Taylor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

COLUMBIA DIVISION

COREY TAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 1:25-cv-00079

)

TAUREAN JAMES, Warden, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On September 23, 2025, Corey Taylor, a Tennessee inmate incarcerated at the Turney

Center Industrial Complex (TCIX), filed a pro se, verified civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Doc. No. 1), a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2), and a

motion to file the suit under seal (Doc. No. 3). The Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP application without

prejudice to renew and denied his motion to file under seal. (Doc. No. 11).

On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). (Doc. No. 7). The Court ordered that the TRO Motion be

held in abeyance pending the resolution of the filing fee issue. (Doc. No. 11 at 5–6).

On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed two motions: a Motion “for leave to file

deposition/affidavit of violent acts done to another as proof of issues” raised in the Complaint

(Doc. No. 12) and a Motion in Opposition to the Court’s denial of leave to file under seal (Doc.

No. 13).

On November 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion asking the Court to entertain his IFP

application (Doc. No. 14) as well as the application itself (Doc. No. 15).

I. MOTION AND APPLICATION FOR PAUPER STATUS

A prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without

prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s affidavit and trust

account documentation that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, his Motion (Doc. No.

14) and IFP application (Doc. No. 15) are GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is ASSESSED.1 The

fee will be collected in installments as described below.

The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust

account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)

20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average

monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of

the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s

preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when

the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350

filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which

Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining

to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,

the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of

confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order

1 Prisoners bringing civil lawsuits are “required to pay the full amount of a filing fee,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1), either in a lump sum at the time of filing or in installments over time via an assessment against

the prisoner’s inmate trust account. Where the prisoner is granted pauper status and allowed to pay in

installments, the fee is $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14

(eff. Dec. 1, 2023).

must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. MOTIONS TO FILE EVIDENCE AND TO RECONSIDER REQUEST TO SEAL

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for leave to file a fellow inmate’s notarized statement, declared

under penalty of perjury, concerning that inmate’s recent violent encounter at TCIX. (Doc. No.

12). However, although styled as “Plaintiff[’]s Petition for Leave to File,” the Motion is not signed

by Plaintiff, but by the inmate declarant, Michael Patton. Mr. Patton is not a party to this case. His

signature is not effective for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)’s requirement that

“[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed . . . by a party personally if the

party is unrepresented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Even if Mr. Patton’s statement was properly before

the Court, Plaintiff offers no explanation about how it relates to him or his claims. Normally,

“[e]vidence should not be submitted to the court until this action reaches an appropriate stage in

litigation for the submission of evidence, such as in response to a motion for summary judgment,

at trial, or when specifically requested by the court.” Sandoval v. Lopez, No. 1:23-CV-00248-JLT-

SKO (PC), 2025 WL 437015, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2025). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for

leave to file Mr. Patton’s declaration (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED. The Clerk SHALL return Docket

No. 12 to Plaintiff and strike it from the docket of this case.

Turning to Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to reconsider its denial of his request to seal

this record and his individual filings from public view, the Court declines to reconsider its ruling.

Plaintiff’s Motion reiterates that he “[feels] he’ll be in danger due to the content” of his pleadings

in this matter, should they be publicly accessible on Westlaw or another “law website,” and asks

the Court to at least “not publish this matter on Westlaw or any sites that will be accessible for the

view of non-parties, etc.” (Doc. No. 3 at 2–3). For the reasons stated in its prior order (Doc. No.

11 at 3–5) and incorporated herein, the Court declines to seal this case or limit its distribution on

publicly accessible internet sites based on Plaintiff’s fear that openness to public view will generate

a nonspecific threat to his safety. The Motion to reconsider (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED.

III. TRO MOTION

With the issue of the filing fee now resolved, Plaintiff’s TRO Motion (Doc. No. 7) is ripe

for ruling. That Motion was filed “pursuant [to] Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)” (id. at 1), which governs

issuance of “a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its

attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). A TRO may issue “only if . . . specific facts in an affidavit or

a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result

to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” and the movant “certifies in

writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Id.

A. Plaintiff’s Filings

As relevant to the TRO Motion, the Complaint claims that understaffing at TCIX has

resulted in security threat group (STG) affiliated inmates “control[ling] the offender population”

by “liv[ing] as they once lived on the streets.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8.) As a result of a particular violent

incident in Plaintiff’s residential unit, Unit 1B, the unit was placed under an extended, security-

related lockdown that forced his confinement to his cell “for 24 hrs a day 7 days a week” (id. at 6)

and caused the loss of various important privileges, including the ability to attend religious services

(id. at 7) and a medical appointment for treatment of an oral condition. (Id. at 4–6).

In his affidavit in support of the TRO Motion, Plaintiff states that he notified the

appropriate officials of his concerns by writing a letter to Warden James inquiring about the

Warden’s goals for prisoner rehabilitation and for stemming the tide of drug overdoses, gang

violence, robberies, and extortions by armed inmates at TCIX. (Doc. No. 8 at 1). He also wrote a

letter to TDOC complaining about these conditions of confinement, though he states that TDOC

officials regularly defer to the Warden when such matters are grieved. (Id. at 1–2). Plaintiff asserts

that, despite being aware of the high levels of prisoner “violence, drugs, stabbings and deaths at

TCIX” for years, Defendants “have failed to do anything.” (Id. at 2).

As revealed in the TRO Motion itself (Doc. No. 7) and in the proposed order submitted by

Plaintiff (Doc. No. 7-2), he primarily seeks emergency injunctive relief from the lockdown

conditions in his unit, which had lasted for 26 days as of the time the TRO Motion was composed.

During the lockdown, Plaintiff was deprived of tablet privileges (and therefore the ability to

conduct online legal research, video visitation with family, and one domestic court hearing via

Zoom), all outdoor recreation, the ability to see providers for medical or mental health treatment

(including a regular appointment for maintenance of Plaintiff’s oral lichen planus condition), hot

meals, and the ability to attend Islamic worship services. (Doc. No. 7 at 2–4). His proposed order

would abate these conditions by enjoining Defendants to “stop prohibiting communication to loved

ones” and to “stop disconnecting offender tablets” in order to prohibit their access to legal,

religious, and educational materials during the lockdown. (Doc. No. 7-2 at 1). It would further

enjoin Defendants from imposing discipline to individual inmates in accord with TDOC

disciplinary policy, and otherwise to provide inmates with adequate healthcare, ventilation,

hygiene, and hot meals. (Id. at 2).

The TRO Motion also seeks to enjoin future instances of the TCIX administration

corporately punishing an entire unit by locking all unit residents down in their cells in response to

the violent conduct of a few individual residents. (See Doc. No. 7 at 11 (“If the court grants this

injunction . . . the defendants would be ordered to . . . stop corporate punishment, lockdowns for

more than one week without opportunities for physical exercise….”); Doc. No. 7-2 at 2). It further

seeks to stop (1) the practice of understaffing TCIX and the related problems of prison staff

yielding to the culture of gang violence, which in turn is fueled by the prison drug trade (Doc. No.

7 at 2, 6–7), (2) the Tennessee Board of Parole’s practice of failing to hold timely hearings (id. at

4), and (3) the failure of TCIX administration to prioritize rehabilitation of the inmates (id. at 4–

6). (See also Doc. No. 7-2).

B. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule 65(b), the purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the

relative positions of the parties until the Court can hold an adversarial hearing for a preliminary

injunction or trial on the merits. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Granny

Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cnty.,

415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir.

1996) (the purpose of injunctive relief “is to preserve the status quo so that a reasoned resolution

of a dispute may be had”). However, “[i]f the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of

the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury, either

by returning to the last uncontested status quo between the parties, by the issuance of a mandatory

injunction, or by allowing the parties to take proposed action that the court finds will minimize the

irreparable injury.” Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978) (internal

citations omitted). “Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary

remedies which should be granted only if the movant carries his burden of proving that the

circumstances clearly demand it.” Ciavone v. McKee, No. 1:08-cv-771, 2009 WL 2096281, at *1

(W.D. Mich. July 10, 2009) (citing Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d

566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002)).

In determining whether to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction, a district court must

consider the following four factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2)

whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) whether granting the

injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public

interest. E.g., A&W X-Press, Inc. v. FCA US, LLC, No. 21-1805, 2022 WL 2759872, at *3 (6th

Cir. July 14, 2022) (citing Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless & Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1199 v.

Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). “These four considerations are ‘factors to be

balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.’” Id. (quoting Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning

Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007)).

When evaluating for an alleged constitutional violation, “the likelihood of success on the

merits often will be the determinative factor.” Thompson v. DeWine, 976 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir.

2020) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2512 (2021) (quoting Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697

F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012)). “But even the strongest showing on the other three factors cannot

‘eliminate the irreparable harm requirement.’” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schools, 942 F.3d 324, 326–

27 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105

(6th Cir. 1982)). “That factor is indispensable: If the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable

injury, there’s no need to grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.” Id.

C. Analysis

Importantly, Plaintiff has now clarified that “on 10-7-2025[,] [he] was let off lockdown

which was one of various reasons as to what motivated him to file this suit.” (Doc. No. 13 at 3).

Accordingly, to the extent that the TRO Motion seeks emergency relief from the conditions that

accompanied the recent lockdown of Plaintiff’s unit, that portion of the motion is now moot. See

Calipo v. Wolf, No. CV 18-320, 2018 WL 7412835, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 858035 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2019)

(“In light of the fact that the lockdown has ended, any relief sought by Plaintiff in connection with

that specific lockdown has been rendered moot.”); Levi v. Hogsten, No. 1:CV-07-1839, 2008 WL

11495449, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL

11495448 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2008) (denying as moot inmate’s injunction motion related to

restrictions accompanying lockdown, including deprivation of “hot meals, one hour recreation per

day, showers and sick call, [and] . . . Kosher meals,” since that particular lockdown ended and “the

lockdown restrictions [were not] likely to occur again”).

1. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff relies upon irreparable harm during the lockdown conditions that were imposed

in the weeks leading up to the filing of the Complaint, which have since been lifted. On the first

page of the TRO Motion, Plaintiff alleges that he “suffered injuries and irreparable harm in the

days preceding the filing of this action,” specifically the loss of First Amendment freedoms. (Doc.

No. 7 at 1). On the seventh page, Plaintiff refers to “the irreparable injury [he] ha[s] already

suffered,” and the additional irreparable injury he will continue to suffer while on lockdown, “due

to his oral disease which he was scheduled to get dental treatment on 9/11/25 when the warden

cancelled his appointment due to individual acts of others.” (Id. at 7). Following the lifting of the

lockdown and, presumably, the restoration of Unit 1B residents’ ability to leave the unit to attend

religious services and dental appointments, it does not appear that Plaintiff makes any showing

that he will suffer any irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief. This alone is sufficient

reason to deny the Motion. See D.T., 942 F.3d at 327 (“If the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and

irreparable injury, there’s no need to grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.”).

2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Outside of the restrictions that accompanied the recent lockdown, the Complaint seeks

relief from TCIX’s practice of locking down an entire unit for the violent misbehavior of a few

unit residents, asking for a prospective “policy change of the institutional procedures regarding

these lockdowns.” (Doc. No. 1 at 11). It further requests “[t]hat corrective actions be taken to stop

the STG violence and stabbings as well as drug overdose deaths of all State of TN prisoners.” (Id.).

Correspondingly, Plaintiff’s proposed injunctive order would enjoin Defendants to “stop . . .

unit/facility lockdowns due to individual acts,” to “take protective measures to stop the

maintaining of a nuisance and the severely violent gang and drug infested conditions in the

offender population,” and to “provide adequate rehabilitative services and safe environments.”

(Doc. No. 7-2 at 1–2).2

Plaintiff does not have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his claim that

TCIX’s lockdown practice (with its attendant loss of privileges for the inmates subject to

lockdown) is unconstitutional. This is particularly true because the lockdown is a response to

deadly violence and its duration was short one month. In Cook v. Campbell, 173 F.3d 854 (Table),

1999 WL 183316 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999), the Sixth Circuit held:

The plaintiffs’ argument that the defendants improperly placed them on lockdown

status is without merit. The plaintiffs allege that, after a fight between prison gang

members, the entire prison was locked down for a four month period. However, the

imposition of lockdown status is not an atypical, significant deprivation from the

ordinary circumstances of prison life and prisoners have no liberty interest in

remaining free from lockdown. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).

The plaintiffs also argue that they were improperly restricted in their use of several

privileges and rights during the lockdown period. However, lawful incarceration

2 Notably, any order to institute “protective measures” and “adequate rehabilitative services” would employ

terms that are too generic and subjective to sustain any viable injunction, whether temporary, preliminary,

or permanent. See Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F.4th 356, 362 (6th Cir. 2022) (an injunctive

order “must be couched in specific and unambiguous terms” or else be subject to vacatur) (citing, e.g., Fed.

R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)).

results in the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, and

this retraction is justified by prison considerations. See id. at 485. While the

plaintiffs allege that their ability to use the prison law library was restricted, they

have not alleged that this restriction actually hindered their ability to pursue a legal

claim, as required for a successful access to the courts claim. See Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Although the plaintiffs also allege that they were not

provided with sufficient exercise while on lockdown status, the restriction of

exercise during a prison lockdown is appropriate. See Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329,

337 (2d Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1997).

Further, the defendants properly restricted prison visitation during this time because

prison inmates have no constitutional right to visitation. See Bazzetta v. McGinnis,

124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2371 (1998). Lastly,

prison officials properly restricted inmates’ religious services during the lockdown

period because the restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate prison

concerns. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 931 (6th Cir. 1985).

Cook, at *1. See also Bond v. Cunningham, No. 22-1105-SHM-TMP, 2023 WL 2842887, at *5

(W.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2023) (finding that “the law is well-settled in the Sixth Circuit that an inmate’s

temporary loss of privileges [during a lockdown] does not rise to the level of constitutional

magnitude”) (citing, e.g., Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Nor can the Court find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims related

to uncontrolled prison violence attributable to understaffing and drug trafficking. It has long been

evident that “drug smuggling and drug use in prison are intractable problems.” Overton v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003). It is also clear that “[p]risons are by definition places where

violent people are housed involuntarily” and that “[a]ll prisons experience incidents of crime that

exceed the levels of the outside.” McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). “As laudable as the plaintiff’s desire to reform the

state prison system is, the alleged conditions of his confinement [will not likely] justify judicial

intervention into the internal workings of state prison oversight, staffing, and administration.” Kirk

v. Parker, No. 3:20-CV-00540, 2020 WL 5039441, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2020) (citing

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349–52 (1981) (finding that, in discharging duty to protect

constitutional rights, courts “cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are

insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution,” nor can they award relief based on

considerations that, though they may “reflect an aspiration toward an ideal environment for long-

term confinement,” “properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than

a court”)).

Finally, although the TRO Motion mentions the Tennessee Board of Parole’s practice of

failing to hold timely hearings, there is no corresponding remedy for that practice in Plaintiff’s

proposed injunctive order. Nor is a claim based on parole determinations properly joined in this

action that otherwise challenges prison conditions, as discussed below. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

not carried his burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his

claims.

Because irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the merits have not been

established, the Court need not review the remaining factors, other than to say that for this Court

to disallow unit-wide lockdowns in response to security threats would unreasonably disrupt the

integrity of TCIX’s administration, in which the public has an established interest. See Glover v.

Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 286–87 (6th Cir. 1988) (setting forth various public policy concerns

relating to court intrusion into jail administrative matters and holding that a federal court should

not “attempt to administer any portion of a state correctional system program except in the most

compelling situations”). In sum, on balancing the relevant factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

not carried his burden of demonstrating the need for emergency injunctive relief. The TRO Motion

(Doc. No. 7) is therefore DENIED.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF

Upon preliminary examination, the Complaint as currently constituted runs afoul of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the joinder of claims and parties in a single lawsuit.

Plaintiff sues one group of defendants at TCIX (Defendants James, Johnson, Cotham, and

Pittman) for denying him medical care related to his oral condition and/or his need for a bland diet.

(See Doc. No. 1 at 2, 4). He sues another group of defendants who appear to be Tennessee

Department of Correction (TDOC) executives (Defendants Strada, Thomas, and Genovese) for

recklessly “dismantl[ing] the CERT teams across TDOC state prisons,” which has resulted in an

increase of gang violence. (Id. at 3). He sues a combination of defendants (Defendants James,

Johnson, Cotham, Thomas, Genovese, Clendindeon, and Pittman) for allowing or maintaining a

variety of unconstitutional conditions at TCIX during the lockdown of Plaintiff’s unit. (Id. at 6–

7). Plaintiff also sues the Tennessee Board of Parole for denying him parole in December 2023, in

breach of the sentencing provisions of his plea agreement and in order to continue his confinement

in unconstitutional conditions. (Id. at 8–9). He sues the American Correctional Accreditation

Association for giving TCIX a passing score after inspecting the facility and seeing crime-scene

tape over the cell where an inmate had been murdered. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff sues Defendant Pittman

for refusing his transfer requests and forcing him to live in his troublesome unit, or else “remain

in [protective custody] or go to segregation,” in retaliation for Plaintiff’s “active suits against

individuals in TCIX” and other instances when he spoke against unlawful acts. (Id. at 9–10).

Lastly, the Complaint names the following defendants who are not identified with any particular

claim: Hickman County Board of Commissioners, Inspector General Leslie Gilmore, TDOC

Assistant Commissioner of Rehabilitative Services Rechael Riley-Coe, TDOC Director of Clinical

Services Brenda Boyd, TDOC Director of Behavioral Health Jim Casey, the Tennessee

Department of Human and Social Services, TDOC Policy Developer and Compliance Staff, and

the Hickman County Mayor and Government of Hickman County. (Id. at 1).

This scattershot style of pleading is typically rejected by courts due to misjoinder of claims

and parties. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Tennessee, No. 2:17-cv-2137-STA-egb, 2017 WL 4324541, at *3

(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2017); Staples v. Stone, No. 16-cv-12367, 2017 WL 76891, at *3 (E.D.

Mich. Jan. 9, 2017). The federal joinder rules permit the joinder of all claims against a single

opposing party, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), and they permit the joinder of all defendants alleged to be

liable for “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” where “any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)

(emphasis added). But they do not permit the conglomeration of unrelated claims against unrelated

defendants in a single lawsuit. See Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich.

2009) (explaining that, under the Federal Rules, a Plaintiff must assert “at least one claim to relief

against each [defendant] that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents

questions of law or fact common to all”); see also Tolbert, 2017 WL 4324541, at *2) (quoting

Harris v. Gerth, No. 08-CV-12374, 2009 WL 368011, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2009) (collecting

circuit court cases and explaining that the “impulse [] toward entertaining the broadest possible

scope of action” does not “provide a plaintiff free license to join multiple defendants into a single

lawsuit where the claims against the defendants are unrelated”)). Put simply, “[u]nrelated claims

against different defendants belong in different suits.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

Cir. 2007).

The Complaint here, which in its present form presents unrelated claims (concerning

understaffing and resulting violent conditions, lockdown procedures and related deprivations,

parole decisions, and retaliation) against different defendants, cannot be entertained without

flouting the federal joinder rules and impermissibly complicating the litigation of this case.

Accordingly, Plaintiff MUST file an amended complaint within 30 DAYS of the date of

this Order, in which he does not join unrelated claims against unrelated parties. In other words,

Plaintiff can assert any claims he has against a single defendant but no other claims, or he can

assert all the claims he has against multiple defendants that arise from the same incident or series

of related incidents and present at least one common question of law or fact, but no other claims.

See King v. Chambers, No. 3:20-CV-00379, 2020 WL 2404672, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 12, 2020).

If Plaintiff wishes to pursue other claims or defendants outside that limited scope of his amended

complaint, he must do so by filing separate lawsuits.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff'a blank Section 1983 complaint form, which he

may use in drafting his amended complaint. Plaintiff MUST include the docket number for this

case — No. 1:25-cv-00079 — on his amended complaint.

Plaintiff is warned that failure to comply with this Order within the time provided, or to

timely request additional time to do so, may result in action by the Court, including potential

dropping of parties, severing of claims, or dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and

failure to comply with the Court’s order. Plaintiff is also warned that he must keep the Clerk’s

Office informed of his current address at all times.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Woub. Eusbe.

negli Gastin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14