Sosa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ALFREDO SOSA, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-03094-SEM

)

GEORGE DUNCAN, )

Defendant. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C §

1983 and a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) filed by Plaintiff Alfredo

Sosa, an inmate at Taylorville Correctional Center (“Taylorville”).

Plaintiff’s account states an Eighth Amendment claim, but the

Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel.

I. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. Upon reviewing the complaint, the

court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing them

liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645,

649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant George Duncan, a physician at

Taylorville, unnecessarily prescribed Plaintiff medication for

asthma. Plaintiff complained about his diagnosis and medication to

no avail. As a result of sickness Plaintiff experienced because of the

medication, Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital for

treatment, where a physician confirmed that Plaintiff did not have

asthma. Plaintiff asserts that the medication prescribed by Duncan

had a detrimental effect on his health.

C. Analysis

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription

against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct

demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on

a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and

subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.

1996).

Under the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the

prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by

showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the

inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,

653 (7th Cir. 2005).

“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may

be held to have displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision

by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate

that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on

such a judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir.

2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendant Duncan.

II. COUNSEL

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court

cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil

cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See

Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional

right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request

counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances).

In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two

questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt

to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if

so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear

competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied because he has

not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has

attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several

lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED.

2) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

[1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs claim against Defendant Duncan. Plaintiff’s claim

against Duncan proceeds in an individual capacity only.

Additional claims shall not be included in the case, except

at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good

cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing

Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days

from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed

Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days

of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been

served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

5) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while

at that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s

current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not

be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

6) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files

a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is

necessary or will be considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has

filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail

his discovery requests and responses directly to

Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent

to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has

filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a

scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

8) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel

shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal

of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

10) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to

the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective Order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendant under the standard procedures.

ENTERED November 19, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE