Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:23-CV-9-KAC-DCP

)

FRANK STRADA, )

SHAWN PHILLIPS, )

BRETT COBBLE, )

ALLAN LEWIS, )

TIM MOONEYHAM, )

JESSICA BROWN, and )

ZACK KOCZWARA, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Revive Party Defendant and § 1983

Claim” [Doc. 137]. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. 137].

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction

(“TDOC”). He filed an Amended Complaint alleging that certain defendants retaliated against

him, conspired to violate his rights, violated his due process and equal protection rights, violated

his rights under Tennessee law and TDOC policy, and engaged in conduct that violated various

federal statutes [See, generally, Doc. 9]. When the Court screened Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

in compliance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A, it only permitted his First Amendment retaliation claims to proceed [See, generally,

Doc. 10]. The Court, as relevant here, (1) dismissed Brian Cox as a defendant because Plaintiff

“fail[ed] to allege facts connecting Defendant[] . . . Cox with any constitutional wrongdoing”;

(2) concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for conspiracy; and

(3) concluded that the failure to follow TDOC policy alone did not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation [Doc. 10 at 20-23, 29, 30].

Plaintiff then filed a purported Second Amended Complaint, again seeking to raise claims

of conspiracy against Cox [Doc. 12 ¶¶ 14, 28-32, 91]. In support of his claims, Plaintiff alleged

that Cox conspired with another TDOC employee to remove Plaintiff from his job and in doing

so, violated TDOC policies [Id. ¶ 30]. The Court screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,

concluded it did not contain enough facts to support a plausible conspiracy claim, and struck it

from the record [See Doc. 36 at 4].

Plaintiff now asks the Court to again “revive Brian Cox as a party defendant” and add a

civil conspiracy claim [Doc. 137 at 1]. To support his Motion, Plaintiff points to an affidavit Cox

filed in this action on May 14, 2025, in which Cox stated that he called Plaintiff’s supervisor as a

courtesy to inform him that Plaintiff was being transferred to a different job [Doc. 99 ¶ 19].

Plaintiff maintains that this evidence now provides the factual specificity required to adequately

support his conspiracy claim [Doc. 137 at 1-2]. It does not.

II. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Motion is untimely. Plaintiff filed his Motion on October

14, 2025, at the earliest [Doc. 137 at 3 (“Dated: October 14, 2025”)]. But the motions deadline in

this case expired on May 14, 2025 [See Docs. 77, 130]. And Plaintiff did not move to reopen the

motion deadline or show good cause to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Therefore, the Motion

is untimely and improper.

Even if the Motion were properly filed, it fails on the merits. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b) recognizes a Court’s authority “to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen

any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.” See Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 36

F.4th 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “Courts will find justification for reconsidering

interlocutory orders where there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence

available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Louisville/Jefferson

Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez v.

Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)). But Rule 54(b)

motions “may not be used to relitigate old matters.” Bailey v. Real Time Staffing Servs., Inc., 927

F. Supp. 2d 490, 501 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

To state a civil conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) the existence of a single

plan, (2) a conspiratorial objective shared by the conspirators to deprive Plaintiff of his

constitutional rights, (3) and the commission of an overt act. See Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273,

290 (6th Cir. 2007). The conspiracy must be pled with particularity—vague and conclusory

allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 564–65 (2007) (holding that allegations must be supported with factual allegations that render

the claim “plausible”); Gutierrez v. Lunch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]onspiracy

claims must be pled with some degree of specificity” and “vague and conclusory allegations

unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983.”).

Here, Plaintiff allegedly identifies “new evidence” in the Cox Affidavit [See Doc. 137 ¶ 8].

But the “new evidence” he offers is not sufficient to support a claim for civil conspiracy against

Cox or others. The fact that Cox called Plaintiff’s supervisor as a courtesy before moving Plaintiff

to another job is not proof that the two shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive Plaintiff of his

rights. See Huffer v. Bogan, 503 F. App’x 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff failed

to state a conspiracy claim where he “merely described the actions taken by various individual

defendants, asserting that their actions were taken in furtherance of a conspiracy,” and failed “to

include allegations regarding an agreement or shared plan between the individual defendants to

violate his civil rights”); see also Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 391 (6th Cir.

2014) (finding unsubstantiated “speculation and conjecture” regarding agreements between

various actors “insufficient to establish the existence of an agreement” for a conspiracy claim

(citing Moore v. City of Paducah, 890 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, even with this

“new evidence,” Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under Section 1983. Without that, there

is no basis for the Court to grant relief under Rule 54(b).1

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s “Motion to Revive Party Defendant

and § 1983 Claim” [Doc. 137]. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would

not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24. Therefore,

should Plaintiff file a notice of appeal, he is DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24. Nothing remains of this action. An appropriate judgment

shall enter.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

/s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge

1 Further, even if Cox violated a TDOC policy in calling Plaintiff’s supervisor or moving Plaintiff

to another job, such conduct does not, alone, violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g.,

McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995).