Euring

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AVERY S. EURING,

Case No. 1:25-CV-03322

Plaintiff,

v. Honorable Sunil R. Harjani

THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Avery S. Euring sues the City of Chicago and four police officers, Christina M.

Fiorentino, Amanda M. Rios, Peter McGlynn, and an unnamed officer, for detaining and searching

him while, as a rideshare driver, he was parked to pick up a passenger. Defendants move to dismiss

the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a

claim because the officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause for their detention and

search of Plaintiff and are also entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants’ arguments are based

on body-worn camera and in-car camera footage that is not referenced in the Complaint and are

not generally considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, and as further explained below,

the motion to dismiss [18] is denied.

Discussion

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff, a rideshare driver, was inside his vehicle waiting to

pick up a passenger. [9] ¶¶ 7–8.1 After the rider entered the vehicle’s rear right passenger seat,

1 For purposes of reviewing this motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true, as it must,

all factual allegations in the complaint. Heredia v. Cap. Mgmt. Servs., L.P., 942 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.

2019).

Defendants Fiorentino and Rios allegedly approached the rear end of the vehicle, pulled the

passenger out, and placed the passenger in handcuffs. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Plaintiff alleges that he was

instructed to exit the vehicle by the unnamed defendant officer and complied. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.

Defendant McGlynn then allegedly placed Plaintiff in handcuffs, searched him, and kept him in

handcuffs for over eight minutes before releasing him without charge. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20, 22.

Plaintiff has brought three federal claims for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights,

and an Illinois state claim for false imprisonment. Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain

and search Plaintiff and are also entitled to qualified immunity. In support of their motion,

Defendants have attached six video exhibits from body-worn cameras (BWC) and an in-car

camera, which they claim show that the officers were conducting a traffic stop, were in hot pursuit

of Plaintiff’s passenger as a suspect of a separate crime, and detained and searched Plaintiff

because of his refusal to provide his driver’s license and belligerence towards the officers.

On a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts in the complaint are accepted as true, and

reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673,

678 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 556 (2007)). “Under the

federal rules’ notice pleading standard, a complaint must contain only a ‘short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608

(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A court may examine video exhibits if they are

“attached to the complaint” or are “referenced in the pleading [and] central to the claim.” Esco,

107 F.4th at 678. A video exhibit is central to a claim when review of the video exhibit will aid

the court in deciding whether a claim has merit. See id. (considering body-worn camera videos

that were referenced in the complaint and “dispositive of the issue of probable cause”); Bogie, 705

F.3d at 608–09 (considering video recordings because “the entire first claim [could] be resolved

as a matter of law by observing the scene in the video”). If the video is properly before the Court

and “‘utterly discredits’ the non-movant’s version of the facts such that there could be no

reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts,” then the videos control over the

contradictory allegations. Esco, 107 F.4th at 679 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007)).

While the Seventh Circuit has recognized the need for a balance between “accept[ing] the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true [and] not giving credence to facts that are clearly, definitively,

and uncontrovertibly contradicted by video footage,” it has only applied this balancing after

determining that the video footage can be reviewed on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. Courts in

this district have consistently adhered to the requirement that the complaint attach or incorporate

by reference video exhibits in order for the videos to be considered on a motion to dismiss. See,

e.g., Van Dyke v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2022 WL 4483835, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2022)

(reviewing video exhibits that were referenced in the complaint); Tate v. City of Chicago, 2020

WL 6715660, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2020) (same); Flores Delgado v. City of Chicago, 547 F.

Supp. 3d 824, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (reviewing video exhibits attached to the complaint); Robinson

v. Crot, 2024 WL 1603485, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2024) (declining to review videos attached to

motion to dismiss where the footage was not mentioned in the complaint, even in passing); Daoud

v. City of Chicago, 2023 WL 5389015, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2023) (same). That threshold

requirement is not met here, where Plaintiff neither attached the videos as exhibits to the Complaint

nor referenced the videos in the Complaint.

None of Defendants’ cases permit the Court to bypass this requirement. The court in Hyung

Seok Koh v. Graf, 2013 WL 5348326, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013), noted that the videos

submitted by the defendants were referenced in the complaint before determining that they were

central to the claims and could be reviewed. In Walker v. Gatsios, 2024 WL 4476118, at *1 (N.D.

Ill. Oct. 11, 2024), and Avitia v. City of Chicago, 2024 WL 2274101, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2024),

the district courts stated that they would consider the defendants’ submitted videos even though

they were not attached to or directly referenced in the complaints because the videos were not

objected to by plaintiffs and captured the entirety of the events referenced in the complaints. In

contrast, Defendants’ six videos are not explicitly referenced by the Complaint, Plaintiff objects to

their use, and they do not capture the entirety of the events underlying Plaintiff’s allegations.

The only videos to capture the beginning of the events are the in-car camera footage

showing Plaintiff’s car in a standing position, and the BWC footage from Defendants Rios and

Fiorentino as they get out of a police car and approach the rear of Plaintiff’s car. These videos do

not depict the officers giving any instructions to Plaintiff regarding a traffic violation and do not

have any audio to determine whether a traffic violation was the reason for them appearing on the

scene. Nor can the Court determine that there was a traffic violation simply by watching this short

clip of the video. Rather, the audio begins once they open the rear door to pull the passenger out

of Plaintiff’s vehicle, and Plaintiff is only seen and heard sometimes in the background. Defendant

McGlynn’s BWC footage shows only part of the unnamed officer’s instructions to Plaintiff to exit

his car. Importantly, none of the videos show Plaintiff being asked for his driver’s license before

he is searched and handcuffed. Instead, they start with Plaintiff getting out of the car on his own

volition, initially pulling away from the unnamed officer saying “don’t touch me,” but then

complying with instructions to put his hands on the car for the pat-down and saying “go ahead.”

Much of the video is then simply Plaintiff expressing his discontentment very loudly, asking for

reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop, and attempting to collect the names and badge

numbers of the officers.

The BWC footage from Defendant Zylinska barely shows Plaintiff, and the BWC footage

from non-party Officer Schneider does not show him at all. Defendants offer these videos to

demonstrate that the officers were in hot pursuit of the passenger as a suspect for a crime, so their

actions towards Plaintiff were reasonable due to his potential involvement with the suspected

crime. However, portions relevant to Defendants’ narrative of events have no audio. This evidence

is similar to that in Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476 (7th Cir. 2023), in which the Seventh

Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant officer who shot the plaintiffs’ dog. Id.

at 482. The district court’s decision rested on the fact that the dog was threatening the officer, but

this fact was only supported by a soundless video that did not show the dog, except maybe one

second of a blurry object. Id. Without being able to tell whether the dog was barking or growling,

the video would not be factually “unambiguous” to a jury. Id. In the same way, the videos here

about the passenger as a suspect do not “definitively demonstrate[] what occurred.” Id. Officer

Schneider’s BWC footage shows him chasing two individuals, but the video is too blurry to

identify them before they get away. Defendant Zylinska’s BWC footage shows conversations with

a parking garage owner who identifies the passenger as a suspect for vehicle theft, but the video

does not itself show this connection.

While these videos will undoubtedly provide key insights into the allegedly unreasonable

events that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims, the videos alone are not dispositive of the facts at

issue or necessary to Plaintiff’s ability to have brought his claims.2 Therefore, following the

2 Defendants claim that Plaintiff had access to the BWC footage before filing the Complaint and therefore

relied upon them. However, Defendants’ exhibit of an alleged FOIA request made by Plaintiff was not

properly filed to allow for review. See [25-1]. Regardless, that would not prove that the videos were

general rule, the Court will not consider the videos that are not attached to or incorporated into the

Complaint and will decide Defendants’ motion based on only the well-pleaded facts in the

Complaint.

Whether the Complaint states a plausible claim turns on whether the officers had

reasonable suspicion or probable cause. “An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth

Amendment if the brief detention is based on reasonable suspicion that the detained individual has

committed or is about to commit a crime.” United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir.

2015). “This is an objective standard, based upon the facts available to the officers at the moment

of the seizure.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). Correspondingly, an officer

may only search an individual during a “Terry stop” when they have “at a minimum some

articulable suspicion that the subject is concealing a weapon or poses a danger to the officer or

others.” Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff alleges

that he was inside his vehicle, told the officers arresting his passenger that they needed reasonable

articulable suspicion, and complied with an instruction to exit the vehicle. He was then allegedly

kept in handcuffs for over eight minutes, before being released without any charges. These

allegations, taking them as true, do not indicate that Plaintiff was suspected of, or could be

reasonably suspected of, committing a crime, preparing to commit a crime, concealing a weapon,

or posing a danger to the officers.

In like manner, whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity turns on whether

they had reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 825 (7th

incorporated by reference into the Complaint because all of Plaintiff’s allegations could have been made

based on his own experience. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Chicago, 594 F. Supp.3d 1021, 1030 (N.D. Ill.

2022) (not reviewing videos where the complaint only made passing reference and the plaintiffs “could

have brought this § 1983 case if the BWC footage never existed”).

Cir. 2022). Once the defense is raised, it is plaintiff’s burden to show that qualified immunity is

barred because the allegations add up to a claim that a constitutional right was violated and the

right was clearly established when the defendants engaged in the alleged conduct. Hanson v.

LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2020). It is clearly established that an individual has a right

against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV;

see, e.g., Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 827 (affirming summary judgment for plaintiff on Fourth

Amendment claim where police officer handcuffed him after he was “friendly, respectful, and fully

compliant with [the officer’s] instructions after stepping out of the car” and “the frisk did not turn

up a weapon or contraband of any kind”). It is also clearly established that, beyond a Terry stop,

a violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is evaluated by the existence of

probable cause. Neita v. City of Chicago, 148 F.4th 916, 931 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Dunaway v.

New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)); United States v. Jackson, 103 F.4th 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2024).

“[P]robable cause and arguable probable cause both depend on the elements of the predicate

offense.” Neita, 148 F.4th at 933. However, qualified immunity is not generally a ground for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because determining whether there was a constitutional violation—

i.e., no reasonable suspicion or probable cause—“so closely depends on the facts of the case.”

Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

As discussed, the Complaint does not indicate that the officers had reasonable suspicion in

order to support a grant of qualified immunity. The Court does not determine on these brief

allegations whether the events here qualify as a Terry stop or remained a Terry stop for the entire

duration, so the lack of reasonable suspicion in the Complaint’s allegations does not end the

inquiry. The question remains whether the officers had probable cause. Because probable cause

“depend[s] on the elements of the predicate offense,” Plaintiff’s allegations must be viewed in light

of the alleged predicate offense to determine probable cause. Neita, 148 F.4th at 933. Defendants

first argue that Plaintiff had committed a traffic violation by stopping “[o]n the roadway side of

any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street.” 625 ILCS 5/11-1303(a)(1)(a).

However, details of the road are not known from the Complaint to determine this. Nor is it clear

from the allegations that this was the purpose of the officers’ encounter with Plaintiff. Defendants

then argue that they were in hot pursuit of the passenger in Plaintiff’s car, and that Plaintiff acted

belligerently. Neither of these assertions are evident from the allegations in the Complaint, and

they are dependent on facts that are not yet part of the record. Therefore, the Court cannot say that

qualified immunity is appropriate at this stage.

The same analysis follows for Defendants’ claimed immunity under the Illinois Tort

Immunity Act against Plaintiff’s state claim of false imprisonment. The Act protects a public

employee from liability for their “act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless

such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct,” which means “an actual or deliberate

intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious

disregard for the safety of others or their property.” 745 ILCS 10/2-202; 745 ILCS 10/1-210. This

immunity is an affirmative defense that a plaintiff generally need not overcome. Doe I v. Bd. of

Educ. of City of Chi., 364 F. Supp. 849, 862–63 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Van Meter v. Darien Park

Dist., 799 N.E.2d 273, 280 (Ill. 2003)). Here, Plaintiff pleads that Defendants each took action

against him without legal justification and were “willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, and done

with reckless indifference and/or callous disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.” [9] ¶ 24. The rest of the

allegations do not develop enough of a record to find otherwise, so granting immunity against the

state claim would also be premature.

Defendants have not requested that the Court convert the motion to dismiss into a motion

for summary judgment in order to consider the videos. However, in anticipation of the Court

converting the motion on its own, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration under Rule 56(d) seeking

further discovery on why Defendants detained him, searched him, and held him as long as they

did. While the videos will be useful evidence, they do not provide all the information that Plaintiff

seeks. Nor do they “utterly discredit[]” Plaintiff’s allegations to justify a ruling for Defendants as

a matter of law. Esco, 107 F.4th at 679. Therefore, the Court does not find it appropriate to convert

the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment on this limited record. See, e.g., Flores

Delgado, 547 F. Supp. 3d at 830 n.2 (declining to convert motion to dismiss into motion for

summary judgment where the plaintiff’s brief was “no substitute for a properly-supported Rule 56

record”).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [18] 1s denied.

SO ORDERED. fk

Dated: November 17, 2025 Ue Phage

Sunil R. Harjani

United States District Judge