Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

RODNEY SCOTT BROWN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-01045-JSD

)

PATRICIA WICKEY et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on convicted and sentenced state-court prisoner

Rodney Scott Brown’s “Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” ECF No. 1. For the reasons

discussed below, this case will be summarily denied and dismissed under Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which also applies to habeas petitions

arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. As a result

of this dismissal, all other pending motions will be denied as moot. Finally, the Court will not

issue a certificate of appealability.

Background

I. Petitioner’s State Court Criminal History

Independent review of the criminal case cited in the Application on Missouri Case.net, the

State of Missouri’s online docketing system, indicates that Petitioner Rodney Scott Brown was

charged in May 2022 with one count of tampering with a judicial officer and one count of first-

degree harassment. State v. Brown, No. 22MA-CR00192 (41st Jud. Cir. 2022) (Macon Cnty.).1

1 The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining

that district court may take judicial notice of public state records).

The tampering charge stemmed from a July 2021 incident in which Petitioner threatened a judge

by saying that the judge “would be met at the courthouse door with a bullet to his forehead.” In

November 2023, a jury found Petitioner guilty on both charges and in January 2024, he was

sentenced to 17 years total. State v. Brown, No. 22MA-CR00192-01 (41st Jud. Cir. 2022) (Macon

Cnty.). Petitioner did not file an appeal.2

Petitioner was allowed to represent himself in his state criminal proceeding after he refused

to talk to his public defender. Petitioner raised multiple arguments in his defense that he also raises

in this habeas matter. For example, in multiple hearings and filings in his state case, Petitioner

argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. In addition, Petitioner filed an “Affidavit of

Notice [of Discharge]” in his state case—also filed as an exhibit in this case—in which he claimed

to discharge his debt and sentence. See ECF No. 1-6 (alteration in original).

II. Petitioner’s Prior Habeas Filing in this Court

In September 2022, Petitioner initiated a § 2241 habeas action in the United States District

Court for the Western District of Missouri, which was transferred to this Court. Brown v. Wilson,

No. 2:22-cv-00071-SRC, ECF Nos. 1, 3 (E.D. Mo). In that case, Petitioner challenged his pretrial

detention in State v. Brown, No. 22MA-CR00192-01 and State v. Brown, No. 22SB-CR00095-01.

Id. at ECF No. 1. When Petitioner initiated this 2022 federal court habeas action, the criminal

charges in both cases were still pending against Petitioner in Missouri courts. As a result, in

January 2023, this Court denied Petitioner § 2241 relief based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

(1971), which prohibits the federal court from interfering in ongoing state judicial proceedings.

2 Although not cited in the Application, Missouri Case.net also shows that Petitioner was facing similar criminal

charges in a second pending case at the same time as the cited case. See State v. Brown, No. 22SB-CR00095-01 (41st

Jud. Cir. 2022) (Shelby Cnty.). In this second case, Petitioner was also charged in May 2022 with one count of

tampering with a judicial officer and one count of first-degree harassment. The tampering charge in this case stemmed

from a different threat made by Petitioner against a judge; Petitioner told the Judge: “I am coming for you.” After a

May 2024 guilty verdict was issued by a jury in this case, Petitioner was sentenced to three years total on these charges,

to run consecutively to his 17-year sentence in the first case.

The Court also found that Petitioner failed to exhaust his available state-court remedies before

seeking relief in federal court. Brown v. Wilson, No. 2:22-cv-00071-SRC, ECF Nos. 5-6.

Of relevance here, Petitioner filed a ‘Demand for Discharge of Debts’ in that prior habeas

case. Id. at ECF No. 4. The Demand was authored by an individual named Bonnie Straight, who

claimed to be acting as a fiduciary for Petitioner. In the document, Straight asserted that a “false

claim” had been “filed in commerce against the trust and [Petitioner’s] living body,” and that the

Macon County sheriff was holding Petitioner “as surety [for] a debt.” She further alleged that

Petitioner had been “kidnapped,” “denied bail,” and “tortured in a racketeering scheme to gain

securities through fraud in violation of 18 USC 1348.” Along with this filing, Straight attached a

“.90 silver coin as full payment for discharging all debts.” Straight apparently believed that

production of the coin would result in Petitioner’s criminal charges being “discharged and

dissolved.” Id. at ECF No. 4 at 5. The Court in that case found that the proffered demand was

frivolous, not based on any viable legal theory, and that it presented no support for the proposition

that Petitioner was entitled to release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at ECF No. 5 at 11.

Petitioner’s Filings in this Matter

I. Application for Habeas Relief and Memorandum in Support3

Petitioner’s Application for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to challenge his January 2024

state court conviction which resulted in a 17-year sentence. ECF No. 1 at 1-4. Petitioner admits

that he did not appeal the conviction, but he describes his “Affidavit of Notice [of Discharge]” as

a post-conviction proceeding that was never ruled by the state court. Id. at 3-4 (alteration in

3 Petitioner filed many exhibits and supplements in support of his Application in this case. See ECF Nos. 1-1 through

1-8, 2. In assessing whether a complaint sufficiently states a valid claim for relief, courts may consider materials that

are attached to the complaint as exhibits. Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all

purposes.”).

original). Petitioner asserts two claims for habeas relief in his Application: (1) “Misapplication of

use of bonds for discharge in post-conviction relief—28 USC §2041” and (2) “Jailers use the ‘tool’

of solitary confinement in addition to various means of torture in violation of the 8th Amendment.”

Id. at 5-6.

As best the Court can decipher, Petitioner is claiming that he tendered proof of funds with

the state court clerk and that this tender should have resulted in the discharge and dismissal of his

conviction, and his release from confinement. He states that “Bonds to perform discharge were

FILED with the Clerk of Court for 22MA-CR00192-01 MACON COUNTY on or about December

30, 2024, via USPS Certified Mail” and that “Funds are on deposit for backing the bonds in

discharge with British Crown proof.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2 ¶¶ 6-7 (emphasis in original). For proof

“that the Tendered Bonds are Valid,” Petitioner attached a letter and affidavit of “Sir Gary Lee”

of Global Solutions Limited Company of Fort Myers, Florida, stating that he opened a Treasury

Direct Account for Petitioner through his “bond processing offices in England, U.K.” ECF Nos.

1-2, 1-5. Petitioner also attached his UCC Financing Statements and other Agreements

purportedly establishing the “Rodney Scott Brown Trust.” ECF No. 1-7.

Petitioner relies on a 1949 United States Supreme Court opinion, Black Diamond S. S.

Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386 (1949), to support his claims. This admiralty law

case dealt with the limitations on liability for a collision between two sea vessels which occurred

in Belgian waters. Petitioner quotes a portion of Justice Jackson’s dissent which discusses the

limitation on liability for maritime ventures that is created by admiralty law. See ECF Nos. 2 at

3-4 & 5 at 7-8 (citing Black Diamond, 336 U.S. at 400). Petitioner appears to be arguing that the

monetary bond filed with a petition for limitation of liability in an admiralty case, can also be

applied to Petitioner’s criminal case to discharge his debt or criminal conviction. See ECF No. 2-

1 at 8-9 (stating “that even charges of a criminal nature can be settled in commerce under

commercial rules,” “remedies in admiralty (securities and underwriting) can be applied to the other

three law forms (law, equity, and maritime) to settle claims,” and that “a court is a ‘Privately

Owned Trading Company’ operating as a bank to settle controversies, causes of action, and orders

distribution of proceeds for settlement.”).

Petitioner also repeatedly quotes and cites 28 U.S.C. § 2041, which states: “All moneys

paid into any court of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any case pending or

adjudicated in such court, shall be forthwith deposited with the Treasurer of the United States or a

designated depositary, in the name and to the credit of such court.” See ECF Nos. 1 at 5, 2 at 1-4,

2-1 at 7, 5 at 9. According to Petitioner, pursuant to Black Diamond and § 2041—along with the

United States Constitution’s Contract Clause, an SEC Rule, and a UCC Rule—his state criminal

charges have been discharged. ECF Nos. 1-1 at 2 ¶ 8, 2 at 1-4.

Furthermore, because his charges allegedly have been discharged, Petitioner argues that

his continued confinement is excessive incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s right

to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. ECF Nos. 1-1 at 3, 2 at 1. For relief, Petitioner seeks

release “as soon as possible for excessive incarceration” and he would like his probation

terminated. ECF No. 1 at 7.

Finally, Petitioner states that “every time” he “attempts to file a brief, obtain outside

counsel, [or] discharge the charges, he is labelled a ‘sovereign citizen,’ and his pleadings are

disregarded as frivolous.” ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner admonishes the Court to “NOT confuse

‘black letter law’ with the concept of the ‘sovereign citizen’ movement” because “[t]hey do not

mix.” ECF No. 2-1 at 1. He asks the Court to “ensure” that he is “noted as operating in Propria

Persona4 and not Pro Se status.” Id. at 2. Furthermore, Petitioner states that “[a]s a result of …

excessive incarceration, [he] became a Secured Party Creditor, Holder-in-Due-Course, [and]

Principal Owner to the RODNEY SCOTT BROWN Estate” and that “Petitioner holds immunity

to/from the local United States/States legislative jurisdiction post discharge.” ECF No. 3-1 at 3.

II. Petitioner’s Other Requests for Relief

Petitioner filed multiple additional requests for relief in this case. ECF Nos. 3-5, 7. In his

“Application for Order to Show Cause RE Temporary Restraining Order Why a Permanent

Injunction Should Not Issue and the Discharge should not be honored for Confinement Release,”

Petitioner requests an Order from the Court directing the State of Missouri to immediately respond

as to why they failed in their duty “to issue a document” of “zero balance due” and “release

Petitioner from excessive incarceration.” ECF No. 3 at 2. Petitioner also wants the State to admit

that it has restrained his right to travel. Id. at 2-3; see also ECF Nos. 3-1, 3-2, 6 at 6-9.

In his “Motion for Order Shortening Time for Hearing for Order to Show Cause and

Temporary Restraining Order, etc.,” Petitioner seeks an “immediate hearing” on his request for an

Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 4 at 2; see also ECF Nos. 4-1, 6 at 1-2. Petitioner states that he

will be irreparably damaged “in [his] commercial and legal relations” without an immediate

hearing. ECF No. 4-1 at 1-2.

In his “Petition to Supersede and Retire all previous Bonds and Release Petitioner,”

Petitioner “declares his ‘person’ to be ‘stateless person’ and outside any/all general jurisdiction of

the federal government,” and that the United States has been “placed on Public Notice via the

commercial registry” that he has “discharged” his original United States birth certificate. ECF No.

5 at 1-2. Given the alleged lack of jurisdiction over him, Petitioner states that his filing constitutes

4 “In propria persona,” translated from Latin, means “in one’s own person.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

a “special appearance” to petition the Court “to setoff and retire all previous bonds … and turnover

any and all claims to Rodney Scott Brown.” Id. at 2. Petitioner provides further explanation of

his legal rationale for why his tendered bonds should result in his immediate release from

confinement. Id. at 3-10.

Finally, Petitioner filed an “Affidavit Regarding Entry of Default Against Respondents or,

in the alternative Declaratory Judgement,” which asks the Court to enter default judgment against

the Respondents for failing “to answer, respond, or object” to the Application. ECF No. 7 at 2.

Discussion

Based on a careful review and liberal construction of Petitioner’s filings, the Court finds

that this case must be summarily dismissed because it plainly appears that Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief. Despite Petitioner’s arguments and citations in alleged support, there is no legal

basis for finding that Petitioner can tender a financial bond, declare himself discharged from his

state court criminal conviction and sentence, and then seek immediate release for illegal

confinement based on an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. Petitioner cannot avoid serving

his criminal sentence through the payment of a financial bond. Furthermore, even if Petitioner’s

arguments had some legal merit, he would have had to exhaust these arguments in state court

before bringing them to this Court in the form of a habeas petition. For these reasons, the

Application before the Court will be denied and dismissed, and no certificate of appealability will

issue.

I. Legal Standard5

5 The title of the Application suggests Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but in one of Petitioner’s

motions he refers to the Application as seeking relief “pursuant to Title 28 USC §2254.” ECF Nos. 1 at 1, 5 at 9.

Where a petitioner brings a “claim related to the manner in which the sentence is being executed, as opposed to the

legality of the sentence … [s]uch a claim is properly cognizable in a habeas corpus petition under section 2241.” U.S.

v. Clinkenbeard, 542 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir. 1976). On the other hand, a prisoner’s general challenge to the validity of

his confinement or to matters affecting its duration falls within the province of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides,

“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled

to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the

petitioner.” Rule 4 also applies to habeas petitions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rule 1(b)

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (stating that the “district court may apply any or all of these

rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a)”).

II. Demand for Discharge is Frivolous

Petitioner seeks immediate release from state court confinement based on the argument

that he tendered proof of funds by filing a bond6 with the state court clerk in December 2024 and,

because of that tender, his criminal conviction and sentence were discharged. Petitioner argues

that his Eighth Amendment right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment has been violated by his

continued, illegal confinement. Petitioner cites language from a dissent in a Supreme Court

opinion, federal statutes, the U.S. Constitution, SEC Rules, and UCC Rules to support his legal

argument.

The Court finds Petitioner’s argument frivolous and lacking in legal merit. Petitioner’s

reliance on the dissent in a 1949 admiralty case to argue that his criminal conviction can be

discharged with a monetary bond is unpersuasive and misplaced. Petitioner’s various legal

citations do not come together to provide support for the conclusion that Petitioner is being

unconstitutionally held by the State of Missouri. Petitioner was found guilty by a Missouri jury

and sentenced to 17-years confinement. That conviction and sentence cannot be discharged with

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Although it is not clear that Petitioner brings this case under the

proper habeas statute, it does not change the Court’s analysis, as Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts applies to both types of habeas cases.

6 The Court will not discuss the questionable validity of these tendered bonds because, regardless whether the bonds

are legitimate, their tender does not result in discharge of Petitioner’s state-court conviction and sentence.

a financial bond. Unless and until Petitioner’s conviction and sentence are overruled, expunged,

or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, there is no evidence that his state

court confinement is unconstitutional.

Although Petitioner suggests the Court should not consider him a sovereign citizen, many

of his arguments are based on the same legal theories espoused by sovereign citizens. “Sovereign

citizens are a loosely-affiliated group who believe government in the United States operates

illegitimately and outside the bounds of its jurisdiction.” Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 732

n.4 (8th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Barraza, 982 F.3d 1106, 1113 n.3 (8th Cir. 2020).

Courts have found common sovereign citizen arguments to be frivolous, including the

belief that they are secured-party creditors who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.

See, e.g., United States v. Simonson, 563 F. App’x 514 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that appellants’

argument “that they are special, sovereign citizens” was frivolous); United States v. Hardin, 489

F. App’x 984, 985 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting as meritless appellant’s challenges to the district

court’s jurisdiction based on his status as a sovereign citizen); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d

753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases rejecting claims of individual sovereignty including

claims of a “sovereign citizen,” a “secured-party creditor,” and a “flesh-and-blood human being”);

United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that appellant’s assertion that

federal courts “have no civil jurisdiction over a sovereign citizen” was frivolous).

Courts have also routinely denied sovereign citizen claims based on an unfettered right to

travel. See, e.g., Hyppolite v. Broward Sheriff’s Off., No. 16-6125, 2017 WL 2691978 (S.D. Fla.

June 22, 2017) (rejected argument of plaintiff pulled over for speeding who claimed that as a

“traveler” he did not need a driver’s license); Secor v. Okla., No. 16-CV-85, 2016 WL 6156316

(N.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2016) (dismissed sovereign-citizen plaintiff’s suit that included allegations

that he was not required to have a driver’s license and automobile insurance); Matthews v. U.S.,

No. 3:16cv00148, 2016 WL 2624974 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2016) (dismissed “sovereign freeman”

plaintiff’s claims that arose from a traffic stop resulting in multiple citations including driving with

an expired driver’s license).

Despite Petitioner’s rejection of the sovereign citizen label, he asserts many common

sovereign citizen arguments, including denying court jurisdiction over him, arguing his right to

travel has been violated, labeling himself a secured-party creditor, referring to himself as a ‘state-

less person’ and naming himself as a trust, and discharging his U.S. birth certificate. Just as the

Eighth Circuit has found the arguments of sovereign citizens to be “completely without merit,

patently frivolous, and … rejected without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their

discussions,” this Court finds Petitioner’s arguments here to be plainly without merit. See United

States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992). This finding is consistent with the Court’s

ruling and dismissal of Petitioner’s prior § 2241 habeas petition before this Court. See Brown v.

Wilson, No. 2:22-cv-00071-SRC, ECF Nos. 5 at 11.

III. Claims were not exhausted

Furthermore, even if Petitioner presented some valid legal argument for habeas relief to

this Court, his Application would still be subject to dismissal because he has not exhausted state

court remedies. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), a state court prisoner seeking a writ of habeas

corpus must first “exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the State.” According to the

United States Supreme Court, “[t]he exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b) ensures that the state

courts have the opportunity fully to consider federal-law challenges to a state custodial judgment

before the lower federal courts may entertain a collateral attack upon that judgment.” Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2001) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).

Comity in our dual system of government “dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued

confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first

opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844.

This exhaustion requirement applies here, as Petitioner is a convicted and sentenced state court

prisoner.7

In this case, according to Missouri Case.net, Petitioner did not file an appeal of his

conviction and sentence in state court. Court records indicate that Petitioner did file a “Affidavit

of Notice [of Discharge]” in November 2024 and a “corrected” Affidavit in December 2024, in his

state court case. State v. Brown, No. 22MA-CR00192-01 (41st Jud. Cir. 2022) (Macon Cnty.).

Along with these Affidavits, Petitioner filed an “Affidavit of Truth,” a “Letter to US Treasury

regarding Title 28 USC 2041 discharge as it applies to the Clerk of Court of a mandatory fiduciary

DUTY,” an IRS “Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship,” a UCC Financing Statement, a

“Copy of Discharged Birth Certificate,” and a “Copy of Discharged Bonds.” Petitioner appears to

have filed these documents to support the same arguments made in his habeas Application here:

that the tendering of bonds should result in his release from state court confinement. Based on the

docket sheet, the state court did not construe any of Petitioner’s filings as motions seeking relief,

and therefore, did not make any rulings or findings based on these arguments. And, again, as

Petitioner did not appeal his state-court conviction, there is no indication that Petitioner ever

presented these arguments to any higher state court.

7 Although Petitioner titles his Application as seeking relief under § 2241, “[i]n discussing exhaustion in the habeas

corpus context,” exhaustion is required “in the post-trial setting.” See Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 225

(5th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, although the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain an exhaustion requirement,

“a petitioner seeking relief from state custody by means of a federal writ of habeas corpus is ordinarily required to

exhaust his state remedies.” Sacco v. Falke, 649 F.2d 634, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S.

241 (1886)); see also Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225 (collecting cases and stating that “federal courts should abstain from

the exercise of [§ 2241] jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in

the state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner”).

Petitioner’s filings in his state court matter, without any appeal or attempt to seek relief

from a higher court, do not constitute adequate exhaustion of his state remedies. Petitioner must

present his grounds to the state courts before pursuing a writ of habeas corpus from this federal

Court. This is especially relevant here, as Petitioner is arguing that State of Missouri employees

failed “to perform their ‘known legal duty.’” ECF No. 3 at 2. A Missouri state court is entitled to

rule on this argument before it is presented to this federal court.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Even though Petitioner seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “as a state prisoner he is subject

to the provisions governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254,” and “must obtain a certificate of appealability.”

Carmona v. Minn., 23 F. App’x 629, 630 (8th Cir. 2002). “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues

a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from … the final

order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process

issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).

In order to issue a certificate of appealability, the Court must find a substantial showing of

the denial of a federal constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A substantial showing is a

showing that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues

differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir.

1997). Because Petitioner has not made such a showing, the Court will not issue a certificate of

appealability.

Conclusion

Petitioner’s asserted grounds for habeas relief are frivolous and lacking in legal merit.

Moreover, Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies before seeking relief from this federal

court. As it plainly appears that Petitioner Rodney Scott Brown is not entitled to relief, the Court

must dismiss his Application for a writ of habeas corpus. Finally, a certificate of appealability will

not issue.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1]

is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s ‘Application for Order to Show Cause RE

Temporary Restraining Order Why a Permanent Injunction Should Not Issue and the Discharge

should not be honored for Confinement Release’ [ECF No. 3] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s ‘Motion for Order Shortening Time for

Hearing for Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order, etc.’ [ECF No. 4] is DENIED

as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s ‘Petition to Supersede and Retire all

previous Bonds and Release Petitioner’ [ECF No. 5] is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s ‘Affidavit Regarding Entry of Default

Against Respondents or, in the alternative Declaratory Judgement’ [ECF No. 7] is DENIED as

moot.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability.

Dated this 19th day of November 2025.

CRISTIAN M. STEVENS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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