Temethy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROGER GEORGE TEMETHY, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1664

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

JUDGE SHANNON M. GALLAGHER, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendant. )

)

Before the Court is Plaintiff Roger G. Temethy’s pro se Motion for Originally Assigned

Judge to Proper Rule on Case to Preserve the United States Constitution (ECF No. 6), which the

Court construes as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the reasons discussed

below, Plaintiff’s construed motion to alter or amend the judgment is DENIED.

On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Shannon M. Gallagher.

(ECF No. 1). Judge Gallagher presided over a 2025 civil case brought by Plaintiff against the

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and the Ohio Court of Claims (collectively, “State

Defendants”). See Temethy v. Ohio Dep’t of Job and Fam. Servs., CV-25-114635 (Cuyahoga

Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas); (ECF No. 1-4, PageID #12–14, 17). On May 27, 2025, Judge Gallagher

granted State Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Journal Entry, Temethy v. Ohio Dep’t of Job and Fam. Servs., CV-25-114635

(Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pleas May 27, 2025). Plaintiff’s complaint generally alleged that Judge

Gallagher violated his due process rights and right to a jury trial and requested that the Court “take

action” against Judge Gallagher without any clarification. (Id. at PageID #4–5).

On November 13, 2025, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order that dismissed

the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e). (ECF No. 4). The Court found that dismissal was

warranted because: (i) the complaint failed to meet the minimum pleading standards under

Twombly and Iqbal; (ii) the relief requested, essentially review and overturning of state court

decisions, was barred by the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines; and

(iii) Defendant was immune from civil suits for money damages. (Id. at PageID #36–39). On

November 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his construed Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.

(ECF No. 6).

Under Rule 59(e), a district court may alter or amend a judgment if the movant establishes

one of the following: “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening

change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Leisure Caviar, LLC v.

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson,

428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gencorp, Inc. v.

Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Motions for reconsideration are

“‘extraordinary in nature and, because they run contrary to notions of finality and repose, should

be discouraged.’” Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D.

Ohio 1995) (quoting In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (S.D. Ind.

1994)). “As such, motions for reconsideration are granted ‘very sparingly.’” Id. (quoting Bakari

v. Beyer, 870 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D. N.J. 1994)).

“A Rule 59 motion ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Brumley v. UPS,

909 F.3d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5,

128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008)); see also Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475

(6th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 59(e) allows for reconsideration; it does not permit parties to effectively

‘re-argue a case.’”). A party moving to alter or amend a judgment based on a “clear error of law”

is held to a high standard. Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 809 (N.D. Ohio

2010). To alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e), the Court must find that it wholesale

disregarded, misapplied, or failed to recognize controlling precedent. Id. (quoting Oto v. Metro.

Life Ins., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2000)). In other words, “a judgment must be ‘dead wrong’

to qualify as being clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting H & A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, No.

4:02-cv-458, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25797, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2005)).

Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment is not well-founded. Plaintiff does not

point to any clear error of law in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the case.

The motion does not address the reasoning of the Court’s judgment; nor does it explain why the

Court’s conclusions about the pleading deficiencies, the application of the abstention doctrines,

and absolute immunity were erroneous. Instead, Plaintiff generally argues that the Court’s

decision was wrong, states that the Court did not judge the case on its merits, and insinuates that

the Court was taking the side of Defendant, who happens to be a judge. (ECF No. 6, PageID #42).

As such, Plaintiff has not established any error of law, let alone a clear one. Plaintiff’s motion also

fails to establish that there is newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law,

or a need to prevent manifest injustice.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established a basis for relief under Rule 59(e). Thus,

Plaintiff’s construed Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment (ECF No. 6) is DENIED.

The Court further CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, that an appeal from this Order

cannot be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 20, 2025 “adi Uauieg

CHARLES E.FLEMING sits

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE