MANNING

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KIEONA MANNING, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV894

)

MAPLE GROVE HEALTH & REHAB CENTER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel (Docket Entry 28). For the reasons that follow, the Court

will grant in part and will deny in part the instant Motion.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff “su[ed Defendant] for denying [her a] position as a

CNA.” (Docket Entry 4 (“Amended Complaint”) at 1.)1 According to

the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff met “all the requirements listed

on the job summary” (id.); yet – after she “showed [Defendant her

disability-related, lifting] restrictions” (id. at 2; see also id.

(“I was diagnosed with [l]umbar spine radiculopathy, [d]egenerative

[d]isc [d]isease, [and s]pinal [s]tenosis L4 & L5. This . . .

breaks down to [s]ciatica . . . .”)) – Defendant “told [her that,]

‘due to [her] restrictions[, she] could not be hired’” (id.),

despite the fact that “[t]he only accommodation [she] would have

needed would have been physical assistance when getting someone up,

1 Pin cites refer to the page numbers appearing in the footer

appended to the document upon docketing in the CM/ECF system.

having a lift to help with getting a person up, or modified

schedules when [her s]ciatica is inflamed” (id.). The Amended

Complaint “seek[s] $13,275.20 due to [Defendant] not hiring

[Plaintiff] for having [disability-related] restrictions and not

trying to accommodate [her] in any way.” (Id. at 4; see also id.

at 3 (invoking “Title I of the ADA”).)

Defendant answered (see Docket Entry 13) and discovery

commenced (see Text Order dated July 29, 2025 (“adopting” Docket

Entry 24); see also Docket Entry 24 at 1 £(proposing that

“commencement date’ of discovery will be July 28, 2025” (bold font

omitted))). On September 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant

Motion, seeking relief because Defendant objected to her discovery

demands as ™“‘vague and ambiguous’, ‘unduly burdensome’, and

‘seeking information not relevant to a claim or defense raised in

this action’ several of [sic] times with given [sic] slack answers

or not answering the questions at all.” (Docket Entry 28 at □□□□□

* Plaintiff did not file a brief in support of the instant

Motion (see Docket Entries dated Sept. 25, 2025, to present

(showing no such brief)), contrary to the requirements of the Local

Rules, see M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(a) (“All motions, unless made during a

hearing or at trial, . . . shall be accompanied by a brief except

as provided in section (j) of this rule.”) & (3) (exempting certain

motions from briefing requirement, but not discovery motions made

without agreement between the parties to resolution via expedited

procedures or consent by the opposing party to the requested

relief). Because (A) Plaintiff did include within the instant

Motion some argument and authority of the sort a brief would

contain (see Docket Entry 28 at 1-2 (discussing Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)’s definition of scope of discovery and

presenting arguments as to impropriety of Defendant’s objections to

(continued...)

Defendant has responded (see Docket Entry 31) and Plaintiff has

replied (see Docket Entry 34).

DISCUSSION

The instant Motion broadly “request[s that Defendant] provide

proper, complete, and sworn responses in how and where did they get

their answers to [Plaintiff’s] interrogatories and production.”

(Docket Entry 28 at 2; see also id. (demanding that Defendant “stop

using the lawyer tactics by saying ‘[Defendant] objects’, ‘vague

and ambiguous’, ‘unduly burdensome’, and ‘seeking information not

relevant to a claim or defense’”).) “A party seeking discovery may

move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or

inspection,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (3) (B), including when “a party

fails to answer an interrogatory,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

37 (a) (3) (B) (111), or “fails to produce documents,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

(a) (3) (B) (iv). However, “[t]he [C]ourt . . . will only address

specific interrogatories or requests for production of documents

which are brought before the [Clourt on a motion to compel... .”

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Knowles, No. 7:03CV163, 2005 WL 8159565, at *4

“(...continued)

three interrogatories)) and (B) Defendant did not raise Plaintiff’s

failure to file a brief in Defendant’s response opposing the

instant Motion (see Docket Entry 31 at 1-5 (making no mention of

missing brief)), the Court will not exercise its discretion to

summarily deny the instant Motion based on Plaintiff’s violation of

the briefing rule, see M.D.N.C. LR 7.3(k) (“A motion unaccompanied

by a required brief may, in the discretion of the Court, be

summarily denied.”). Plaintiff should understand that any future

non-compliance with the briefing requirement likely will result in

the summary denial of any motion lacking a required brief.

(E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2005) (unpublished) (emphasis added); see also,

e.g., McKelvey v. Western Reg’l Jail, No. 3:13CV22206, 2015 WL

2144668, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. May 7, 2015) (unpublished) (denying

motion to compel because moving party “failed to identify the

specific answers to interrogatories that he believe[d wel]lre

incomplete or objectionable”); Hart v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

Co., 270 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Del. 2010) (“In [his mJotion [t]o

[c]lompel, [the p]laintiff makes only generalized arguments about

[the d]efendant’s [discovery] responses, and the [c]ourt will not

undertake a review of each of the [plaintiff’s discovery] requests

without more specific guidance from [the pJlaintiff on what

responses [the plaintiff] is challenging and why.”).°

In terms of particular discovery items for which Plaintiff

would have the Court compel some further response from Defendant,

the instant Motion identifies two interrogatories by number, i.e.,

“interrogatory number five” (Docket Entry 28 at 1; see also id.

(describing interrogatory number five as “ask[ing] Defendant to

define the term ‘post-offer, pre-hire drug test’”)) and

> To the extent the instant Motion seeks to compel Defendant

to respond to Plaintiff’s “revised request for production” (Docket

Entry 28 at 1), served “[o]n September 5, 2025” (id.), and/or her

“revised [i]nterrogatories” (id.), served “[o]n September 11, 2025”

(id.), the Court agrees with Defendant that “[Plaintiff]

prematurely filed th[at aspect of the instant MJotion . . . on

September 25, 2025” (Docket Entry 31 at 2). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

33(b) (2) (generally allowing 30 days for service of interrogatory

answers and objections); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) (2) (A) (generally

allowing 30 days for document request responses).

“interrogatory number eight” (id. at 2; see also id. (describing

interrogatory number eight as “ask[ing] Defendant Have Jean

Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson, Tawanna Craft, or Scott

(no first name) ever worked on the floor to help a CNA? If so what

did you do to help a CNA?”)). The instant Motion also appends a

document labeled “15 Interrogatories” (id. at 4),* which contains

a corresponding interrogatory number five of “Define post offer -

pre hire drug test” (id.) and a corresponding interrogatory number

eight of “Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson,

Tawanna Craft, or Scott (no first name) ever worked on the floor to

help a CNA? If so what did you do to help a CNA?” (id.).

Additionally, the instant Motion quotes a third interrogatory

without giving a number: “I asked a simple question ‘who pulled

the resume and where did they pull it from?[] A. Who wrote on the

resume? B. What is it saying?[’]” (Id. at 2.) That language

corresponds to interrogatory number four from the instant Motion’s

appended document labeled “15 Interrogatories” (id. at 4). (See

id. (“4. Who pulled the resume and where did they pull it from[?]

A. Who wrote on the resume? B. What is it saying?”).)

“ After the list of “15 Interrogatories” (Docket Entry 28 at

4) - most of which consist of multiple inguiries and/or contain

multiple sub-parts (see id. at 4-5) - that appended document

continues, under the heading “Plaintiff [sic] Request for

Production of Documents” (id. at 5), with another 15-numbered list

(see id.), followed by an address block for Plaintiff and a

notation of delivery on “July 29, 2025 @ 4:42pm [by e-mail] to

[Defendant’s counsel]” (id. at 6).

As further support, Plaintiff included with the instant Motion

“Defendant[’s ] Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories” (id. at 14

(all-caps and bold font omitted)), showing that, for interrogatory

numbers four, five, and eight, Defendant gave these answers:

4. Who pulled the resume and where did they pull

it from

A. Who wrote on the resume?

B. What is it saying?

ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as

vague and ambiguous and as seeking information not

relevant to any claim or defense raised in this action.

Subject to and without waiving any objection, and

pursuant to [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 33(d),

please see document Bates-labeled [Defendant] 000013-16.

5. Define post offer - pre hire drug test?

ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as

vague and ambiguous and as seeking information not

relevant to any claim or defense raised in this action.

Plaintiff was drug tested, but the results of her drug

test are not material in this action as she was otherwise

not qualified for the position at issue.

. . . .

8. Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy

Johnson, Tawanna Craft, or Scott (no first

name) ever worked on the floor to help a CNA?

If so what did you do to help a CNA?

ANSWER: [Defendant] objects to this Interrogatory as

seeking information not relevant to a claim or defense

raised in this action. Whether a given staff member of

[Defendant] has performed a task has no bearing on

Plaintiff’s qualifications for the job at issue in her

failure to hire claim.

(Id. at 17 (bold font and underscoring omitted).)

Regarding interrogatory number four, the instant Motion

(A) asserts that Defendant’s above-quoted “answer showed how

6

[Defendant] went around in answering a simple question” (id. at 2),

(B) speculates that, in responding, Defendant just “asked the chief

human resources office or avp of employee relations who did not

know anything about [the events in question]” (id.), (C) expresses

Plaintiff’s lack of “belie[f that Defendant’s] information that was

given was given in good faith effort” (id.), and (D) accuses

Defendant of “playing dodge ball with answering [Plaintiff’s]

question” (id.), all of which supposedly “shows how [Defendants’ ]

attorney[s are] using their power with lies and avoiding to answer

[Plaintiff’s] interrogatories” (id.). In so arguing, the instant

Motion does not mention the “document Bates-labeled [Defendant]

000013-16” (id. at 17), much less explain why Defendant’s direction

of Plaintiff to that document failed to suffice under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 33(d). (See id. at 2.)

Defendant, for its part, did not directly address

interrogatory number four in responding to the instant Motion.

(See Docket Entry 31 at 1-5.)° Plaintiff’s reply likewise neglects

° Defendant’s “Legal Argument” (Docket Entry 31 at 2 (all-caps

and bold font omitted)) opposing the instant Motion contests:

1) Plaintiff’s criticism of Defendant’s objections (without

defending its objection to interrogatory number four) (see id.);

2) the overbreadth and/or irrelevance of some of Plaintiff’s

discovery requests (without specific reference to interrogatory

number four) (see id. at 2-4);

3) Plaintiff’s service of more than the limit of 15

interrogatories, considering all the discrete interrogatory sub-

(continued...)

to discuss interrogatory number four (or even to note the failure

of Defendant’s response to do so). (See Docket Entry 34 at 1-3.)

Under these circumstances, the Court exercises its discretion to

deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for relief as to

interrogatory number four. See generally Lone Star Steakhouse &

Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir.

1995) (“afford[ing ] district court[s] substantial discretion in

managing discovery”); see also Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No.

1:12CV717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014)

(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.) (“A party should not expect a court

to do the work that [the party] elected not to do.”).

Turning to interrogatory number 5, the instant Motion makes

this argument:

°(...continued)

parts and additional interrogatories masquerading as document

requests or as revisions to prior interrogatories (see id. at 3-4;

see also Docket Entry 24 at 1 (proposing limit of “15

interrogatories, including subparts” (bold font omitted)); Text

Order dated July 29, 2025 (“adopting” Docket Entry 24)), which

would not invalidate interrogatory number four (or five or eight)

as the total number of inguiries within interrogatory numbers one

through eight warranting treatment as separate interrogatories does

not appear to exceed 15 (see Docket Entry 28 at 4); and

4) Plaintiff’s resort to “ad hominem attacks on [Defendant]

and its counsel” (Docket Entry 31 at 5 (italics omitted)), which

would not require the Court to reject an otherwise valid request

for relief, even though such attacks “do nothing to advance the

litigation,” United States for the Use and Benefit of Arrow

Concrete Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 443, 445 n.2

(S.D. W. Va. 1997); see also id. at 445 & n.2 (cautioning litigants

against use of over-heated rhetoric while still resolving related

motion on merits).

[I]nterrogatory number five (5) ask[s] Defendant to

define the term “post-offer, pre-hire drug test.”

Defendant objected as vague, ambiguous, and irrelevant,

and further asserted that . . . Plaintiff[’s] drug test

results are “not material.” This objection is improper.

[Interrogatory number five] did not ask about the

results, but rather for Defendant to explain its own

definition and policy concerning post offer, pre hire

drug testing. Such information is directly relevant

under Fed[eral] R[ule of] Civ[il] P[rocedure] 26(b)(1) to

whether Defendant followed its own hiring procedures,

whether . . . Plaintiff was treated consistently with

other applicants, and whether Defendant’s stated reasons

for not hiring . . . [P]laintiff are pretextual.

Defendant should be compelled to provide a substantive

answer and produce responsive documents.

Defendant[’s] objection is improper because

[interrogatory number five] did not ask about the results

at 1st but now [Plaintiff] would like to know the

results. Defendant is arguing the merits by saying

[Plaintiff] was not qualified anyway so it does not

matter. In discovery a defendant cannot withhold

information because the[ defendant] think[s that

information] will not help [the plaintiff].

[Interrogatory number five] is relevant due to the [fact

that the] definition and timing of a post offer and pre

hire drug test goes to whether [Defendant] followed [its]

own hiring process, whether [Plaintiff] was treated

differently than others, whether [Defendant] improperly

tested [Plaintiff] before a bona fide offer, or whether

[Defendant’s] stated reason for not hiring [Plaintiff is]

shifting [and] pretextual.

(Docket Entry 28 at 1.)

This argument suffers from multiple, facially obvious flaws.

“To begin, [i]nterrogatory [number five] does not require the

production of documents,” Morley v. Energy Serv. of Am. Corp., No.

3:22CV375, 2023 WL 3167438, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 28, 2023)

(unpublished); see also Speed RMG Partners, LLC v. Arctic Cat Sales

Inc., No. 20CV609, 2021 WL 5087362, at *12 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2021)

9

(unpublished) (emphasizing that party “is not required to produce

documents in response to an interrogatory”). The Court therefore

rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that, for interrogatory number five,

“Defendant should be compelled to . . . produce responsive

documents” (Docket Entry 28 at 1). Similarly, the plain language

of interrogatory number five’s demand for Defendant to “[d]efine

post offer – pre hire drug test” (id. at 4) did not require

“Defendant to explain its . . . policy concerning post offer, pre

hire drug testing” (id. at 1). Simply put, giving one’s definition

of a term does not necessitate “explain[ing one’s] . . . policy

concerning [the term]” (id.). See https://dictionary.cambridge.org

/dictionary/english/define (defining “define” as “to say what the

meaning of something, especially a word, is” (bold font omitted))

(last visited Nov. 20, 2025).

Next, Plaintiff has contended that Defendant wrongly relied on

the immateriality of the results of her drug test in objecting to

interrogatory number five, because she “did not ask about the

results” (Docket Entry 28 at 1),6 but that contention misses the

point. Defendant noted the immateriality of the drug test results

6 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s above-quoted admission, the

instant Motion states that “now [she] would like to know the

results” (Docket Entry 28 at 1); however, “[t]he [C]ourt cannot

compel [D]efendant[] to provide such information if [P]laintiff

never made any appropriate request for it,” Grabek v. Dickinson,

No. CIV S-10-2892, 2012 WL 113799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012)

(unpublished); accord, e.g., White v. City of Grand Rapids, No.

1:19CV877, 2020 WL 13750043, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2020)

(unpublished).

10

to explain the irrelevance of Plaintiff’s inquiry into Defendant’s

definition of “post offer - pre hire drug test” (id. at 4). In

sum, Defendant’s response to interrogatory number five effectively

binds Defendant to the position that Defendant did not rely on any

such drug test to deny Plaintiff employment and, as a result,

Defendant’s definition of that drug test holds no apparent

relevance in this case, as that definition could not affect the

resolution of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant unlawfully refused

to employ her due to her disability. See Republican Party of N.C.

v. Martin, 136 F.R.D. 421, 425 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (“[W]hile ‘the

requirement of relevancy should be construed liberally and with

common sense, rather than in terms of narrow legalisms, no one

would suggest that discovery should be allowed of information that

has no conceivable bearing on the case.’” (internal brackets

omitted) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc.:

Civil § 2008, at 45-46 (1970))); see also, e.g., U.S. Home Corp v.

Settlers Crossing, LLC, Civ. Action No. 08-1863, 2013 WL 5530282,

at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished) (“[I]f the discovery

sought has no bearing on an issue of material fact... it is not

relevant ... .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).’

’ Stated another way, Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed that

the drug test did not cause Defendant to deny Plaintiff employment,

albeit for different reasons, i.e., Plaintiff has asserted that

Defendant did not employ her due to her non-drug-test-related

disability (see Docket Entry 4 at 1-4) and Defendant has countered

that it did not employ Plaintiff due to her non-drug-test-related

(continued...)

11

The instant Motion nonetheless insists that interrogatory

number five:

is relevant due to the [fact that the] definition and

timing of a post offer and pre hire drug test goes to

whether [Defendant] followed [its] own hiring process,

whether [Plaintiff] was treated differently than others,

whether [Defendant] improperly tested [Plaintiff] before

a bona fide offer, or whether [Defendant’s] stated reason

for not hiring [Plaintiff is] shifting [and] pretextual.

(Docket Entry 28 at 1; see also id. (arguing that interrogatory

number five “is directly relevant . . . to whether Defendant

followed its own hiring procedures, whether . . . Plaintiff was

treated consistently with other applicants, and whether Defendant’s

stated reasons for not hiring... [P]laintiff are pretextual”) □□

But Plaintiff has not explained how Defendant’s definition of

that drug test - as opposed to information (not solicited by

interrogatory number five) about (A) the timing of the drug test’s

administration to Plaintiff and others, (B) Defendant’s policy

concerning that drug test, and (C) Defendant’s stated reasons for

not hiring Plaintiff - would reveal “whether [Defendant] followed

[its] own hiring process” (id.), “treated [her] differently than

others” (id.), “improperly tested [her] before a bona fide offer”

(id.), and/or “stated [a] reason for not hiring [her that]

‘(...continued)

failure to “qualif[y] for the position” (Docket Entry 28 at 17

(bold font omitted)). In view of the parties’ agreement that the

drug test did not play a part in the employment decision, the

definition of that drug test does not carry any clear significance

to the resolution of this case.

12

shift[ed, showing] pretext[]” (id.). (See id.; see also Docket

Entry 34 at 1-3 (making no mention of interrogatory number five)

On the other hand, Defendant’s response to the instant Motion does

not engage with Plaintiff’s theory of relevance. (See Docket Entry

31 at 1 (asserting that “Plaintiff served extraordinarily broad

initial discovery requests, most of which sought information and

documents completely irrelevant to any claim or defense in this

case” without analyzing any specific request), 2 (discussing

authority barring discovery “[flishing expeditions” and giving

example of “inquiries .. . seeking all communications relating to

[the p]laintiff” (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)),

3 (describing “many of Plaintiff’s requests and interrogatories

[as] so overly broad as to constitute fishing expeditions” but not

focusing on any particular request or interrogatory), 4 (arguing

that “majority of Plaintiff’s interrogatories and document requests

are wholly irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case” and

highlighting two document requests as examples) .)

“Traditionally, the party opposing discovery bears the burden

in a discovery dispute.” Seamon v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15CV462, 2018

WL 1441267, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2018) (unpublished) (Webster,

M.J.); accord, e.g., Furr v. Jerinkin, No. 5:22C7T3454, 2025 WL

2985897, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2025) (unpublished); South

Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v. McMaster, 584 F. Supp. 3d 152,

159 (D.S.C. 2022) (Childs, J.); Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v.

13

Willowood, LLC, No. 1:15CV274, 2016 WL 6783691, at *1 (M.D.N.C.

Oct. 6, 2016) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.). “That includes ‘where

the resisting party asserts that the discovery is irrelevant.’”

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of N.C., No.

1:14CV954, 2017 WL 11684866, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2017)

(unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (quoting United Oil Co. v. Parts

Assocs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 404, 411 (D. Md. 2005)); see also, e.g.,

United States v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 1:00CV1262, 2012 WL

1565228, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2012) (unpublished) (Osteen,

C.J.) (“*[T]he burden of showing that the requested discovery is

not relevant to the issues in the case is on the party resisting

discovery.’” (quoting Flora _v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 578

(M.D.N.C. 1978) (Gordon, C.J.))); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp.

1090, 1114 (EBE.D.N.cC. 1984) (“[T]he burden of showing that the

requested discovery is not relevant to the issues in this

litigation is clearly on the party resisting discovery.”). The

lack of argument by Defendant about interrogatory number five might

loom large if “the [instant M]otion must be decided based upon

th[at traditional allocation of the] burden of persuasion,” United

States v. Sanchez-Martinez, No. 13CR236, 2013 WL 3662871, at *4 (D.

Colo. July 12, 2013) (unpublished). See generally United States v.

Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 946 (llth Cir. 2023) (“In a close case,

the burdens of production and persuasion can decide the case.”).

14

The Court, however, must consider the fact that “[Federal]

Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1) was amended in 2015, regarding

the scope of discovery in civil cases, in an effort to curb

widespread abuse in discovery.” Shackleford v. Vivint Solar Dev.

LLC, Civ. Action No. 19-954, 2020 WL 3488913, at *5 (D. Md. June

25, 2020) (unpublished). Notably, that amendment “restore[d]

proportionality to the forefront of the discovery process ... .”

Black v. West Va. State Police, Nos. 3:22CV96, 3:22CV203, 2023 WL

4834948, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. July 27, 2023) (unpublished); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order,

the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s

claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case

.. .”). Accordingly, “[u]nder the 2015 amendments to [Federal]

Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1), . . . the inquiry is whether

the discovery [sought] is relevant to any party’s claim or defense

and proportional to the needs of the case.” Doe v. Cabell Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., No. 3:21CV31, 2022 WL 288193, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan.

31, 2022) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, “on its own, the [C]ourt must limit the... extent

of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the proposed

discovery is outside the scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of

Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (iii)

(emphasis added); see also Miller v. McWilliams, No. 1:20CV671,

15

2021 WL 11723046, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 8, 2021) (unpublished)

(acknowledging that, in opposition to motion seeking to compel

discovery, resisting party “fail[ed] to substantiate [its

discovery] objection with great specificity” but nevertheless

denying motion and emphasizing independent “obligation of the

[c]ourt to enforce [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26’s

proportionality principle”); Cybernet, LLC v. David, No. 7:16CV16,

2018 WL 810142, at *5-7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2018) (unpublished)

(denying motion to compel in part based on judicial responsibility

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to police

proportionality limits), aff’d, 954 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2020); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment (“The

parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider

the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving

discovery disputes.”). And the applicable rule commentary

expressly contemplates that the party requesting discovery must

satisfy the Court that a disputed discovery demand falls within the

proper scope of discovery (i.e., qualifies as both relevant and

proportional): “A party claiming that a [discovery] request is

important to resolve the issues [in a case] should be able to

explain the ways in which the [requested] information bears on the

issues as that party understands them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26

advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment (emphasis added).

16

Consistent with the foregoing authority, some judges in this

circuit (including the now-Chief Judge of this Court) have begun to

apply a burden-shifting approach to discovery disputes: “‘The

party seeking discovery has the [initial] burden to establish its

relevancy and proportionality, at which point the burden shifts to

the party resisting discovery to demonstrate why the discovery

should not be permitted.’” Cook v. Wake Forest Univ. Baptist Med.

Ctr., No. 1:20CV193, 2021 WL 620707, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2021)

(unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (quoting Shackleford, 2020 WL 3488913,

at *5); see also, e.g., Harris v. Vanderburg, No. 4:19CV111, 2020

WL 7319607, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2020) (unpublished) (focusing,

in order denying compelled response, on requesting parties’ failure

“to explain why they need[ed requested] . . . information” rather

than resisting party’s showing); Machinery Sols., Inc. v. Doosan

Infracore Am. Corp., 323 F.R.D. 522, 526 (D.S.C. 2018) (Childs, J.)

(“While the party seeking discovery has the burden to establish its

relevancy and proportionality, the party objecting has the burden

of showing the discovery should not be allowed and doing so through

clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent

evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eramo v. Rolling

Stone LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“Where a prima

facie showing of discoverability has been made by the party seeking

discovery, the burden shifts to the resisting party to show . . .

that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad

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scope of relevance . . ., or (2) is of such marginal relevance that

the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the

ordinary presumption of broad discovery.” (internal ellipsis and

quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff (A) has not

adequately “explain[ed] the ways in which [interrogatory number

five] bears on the issues [in this case],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26

advisory committee notes, 2015 Amendment, and otherwise (B) has not

satisfied (what some courts have called) her threshold “burden to

establish [interrogatory number five’s] relevancy and

proportionality,” Cook, 2021 WL 620707, at *2 (internal quotation

marks omitted). For either or both of those reasons, the Court

will not compel Defendant to make any further response to

interrogatory number five; instead, “on its own, the [C]ourt must

limit the . . . extent of discovery . . . [because] it [has]

determine[d] that . . . [interrogatory number five] is outside the

scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1),”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), i.e., not “relevant to any

party’s claim or defense,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (at a

minimum) of insufficient relevance to qualify as “proportional to

the needs of the case,” id.

The preceding analysis leaves for decision Plaintiff’s request

for the Court to compel Defendant to answer interrogatory number

eight: “Have Jean Williams, Kimberly Price, Tammy Johnson, Tawanna

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Craft, or Scott (no first name) ever worked on the floor to help a

CNA? If so what did you do to help a CNA?” (Docket Entry 28 at

4.) Rather than answer, Defendant “object[ed] to th[at

i]nterrogatory as seeking information not relevant to a claim or

defense raised in this action.” (Id. at 17 (emphasis added).)

Specifically, that objection reasons that information about

“[w]hether a given staff member of [Defendant] has performed a task

has no bearing on Plaintiff’s qualifications for the job at issue

in her failure to hire claim.” (Id.) The instant Motion, in turn,

rejoins that such “information is relevant because[, if]

individuals outside of the CNA role performed CNA duties[, that

(A) would] mean[ Defendant allowed] flexibility in roles” (id. at

2), and (B) would “[s]how a possible pattern of inconsistent job

requirements” (id.), which could allow Plaintiff to “show

[Defendant’s reliance on a] pretextual reason for denying [her]

employment” (id.), e.g., that “qualifications used to reject [her]

were not consistently applied” (id.).

As detailed previously (in connection with interrogatory

number five), the relevance-related arguments made in Defendant’s

response opposing the instant Motion deal with matters unrelated to

Plaintiff’s above-quoted rejoinder to Defendant’s relevance

objection to interrogatory number eight. (See Docket Entry 31 at

1-5.) Furthermore, the unrebutted theories advanced in the instant

Motion about the potential significance of the information sought

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by interrogatory number eight appear plausible (unlike Plaintiff’s

deficient explanation about the purported importance of the

information solicited by interrogatory number five). As such, for

interrogatory number eight, the Court will enter “an order

compelling an answer,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (3) (B), and will not

rule sua sponte that interrogatory number eight falls “outside the

scope permitted by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (1),”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (C) (iii). See generally Black, 2023 WL

4834948, at *6 (“The determination as to whether discovery violates

[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 26(b) (2) (C) rests with the

district court, and district courts ‘have broad discretion in their

resolution of discovery problems that arise in cases pending before

them.’” (quoting Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy

Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003))).°

® In addition to seeking compelled answers to interrogatories

four, five, and eight, Plaintiff voiced within the instant Motion

a desire to “speak on [three] lie[s]” (Docket Entry 28 at 2):

1) “lie number one (1) ‘[Defendant] states that Jean Williams

is unknown to [Defendant]’ & ‘All but Jean Williams, who is unknown

to [Defendant]’” (id.);

2) “[l]ie number two (2) WOTC are completed at the point of a

contingent offer” (id.); and

3) “number three (3) lie ‘there is no Jean working for

[Defendant]’ during August 19, 2022” (id.).

The two internal quotations in item one above come from

Defendant’s answers to interrogatory number one (specifically its

principal inquiry and subpart A). (See id. at 16.) In item two

above, Plaintiff appeared to refer to Defendant’s answer to

(continued...)

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CONCLUSION

The instant Motion presents cognizable requests for relief

regarding three interrogatories (interrogatory numbers four, five,

and eight) served by Plaintiff. The present record does not permit

a definitive determination about the sufficiency of Defendant’s

answer to interrogatory number four. Interrogatory number five

falls outside the relevance and/or proportionality limits on the

scope of discovery. Defendant failed to adequately respond to

interrogatory number eight’s relevant and proportional inquiry.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the instant Motion (Docket Entry

28) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, in that Defendant shall

®(...continued)

interrogatory number two (specifically subpart C). (See id.) The

internal quotation in item three above comes from Defendant’s

answer to interrogatory number 13. (See id. at 18.) Plaintiff

based her allegation that Defendant lied about its knowledge of

Jean Williams and its employment of someone named Jean on “an email

that states [f]acility address and Jean Williams - Interim Director

of Nursing dated August 18, 2022.” (Id. at 2 (apparently

referencing id. at 30).) Plaintiff’s charge that Defendant lied

about the WOTC (work opportunity tax credit) evidently rests on her

assertions that “[n]o contingent offer was made and the WOTC number

was not written down.” (Id. at 2; see also id. (discussing

definitions of “contingent offer” and “contingent job offer”).)

The Court deems these “alleg[ations] that [D]efendant ... liedin

[its] interrogatory responses,” Evans v. Bamke, No. 22CV1255, 2023

WL 7111245, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2023) (unpublished), “factual

disagreement[s] for another day,” id., not matters suitable for

resolution via a motion to compel, see Cooper _v. McGowan, No.

17CV383, 2018 WL 2223671, at *5 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2018)

(unpublished) (“[The plaintiff] contends that ... [the defendant]

lied in response to [two] interrogatories ... . [The plaintiff]

can argue in his summary judgment briefing or at trial that [the

defendant] is lying, but [the court] will not compel [the

defendant] to respond to [the plaintiff’s] interrogatories ina

certain way.”).

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serve Plaintiff with a proper and complete answer to interrogatory

number eight by November 26, 2025, but Plaintiff shall obtain no

further relief (although the Court denies relief as to

interrogatory number four without prejudice).9

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

November 20, 2025

9 Because “the [instant M]otion is granted in part and denied

in part, the [C]ourt . . . may, after giving an opportunity to be

heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the [instant M]otion.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Given that neither party requested

expense-shifting (see Docket Entry 28 at 1-3; Docket Entry 31 at 1-

5; Docket Entry 34 at 1-3), the Court exercises its discretion to

decline to apportion reasonable expenses for the instant Motion,

see generally Bryson v. CompuCom Sys., Inc., No. 1:19CV1121, 2021

WL 7184369, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2021) (unpublished) (Peake,

M.J.) (“The Court has no indication here that either [p]arty was

significantly more burdened by this motion than the other, so each

will bear its own costs.”); Harrison v. Carrington Mortg. Servs.,

LLC, No. 3:16CV14, 2017 WL 1612135, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2017)

(unpublished) (recognizing that, when “[Federal] Rule [of Civil

Procedure] 37(a)(5)(C) applies, [] it is within the court’s

discretion whether to apportion expenses”).

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