Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ALLEN BROWN, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-CV-00107-SPM

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Pending before this Court are two motions: a Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint filed by Plaintiff Allen Brown, Jr. (Doc. 158) and a Motion to Dismiss filed

by Defendants Rob Jeffreys, William Puga, and Melvin Hinton. (Doc. 164). Having

been fully informed of the issues presented, Brown’s Motion is DENIED and the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Allen Brown, Jr. is an individual in the custody of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). (Doc. 1). He was incarcerated at Menard

Correctional Center from July 9, 2021 to May 19, 2022. (Id., ¶ 1). The crux of his

claims involves six days during 2021 when he was not provided his psychotropic

medication while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. (Doc. 120, ¶¶ 1, 40–

52).

Brown has been on “enforced medication status”—meaning that his

psychotropic medications are forcibly administered to him if he will not take them

himself—since July 2018. (See id., ¶ 19). When Brown first arrived at Menard on July

10, 2021, Defendant Poteat noted that Brown had “a history of ‘repeated self-injurious

behaviors’ and many suicide attempts, including a recent attempt in December 2020

while in custody at Joliet Treatment Center.” (Id., ¶ 20). Brown “had multiple old

scars and recently inserted metal paperclips and staples into his arms and legs” and

was determined to be “at moderate risk of suicide and at high risk of aggressive

behavior.” (Id.). Additionally, “[w]ithin a week of his evaluation with Defendant

Poteat, Mr. Brown had swallowed several screws and was placed on continuous crisis

watch as a result.” (Id., ¶ 21). During time he was at Menard, Mr. Brown was

diagnosed with “bipolar disorder, PTSD, borderline personality disorder, antisocial

personality disorder, and substance use disorder.” (Id., ¶ 20). Brown spent some forty

days on crisis watch, from August 26, 2021 to October 6, 2021. (Id., ¶ 31).

Subsequently, on October 16–19 and 28–29, Brown’s psychotropic mediations were

not administered to him. (Id., ¶ 40). On October 28, “Mr. Brown inserted a screw into

his penis, punched the wall, and cut his testicle.” (Id., ¶ 43). He later cut his leg and

ingested “foreign bodies from a broken fan” on or around November 3 (id., ¶ 45) and

inserted a foreign object into both eyes on November 12 (id., ¶ 47). He was treated at

St. Louis University Hospital after both incidents. (Id., ¶¶ 46–47)

Brown filed his initial pro se Complaint on January 12, 2023; his Complaint

listed eighteen named defendants and alleged various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (See Doc. 1). This Court conducted preliminary review in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 1915A on September 25, 2023. (Doc. 20). The Court permitted Brown’s

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Wexford, Crain, Martin,

Morris, Lawrence, Poteat, Wills, Reister, and Nurse Jane Doe for failure to provide

him with his required medication on October 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, and 29, 2021 to

proceed into discovery. (See Doc. 20, p. 5). Defendants Cooper, Lawrence, Morris, and

Reister filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on exhaustion of administrative

remedies on September 9, 2024 (Doc. 94); this Court denied the Motion on March 6,

2025 (Doc. 112) and set a Scheduling Order on the same day (Doc. 113).

On October 4, 2024, Attorney Nicole Schult of Uptown People’s Law Center in

Chicago entered an appearance as counsel of record for Plaintiff Brown.1 (See Doc.

99). Plaintiff Brown filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint on March 21, 2025 (Doc.

118), which this Court granted on March 24, 2025 (Doc. 119). (See Doc. 120). The

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 4, 2025 (Doc. 121); this Court granted

it in part and denied it in part on June 9, 2025 (Doc. 137) and subsequently granted

a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Brown on June 17, 2025. (See Docs. 138, 139).

The operative Second Amended Complaint was filed on June 18, 2025. (Doc. 140). The

Second Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference against Defendants Angela Crain, Kimberly Martin, Carrie

Morris, Rob Jeffreys, Advup Lawrence, Thena Poteat, Anthony Wills, Lewis Shicker,

Nicole Brand, Melissa Ogle, Shane Reister, William Puga, Melvin Hinton, and Glen

Babich; (2) Eighth Amendment failure to protect against Defendants Wills, Poteat,

and Crain; (3) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference against Wexford Health

Sources; (4) Illinois state law institutional negligence against Wexford; (5) Illinois

1 Attorneys Shireen Jalali-Yazdi and Ian McCollum subsequently entered appearances on behalf of

Brown. (See Docs. 109, 111).

state law medical malpractice against Defendants Poteat and Babich; and (6) Illinois

state law medical malpractice against Wexford based in respondeat superior. (See

id.).

In his Motion, Brown seeks to amend the operative Second Amended

Complaint to name Illinois Department of Corrections Medical Director Dr. Steve

Bowman in place of Dr. Louis Shicker; Brown insists that “Louis Shicker was named

instead of Steven Bowman only because of mistaken identity” and that “[t]he facts to

support the claim against Steven Bowman have therefore already been pleaded and

the proposed amendment introduces no new facts to the case.” (Doc. 158, p. 3). This

Court previously granted Brown’s Motion to Substitute Bowman for Shicker on the

docket. (See Docs. 156, 157). Defendants Nicole Brand, Rebecca Cooper, Angela Crain,

Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Lawrence, Kimberly Martin, Carri Morris, Melissa

Ogle, William Puga, Shane Reister, and Anthony Wills oppose and object to Brown’s

Motion. (Doc. 161). Brown filed a Reply. (Doc. 162).

While Brown’s Motion for Leave to Amend was still pending, Defendants

Jeffreys, Puga, and Hinton filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 163); they argue

that the claims against them must be dismissed due to the statute of limitations and

Plaintiff’s failure to allege their personal involvement. (Id.). Brown filed a Response

(Doc. 171), to which the Defendants replied (Doc. 172).

APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the amendment of pleadings and

provides that courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Nonetheless, “[a] district court may deny leave to file an

amended complaint in the case of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the

part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, and futility of amendment.’” Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562

(7th Cir. 2010) (citation modified) (quoting Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T

Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Ultimately, the decision to grant

or deny a motion to file and amended pleading is a matter purely within the sound

discretion of the district court.” McDaniel v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 317 F.R.D. 72,

76 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Delay alone may not prove sufficient grounds to warrant denial of leave to

amend a complaint; “rather, the degree of prejudice to the opposing party is a

significant factor in determining whether the lateness of the request ought to bar

filing.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotations omitted) (citing Doherty v. Davy Songer, Inc., 195 F.3d 919, 927

(7th Cir. 1999)). Nonetheless, the longer the delay, the greater presumption against

granting leave to amend. McDaniel v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 317 F.R.D. 72, 77 (N.D.

Ill. 2016) (citing King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 1994)). Undue delay is most

likely to result in undue prejudice when a combination of factors, including delay in

proceedings without explanation, no change in the facts since filing of the original

complaint, and new theories that require additional discovery, occur together.

McDaniel v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 317 F.R.D. 72, 77 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing J.P.

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Drywall Serv. & Supply Co., 265 F.R.D. 341, 347 (N.D.

Ind. 2010)). It is the party seeking to amend that “has the burden of showing that

undue prejudice will not result to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing King, 26 F.3d at

724). “If the moving party fails to provide any explanation for not filing its

amendment sooner or if the explanation it provides is inadequate, that will weigh

towards denying leave to amend.” J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 265 F.R.D. at 347

(citing Sanders, et al. v. Venture Stores, Inc., 56 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Additionally, in analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must determine

whether or not the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that “‘[p]lausibility’ is not a synonym

for ‘probability’ in this context, but it asks for ‘more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d

633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1099

(7th Cir. 2015)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [the] [f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555.

District courts are required by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to

review the facts and arguments in Rule 12(b)(6) motions “in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged and drawing all

possible inferences in her favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th

Cir. 2008). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the

complaint, not to decide the merits.” Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520

(7th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS

I. Claims Against Defendant Bowman

In his Motion (Doc. 158), Plaintiff Brown seeks to amend the operative Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 140) to substitute Dr. Steven Bowman for Dr. Louis

Shicker as the IDOC Medical Director. Brown insists that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) permits

this modification, as the claims relate back to the original Complaint in this case. (Id.,

p. 3).

In response, the Defendants insist that the substitution of Bowman for Shicker

and the amendment of the operative Complaint is barred by the two-year statute of

limitations, that Plaintiff cannot make use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(c)(1)(C) to relate his amendment back to the date of his original pleading, and that

Plaintiff did not serve Defendant Shicker (or Defendants Hinton, Puga, and Jeffreys,

see infra Section II) within the 90-day limit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m). (See Doc. 161).

In his Reply, Brown insists that “[t]he notice required by rule 15(c)(1)(C) ‘may

be inferred based on either the identity of interest between the old and new parties

or by the fact that they share an attorney.’” (Doc. 162, p. 2 (quoting Kazmer v. Bayer

Healthcare Pharms., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-112-TS, 2007 WL 4148003, at *5 (N.D. Ind.

Nov. 19, 2007)). He argues that the fact that Defendants Nicole Brand, Rebecca

Cooper, Angela Crain, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Lawrence, Kimberly Martin,

Carri Morris, Melissa Ogle, William Puga, Shane Reister, and Anthony Wills share

the same attorney means that Bowman had timely notice of the claims against him.

(Id. (quoting Davenport v. Dovgin, 545 F. App’x 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2013); Singletary

v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186 (3d. Cir. 2001))). Brown alleges that the fact that

“John Doe Chief of Medical Services” was previously named as a Defendant and the

fact that discovery requests were submitted to Shicker also constituted sufficient

notice and that there is sufficient “identity of interest” among the administrators

listed in this lawsuit. (Id., pp. 2–4). He also insists that “procedural hurdles”

prevented the timely addition of the “administrative defendants” to this case. (Id., p.

4).

First, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff has provided no justification for

why the case of “mistaken identity” with regard to Shicker was not identified before

now when Plaintiff’s counsel first entered an appearance in October 2024 (Doc. 99;

see Docs. 109, 111) and Amended Complaints naming Shicker were filed on March

24, 2025 (Doc. 120) and June 18, 2025 (Doc. 140). A Google search shows that Dr.

Bowman is, indeed, the current IDOC Medical Director. See AGENCY MEDICAL

DIRECTOR, ILL. DEPT. CORR., https://idoc.illinois.gov/aboutus/

agencymedicaldirector.html [https://perma.cc/PQ89-D6ST] (last visited Nov. 19,

2025). Additionally, Seventh Circuit caselaw indicates that Shicker was no longer

IDOC Medical Director as of March 23, 2020. See Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 494

(7th Cir. 2020) (“In November 2016, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, naming

IDOC, Wexford (again), IDOC’s medical director (initially Dr. Michael Puisis, who

was later succeeded by Dr. Louis Shicker and then Dr. Steven Meeks), and several

other doctors as defendants.”).

Second, Plaintiff cannot use the “shared attorney method” to impute notice to

Bowman. See Davenport, 545 F. App’x at 539. In Davenport, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint,

holding that the shared attorney method did not apply “because notice of the suit was

not imputed to the proposed defendants through the shared attorney within 120 days

of Davenport’s filing of her complaint.” Id. Additionally, the “shared attorney did not

begin representing the proposed defendants until Davenport moved to amend the

complaint, almost two years after she filed suit.” Here, Defendants’ counsel of record

began representing Defendant Bowman on November 3, 2025 (Doc. 170) and had

never previously entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Shicker or Bowman.

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to add Bowman to the lawsuit almost three years after

his original Complaint was filed, clearly beyond the 120-day limit and beyond the

two-year statute of limitations, since the alleged incident occurred in November 2021.

(See Doc. 161, p. 2). In that vein, Plaintiff cannot make use of the “identity of interest”

method to impute notice to Bowman, either, because he has not provided any evidence

or reason to believe that Defendants’ counsel of record represented or contacted

Bowman regarding this lawsuit. See Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 227

(3d Cir. 2003).

Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided a reason as to why Shicker, Bowman, or

the IDOC Medical Director in its official capacity were not served after the First

Amended Complaint was filed in March 2025. (Doc. 140). Brown admits that it

required Defendants’ counsel of record informing him on August 28, 2025 that

Shicker had not been served for him to take action. (Doc. 156, p. 1). Additionally,

while Brown did indeed assert claims against “John Doe Chief of Medical Services”

in his original pro se Complaint filed on January 12, 2023 (Doc. 1), this Court

terminated Shicker as IDOC Medical Director as a named Defendant at preliminary

review on September 25, 2023 (Doc. 20). Brown later added Shicker as a Defendant

on March 25, 2025 after Plaintiff retained counsel (see Doc. 140), meaning it is wholly

unreasonable for Bowman to believe that he would be named in this lawsuit if he was

never previously served. This Court cannot ignore Defendants’ statement that

“individuals in custody are particularly litigious,” that “IDOC employees are

inundated with lawsuits,” and that “it is inconceivable that Dr. Bowman would know

which of his colleagues were being sued for what.” (Doc. 161, p. 4). This is undoubtedly

true—this Court can attest to the constant deluge of lawsuits filed daily in this

District. Notably, according to internal statistics compiled on November 19, 2025,

1059 civil cases have been filed in this District in 2025, with 53 filed this month and

5 filed yesterday alone—a large proportion of these cases are civil rights lawsuits filed

by pro se prisoners.

This Court also notes that, even though this Court has not ruled on Brown’s

Motion to Leave to Amend, Brown executed service of process on Bowman, anyway.

(See Doc. 169). The operative Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 140) lists Shicker as

a Defendant, not Bowman, so it is unclear which version of the Complaint was served

on Bowman in the first place. (See id.).

Thus, while Plaintiff Brown insists that justice requires the amendment of his

operative pleading in line with Rule 15(a)(2) and that dismissal of his claims against

Bowman would be a “windfall” (Doc. 162, p. 4), this Court holds that Brown has not

met his burden to prove that undue prejudice will not result to Defendant Bowman

when this case has already been in discovery since March 5, 2025. (See Doc. 113); see

also McDaniel, 317 F.R.D. at 77. This Court holds that Brown’s unexcused delay in

both determining the identity of the IDOC Medical Director and serving him means

that his claims against Dr. Bowman must be dismissed, especially since he has

already been provided with multiple opportunities to amend his pleadings. Therefore,

Brown’s Motion shall be denied, Brown’s claims against IDOC Medical Director Dr.

Bowman shall be dismissed with prejudice, and Dr. Bowman shall be terminated

from this lawsuit.

II. Claims Against Defendants Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga

First, Defendants Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga argue that Plaintiff Brown has

not met the conditions imposed by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) to relate the claims against them

back to the date of filing of this lawsuit. (Doc. 164, p. 2). They insist that they were

originally sued in their official capacities only, that they did not receive notice of this

suit because the claims against them were dismissed at this Court’s § 1915A review,

and that they could not have known that this action was brought against them. (Id.,

pp. 2–3). They also argue that Brown fails to state specific claims against them and

that any claims for liability based on respondeat superior are prohibited in § 1983

lawsuits. (Id., p. 4).

In opposition, Brown insists that Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga are “original

defendants and are not being substituted for mistaken parties” (Doc. 171, p. 2

(footnote omitted)), that these Defendants waived any challenge to service of process

when they executed waivers of service (id.), and that any delay in service is either

justified by good cause or is excusable neglect (id., p. 3). Regarding the sufficiency of

his claims against Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga, Brown argues that he is not alleging

claims based on respondeat superior but rather is arguing “that Defendants

themselves are directly liable for consciously maintaining an inadequate mental

healthcare system that posed a substantial risk of harm to IDOC prisoners.” (Id., p.

5 n.2 (citing Doc. 140, ¶¶ 53–65)). Brown heavily relies on the Seventh Circuit’s

opinion in Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1989) in arguing that

these Defendants “were personally aware from their participation in the Rasho

litigation that IDOC’s mental health care program suffered from a number of

systemic problems, including a lack of medical staff, that posed significant dangers

to prisoners with mental illness.” (Doc. 171, p. 7 (quoting Doc. 140, ¶ 56)). Brown also

argues that he has met the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requirements to relate the claims against

Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga back to the filing of this lawsuit, insisting that

“Defendants’ counsel has been aware at least since he filed his appearance on October

17, 2023 that each of them were named Defendants.” (Id., p. 9 (citing Doc. 34)).

Recall that Defendants first bring their arguments related to improper service

of Jeffreys, Puga, and Hinton in their Response to Brown’s Motion. (See Doc. 161).

They argue that there were not served within the 90 days required by Rule 4(m),

insisting that waivers of service were not sent until August 29, 2025, some 158 days

after Brown’s First Amended Complaint was filed on March 24, 2025. (See id., p. 3).

However, Defendants’ calculation of 158 days after filing of the First Amended

Complaint on March 24, 2025 (Doc. 140) fails to mention that the Second Amended

Complaint was filed on June 18, 2025 (Doc. 140), putting service within the 90 days

permitted by Rule 4(m). Defendants do not even mention the Second Amended

Complaint in their Response.

Additionally, Rule 4(m)’s dismissal requirement is not mandatory—it is

permissive, stating that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the

complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—

must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service

be made within a specified time.” (emphasis added). Moreover, Hinton returned a

waiver of service on September 11, 2025 (Doc. 150) and counsel entered an

appearance on his behalf on September 17, 2025 (Doc. 154); Jeffreys returned a

waiver of service on September 23, 2025 (Doc. 155) and counsel entered an

appearance on his behalf on September 30, 2025 (Doc. 160); counsel of record entered

an appearance for Puga on September 15, 2025 (Doc. 153) and Puga returned a waiver

of service on October 29, 2025 (Doc. 168).

However, Jeffreys, Puga, and Hinton did file the instant 12(b) Motion within

the required timeline (within 60 days if service is timely waived, see FED. R. CIV. P.

12(a)(1)(A)(i)). Brown offers only out-of-district cases to argue that execution of a

service waiver constitutes waiver of objection to the sufficiency of service. (See Doc.

171, pp. 2–3 (citing McGee v. Macon Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

233598, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2017); Beale v. Revolution Portfolio, LLC, 07 C 6909,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82482, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2008); Foster v. Ghosh, 11 C

5623, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132587, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2012))). Moreover, while

Brown construes Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as being brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(5), the Defendants explicitly cite to Rule 12(b)(6) in their Motion. (See Doc. 164).

In the same vein as his arguments regarding Bowman’s notice (or lack thereof),

Brown again argues that defense counsel should have been aware that Jeffreys,

Hinton, and Puga were named as Defendants when counsel entered his appearance

on October 17, 2023. (Doc. 171, p. 9 (citing Doc. 34)). Once more, Brown does not

include the fact that this Court dismissed the claims against Jeffreys, Hinton, and

Puga at § 1915A preliminary review on September 25, 2023, prior to defense counsel’s

appearance on October 17, 2023. (Doc. 20). Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga were never

served in 2023 and Brown cannot rely on the fact that he named them in his initial

Complaint. (Doc. 1). Moreover, Brown cannot claim the Defendants had notice of his

claims when he did not attempt to notify them; defense counsel informed Brown’s

counsel that service had not been executed. (Doc. 171, p. 9).

Considering all of the above, this Court holds that Brown cannot relate his

claims against Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga back to the filing of his initial Complaint

in this action in accordance with Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Additionally, this Court holds that

Brown has not carried his burden to show that undue prejudice will not result to

Defendants Jeffreys, Hinton, and Puga. See McDaniel, 317 F.R.D. at 77. Therefore,

the claims against these Defendants shall be dismissed. The Court does not reach the

question of whether the claims against these Defendants are sufficient in accordance

with Rule 12(b)(6).

This Court notes that this case will have been pending for three years as of

January 2026. This Court reminds the parties that their cooperation is essential in

order to bring this suit to a final resolution on the merits as expeditiously as possible.

The parties were already sternly warned on June 17, 2025 that modifications to the

operative Scheduling Order would not be permitted absent unforeseen circumstances.

(See Doc. 139). This Court will not tolerate additional delay in the discovery or

dispositive motions deadlines absent exceptional or emergent circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Considering the above, Plaintiff Allen Brown, Jr.’s Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint (Doc. 158) is DENIED. Additionally, Defendants Rob Jeffreys,

William Puga, and Melvin Hinton’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 164) is GRANTED.

Brown’s claims against Defendants Bowman, Jeffreys, Puga, and Hinton are

DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate

Bowman, Jeffreys, Puga, and Hinton as named Defendants in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 21, 2025

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge