Mejia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MICHAEL MEJIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25-cv-01453-MMM

)

STERLING ADAMS, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se on a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,

liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th

Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts

must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v.

United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names Internal Affairs Officer Sterling Adams, John Does 1 and 2,

Reviewing Officer A. Thompson, Lieutenant C. Myers, Grievance Officer Kellie Dennis,

Warden Cherryle Hinthorne, Administrative Review Board member Ryan Kilduf,

Lieutenant Shawn Thrush, Correctional Officer Mason Guerra, and Illinois Department

of Corrections Director Latoya Hughes, as Defendants.

Investigative Report Issues

On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in segregation at Illinois River Correctional

Center. On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff was served with an Investigative Disciplinary Report.

The Investigative Report was authored by Defendant Myers, reviewed by Defendant

Thompson, investigated by Doe 2 and reviewed by Doe 1. The Investigative Report

“listed Plaintiff in observation as Kevon Cooper ID# Y53375. Ironically, it then goes on

to state that ‘Mejia identified by state issued ID and O360 [Offender 360 housing

placement software].’” Plaintiff alleges these Defendants failed to abide by the

Administrative Codes, thereby violating Plaintiff’s due process rights.

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the Investigative Report.

On June 12, Defendant Dennis upheld the issuance of the Investigative Report via

denial of Plaintiff’s grievance. Plaintiff asserts that this was a Fourteenth Amendment

violation. On June 12, 2023, Defendant Warden Hinthorne upheld the issuance of the

Investigative Report by concurring with Dennis’s denial of Plaintiff’s grievance.

Plaintiff was, apparently, transferred to Western Illinois Correctional Center from

Illinois River Correctional Center during this timeframe. Hinthorne did not mail the

grievance denial decision to Plaintiff until September 1, 2023, so Plaintiff missed his 30-

day deadline to appeal to the Administrative Review Board. Plaintiff wrote to

Defendant Kilduf informing him that the late appeal was due to Hinthorne’s delay.

Kilduf deemed Plaintiff’s grievance moot because Kilduf conflated Plaintiff’s grievance

regarding the Investigative Report with a later grievance Plaintiff filed regarding a

Disciplinary Report (discussed below). Plaintiff forwarded Defendant Director Hughes

correspondence about the Disciplinary Report that replaced the Investigatory Report,

and asked Hughes to direct Kilduf to address Plaintiff’s grievance regarding the

Investigatory Report. Plaintiff did not receive a response. Plaintiff asserts Kilduf and

Hughes thus violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by ending his

grievance and upholding the issuance of the Investigatory Report.

Disciplinary Report Issues

On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff was taken to the segregation TV room, still at Illinois

River Correctional Center. Defendant Adams attempted to question Plaintiff. Based on

the documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, Adams was questioning Plaintiff

regarding allegations that another inmate entered Plaintiff’s cell and engaged in a fight

with Plaintiff. Plaintiff told Adams that he had no statement to make. Adams told

Plaintiff that he could get Plaintiff a job in the law library if Plaintiff worked with him,

and that he could make sure Plaintiff was released from segregation without a ticket.

Plaintiff refused to make any statement. Adams then told Plaintiff that he would “make

sure Plaintiff received a ticket, and was found guilty no matter what.”

On May 11, 2023, Adams issued what Plaintiff asserts was a false Disciplinary

Report. That Disciplinary Report charged Plaintiff with: 110 Impeding an Investigation,

214 Fighting, 308 Giving False Information to an Employee, and 601 Aiding and

Abetting Unauthorized Movement. Plaintiff asserts Adams violated Plaintiff’s “First

Amendment Rights Not To Be A Snitch.”

Plaintiff went before an Adjustment Committee comprised of Defendants Thrush

and Guerra on May 19, 2023. Plaintiff was found guilty on the charges. The 601 charge

was later expunged. Plaintiff alleges Thrush and Guerra violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights through the way they handled the hearing, and the evidence they

considered and did not consider. He alleges Adams conspired with them to influence

their decision. Plaintiff was sanctioned with seven days in segregation but had already

been in segregation for eleven days by the time of the hearing.

On June 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the Disciplinary Report

and the Final Summary Report issued by the Adjustment Committee. On January 2,

2024, Kilduf and Hughes denied Plaintiff’s grievance. On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff

forwarded to Hughes correspondence about the denial of the grievance, pointing out

issues that he believed existed, and asked that the Disciplinary Report be expunged.

Plaintiff did not receive a response.

Additional Grievance

On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting compensation for the four

additional days he spent in segregation. On February 13, 2024, Kilduf and Hughes

denied the grievance.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim for relief.

First, Plaintiff does not state a First Amendment claim. To state such a claim

Plaintiff must allege that he was penalized for engaging in protected speech. See Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir.

2009). Refusing to assist in the investigation of a prison security violation is not

protected speech. Caffey v. Maue, 679 F. App’x 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017).

Prison administrators often use the “stick” of withholding amenities and

privileges to facilitate cooperation with their goals. See United States v.

Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing federal Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program). More importantly, prisoners may be compelled

to disclose information during internal investigations provided they are

not punished for refusing to make self-incriminating statements without

immunity. Riggins v. Walter, 279 F.3d 422, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). Caffey never

hinted that answering the investigators’ questions might incriminate him,

so he was not privileged to refuse.

Id.

Here, Plaintiff was offered immunity if he agreed to cooperate. When he failed to

cooperate and assist the investigation, he was, permissibly, charged with impeding the

investigation along with other related charges. Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible First

Amendment claim.

Plaintiff’s allegations also do not state a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim against any Defendant, because he has not alleged that he was deprived by the

state of any protected interest.

“When an inmate is placed in conditions more restrictive than those in the

general prison population, whether through protective segregation like suicide watch or

discretionary administrative segregation, his liberty is affected only if the more

restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if he

remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time.” Earl v. Racine Cty. Jail,

718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013); Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013)

(holding that the plaintiff’s six months and one day in disciplinary segregation did not

implicate liberty interest because he was allowed yard time and weekly showers and

was not deprived of all human contact or sensory stimuli); see also Singh v. Gegare, 651 F.

App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff’s 105 days in disciplinary

segregation did not implicate liberty interest because “he was permitted several hours

of yard time and several showers each week, as well as authorized to leave his cell for

visits and appointments”).

When assessing a claim related to disciplinary segregation, “the key comparison

is between disciplinary segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather than

between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population,” Wagner v. Hanks,

128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997), “because, in every state’s prison system, any member

of the general prison population is subject, without remedy, to assignment to

administrative segregation or protective custody at the sole discretion of prison

officials.” Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that plaintiff’s “discipline in segregated confinement did

not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest” because “disciplinary segregation, with

insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody” and thus, the plaintiff’s

“confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either

duration or degree of restriction”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he was sentenced to seven days in segregation, and due to

the administrative delay in the hearing on his charges he was held in segregation an

additional four days. This period is insufficient to indicate a loss of any protected liberty

interest. And Plaintiff has not alleged that that the conditions in disciplinary

segregation were significantly and atypically harsh compared to the conditions in

administrative or protective custody segregation, which are, by definition, already

harsh and difficult.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff will be allowed 21

days to file an amended complaint if he believes he can do so, and state a

claim, in good faith and consistent with this order. If Plaintiff does not

amend then the suit will be dismissed without prejudice.

Entered this 20th day of November, 2025.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE