Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago

2025 IL 131305

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 131305)

TAMICA N. RAINEY, Appellee, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN’S

ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 20, 2025.

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Neville and Justices Theis, Overstreet, Holder White,

Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This case requires us to interpret section 5-228(b) of the Illinois Pension Code

(40 ILCS 5/5-228(b) (West 2022)) to determine whether plaintiff Tamica Rainey is

entitled to an award of her attorney fees and costs based on the appellate court’s

ruling that ordered defendant, the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity

and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Board), to restore her duty disability

benefits. We find the statute authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to

police officers, like Rainey, who successfully challenge on administrative review

the discontinuation of their duty or occupational disease disability benefits.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Rainey was injured in car accidents in 2013 and 2015 while on duty as a

Chicago police officer. She applied for duty disability benefits in 2016 and was

awarded them in 2017 under section 5-154 of the Pension Code (id. § 5-154) for

injuries she sustained to her neck and shoulder. Rainey was required to submit to

annual examinations under section 5-156 of the Pension Code (id. § 5-156) to

review her disability status. The Board scheduled a March 2022 status hearing to

determine whether Rainey’s duty disability benefits should be continued, modified,

or discontinued. Rainey appeared before the Board on March 24, 2022, and

requested a continuance to obtain counsel and medical records, which the Board

granted. Rainey submitted additional medical records to the Board on June 25,

2022, and at a June 30, 2022, hearing, the Board continued the proceedings on its

own motion so it could review the recent submissions. At an August 25, 2022,

hearing, Rainey requested another continuance. The Board offered to award her an

ordinary disability benefit at 50% salary without a hearing, an offer she declined.

See id. § 5-155. The Board rejected Rainey’s request to continue the hearing, held

the hearing, and voted to discontinue her duty disability benefits. The Board issued

its written decision on October 27, 2022, finding Rainey was no longer disabled as

a result of her duty-related injuries. However, when Rainey reported to the police

department for assignment, the department found her to be physically unable to

perform her duties. Rainey was not cleared for full duty, and the department was

unable to provide her with a position.

¶4 Rainey sought administrative review, and the Cook County circuit court

reversed the Board’s decision to discontinue Rainey’s duty disability benefits. The

trial court relied on this court’s ruling in Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the

Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 471 (2009), where

we found that an officer remains disabled when the police department is unable to

provide her a position with the necessary accommodations. Rainey also sought, and

the trial court granted, her attorney fees and costs in the amount of $33,981.94

-2-

pursuant to section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5-228(b) (West

2022)). The Board appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s

conclusion that Rainey’s duty disability benefits should continue. 2024 IL App (1st)

231993, ¶¶ 61, 68. It also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs.

Id. This court thereafter granted the Board’s petition for leave to appeal, where it

challenges only the award of attorney fees and costs.

¶5 ANALYSIS

¶6 The issue before us is whether Rainey was entitled to an award of statutory

attorney fees and costs for successfully challenging the Board’s discontinuation of

her duty disability benefits. The Board asserts that the attorney fees and costs

provision of the Pension Code does not apply when the Board discontinues duty

disability benefits. It argues that Rainey is not entitled to recover her attorney fees

and costs and that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s incorrect

determination that the award was proper. The Board construes the attorney fees and

costs provision as applicable in only two circumstances: when an initial duty

disability benefits application is denied (1) under section 5-154 or (2) under section

5-154.1, neither of which, it contends, is at issue here. See 40 ILCS 5/5-154, 5-

154.1 (West 2022). In response, Rainey argues that the plain language of the

attorney fees and costs provision directs that she is entitled to the statutory fee

because she successfully challenged the Board’s denial of her continued duty

disability benefits on administrative review. She maintains the appellate court

correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court and its award of attorney fees and

costs.

¶7 To determine whether Rainey was eligible for a statutory attorney fees and costs

award, we must interpret sections 5-154, 5-156, and 5-228(b) of the Pension Code.

¶8 Section 5-154, titled “Duty disability benefit,” states:

“(a) An active policeman who becomes disabled on or after the effective

date as the result of injury incurred on or after such date in the performance of

an act of duty, has a right to receive duty disability benefit during any period of

such disability for which he does not have a right to receive salary, equal to

-3-

75% of his salary, as salary is defined in this Article, at the time the disability

is allowed ***.” Id. § 5-154(a).

¶9 Section 5-156 is titled “Proof of disability—Physical examinations” and

provides:

“Proof of disability—Physical examinations. Proof of duty, occupational

disease, or ordinary disability shall be furnished to the board by at least one

licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board. In cases where the

board requests an applicant to get a second opinion, the applicant must select a

physician from a list of qualified licensed and practicing physicians who

specialize in the various medical areas related to duty injuries and illnesses, as

established by the board. The board may require other evidence of disability. A

disabled policeman who receives a duty, occupational disease, or ordinary

disability benefit shall be examined at least once a year by one or more

physicians appointed by the board. When the disability ceases, the board shall

discontinue payment of the benefit, and the policeman shall be returned to

active service.” Id. § 5-156.

¶ 10 Section 5-228, titled “Administrative Remedies,” states:

“(b) If any policeman whose application for either a duty disability benefit

under Section 5-154 or for an occupational disease disability benefit under

Section 5-154.1 has been denied by the Retirement Board brings an action for

administrative review challenging the denial of disability benefits and the

policeman prevails in the action in administrative review, then the prevailing

policeman shall be entitled to recover from the Fund court costs and litigation

expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, as part of the costs of the

action.” Id. § 5-228(b).

¶ 11 Also important to our discussion are sections 5-154.1 and 5-155 of the Pension

Code. Section 5-154.1, “Occupational disease disability benefit,” provides, in

pertinent part:

“(b) Any police officer with at least 10 years of service who suffers a heart

attack or any other disabling heart disease but is not entitled to a benefit under

Section 5-154 is entitled to receive an occupational disease disability benefit

-4-

under this Section. The occupational disease disability benefit shall be 65% of

the salary attached to the rank held by the police officer in the police service at

the time of his or her removal from the police department payroll.” Id. § 5-

154.1(b).

Section 5-155, “Ordinary disability benefit,” states:

“Ordinary disability benefit. A policeman less than age 63 who becomes

disabled after the effective date as the result of any cause other than injury

incurred in the performance of an act of duty, shall receive ordinary disability

benefit during any period or periods of disability exceeding 30 days, for which

he does not have a right to receive any part of his salary.” Id. § 5-155.

¶ 12 In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the legislature. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill.

2d 455, 461 (2010). A statute’s plain language is the best indicator of legislative

intent, and where the statute’s language is clear, we apply it as written. Id. (citing

DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006)). No term should be rendered

meaningless, and we cannot read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or

conditions the legislature did not intend. Id. We review issues of statutory

construction de novo. State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow,

Inc., 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 18.

¶ 13 We begin our interpretation of the above statutory provisions, as the appellate

court did, with the statute’s plain language, which we consider as a whole pursuant

to the appropriate interpretive rules. Three sections of the Pension Code describe

the types of disability benefits and explain an officer’s right to those benefits, which

differ according to whether the disability is duty (40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West 2022)),

occupational disease (id. § 5-154.1), or ordinary (id. § 5-155 (“the result of any

cause other than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty”)). We first

examine section 5-154, which describes a police officer’s right to the disability

benefit. It is applicable to an “active policeman who becomes disabled” as a result

of a job-related injury and authorizes “a right to receive duty disability benefit.” Id.

§ 5-154(a). Section 5-154 does not include any processes or evidentiary

requirements to obtain and maintain a duty disability benefit. It is section 5-156 that

describes the process in which a police officer must engage and the proof she must

present to both obtain and continue her disability benefit. Section 5-156 specifies

-5-

its applicability to all three types of disability benefits, including duty, occupational

disease, and ordinary. It includes the requirements for proof of disability in both

the initial request for disability benefits and for continuation of those benefits. Id.

§ 5-156. It addresses “applicant[s]” and their burden of proof and requires that the

“disabled policeman” receiving a disability benefit be examined annually. Id.

Finally, section 5-156 explains that benefit payments shall be “discontinue[d]”

when the policeman’s disability ceases. Id.

¶ 14 We agree with the appellate court’s interpretation that section 5-154 provides

for an ongoing right to benefits and section 5-156 sets forth the process and required

proof for a disabled police officer to obtain disability benefits and to continue

receiving them. See 2024 IL App (1st) 231993, ¶¶ 58-59. The appellate court

correctly characterized Rainey’s continuation of benefits as an “ongoing section 5-

154 application” for benefits, recognizing there is only one process to obtain and

continue disability benefits. Id. ¶ 61. Rainey applied for and was granted a duty

disability benefit in 2017 based on the injuries she received in the performance of

her police duties. As statutorily required, the Board reviewed the continuation of

Rainey’s duty disability benefits in 2022, initiated additional review, and concluded

they should be discontinued. At that time, Rainey did not submit another

application to the Board for the continuation of her duty disability benefits. Neither

she nor the Board revisited old evidence but concentrated on evidence establishing

that her duty-related injuries continued to disable her. The Board asked her for

proof that she continued to suffer from her disability and that the disability

prevented her from performing her responsibilities as a police officer. What Rainey

submitted were medical records in support of the continuation of her duty disability

benefits. This proof is the same type she submitted in 2017 when originally seeking

benefits, although the 2022 evidence concerned her current medical circumstances,

but it was all based on her duty-related injuries. Section 5-156 requires the same

proof for the initial award of duty disability benefits and for the continuation of

them, that is, evidence establishing disability. Rainey had to show she continued to

be disabled and that the disability resulted from a duty-related injury. Section 5-

156 presents the process and requirements an officer must meet to be awarded a

disability benefit. It does not differentiate between the types of disabilities or

whether the officer is seeking to start disability benefits or to continue them. With

both her initial request and in her response to the status hearing, Rainey was seeking

duty disability benefits.

-6-

¶ 15 The Board misconstrues the statute when it argues that section 5-228(b)

differentiates between an original request for benefits and the continuation of them.

The Board places great stock in the legislature’s use of “deny” and “discontinue”

in section 5-228(b), contending that the use of those different words codifies that

section 5-154 and 5-156 set forth different processes. We find the distinction to be

without a difference. Section 5-228(b) refers to officers whose disability benefit

application had been “denied” and who successfully challenge the “denial” of

benefits. The plain language does not limit the attorney fees and costs award to only

those officers who prevail on their challenge to the original request for disability

benefits. Had the legislature intended that outcome, it would have differentiated

between section 5-154 and section 5-156 as it did between section 5-154 and section

5-154.1, and section 5-155. The Board itself, in its decision and order discontinuing

Rainey’s disability benefits found Rainey was not “entitled to continuation of duty

disability pension benefits pursuant to section [5-]154 of the Illinois Pension

Code.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 16 The Board relies on two unpublished appellate court decisions as support that

Rainey was not entitled to an attorney fees and costs award based on its

interpretation that section 5-228(b) differentiates between an initial request for

disability benefits and an officer’s defense of their continuation. In Warner v.

Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2022 IL

App (1st) 200833-U, ¶ 2, the Board terminated the plaintiff’s duty disability

benefits granted under section 5-154 and awarded him ordinary duty benefits under

section 5-155 instead. The Board found that the plaintiff’s disability was not

causally related to his act of duty injury. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court reversed the Board’s

denial of the plaintiff’s continued duty disability benefits, and although the

appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination regarding the plaintiff’s

disability, it denied the plaintiff an award of attorney fees and costs under section

5-228(b) of the Pension Code. Id. ¶¶ 69, 71. The court concluded that the appeal

concerned continuing proof of disability, not an application for disability benefits,

and thus section 5-228(b) did not apply. Id. ¶ 69. In rejecting the plaintiff’s attorney

fees and costs request, the Warner court reasoned the appeal involved “proceedings

initiated by the Board under section 5-156 to establish continuing proof of

disability,” not an application for disability benefits under section 5-154, and

differentiated the two types of proceedings. Id. Similarly, in Koniarski v.

Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2021 IL

-7-

App (1st) 200501-U, ¶ 47, the appellate court distinguished between section 5-154

and section 5-156 in finding the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney fees and

costs award under section 5-228(b). Like the Warner court, the Koniarski court

stated that the appeal was not about an application for benefits under section 5-154

but about the continuation of benefits under section 5-156 and an award of attorney

fees and costs for the successful challenge of the discontinuation of benefits is not

authorized by the statutory language. Id. Warner and Koniarski both concluded that

section 5-228(b) concerns only initial applications for disability benefits and not

the discontinuation of them.

¶ 17 The appellate court below rejected Warner and Koniarski, finding them

unpersuasive and noting that they are unpublished, nonprecedential, and

nonbinding Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) orders. 2024 IL App

(1st) 231993, ¶ 64. The appellate court determined both decisions were

“conclusory” regarding the attorney fees and costs issue. Id. We agree with the

appellate court’s description of Warner and Koniarski as “conclusory” in

interpreting the attorney fees and costs provision. Indeed, both courts presented the

same conclusion almost verbatim, merely setting forth the language of section 5-

228(b) and summarily determining that it applied only to the denial of an original

application for benefits and not to the discontinuation of the benefits. Both Rule 23

orders are devoid of any analysis or reasoning regarding the resolution of the issue.

They do not rely on rules of statutory interpretation or present any support for their

conclusory and incorrect construction of the attorney fees and costs provision. In

contrast, the appellate court in the instant case employed a reasoned statutory

analysis in rejecting the conclusions reached by the Warner and Koniarski courts

and holding that section 5-228(b) applies where “an applicant for duty disability

benefits has benefits discontinued by the Board at a status hearing and succeeds in

having that decision by the Board reversed on appeal.” Id. ¶ 57.

¶ 18 Likewise, we reject the Board’s interpretation that section 5-154 and section 5-

156 are two separate processes: one to apply for benefits and one to discontinue

them. Sections 5-154, 5-154.1, and 5-155 each address a disabled officer’s right to

the disability benefit. Section 5-156 explains how to obtain the benefits. The

sections necessarily work together and apply to all disability benefits. As stated

above, the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between an initial

application for benefits and the continuation of them. The Board’s interpretation of

-8-

the attorney fees and costs provision, limiting the award to those officers whose

initial application for disability benefits was denied and reversed on administrative

review, is in contradiction of the legislative intent to assist disabled officers who

successfully challenge the denial of their disability benefits, including their

continuation. The award of attorney fees and costs helps to level the playing field

for officers who are required by the Board to defend their eligibility for continued

disability benefits. The attorney fees and costs provision supports officers who are

confronting the vast resources of the Board. Police officers like Rainey who

respond to the Board’s review of their disability benefits should not be penalized

for defending those benefits when they are improperly discontinued.

¶ 19 The unambiguous language of the statute directs that the trial court may award

attorney fees and costs to an officer who applies for and receives disability benefits

for a duty-related injury or for occupational disease and successfully challenges the

denial of benefits. Both section 5-154 and section 5-154.1 provide disability

benefits for duty-related injuries. See 40 ILCS 5/5-154(a) (West 2022)) (benefits

for officer injured “in the performance of an act of duty”); id. § 5-154.1(a) (benefits

for officer with disability that “arise[s] out of or in the course of employment”). In

enacting these provisions, the legislature determined that these two classes of

officers were entitled to an attorney fees and costs award when their applications

for duty or job-related disability were wrongly denied by the Board. It makes no

sense to deny these officers an award of attorney fees and costs when they challenge

the discontinuation of their disability benefits. Indeed, we construe the legislative

intent in favor of officers who are disabled as a result of their public service. We

find section 5-228(b) allows attorney fees and costs to be awarded to officers who

successfully challenge denial of their initial request for duty or occupational disease

disability benefits and the continuation of those benefits.

¶ 20 Section 5-228(b) does differentiate between duty/occupational disease

disabilities and ordinary disabilities. Its plain language limits attorney fees and

costs awards to police officers whose disabilities are duty related and does not

authorize an award to officers obtaining an ordinary disability benefit,

distinguishing officers who incur injuries related to the job from those officers

whose disabilities are not job related. The appellate court construed these

provisions with the rest of the statute and properly distinguished police officers

seeking duty- or occupational-related disability benefits from those officers seeking

-9-

ordinary disability benefits unrelated to their job as police officers. 2024 IL App

(1st) 231993, ¶ 62. It reasoned the distinction exists to provide greater support to

officers who are disabled as a result of their job-related injuries as opposed to

officers whose disabilities arose outside the context of their employment. Id. ¶ 63.

It concluded that “the legislature clearly and logically prioritized officers who were

wrongly denied job-related disability benefits.” Id. ¶ 62. We agree with the

appellate court’s reasoning that the legislature decided that officers who sought

disability benefits under section 5-155 for a disability “the result of any cause other

than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty” (40 ILCS 5/5-155 (West

2022)) were not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. 2024 IL App (1st)

231993, ¶ 62. The statute evinces a policy that officers who are denied job-related

duty disability benefits should not foot the bill for challenging the improper denial

or termination of those benefits. Per the plain language of section 5-228(b), we find

officers who are seeking ordinary disability benefits unconnected to a job-related

disability are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs.

¶ 21 Finally, we consider the Board’s argument that pending legislation negates the

above policy determination where the proposed legislation permits an award of

attorney fees to officers who also prevail in challenging the denial of ordinary

benefits and to those who challenge the termination of their continued disability

benefits. The legislation would codify the appellate court’s ruling in this case that

attorney fees and costs may be awarded to officers who successfully challenge the

denial of benefits and the continuation of them. The legislation failed to pass, and

according to the Board, the legislature’s failure to adopt the legislation means that

it agrees with the cases interpreting the fee provision such as Warner and Koniarski.

See Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369, 380 (2008)

(legislature’s failure to pass legislation indicates its acceptance of the judicial

interpretation of the statute). We are not persuaded by the Board’s reliance on

legislative efforts to amend the attorney fees and costs provision.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of

the circuit court, and find that section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code authorizes the

award of the attorney fees and costs to a police officer who prevails on

- 10 -

administrative review when challenging either the denial of duty or occupational

disease disability benefits or the discontinuation of them.

¶ 24 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 25 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 26 Board decision reversed.

- 11 -