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, this Court considers

whether Plaintiff has asserted a plausible claim against Defendant Bowers for failing to address

his grievances (Claim Two). Established case law compels this Court to answer that question in

the negative. Indeed, “no constitutional right [is] violated by the defendants’ failure, if any, to

process all of the grievances [plaintiff] submitted for consideration.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d

494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)

(federal grievance regulations do not create liberty interest in access to that procedure). Plaintiff,

therefore, has similarly failed to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Bowers for her

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purported failure to adequately address his grievances. Because Plaintiff asserts no other § 1983

claims against Defendants Bowers, Lamkins, and Nava, the undersigned must recommend that the

ADC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, and that they be TERMINATED as

Defendants in this action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) the ADC Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40), as supplemented (ECF No. 78), be GRANTED; and (2) that

Defendants Deputy Director Syrna Bowers, Transport Officer Lamkins, and Transport Officer

Nava be TERMINATED as Defendants in this action.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

STATUS OF REFERRAL: Remains referred.

DATED this 24th day of October 2025.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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