Levy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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AT SEATTLE

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10 GARY LEVY, CASE NO. C23-1678JLR

11 Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

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GOOGLE LLC,

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Defendant.

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15 I. INTRODUCTION

16 Before the court are two motions by pro se Plaintiff Gary Levy: (1) an

17 “Emergency Motion to Clarify Protective Order” (Motion to Clarify (Dkt. # 49); Motion

18 to Clarify Reply (Dkt. # 63)) and (2) an ex parte “Emergency Motion for Guidance,

19 Extend Dispositive Deadline: 10/20/25, Amend Protective Order, Rule 56d Items &

20 Extend Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s MSJ” (Motion for Guidance (Dkt. # 65)).

21 Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) opposes the motion to clarify. (Resp. (Dkt. # 61).)

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1 The court has considered the motions, the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of

2 the record, and the governing law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES the motions.

3 II. BACKGROUND1

4 Mr. Levy filed his motion to clarify on October 17, 2025. (Motion to Clarify.) He

5 “seeks emergency clarification that [the parties’ stipulated] Protective Order does not

6 restrict communications with government agencies.” (Id. at 1; see Stip. Prot. Order (Dkt.

7 # 17).) He asserts that the stipulated protective order “lacks agency carveouts” in

8 violation of 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17; that “[f]ederal whistleblower law preempts court

9 orders[;]” that Google has admitted that there was “no restriction intended” in the

10 stipulated protective order; and that he has been “chilled” from communicating with the

11 Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Department of Justice, and other agencies

12 since September 9, 2024, when the stipulated protective order was entered. (Motion to

13 Clarify at 2-4.) He asks for “immediate clarification” that the stipulated protective order

14 does not restrict his ability to communicate with agencies; a modification of the

15 Attorneys Eyes Only (“AEO”) provision of the order; a 21-day “deadline extension[;]”

16 “cost-shifting[;]” and sanctions against Google pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (Id. at 5.)

17 Mr. Levy does not point to the specific language in the stipulated protective order that he

18 finds objectionable; identify which documents, if any, should have “confidential” or

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1 The court has set forth the recent procedural history of this case in multiple orders and

does not repeat that history here except as relevant to the motions now before the court. (See

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10/15/25 Order (Dkt. # 46); 10/23/25 Order (Dkt. # 56); 10/28/25 Order (Dkt. # 58).)

1 “AEO” designations removed; or explain the basis for his purported entitlement to cost-

2 shifting. (See generally id.)

3 Google responds that it informed Mr. Levy that the stipulated protective order

4 does not prohibit him from communicating with federal agencies, including the SEC.

5 (Motion to Clarify Resp. at 2-3 (citing Fredrickson Decl. (Dkt. # 62) ¶ 2, Ex. 1).) Rather,

6 according to Google, Mr. Levy is barred only from disclosing materials protected by the

7 stipulated protective order to an agency unless (1) the confidentiality designations are

8 removed by Google or by court order or (2) the agency issues a subpoena for the

9 documents. (Id. at 3.) Google further argues that Mr. Levy cannot now attempt to

10 relitigate issues that it had previously resolved with his former attorney, such as the

11 language of the stipulated protective order and a stipulation that the parties had

12 completed discovery. (Id. at 2; see 8/7/25 Stip. Mot. (Dkt. # 23) at 1.)

13 Mr. Levy filed a reply in support of his motion to clarify on November 10, 2025.

14 (Motion to Clarify Reply.) He asks the court (1) to “[a]dd carve-out language for US

15 agencies with no limitations on disclosure,” (2) to extend the “October 20, 2025

16 dispositive deadline” to “enable Mr. Levy to engage US agencies” and move to amend

17 his complaint, and (3) for “cost-shifting.” (Id. at 1.) Mr. Levy further argues that his

18 whistleblower claims have merit; that Google’s discovery production and depositions

19 revealed further evidence of statutory and policy violations; that his prior attorneys

20 “bypass[ed]” him when working with Google’s attorneys; and that the stipulated

21 protective order and its process for removing a confidentiality designation “impede[s]”

22 his ability to communicate directly with SEC staff. (Id. at 4-5.)

1 Mr. Levy did not respond to Google’s pending motion for summary judgment by

2 his November 12, 2025 deadline to do so. (See 10/28/25 Order at 6 (ordering Mr. Levy

3 to file his response to the motion for summary judgment by no later than November 12,

4 2025, and stating that “the court cannot and will not grant any further extensions” of that

5 deadline); see also id. at 2 (noting that Mr. Levy’s original deadline to respond to the

6 motion for summary judgment was September 19, 2025).) Google filed its reply in

7 support of its motion for summary judgment on November 13, 2025. (MSJ Reply (Dkt.

8 # 64).) Later that same day, Mr. Levy filed his ex parte motion for guidance, in which he

9 avers “that there are requests for guidance and or orders that precede [Google’s reply]

10 and which directly impact [Mr. Levy’s] Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

11 Judgment.” (Motion for Guidance.)

12 III. ANALYSIS

13 The court denies Mr. Levy’s motions to clarify and for guidance. The motions, at

14 their core, seek leave to relitigate matters that Mr. Levy’s former counsel had already

15 resolved, including the terms of the parties’ stipulated protective order and the scope of

16 discovery. (See generally Motion to Clarify; Motion for Guidance; see also 10/15/25

17 Order (discussing Mr. Levy’s earlier motions relating to discovery); 10/23/25 Order

18 (same); 10/28/25 Order (same).) The court finds, however, that “allowing [Mr. Levy] to

19 restart the litigation at this stage because [his] choice of counsel went awry would unduly

20 prejudice [Google] and interfere with the timely and efficient administration of justice.”

21 Nguyen v. Mercer Island Boys Basketball Booster Club, No. C23-0855RSL, 2024 WL

22 4437782, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2024) (denying plaintiffs’ request to reopen

1 discovery and to “correct what they see as the errors and omissions of their prior counsel”

2 after their prior counsel withdrew). As this court has observed, “[i]t is well settled . . .

3 that a client, having chosen [his] representative and agreed to have counsel act as [his]

4 agent before the [c]ourt, is bound by counsel’s representations and actions.” Id. As a

5 result, “[i]n cases such as this, the client’s remedy is a malpractice case against prior

6 counsel, not starting the litigation anew.” Id. (citing Nealey v. Transport. Maritima

7 Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1282 n.13 (9th Cir. 1980); Link v. Wasbash R.R. Co., 370

8 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962) (“[I]f an attorney’s conduct falls substantially below what is

9 reasonable under the circumstances, the client’s remedy is against the attorney in a suit

10 for malpractice.”); Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The civil

11 remedy is damages for malpractice”)). Thus, the court denies Mr. Levy’s requests to

12 modify the stipulated protective order and to reopen discovery.

13 The court also denies Mr. Levy’s requests to extend his deadlines to respond to the

14 motion for summary judgment and to amend his complaint. First, the court has already

15 extended Mr. Levy’s deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment from the

16 21 days provided under the court’s Local Civil Rules to 54 days. (See 10/15/25 Order;

17 10/23/25 Order; 10/28/25 Order.) The court made clear in its October 28, 2025 order that

18 it could not and would not further extend this deadline in light of the rapidly approaching

19 trial date. (10/28/25 Order at 6.) Mr. Levy’s assertion that he was awaiting the court’s

20 ruling on his motion to clarify before filing his response does not change the court’s view

21 because, under Local Civil Rule 7(j), “[p]arties should not assume that [a motion for

22 relief from a deadline] will be granted and must comply with the existing deadline unless

1 the court orders otherwise.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(j) (emphasis added).

2 Second, the court denies Mr. Levy’s request for leave to file a motion to amend his

3 complaint because adding new claims over a year and a half after the deadline to amend

4 pleadings expired and at this late stage of the litigation would prejudice Google. (See

5 12/20/23 Sched. Order (Dkt. # 12) (setting a February 1, 2024 deadline to amend

6 pleadings)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause

7 and with the judge’s consent.”); Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir.

8 1990) (instructing courts assessing a motion for leave to amend to consider five factors:

9 (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of

10 amendment, and (5) whether the party has previously amended its pleading).2 The court

11 will decide Google’s motion for summary judgment on the record now before it.

12 IV. CONCLUSION

13 For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Mr. Levy’s motions to clarify and

14 for guidance (Dkt. ## 49, 65).

15 Dated this 14th day of November, 2025.

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A

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18 JAMES L. ROBART

United States District Judge

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2 Because the court denies the substantive portions of Mr. Levy’s motions, it also denies

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his requests for “cost-shifting” and for sanctions. (See Motion to Clarify at 5.)