“That most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.”
How later courts described this case
- “That most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.”
- “Plaintiffs cannot now introduce an entirely new theory of liability in their summary judgment papers.”
- “[P]ro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
AKWELEY ABLORH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-11937-MJJ
)
TOWN OF STONEHAM, DAVID )
STEFANELLI, SHERYL ROTONDI, & )
BRIAN RAFFAELO, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
November 20, 2025
JOUN, D.J.
Plaintiff Akweley Ablorh (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was tricked by multiple Stoneham
police officers into presenting herself for a psychiatric evaluation, which purportedly resulted in
her involuntary hospitalization and the eventual temporary loss of custody of her child. See [Doc.
No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 58–80]. Plaintiff brings two causes of action against defendant Town of Stoneham
(the “Town”) and nine causes of action against three defendant police officers thereof, David
Stefanelli (“Stefanelli”), Sheryl Rotondi (“Rotondi”), and Brian Raffaelo (“Raffaelo”)
(collectively, “Defendant Officers”), (altogether, the “Defendants”) for injuries allegedly sustained
as a result of the events leading up to and following Plaintiff’s hospitalization. See generally [Doc.
No. 1-3].
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims on June 30, 2025. See
generally [Doc. No. 48]. For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, at the time represented by counsel, filed her complaint in Middlesex Superior
Court on June 14, 2023 (Civil Docket No. 2381CV01765). [Doc. No. 4]. Shortly thereafter, on
August 23, 2023, the matter was removed to this Court. [Doc. No. 1]. Defendants filed an answer
on September 12, 2023. [Doc. No. 5]. On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew
representation. [Doc. No. 43]. From that point on, Plaintiff has proceeded pro se.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims on June 30, 2025. [Doc.
No. 48]. On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a one and a half-page opposition that did not contain any
citations to case law or the record. See generally [Doc. No. 52]. Plaintiff was permitted to refile
and did so on July 25, 2025. [Doc. No. 58]. Plaintiff’s second opposition identifies “at least 10
significant factual disputes requiring a hearing in this case” but does not contain any citations to
the record in support of the alleged disputes. See generally [id.]. Plaintiff also did not submit a
formal response to Defendants’ statement of material facts or file her own statement of material
facts. See [Doc. No. 58 at 10]. Defendants were permitted to file a reply but did not do so. See
[Doc. No. 55].
II. BACKGROUND
The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are either undisputed or recounted in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. See Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 99 F.4th
105, 108 (1st Cir. 2024).
On the morning of June 14, 2020, Plaintiff contacted the non-emergency line of the
Stoneham Police Department to report “minor injuries” on herself, her three-month-old child, and
her property, which she believed were caused by her then-husband. [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 8–9].
Plaintiff’s phone call was transferred to police officer Stefanelli, and they discussed her concerns.
[Id. at ¶¶ 10–15]. During that call, Plaintiff informed Stefanelli that “she has unexplained minor
injuries and believes that her husband who is often up at night inflicts these minor injuries on her
and their son. She stated that some of the scratches are fresh and some have heeled [sic] and have
left a scar but they are very minor.” [Doc. No. 48-4 at 2]. She also stated that her husband cuts her
fingernails into a “jigsaw pattern” while she sleeps and that she believes he twists her wrists in the
process because they are sore when she wakes up. [Id.]. She further stated that her husband branded
her phone with a triangle “punch” mark and claimed her husband pushed her a couple times but
admitted there was no history of violence. [Id.].
Plaintiff testified that she had been sleeping in a separate room as her husband for “several
weeks” leading up to her phone call to the police department. [Doc. No. 48-8 at 8]. According to
Stefanelli’s written police report, during their phone conversation, Plaintiff “stated that she has
been ‘barricading in our nursery’ with the baby because she feared what he[r husband] may do” at
night. [Doc. No. 48-4 at 2]. Plaintiff now disputes whether she used the term “barricade” to
describe her sleeping situation at home, suggesting that only her husband used that descriptor, but
she concedes that, at a minimum, she “hung something noisy on the doorknob” as an alert
mechanism because she “was not comfortable with him entering the room while [she] was
sleeping.” [Doc. No. 48-8 at 8–9]. Stefanelli testified that Plaintiff “was very calm and articulate
with her descriptions and believable” and that she was describing “a domestic violence situation.”
[Doc. No. 48-5 at 15; Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 14]. Plaintiff claimed she was afraid of her husband and
agreed to have Stefanelli and a few other officers come to her house to evaluate the situation. [Doc.
No. 48-4 at 2].
The Defendant Officers arrived at Plaintiff’s house later that same morning. [Doc. No. 50
at ¶ 18]. Plaintiff showed the Defendant Officers the alleged injuries to her phone, fingernails, and
son upon their arrival. [Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21, 32]. Stefanelli reported that the damage to Plaintiff’s phone
appeared “very typical of minor wear” and was “so miniscule that you could barely see it.” [Doc.
No. 48-4 at 2]. According to Stefanelli, there were “no marks like anything she described on the
phone,” he had to “ask to see her fingernails,” and the “injuries [to her son] were extremely minor
and typical with tiny scratches that would be normal for an infant.” [Id.]. In fact, Plaintiff concedes
that the scratches and scars on her son’s cheeks were “barely visible.” [Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 22; Doc.
No. 48-6 at 6]. Stefanelli reported that other aspects of Plaintiff’s story, as she relayed them to him
during their earlier phone call, were unsubstantiated based on what he observed during the at-home
visit. See [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 23–25].
According to Plaintiff’s husband, Plaintiff had become “paranoid” of him being around
their child, and she had been limiting his access to their child to just ten to fifteen minutes of
supervised time each day. [Id. at ¶ 33; Doc. No. 48-9 at 2]. Plaintiff’s husband also told one of the
Defendant Officers about her past trauma and history of depression. [Doc. No. 48-9 at 2-4; Doc.
No. 50 at ¶¶ 27–30].
The Defendant Officers conferred and agreed that Plaintiff might be suffering from mental
health issues and should be evaluated by a medical professional. [Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 35]. Stefanelli
encouraged Plaintiff’s husband to call her physician to discuss whether involuntary hospitalization
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws (“M.G.L.”) ch. 123, § 12 (“Section 12”) was appropriate. [Id. at ¶
34; Doc. No. 48-5 at 42–43]. Stefanelli testified that Plaintiff’s husband called but was unable to
reach the physician, and thereafter the Defendant Officers devised a plan to get Plaintiff and her
child to Melrose-Wakefield Hospital (“MWH”). See [Doc. No. 48-5 at 44–46]. According to
Plaintiff, the Defendant Officers told her that she needed to have her child evaluated at the hospital
if she wanted to pursue a restraining order against her husband and suggested she bring her son to
MWH. [Id. at 65]. Plaintiff agreed it was a good idea to have her son evaluated at the emergency
department and drove her son to MWH in her personal vehicle. [Id. ¶ 4; Doc. No. 48-5 at 67–68].
Stefanelli and Rotondi followed Plaintiff to the hospital in their own respective vehicles. [Id.].
Raffaelo stayed at the house with Plaintiff’s husband while Plaintiff, Stefanelli, and
Rontondi went to the hospital. [Doc. No. 48-9 at 4]. Stefanelli told Raffaelo that he was going to
advise Plaintiff to go to the hospital “to be evaluated and possibly sectioned” and that Raffaelo
“should . . . make contact with DCF.” [Id.]. After wrapping up at Plaintiff’s home, Raffaelo
returned to the police station, where he did eventually contact DCF and share his “concerns and
what had taken place.” [Id.].
The Defendant Officers admit that they did not inform Plaintiff that they suspected she was
suffering from mental health issues or that they intended to inform hospital staff of their suspicions
once they arrived at MWH. [Doc. No. 48-5 at 67–68]. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the Defendant
Officers had also contacted the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to investigate the
child’s wellbeing and instructed DCF to respond directly to the hospital. [Doc. No. 48-9 at 4].
Once at the hospital, Stefanelli helped Plaintiff check in her son for evaluation. [Doc. No.
50 at ¶40]. Plaintiff and her son were then brought into an exam room, after which point none of
the Defendant Officers saw Plaintiff or her child again. [Id. at ¶¶ 40–44]. Stefanelli then briefed
certain hospital staff of his concern for the mother’s mental state and relayed details from his phone
conversation with Plaintiff as well as his at-home visit. [Id.]. According to Raffaelo’s police report,
hospital staff had requested that DCF go to the hospital directly rather than to Plaintiff’s home.
[Doc. No. 48-9 at 4]. Stefanelli conveyed this request to Raffaelo, who was still on the phone with
DCF and capable of relaying the hospital’s request. [Id.]. Stefanelli did not have any discussions
with hospital staff beyond this, and the Defendant Officers never personally interacted with any
DCF workers at the hospital. [Doc. No. 50 ¶¶ 40–44].
After an initial examination was conducted, Plaintiff was taken to a second examination
room that was guarded by a MWH employee. [Id. at ¶ 45]. Around this time, an emergency room
doctor determined Plaintiff needed further in-patient care and admitted her involuntarily pursuant
to Section 12(a). [Id. at ¶¶ 45–46; Doc. No. 48-15 at 1]. Approximately four hours after that
determination, DCF arrived and took custody of Plaintiff’s baby. [Doc. No. 48-8 at 17; Doc. No.
48-12 at 6; Doc No. 50 at ¶ 50]. Though reluctant to part with her child, Plaintiff willingly handed
her son to DCF. See [Doc. No. 48-8 at 18] (“A. [DCF] had thought if I was upset talking about
[my husband], it would impact [my son]. I do not necessarily agree with these comments, but that
is how they put it. Q. So you allowed the individual to take [your son] from you? A. Yeah, I guess
so, if you can call being – yeah . . .”). According to the DCF report, Plaintiff’s father agreed to
take on primary care duties while Plaintiff was in the hospital. See [Doc. No. 48-13 at 9].
According to the application for authorization of Plaintiff’s temporary involuntary
commitment, the identified applicant is MWH physician Dr. Shannon Bottari, not any of the
Defendant Officers. See [Doc. No. 48-15 at 1]. The application cites as evidence of Plaintiff’s
mental illness that the Defendant Officers suspected Plaintiff was suffering “paranoid delusions”
and that Plaintiff was allegedly barricading herself in her room. [Id.]. Plaintiff was hospitalized for
a period of approximately three days: from June 14 to June 17, 2020. [Doc. No. 48-16]. Plaintiff
was diagnosed with postpartum psychosis during this stay. [Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 53]. Plaintiff alleges
that her diagnosis is wrong because it was based, at least in part, on the flawed history that the
Defendant Officers conveyed to the doctors. See generally [Doc. No. 58].
On June 17, 2020, Plaintiff’s husband filed for a restraining order, citing Plaintiff’s
hospitalization as justification. [Doc No. 50 at ¶ 55; Doc. No. 48-12 at 8]. The Woburn District
Court granted the restraining order thereby granting Plaintiff’s husband temporary full custody of
the child. [Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 56; Doc. No. 48-12 at 8].
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the record, “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed
in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue
in favor of either party.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
1990) (citation omitted). To prevail, the moving party must show that “there is no factual
determination which a ‘rational factfinder’ could make as to the ‘existence or nonexistence’ of a
fact that ‘has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.’” Gibson Found., Inc. v. Norris, 88
F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st
Cir. 2010)).
Courts “must consider the record and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant,” but “need not credit ‘conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation.’” Dixon-Tribou v. McDonough, 86 F.4th 453, 458 (1st
Cir. 2023) (quoting Lahens v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc., 28 F.4th 325, 333 (1st Cir. 2022)).
The non-moving party may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials,” but instead “must
present affirmative evidence.” Sterilite Corp. v. Olivet Intern’l Inc., 22-cv-10327, 2024 WL
_______ (D. Mass. 2024) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986));
Bellone v. Southwick-Tolland Regional School District, 748 F.3d 418, 424 (1st Cir. 2014). In
reviewing a summary judgment motion, a court may examine “all of the record materials on file”
“including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations…or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 495 (1st
Cir. 2014).
IV. DISCUSSION
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, I construe her challenges to Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment liberally. See Jones v. Mitchell, 2022 WL 3754846, at *1 (1st Cir. June 3,
2022) (“We construe liberally the challenges raised by Jones, who proceeds pro se on appeal.”);
Miller v. Kopelman & Paige, P.C., 2008 WL 11388634, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing
Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997)) (“The pleadings of pro se litigants must
be liberally construed….”); but see id. (“[P]ro se status does not insulate a party from complying
with procedural and substantive law.”).
A. Claims Against The Defendant Officers
Plaintiff alleges nine claims against the Defendant Officers: false imprisonment (Count
One), excessive force (Count Two), abuse of process (Count Three), negligence (Count Five),
negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Seven), intentional infliction of emotional distress
(Count Eight), loss of consortium (Count Nine), violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
(Count Ten), and interference with the parent-child relationship (Count Eleven). See generally
[Doc. No. 1-3]. Summary judgment of all nine claims is appropriate.
1. False Imprisonment (Count One)
Plaintiff brings a claim for false imprisonment on the basis that the Defendant Officers
manipulated MWH staff into having her involuntarily and unlawfully committed. See [Doc. No.
1-3 at ¶ 82] (“Defendants acting under color of law, intentionally and unlawfully restrained the
Plaintiff through trickery by having her present to the emergency department leading to her
unsubstantiated Section 12 confinement, thereby directly confining the Plaintiff against her will.”);
[Doc. No. 58 at 2] (“Defendant’s intentionally and unlawfully restrained the Plaintiff through using
their influence and authority under color of law, over the Plaintiff, the emergency department staff,
and other local government actors leading to her unsubstantiated Section 12 confinement….”); [id.
at 8] (“[T]he officers specifically requested of MWH staff that Plaintiff be held against her
will….”).
“[T]o succeed on a claim of false imprisonment, a party must show an intentional and
unlawful confinement of a person, either directly or indirectly, of which the person confined is
conscious or is harmed by such confinement.” See Mackey v. Town of Tewksbury, 433 F. Supp. 3d
116, 167 (D. Mass. 2020) (citation and quotations omitted). Confinement can be imposed by
physical barriers or physical force, but threats may also suffice so long as the actor “has the
apparent intention and ability to apply force to the other’s person immediately upon the other’s
attempting to escape from the area [of confinement].” Steiner v. eBay, Inc., 21-cv-11181, 2025
WL 2318805, at *10 (D. Mass. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d
51, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 40 & cmt. a); Gallagher v. South
Shore Hospital, Inc., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 807, 831–32 (2022) (citations omitted) (“To establish a
claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘impos[ed] by force or
threats an unlawful restraint upon freedom of movement.’”). “An actor has the requisite intent
when ‘his act was done for the purpose of imposing confinement upon the other or with knowledge
that such confinement would, to a substantial certainty, result from it.’” Steiner, 2025 WL
2318805, at *10 (citation omitted).
Here, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was involuntarily committed at MWH for
several days. [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 45–46, 51–52]. Instead, they argue that the claim fails because the
hospital, not the Defendant Officers, caused Plaintiff’s confinement. See [Doc. No. 49 at 7] (“The
psychiatric evaluation of the Plaintiff, which ultimately led to her involuntary hospitalization, was
carried out by MWH staff… Defendants simply were not involved in making the determination to
admit or prevent her from leaving MWH.”). I agree that the hospital is responsible for
implementing the Section 12 hospitalization.
Upon arriving at the hospital, Stefanelli helped Plaintiff check in her son, who was
examined. [Doc. No. at ¶ 40]. After Plaintiff and her son went into an examination room, Stefanelli
informed hospital staff that he was also concerned about Plaintiff’s mental state. [Id. at ¶¶ 40–41].
He relayed what Plaintiff had shared with him during their initial phone conversation as well as
conversations and observations from the home visit, and he informed the doctors of his suspicions
of mental illness. [Id. at ¶¶ 42–43]. The Defendant Officers had no further contact with the hospital
staff or Plaintiff and left. [Id. at ¶ 44; Doc. No. 48-8 at 16]. After the Defendant Officers left,
Plaintiff was evaluated by MWH emergency room physician, Dr. Shannon Bottari, who moved to
admit Plaintiff pursuant to Section 12(a). See generally [Doc. Nos. 48-14; Doc. No. 48-15 at 1].
Since Dr. Bottari examined and applied for Plaintiff’s admission after the Defendant Officers had
left the hospital, Plaintiff cannot say that the Defendant Officers are liable for her confinement.
But “a person can be liable for false imprisonment carried about by third parties if they
engage in conduct that sets in motion a false imprisonment knowing that there was no lawful basis
for the imprisonment.” Gallagher, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 832 (citation omitted) (“[I]f jury found
that defendant . . . caused physician by false statements to request commitment of plaintiff . . .
defendant would be liable….”). Therefore, I must also consider whether the Defendant Officers
indirectly caused Plaintiff’s confinement.
Here, it is clear that Dr. Bottari’s decision to commit Plaintiff took the Defendant Officers’
statements into account. On her application for involuntary hospitalization, Dr. Bottari cited as
evidence of Plaintiff’s potential mental illness that the Defendant Officers suspected that Plaintiff
was experiencing paranoid delusions. [Doc. No. 48-15 at 1] (“? Paranoid delusions per police
report – experience LT. police suspicious”). Her application also stated that Plaintiff was
barricading herself in her room because she believed her husband was causing injury to their child
and that her husband cuts “jigsaw” patterns into her fingernails. [Id.]. Additionally, Dr. Bottari’s
emergency room report states that the Defendant Officers “recommended to section 12” and that
she agreed to admit them “based on their [summary of the Patient’s] history and concern for the
family’s safety.” [Doc. No. 48-14 at 1].
As an initial matter, that Dr. Bottari considered the Defendant Officer’s concerns and
assumed as true the facts as they were relayed to her does not mean that she supplanted her own
medical judgment for that of the Defendant Officers’. It simply means that she agreed with their
assessment, which she indicated in Plaintiff’s medical records. [Id. at 1] (“They recommended to
section 12, which I agreed to….”); see [Doc. No. 48-15 at 1] (checking box indicating she
personally examined Plaintiff). In addition, Plaintiff does not dispute that either she or her husband
made these statements to the Defendant Officers. See [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 12–15]; see generally
[Doc. No. 58] (failing to object to Defendants’ statements of fact). Absent proof that the Defendant
Officers relayed false statements to Dr. Bottari, let alone that they did so intentionally, Plaintiff
cannot show that the Defendant Officers “engage[d] in conduct that sets in motion a false
imprisonment knowing that there was no lawful basis for the imprisonment.” See Gallagher, 101
Mass.App.Ct. at 832.
It is unclear whether Plaintiff alleges that she was falsely imprisoned during her drive to
the hospital because she “drove her baby to the hospital at the Defendant Officers’ request.” [Doc.
No. 58 at 8]; see [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 82] (“Defendants… intentionally and unlawfully restrained the
Plaintiff through trickery by having her present to the emergency department….”). Defendants
argue that Plaintiff was not falsely imprisoned during her drive because there is no evidence that
the Defendant Officers used or threatened to use force. See [Doc. No. 49 at 7]. I agree.
The record is clear that Plaintiff willingly complied with the Defendant Officers’
suggestion to bring her son to the hospital because she believed this to be a necessary step in
obtaining a restraining order against her husband and consequently agreed it was a good idea to
get her son checked out. See [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶37–39] (“They said … that it was required for me
to take [my son] to the hospital if I was, in fact, concerned about my husband’s behavior, and that
was the only way to get a restraining order….”); [Doc. No. 48-8 at 14–15] (“Q. What did you do
next when they said you should take the baby to the hospital; did you agree? A. Yes.”); [Doc. No.
48-5 at 72] (“Q. It’s fair to say that [Plaintiff] cooperated with you as far as deciding that she would
go to [the hospital], she didn’t resist? A. No. She cooperated in that she believed her newborn son
was being evaluated.”); see also [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 37–39]. The Defendant Officers neither drove
Plaintiff and her son to the hospital in their police cruisers nor called for an ambulance to transport
them. See [Doc. No. 50 at ¶ 39]. Instead, Plaintiff drove her son in her personal vehicle, and the
officers followed. See [Doc. No. 48-12 at 67] (“Q. [Plaintiff] went to the hospital voluntarily and
did [the Defendant Officers] follow her? A. Yes.”). Plaintiff does not cite, nor am I aware of, any
evidence suggesting that the Defendant Officers used force, threats, or intimidation to compel an
otherwise involuntary Plaintiff to appear at the hospital and there is also no evidence that the
Defendant Officers were prepared to use force to get Plaintiff to go to the hospital; by all accounts,
Plaintiff traveled to MWH on her own accord, even if for a misinformed purpose.
Because Plaintiff cannot show that she was confined by the Defendant Officers, her claim
for false imprisonment (Count One) fails. Accordingly, I need not address Plaintiff’s allegations
that her Section 12 hospitalization was improper.
2. Excessive Force (Count Two)
Turning to Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at threshold, I must
determine whether it should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment. “To make out a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show, as
an initial matter, that there was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Conlon
v. Scaltreto, 2025 WL 2976531, at *3 (1st Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (citation omitted). But where a
person is subjected to force without being seized, the claim is analyzed as a substantive due process
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833 (1998). Plaintiff’s claim fails under both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment because there was no “seizure” and there was no “use of force.”
The undisputed facts make plain that Plaintiff was not arrested, detained, restrained, or
otherwise “seized” as traditionally understood under the Fourth Amendment. And as explained
above, it was the hospital staff, not the Defendant Officers, who instituted Plaintiff’s Section 12
confinement. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants . . . used excessive and unreasonable force
through coercion and trickery in the course of placing Plaintiff under a Section 12 . . . ,” [Doc. No.
1-3 at ¶ 86], and that the Defendant Officers “were armed,” [Doc. No. 58 at 8]. Plaintiff has not
pointed to any authority, nor am I aware of any, that holds that coercion or trickery in similar
circumstances as here may constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the fact that the officers were armed, standing alone, cannot constitute a use of force
such that an encounter turns into a seizure. See U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002) (“That
most law enforcement officers are armed is a fact well known to the public. The presence of a
holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active
brandishing of the weapon.”). Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force (Count Two) is dismissed.
3. Abuse of Process (Count Three)
Count Three asserts a claim for abuse of process. [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 89–96]. “The
elements of an abuse of process claim are (1) the defendant used ‘process’ (2) for an ulterior or
illegitimate purpose (3) resulting in damage.” Cabot v. Lewis, 241 F. Supp. 3d 239, 259 (D. Mass.
2017) (quoting Millenium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 636 (2010)).
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because “Plaintiff can identify no
legal process which the Defendants effectuated as none of them has brought criminal charges or
any lawsuit against the Plaintiff nor has Plaintiff identified any ulterior motive or illegitimate
purpose. [Doc. No. 49 at 9–10]. Plaintiff refers to two types of legal processes in her complaint:
involuntary admission to a hospital pursuant to Section 12 and obtaining a restraining order
pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 209A. See [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 89–96]. However, as explained above, the
Defendant Officers did not initiate Plaintiff’s Section 12 admission. Additionally, Plaintiff admits
that her husband, not the Defendant Officers, applied for the 209A restraining order. [Doc. No. 1-
3 at ¶ 93] (“By the Defendants initiating said [Section 12] process a third party, [husband], was
able to utilize this to obtain an emergency restraining order against Plaintiff through the Woburn
District Court and deprive her of her infant son who was placed in his care.”). Plaintiff’s abuse of
process claim (Count Three) therefore must fail because she cannot show that the Defendant
Officers used either of the legal processes she identified.
4. Negligence (Count Five) And Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress (Count Six)
Count Four asserts a claim for negligence on the basis that the Defendant Officers
“breached the duty of reasonable care owed to Plaintiff when they negligently, carelessly, and
recklessly falsely and unlawfully detained Plaintiff . . . [and] falsely imprisoned Plaintiff and
subsequent abuse [sic] of process.” [Id. at ¶¶ 105–09]. Count Six asserts a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress based upon the same alleged breach of duty. See [id. at ¶¶ 118–24].
Because the Defendant Officers did not detain or imprison Plaintiff or abuse process, as previously
explained, Count Four and Count Six both fail.
In her opposition, Plaintiff raises several new theories of negligence: that the Defendant
Officers incompetently or maliciously obstructed Plaintiff’s filing of a 209A restraining order and
failed to investigate claims of physical assault. [Doc. No. 58 at 9]. A party cannot allege new
theories of liability in an opposition to summary judgment. See Estrada v. Progressive Direct Ins.
Co., 53 F.Supp.3d 484, 497 (D. Mass. 2014) (“Plaintiffs cannot now introduce an entirely new
theory of liability in their summary judgment papers.”).
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Eight)
Count Eight raises a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See [Doc. No. 1-
3 at ¶¶ 125–30]. To succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff
must show ‘(1) that the defendant intended to cause, or should have known that his conduct would
case, emotional distress; (2) that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the
defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered severe
distress. To be considered extreme and outrageous, the defendant’s conduct must be beyond all
bounds of decency and . . . utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Hellenga v. Controlled
Risk Inc. Co. of Vermont, Inc., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1111, 2014 WL 1302078, at *1 (2014) (citation
omitted). “Conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous only if it ‘go[es] beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379, 386 (2014) (citation omitted).
As articulated in the complaint, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress merely alleges the elements of the claim without any recitation of facts in support of the
claim. See [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 125–30]. Defendants argue for dismissal of the claim on the basis
that Plaintiffs’ interactions with the Defendant Officers were “cordial” and “cooperative” and that
“Plaintiff fails to show any instances of conduct that meet the threshold of extreme and
outrageous.” [Doc. No. 49 at 13–14]. In her opposition, Plaintiff alleges without citation to
evidence that the Defendant Officers “repeatedly and falsely denied under oath actions clearly
evidenced in medical and DCF records showing their intent to inappropriately separate a first-time
nursing mother from her newborn baby indefinitely and against her will.” [Doc. No. 58 at 9].
Plaintiff’s response fails for multiple reasons. First, as explained above, hospital staff (and,
under the same logic, DCF workers) independently determined that Plaintiff might have been
suffering mental health issues, and the Defendant Officers therefore are not responsible for
committing Plaintiff. Relatedly, DCF’s decision to take the child was based on the physician’s
concerns for Plaintiff’s mental health and not on the Defendant Officer’s concerns. See [Doc. No.
48-13 at 6] (“We informed mother that this decision was not based on her parenting skills and only
because there are concerns from the hospital about her mental health, we all agreed that she is a
wonderful mother and will receive the help she needs before returning to her son.”). Second,
Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence to support her argument, a necessary requirement at the summary
judgment stage. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (“[A] party opposing
a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’”). Third, even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Plaintiff cannot show that the
Defendant Officers’ conduct rises to the level of extreme or outrageous. Consequently, Plaintiff’s
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count Eight) is dismissed.
6. Loss of Consortium (Count Nine)
Plaintiff raises a claim under M.G.L. ch. 231, § 85X for the loss of consortium of her son.
See [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 131–34; Doc. No. 58 at 6]. Section 85X provides parents with “a cause of
action for the loss of consortium of the child who has been seriously injured against any person
who is legally responsible for causing such injury.” M.G.L. ch. 231, § 85X.
Defendants argue that this claim fails on the merits because Plaintiff has not provided any
evidence whatsoever that her son sustained a serious injury, a required element of her loss of
consortium claim. See [Doc. No. 49 at 14–15] (noting Plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to supply any medical
records, school records, or other psychotherapy records” indicating an injury to her child). I agree.
Plaintiff generically states in her complaint that the Defendant Officers “caused injury to
Plaintiff’s infant son,” but she does not identify what those injuries might have been or explain
how her son’s injuries result in a loss of his society. See [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 133]. Plaintiff then
alleges in her opposition that her hospitalization and the Defendant Officers’ “request[] that DCF
take her newborn baby away from her” deprived her child of his “main source of sustenance at the
time,” but she does not explain why alternative sources of sustenance (such as formula) were
insufficient or how this alleged deprivation caused the child serious harm. See [Doc. No. 58 at 9].
Such unsupported allegations are insufficient to create a dispute of material fact. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”). And, in fact, the record
suggests that Plaintiff did breastfeed during at least a portion of her stay at MWH. See [Doc. No.
48-17 at 2] (Emergency Room Report Dated 06/14/2020: “[M]om was very cooperative and
comfortably nursing her baby in her arms… [M]om is currently nurturing and breast-feeding her
baby safely.”).
In addition, as explained above, the hospital rather than the Defendant Officers are
responsible for Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment and DCF’s decision to remove Plaintiff’s child
from her was based on the hospital’s determination and not the Defendant Officers’ concerns
regarding Plaintiff’s mental state. As a result, Plaintiff’s claim for loss of consortium (Count Nine)
is dismissed.
7. Massachusetts Civil Rights Violations (Count Ten)
Count Ten asserts a claim for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”)
on the basis of racial discrimination. See [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 135–40] (“Defendants… failed to
provide bias free professional policing and Equal Protection under the Law… [and] intimidated,
threatened, and/or coerced Plaintiff based on her race and ethnic background….”).
To establish a claim under the MCRA, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) their exercise or
enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or law of either the United States or of the
Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the
interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’” Reproductive
Rights Network v. President of Univ. of Mass., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 505 (1998) (quoting Swanset
Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 423 Mass. 390, 395 (1996)). Defendants argue that the claim should be
dismissed because, among other reasons, Plaintiff cannot show that she was threatened,
intimidated, or coerced within the meaning of the MCRA. [Doc. No. 49 at 15–17].
A threat under the MCRA requires “the intentional exertion of pressure to make another
fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm.” Reprod. Rights Network, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 505.
Similarly, intimidation requires “putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring
conduct.” Id. Plaintiff does not specifically allege how the Defendant Officers might have caused
her to become fearful, and the record does not support such a claim. See [Doc. No. 49 at 16]
(describing interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Officers as “cordial”); see generally [Doc.
Nos. 1-3, 58]. Plaintiff’s suspicions and fears regarding her husband existed before Plaintiff met
the Defendant Officers and were the reason she originally sought help. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the Defendant Officers caused those fears, let alone that they did so intentionally or for the
purpose of compelling certain conduct.
It also cannot be said that Plaintiff was coerced into going to the hospital. Coercion under
the MCRA requires “the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to
constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.” Reprod. Rights
Network, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 505. Here, the Defendant Officers recommended that Plaintiff’s son
get examined by a medical professional, and Plaintiff agreed that was in his best interest and
brought him to the hospital. See [Doc. No. 48-8 at 13–15] (“Q. And did you understand that they
were concerned about the wellbeing of the baby? A. Yes. That was a shared concern, I suppose.
Q. Shared by you and by the police officers? A. Correct… Q. What did you do next when they
said you should take the baby to the hospital; did you agree? A. Yes.”). Even if Plaintiff was, in
fact, “tricked” as she alleges, there is still no evidence that she was forced to bring her son to the
hospital for a wellness check against her will. As discussed above, there was no use of force and,
by all accounts, she consistently sought to protect her child in the ways she thought best, e.g., by
limiting and supervising her husband’s visits with their child and requesting legal help, and there
is no evidence she would have been unwilling to get her son examined absent police intervention.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that she was involuntarily hospitalized as a result of her race,
the argument fails because, as previously explained, the Defendant Officers are not responsible for
Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalization and because there is no evidence, only conclusory
statements, of racial discrimination. See [Doc. No. 1-3 at 136] (stating Defendants “unlawfully
caus[ed] the detainment… thereby depriving Plaintiff of her … liberty and to be free form [sic]
unreasonable searches and seizures”).
Because Plaintiff cannot show that her rights were interfered with through “threats,
intimidation, or coercion,” her claim alleging a violation of the MCRA (Count Ten) fails.
8. Interference With Parent-Child Relationship (Count Eleven)
Plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship alleges the
Defendant Officers tricked her into bringing her son to the hospital with the intention of having
DCF remove him from her care. [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 141–47] (“When Defendants induced Plaintiff
to present to the emergency department with her infant son, they intended to have the Department
of Children and Families remove him from her care.”). Defendants argue that this claim should be
dismissed because there is no evidence the Defendant Officers intended to separate Plaintiff from
her child and because they “played no other role in Plaintiff’s child being removed from her
custody.” See [Doc. No. 49 at 17–18].
The tort of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship is intended to grant
redress for a loss of filial consortium that results from “abduction, enticement, and harboring and
secreting of minor children from their parents.” Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. Of New England, Inc., 409
Mass. 842, 860 (1991). To succeed on a claim for abduction, a plaintiff must show “the physical
taking of a minor child from the parent having legal custody.” Id. (citation omitted). “An action
for enticement will lie where one, through an ‘active and wrongful effort’ and knowing that the
parent does not consent, induced a child to leave the parent’s home.” Id. (citation omitted). “One
‘harbors’ a minor child by inducing or encouraging a child, who is away from the parent without
the parent’s consent, to remain away from the parent.” Id. (citation omitted).
Defendants admit that the Defendant Officers informed DCF of their concerns over
Plaintiff’s mental state and encouraged her to go to the hospital to get her son evaluated, and they
also admit that these incidents “ultimately led to Plaintiff being temporarily separated from her
child.” [Doc. No. 49 at 17–18]. But Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant Officers abducted,
enticed, or concealed Plaintiff’s infant son. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was still in physical
custody of her son when the Defendant Officers left the hospital, and, as explained above, the
hospital staff and DCF workers independently determined that Plaintiff was experiencing mental
health issues. See [Doc. No. 50 at ¶¶ 40–44]. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish that the
Defendant Officers removed her son through a physical taking or inducement. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship (Count Eleven) fails.
9. Qualified Immunity
I need not address Defendants’ argument that the claims against the Defendant Officers are
barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity because Plaintiff’s claims have been properly
dismissed on the merits.
B. Claims Against The Town
Plaintiff alleges two claims against the Town: negligence (Count Four) and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (Count Six). [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 97–104, 110–17]. Summary
judgment of both claims is warranted.
1. Negligence (Count Four)
Count Four raises a claim for negligence. [Id. at ¶¶ 97–104]. Defendants argue that the
claim should be dismissed because it is barred by numerous provisions within M.G.L. ch. 258, §
10. See [Doc. No. 49 at 10–11] (arguing that Count Four is barred by subsections 10(b), 10(h), and
10(j)). In her opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute this argument and instead argues that the
doctrine of comparative negligence does not preclude liability. See [Doc. No. 58 at 9].
Plaintiff’s claim is barred because it falls within the discretionary acts exemption to the
Massachusetts Tort Claims provided in M.G.L. ch. 258, § 10(b). Subsection 10(b) exempts from
liability “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the party of a public employer or public employee, acting within
the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.” M.G.L.
ch. 258, § 10(b). Plaintiff alleges that the Town breached its duty of reasonable care when it “failed
to handle, address, and/or otherwise properly investigate Plaintiff’s complaints regarding [her
husband].” [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 99]. Courts have long held that “[d]ecisions regarding when, when,
how, and whom to investigate… are discretionary and fall within the discretionary functions
exception.” [Doc. No. 49 at 11] (quoting Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 257 (1994)).
Thus, any claims based on the manner in which the Defendant Officers investigated Plaintiff’s
allegations against her husband are barred by subsection 10(b).
2. Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress (Count Six)
Defendants move for summary judgment of Count Six based on a misunderstanding that
the cause of action alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. See [Doc. No. 49 at 13]
(“The Plaintiff’s Claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI) Against the
Town Fails as a Matter of Law”). Defendants’ argument that municipalities are not liable for the
intentional torts of their employees is therefore irrelevant because the cause of action is for
negligent, not intentional, infliction of emotional distress. [Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶¶ 110–17].
Nevertheless, because Count Six is based on the same alleged breach of duty as Count Four, it is
denied for the same reasons that Count Four is denied. See [id. at ¶ 112] (“Defendant Stoneham
breached its duty of reasonable care to the Plaintiff when it… failed to handle, address, and/or
otherwise properly investigate Plaintiff’s complaints regarding [her husband].”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [Doc. No.
48], is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Myong J. Joun
United States District Judge