The opinion
Judgment rendered November 19, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,492-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
ANTONIO MARKUEZ BROWN Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2023CR5313
Honorable Larry Donell Jefferson, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Christopher Albert Aberle
ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney
ROBERT NICOLAS ANDERSON
DAVID JOSEPH SUMMERSGILL, JR.
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before COX, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.
COX, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. Defendant, Antonio Markuez Brown, was
convicted of one count of obscenity in violation of La. R.S. 14:106(A)(1).
Defendant was sentenced to 12 months without hard labor with all but time
served suspended. Brown now appeals his conviction and sentence. For the
following reasons, Brown’s conviction is affirmed, and his sentence is
vacated and remanded for resentencing.
FACTS
Brown was initially charged with two counts of obscenity and pled
not guilty to both counts. A bench trial commenced February 10, 2025,
where the following testimony was presented:
First, Deputy Sheriff Charles Crain (“Deputy Crain”) testified that on
October 21, 2023, he was dispatched to 206 Balboa Drive in reference to a
woman, later identified as Cassandra Tuberville (“Tuberville”), who claimed
a man exposed himself to her and her son, Steven Nguyen (“Nguyen”).
Deputy Crain stated that both Tuberville and Nguyen provided similar
statements about the incident and Tuberville provided a description of the
man’s clothing. Deputy Crain stated that Tuberville took him to the area
where the incident occurred. During that time, Tuberville identified a man
sitting in a white vehicle as the person who exposed himself to her and
Nguyen. Deputy Crain then identified Brown in open court and recalled that
when he effected the arrest, Brown was wearing a black shirt and light-
colored sweatpants.
Next, Tuberville testified that she took her dog out for a walk with
Nguyen. She stated that as they were going home, Brown exited the
passenger side of his vehicle and approached them. Tuberville explained
that she had interactions with Brown prior to this incident, and because of
that, she would try to avoid coming in contact with him, even walking an
extra block to her home to avoid encountering him. Regarding the current
incident, Tuberville stated that when Brown got closer to them, he told
Nguyen, “Get the f*** out of the way,” grabbed his genitals and exposed
himself before he stated, “Move, [expletive], because I’m going to f*** this
b****.” Tuberville stated Nguyen turned to her immediately, asking what
he needed to do to defend her because both were unsure if Brown had a
weapon. Tuberville stated that she and Nguyen rushed home, and she called
the police and then her husband.
On cross-examination, Tuberville reiterated that while on her walk,
she did not see Brown until he walked around his car and walked out to
stand in front of her. She clarified that when Brown told Nguyen to move,
he had his hand in his pants, and then quickly flicked out his genitals for a
“good couple of seconds” before covering himself again. Tuberville
expressed that she should not have been exposed to that kind of conduct,
especially with her son present, and in an area with a school close by.
Tuberville stated that when the police arrived, she went outside and saw
Brown in the middle of the road and identified him to both officers.
Tuberville also testified about a previous interaction with Brown, in
which she was riding her bicycle when Brown stopped her, with his legs on
either side of the front wheel of the bicycle. She explained that Brown had a
knife in his hand and commented on the rings she wore. Tuberville stated
that she was married and jerked her bicycle away and hurried home.
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Nguyen then testified that he was 15 years old when the incident
occurred. Nguyen stated that he went with his mother to walk their dog
when Brown approached them. Nyguen admitted that prior to that occasion,
he had only heard about Brown from his mother but had not seen him before
that day. Nyguen explained that as Brown approached them, he stated,
“Move, boy. Let me f*** that b****.” Nguyen stated that when Brown
exposed his genitals, he quickly looked at his mother and asked what he
needed to do, and then they quickly went back home and called the police.
Nguyen then identified Brown in open court. Nguyen admitted he was
emotional when he provided his statement to the officers due to the situation.
On cross-examination, Nguyen explained that while he and his mother were
walking, he did not see anyone else before Brown walked out in front of
them. He stated that Brown did not touch either of them and did not follow
or say anything else to them.
Following testimony, defense counsel moved for judgment of
acquittal for count two concerning Nguyen, which the court granted.1
Thereafter, the court found Brown guilty as charged regarding count one.
Brown was then sentenced to 12 months without hard labor with all but time
served suspended. Brown was also placed on 12 months’ supervised
probation.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Brown presents only one assignment of error: whether the
State presented sufficient evidence to find him guilty of obscenity. Brown
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Count two concerned Nguyen, and following the motion from defense counsel,
Brown was acquitted of the charge.
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acknowledges that there was testimony presented that he made offensive
statements and grabbed his genitalia but asserts there was no evidence to
show that he intentionally or willfully exposed himself.
In support, Brown cites several cases concerning convictions for
obscenity, including State v. Narcisse, 36,595 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02),
833 So. 2d 1186; State v. Rodriguez, 98-2574 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/00), 753
So. 2d 339; State v. Odom, 554 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989), writ
granted and judgment modified on other grounds, 559 So. 2d 1362 (La.
1990);2 and State v. Allo, 510 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1987), writ denied,
514 So. 2d 1174 (La. 1987). Brown argues that in each of these cases, the
convictions involved public masturbation, nudity, or multiple exposures,
with evidence supporting intentional exposure.
Brown asserts that it was just as likely that his conduct (i.e., grabbing
himself) while wearing loose-fitting pants, “led to an accidental exposure of
his [genitals] for a matter of seconds.” Brown argues that without more,
there was no evidence that he intentionally exposed himself. Therefore, he
argues that his conviction should be reversed and his sentenced vacated.
We disagree.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124
2
The court affirmed the obscenity conviction for exposure.
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S. Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Robinson, 55,688 (La. App. 2
Cir. 5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 854. This standard, now legislatively embodied in
La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder.
State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the
bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v.
Higgins, 03-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So. 2d 1219, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883,
126 S. Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed. 2d 187 (2005); Robinson, supra. When there is
conflicting evidence about factual matters, the resolution of which depends
on a determination of the credibility of witnesses, the matter is one of the
weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,
102 S. Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1982); Robinson, supra.
La. R.S. 14:106(A)(1) provides that the crime of obscenity is the
intentional exposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva, or female breast
nipples in any public place or place open to the public view, or in any prison
or jail, with the intent of arousing sexual desire or which appeals to prurient
interest or is patently offensive.
Pursuant to this statute, the State was only required to prove Brown
exposed himself in a public place, open to public view, and the exposure was
patently offensive. Here, both Tuberville and Nguyen testified that Brown
approached them on a public street and exposed himself after stating, “I’m
going to f*** this b****.” Brown does not deny he made these statements,
nor does he claim that he did not expose himself in front of Tuberville and
Nyguen; instead, he argues that the exposure was accidental and occurred
for only a few seconds. However, the duration of such conduct is immaterial
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to the State’s burden of proof. Tuberville testified that Brown’s actions were
something that she should have never witnessed, and that she was not only
concerned that Brown had exposed himself to her but had done so in front of
her minor child. Likewise, Nguyen also testified that, even though he only
saw a glimpse, he was uncomfortable with Brown’s conduct.
The trial court was in the best position to weigh the testimony and
credibility of each witness and could accept or disregard that testimony in
determining whether Brown’s exposure was intentional or accidental. Given
the testimony presented, Brown’s conduct, in tandem with his statements
toward Tuberville, supports the State’s assertion that Brown’s exposure was
not only intentional, but done to arouse sexual desire or appeal to a prurient
interest, and was at a minimum, patently offensive. Therefore, we find that
this assignment of error lacks merit, and Brown’s conviction is affirmed.
Error Patent
Our review of the record has disclosed two errors patent discoverable
on the face of the record. Specifically, during sentencing, the trial court
failed to advise Brown of the prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction
relief (“PCR”) as required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(C). By way of this
opinion, we advise Brown that no application for PCR shall be considered if
it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence
has become final under La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922. State v. Tovar, 56,298
(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 411 So. 3d 966.
Further, the record reflects that the trial court sentenced Brown under
La. R.S. 14:106(G)(1), imposing 12 months without hard labor with all but
time served suspended. However, testimony presented established that
Brown exposed himself to Tuberville in the presence of Nguyen, who was
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15 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, Brown should have been
sentenced under La. R.S. 14:106(G)(4), which provides:
When a violation of Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Subsection A
of this Section is with or in the presence of an unmarried
person under the age of seventeen years, the offender shall be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars and shall be
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than two
years nor more than five years, without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis added).
La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A) provides that an illegal sentence may be corrected
at any time by an appellate court on review, despite the failure of either party
to raise the issue. State v. Thomas, 55,579 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So.
3d 892. Further, the appellate court may notice sentencing errors as error
patent. State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790. While
this Court is not required to take such action, in this matter, however, and in
this Court’s discretion, we vacate Brown’s sentence and remand this matter
to the trial court to impose sentencing pursuant to the requirements of La.
R.S. 14:106(G)(4).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s conviction is affirmed, and his
sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this
opinion.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED and
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
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