United States v. Wilfredo Robles

USCA11 Case: 23-11483 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2025 Page: 1 of 13

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-11483

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILFREDO ROBLES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20494-RNS-1

____________________

____________________

No. 23-11498

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11483

versus

JONATHAN VASQUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20494-RNS-3

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____________________

No. 23-11524

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RUBEN PUSHIANA,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20494-RNS-2

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Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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23-11483 Opinion of the Court 3

Codefendants Wilfredo Robles, Ruben Pushiana, and

Jonathan Vasquez (collectively, “appellants”) appeal their

convictions and sentences for a drug-related crime under the

Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”). Collectively,

they raise three arguments on appeal. First, they argue that the

district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the

indictment because the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to

them because their vessel was seized in the Dominican Republic’s

Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), which is not part of the “high

seas,” and is therefore not subject to Congress’s authority. Second,

they argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to

dismiss the indictment because their prosecution violated the Due

Process Clause and exceeded Congress’s authority under the

Felonies Clause of the Constitution because the offense had no

nexus with the United States. Finally, they challenge the district

court’s denial of a minor-role reduction under the Sentencing

Guidelines. After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

In 2022, the United States Coast Guard stopped the

appellants’ go-fast vessel within the waters of the Dominican

Republic’s EEZ. The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality.

The appellants refused to answer questions, and, therefore, no one

claimed to be the master or made a claim of nationality for the

vessel. As a result, the vessel was treated as one without a

nationality subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The

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Coast Guard seized approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine from

the vessel.

Thereafter, a grand jury in the Southern District of Florida

indicted Robles, Pushiana, and Vasquez on one count of knowingly

and intentionally possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine

while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States, in violation of 46 U.S.C §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 21 U.S.C.

§ 960(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of conspiracy to do

the same.

The defendants jointly moved to dismiss the indictment on

two grounds. First, they argued that the MDLEA was

unconstitutional as applied to them because the alleged offenses

occurred in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ, not on the “high seas,”

and, therefore, their conduct was beyond the reach of Congress’s

authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution. Second,

they argued that the alleged offense conduct lacked a sufficient

nexus to the United States, such that their prosecution violated the

Due Process Clause and the Felonies Clause of the Constitution.

Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion.

Thereafter, Robles, Pushiana, and Vasquez pleaded guilty to the

conspiracy count. 1

Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office

prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) for each

defendant. As relevant to this appeal, Robles, Pushiana, and

1 In exchange, the government dismissed the other count.

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Vasquez each objected to the PSI’s offense level calculation,

arguing that they were entitled to a two-point minor-role reduction

under the Sentencing Guidelines. They argued that they played a

minor role in the offense because they only transported the

cocaine, they did not know the full scope of the conspiracy, and

they had very limited courier-type roles in the overall drug-

trafficking scheme.

At their joint sentencing hearing, they maintained that

other, unidentified individuals were more culpable in the

drug-trafficking scheme, such as the individuals who recruited

them and planned and coordinated the scheme and those who

owned the drugs. The government opposed each of their requests

for a minor-role reduction and argued that they all shared the

responsibilities associated with operating the vessel and were all

“equally culpable.” The district court overruled their objections

and denied the reduction request.

After hearing additional sentencing-related arguments, the

district court imposed below-guidelines sentences of 60 months’

imprisonment to be followed by two years’ supervised release for

Robles and Vasquez.2 As for Pushiana, who had prior drug

offenses, the district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of

2 Robles and Vasquez each had an advisory guidelines range of 108 to 135

months’ imprisonment.

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144 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervised

release. 3 This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

The appellants raise (A) an as-applied constitutional

challenge to the MDLEA; (B) a due process challenge to their

prosecution based on the lack of a nexus between their conduct and

the United States; and (C) a sentencing challenge to the district

court’s failure to award them a minor-role reduction.4 We address

each argument in turn.

A. The as-applied constitutional challenge

The appellants argue that the district court erred in denying

their motion to dismiss the indictment because the MDLEA is

unconstitutional as applied to them. They maintain that their

vessel was seized in the waters of the Dominican Republic’s EEZ,

which is not part of the “high seas,” and is therefore not subject to

Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause of the

Constitution.5 They acknowledge that their claim is foreclosed by

3 Pushiana’s advisory guidelines range was 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment.

4 We note that, despite pleading guilty, Robles, Pushiana, and Vasquez are

permitted to challenge “the Government’s power to constitutionally

prosecute” them. See Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 178 (2018).

5 Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress has “three

distinct grants of power: (1) the power to define and punish piracies, (the

Piracies Clause); (2) the power to define and punish felonies committed on the

high Seas, (the Felonies Clause); and (3) the power to define and punish

offenses against the law of nations (the Offences Clause).” United States v.

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our decision in United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir.

2024), but they maintain that Alfonso was wrongly decided and they

seek to preserve the issue for further review.

In Alfonso, we rejected a constitutional challenge that

Congress lacked the authority under the Felonies Clause of the

Constitution to prosecute offenses occurring in an EEZ—“the

waters extending 200 nautical miles seaward of and adjacent to the

territorial sea of a nation”—because those waters were not part of

the “high seas.” 104 F.4th at 818. In rejecting this challenge, we

held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause” and

that EEZs were “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies

Clause.” Id. at 823, 826–27; see also United States v. Canario-Vilomar,

128 F.4th 1374, 1381–82 (11th Cir. 2025) (reaffirming Alfonso’s

holding that Congress was not constrained by international law in

crafting the MDLEA, and rejecting the appellant’s argument that

Congress could not reach his conduct because it occurred in an

EEZ). Thus, the appellants’ as-applied constitutional challenge to

Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate conduct in the

Dominican Republic’s EEZ is squarely foreclosed by circuit

precedent. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.

2008) (“Under [our prior-panel-precedent] rule, a prior panel’s

holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is

overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the

Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.”). Although the

Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024) (alteration adopted) (quotations

omitted), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025).

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appellants argue that Alfonso was wrongly decided for several

reasons, the argument that a case was wrongly decided does not

overcome the prior-panel-precedent rule. United States v. Lee, 886

F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the district court

did not err in denying the appellants’ motion to dismiss on this

ground.

B. The nexus challenge

Next, the appellants argue that the district court erred in

denying their motion to dismiss the indictment because their

prosecution violated the Due Process Clause and exceeded

Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution

because their offense had no nexus with the United States. They

acknowledge that their claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and

they seek to preserve the issue for further review.

We have repeatedly held that “the MDLEA is a valid

exercise of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause as applied

to drug trafficking crimes without a ‘nexus’ to the United States.”

United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020)

(collecting cases); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810–12

(11th Cir. 2014). Relatedly, we have also repeatedly “held that the

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not prohibit the trial

and conviction of aliens captured on the high seas while drug

trafficking because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all

nations prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless

vessels on the high seas.” Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 587;

Campbell, 743 F.3d at 812 (same). Accordingly, the district court did

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not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment on this

ground.

C. Sentencing challenges based on minor-role reduction

Finally, the appellants argue that the district court erred in

denying them a minor-role reduction under the sentencing

guidelines. “[A] district court’s determination of a defendant’s role

in the offense is a finding of fact to be reviewed only for clear

error.” United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999)

(en banc).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant is

entitled to a two-level decrease in his offense level if he “was a

minor participant in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2(b). The guideline’s commentary explains that a minor-role

reduction applies to a defendant “who is less culpable than most

other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not

be described as minimal.” Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. (n.5). 6 The defendant

bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the

6 In United States v. Dupree, we held that courts “may not defer” to the

commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines “if uncertainty does not exist” in

the guideline itself. 57 F.4th 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (quotation

omitted). However, here, both parties rely on the commentary and do not

dispute its validity. Thus, we will rely upon it as well in determining whether

the district court properly denied the minor-role reduction. See United States

v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325, 1327 & n.2, 1328 (11th Cir. 2023) (relying on the

commentary of a guideline where “[n]o party contest[ed] the commentary’s

validity . . . or the propriety of its interpretation of [the guideline’s] text”).

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evidence that he is entitled to a minor-role reduction. United States

v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 731 (11th Cir. 2019).

A determination of whether a defendant is entitled to this

reduction is a fact-intensive inquiry based on the totality of the

circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. (n.3(C)). In making its

determination, the district court should consider various factors,

including:

(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the

scope and structure of the criminal activity;

(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in

planning or organizing the criminal activity;

(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised

decision-making authority or influenced the exercise

of decision-making authority;

(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s

participation in the commission of the criminal

activity, including the acts the defendant performed

and the responsibility and discretion the defendant

had in performing those acts;

(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit

from the criminal activity.

Id. § 3B1.2, cmt. (n.3(C)(i)–(v)). “The court must consider all of

these factors to the extent applicable, and it commits legal error in

making a minor role decision based solely on one factor.” Valois,

915 F.3d at 732 (quotations omitted).

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[Additionally, we have] established two

principles to guide the determination of whether a

defendant played a minor role in the criminal scheme:

(1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for

which he has been held accountable at sentencing,

and (2) his role as compared to that of other

participants in his relevant conduct. In making the

ultimate finding as to role in the offense, the district

court should look to each of these principles and

measure the discernable facts against them.

Id. (alterations adopted) (quotations and citation omitted).

Importantly, under the first principle, “the inquiry is whether the

defendant played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which

[he] has already been held accountable—not a minor role in any

larger criminal conspiracy.” Id. (quotations omitted).

“[T]he district court has considerable discretion in making

[the] fact-intensive determination” of whether a defendant played

a minor role in the offense. United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274,

1277–78 (11th Cir. 2002). “The district court’s choice between two

permissible views of the evidence as to the defendant’s role in the

offense will rarely constitute clear error so long as the basis of

the . . . decision is supported by the record and does not involve a

misapplication of a rule of law.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837

F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration adopted) (quotations

omitted). “[W]e will not disturb a district court’s findings unless

we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.” Id. (quotations omitted).

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The appellants argue that the district court clearly erred in

denying them the two-level minor-role reduction because the

court erroneously measured their culpability against only each

other instead of against that of the unindicted co-conspirators in

the overall drug trafficking conspiracy, such as the people who

recruited them, those who owned the drugs and orchestrated the

trip, and the drug distributors. They maintain that they each

played a minor role in the offense because they were mere drug

couriers without any decision-making authority, not captains,

masters, or operators.

Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying each of

the appellants’ request for a minor role reduction. First, contrary

to the appellants’ claim, the relevant inquiry is whether they each

“played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [they have]

already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger

criminal conspiracy.” Valois, 915 F.3d at 732 (alteration adopted)

(quotations omitted). Thus, in determining whether a minor-role

reduction was warranted, the district court was “not required to

consider the culpability of any unknown conspirators,” such as the

drug distributors, the persons who recruited them, or the persons

who planned the scheme. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 608

(emphasis in original).

Furthermore, the district court did not err in its comparison

of the defendants with each other. Although they each argue they

had minor roles, the record establishes that they all knowingly

participated in the illegal transportation of a large quantity of

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cocaine, they were critical to the transportation part of the

trafficking scheme, they were set to receive money for their

services, and they were all held responsible for the same conduct

and the same quantity of drugs. “While these facts do not render

the defendants ineligible, they support the court’s denial of the role

reduction.” Valois, 915 F.3d at 732.

In sum, the record confirms that the district court

considered each defendant’s arguments about a minor-role

reduction and considered the totality of the circumstances in

determining that each of them did not qualify for the reduction.

While the appellants may disagree with the district court’s ultimate

determination, “the district judge [was] in the best position to

weigh and assess [each] defendant’s role in [the] relevant conduct

and the relative degrees of culpability of the other participants in

that conduct.” De Varon, 175 F.3d at 938. Based on the record in

this case, we “are [not] left with a definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.” Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1192

(quotations omitted). Accordingly, the appellants are not entitled

to relief.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we affirm the appellants’ respective

convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.