State v. Martinez

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-1082

Filed 19 November 2025

Johnston County, No. 21CR051550-500

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

DEYSI MARTINEZ

Appeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 4 May 2023 by Judge Paul A.

Holcombe, III, in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26

August 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Benjamin

Szany, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F.

Carella, for Defendant-Appellant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Deysi Martinez (Defendant) appeals from a Judgment entered pursuant to a

jury verdict finding her guilty of First-Degree Murder. The Record before us,

including evidence presented at trial, tends to reflect the following:

STATE V. MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

On the evening of 3 April 2021, Defendant, Martin Garcia—Defendant’s

boyfriend and the victim in this case—and Joel Silva, Defendant’s childhood friend,

went out for drinks. At 3:32 a.m., after returning home, Defendant called 911 and

stated she needed an officer at 128 Liberty Lane1 because Garcia was hitting her.

Sergeant G.W. Coley, II, the first officer on the scene, arrived around 3:45 a.m.

Sergeant Coley was “somewhat familiar” with Defendant and Garcia; he had been to

the home before because of previous “domestic disturbances[.]” On his approach to

the front door, Sergeant Coley observed blood on the porch and on the door. He heard

someone to his right and saw Garcia lying in the grass to the side of the porch. Garcia

had blood on his chest, seemed dazed, could not communicate, and appeared to be

attempting to get up. Garcia’s head was “moving left and right” but he was verbally

nonresponsive.2 When the scene was cleared to be safe for EMS to approach, it was

discovered Garcia had been stabbed and had died from his injuries.

Sergeant Coley, now joined by Deputy Matthew Chism, knocked on the front

door of the home, but no one answered. The officers forced the door open and, upon

entering the home, observed blood in the living room and kitchen. Sergeant Coley

found Defendant in a bedroom, where she appeared to be asleep. Sergeant Coley

1 Defendant’s home address.

2 At 3:37 a.m., five minutes after Defendant called 911—but before officers arrived on the

scene—Garcia had also called 911 and asked for an ambulance at 128 Liberty Lane. Garcia was

groaning, his responses to the dispatcher’s questions were mostly unintelligible, and he eventually fell

silent while the call was still ongoing.

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Opinion of the Court

woke Defendant; she told Sergeant Coley she had been home all night and there was

no one else home. Defendant later became belligerent when told her house was a

crime scene and she would have to leave. Eventually, Defendant was brought to the

police station.

At the station, Defendant provided her version of events in a recorded

interview with Detective Randy Ackley. She told Detective Ackley she had left the

bar alone that evening and later received a call from Garcia saying he had been in a

car wreck. She stated she had called 911 because Garcia was threatening her. She

claimed she then went to bed until she was awoken by Sergeant Coley.

After a break, Defendant commented she knew Garcia was suicidal but did not

think he would have stabbed himself. During the interview, although he referred to

a chest injury, Detective Ackley had not specifically informed Defendant that Garcia

had been stabbed.

The State’s medical examiner concluded Garcia died of a stab wound to the

chest, which resulted in severe internal bleeding. According to the medical examiner,

it was “possible” but “awkward” for a person to inflict an injury on himself in that

location and not a typical location for suicide. Additionally, Garcia suffered a stab

wound that perforated his left arm, injuries to his torso, a cut on his left lower eyelid,

and bruising. The medical examiner classified the death as a homicide.

On 3 May 2021, Defendant was indicted for Murder, Obstructing Justice,

Assault Inflicting Serious Physical Injury on a Law Enforcement Officer, Misuse of

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Opinion of the Court

the 911 System, and two counts of Simple Assault. Prior to trial, the State dismissed

all charges except for Murder. Additionally, the State filed notice of its intent to offer

“hearsay statements that Martin Garcia made to his mother[ ] . . . regarding his

relationship with the Defendant.” Counsel for Defendant objected to the admission

of this evidence and filed multiple pretrial motions to exclude this and other evidence

under Rules 403, 404, and the hearsay rules, including evidence of “any alleged acts

of prior misconduct on the part of” Defendant.

The case came on for trial on 17 April 2023. At trial, Silva testified he,

Defendant, and Garcia had left the bar together in Defendant’s car; Defendant was

the driver. According to Silva, Garcia complained Defendant was not driving straight

and grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to veer off the road. Garcia exited

the car and ran away. Defendant and Silva eventually got out of the car, walked

down the road, and Defendant called an Uber for herself.

The Uber Driver testified he had initially picked Defendant up alone, as

Defendant would not let Silva into the Uber. However, Defendant asked the Uber

Driver to stop at a McDonald’s where they picked up Garcia. He testified Defendant

and Garcia were arguing with each other throughout the duration of the car ride, and

Defendant had punched Garcia in the face. Defendant and Garcia were dropped off

at 128 Liberty Lane at 3:24 a.m.

Garcia’s mother, Rosalinda Grady, also testified. Prior to admitting her

testimony, the trial court held a Rule 404(b) hearing. Garcia’s mother testified on

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Opinion of the Court

voir dire about an incident on 1 April 2020 where Defendant had allegedly assaulted

Garcia. In addition to Grady’s testimony, the State sought to admit photographs

Grady had taken of the injuries Garcia allegedly suffered. At the end of the hearing,

the trial court concluded it would allow both Grady’s testimony and the photographs

into evidence, subject to a limiting instruction.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant, through counsel, moved to

dismiss the case for insufficient evidence. The trial court denied this Motion.

Defendant then put on her own evidence, including the testimony of a clinical

psychologist and of an expert medical examiner. The psychologist testified Garcia

had a history of suicidal thoughts, and the medical examiner testified it was possible

Garcia had self-inflicted the fatal wound.

At the close of all evidence, defense counsel renewed its Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court again denied the Motion.

On 3 May 2023, the jury found Defendant guilty of First-Degree Murder. The

trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant gave

oral Notice of Appeal in open court.

Issues

The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (I) admitting

evidence of Defendant’s alleged prior assault on Garcia; and (II) denying Defendant’s

Motions to Dismiss.

Analysis

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Opinion of the Court

I. Evidence of Alleged Prior Assault

Defendant argues certain evidence of the alleged 1 April 2020 assault should

not have been admitted because it was: (A) hearsay not falling within any exception

and (B) inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403.

A. Hearsay

As a threshold matter, the State contends Defendant failed to fully preserve

her hearsay argument. “Generally speaking, the appellate courts of this state will

not review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence unless there has been a timely

objection.” State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 277, 697 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2010) (citing State

v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 581-82, 532 S.E.2d 797, 806 (2000), cert. denied, 531

U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 976 (2001) (Mem.)). “To be timely, an

objection to the admission of evidence must be made at the time it is actually

introduced at trial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Moreover, it is of

no consequence if the witness’ actual testimony substantively coincides with counsel’s

preliminary assumptions. For purposes of appeal preservation, objections to

testimony must be contemporaneous with the time such testimony is offered into

evidence.” Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. at 581-82, 532 S.E.2d at 806 (citations omitted).

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Opinion of the Court

On appeal, Defendant challenges the admission of the following testimony,

specifically, Grady’s testimony that on 1 April 2020, Garcia said Defendant had

beaten him and he was “scared for the baby”3:

[The State]: All right. Can you explain to the members of the jury

what [Garcia’s] demeanor was like when he called you on the

phone?

[Grady]: When he called me he was crying, and over everything

else he was scared.

[The State]: And –

[Grady]: She – and then [Garcia] told me that [Defendant] had

beaten him.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Your Honor, it’s hearsay.

....

[Grady]: When I went to pick him up, because since it was

nighttime, I only saw the marks on his face at that time. But he

was just crying a lot, and saying that he was scared for the baby

because the baby had stayed with her.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

These are the only portions of Grady’s testimony to which Defendant has both

objected to at trial and presented arguments on appeal. Thus, our review is limited

to these portions of Grady’s testimony.

The trial court’s primary basis for admitting Grady’s testimony was Rule

803(3). Under Rule 803(3), “[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state of

3 Defendant and Garcia share a child together.

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mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition” is admissible even when given for

the truth of the matter asserted. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (2023).

Defendant argues Grady’s testimony does not fall under Rule 803(3) because

Garcia did not say he was afraid of Defendant. In so arguing, Defendant likens this

case to State v. Lesane. There, a witness testified the victim “acted frightened[ ]” and

had told her the defendant had “stabbed this guy seventeen times.” 137 N.C. App.

234, 240, 528 S.E.2d 37, 42 (2000). The Court, in holding the testimony should not

have been admitted, explained: “Absent an actual statement of emotion by [the

victim], any statement of fact that could purportedly serve as a basis for this emotion

is outside the scope of Rule 803(3).” Id. at 240-41, 528 S.E.2d at 42.

Here, however, the trial transcript indicates Grady testified, “[Garcia] was just

crying a lot, and saying that he was scared for the baby[.]” (emphasis added). Thus,

unlike the witness testimony in Lesane, Grady’s testimony contains a statement of

emotion by Garcia.

We believe the facts of this case are more like State v. Wilds. There, the

victim’s mother testified the victim would often come over to her house to sleep “

‘because she was afraid to close her eyes around’ ” the defendant and the victim “was

afraid that [the] defendant ‘would kill her.’ ” 133 N.C. App. 195, 204, 515 S.E.2d 466,

474 (1999). The Court ruled this testimony was admissible to show the victim’s state

of mind, “despite the fact that the statements also contained descriptions of factual

events.” Id. at 205, 515 S.E.2d at 475. The Court noted it was not necessary for the

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STATE V. MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

victim to “state explicitly to each witness that she was afraid, as long as the ‘scope of

the conversation . . . related directly to [her] existing state of mind and emotional

condition.’ ” Id. at 206, 515 S.E.2d at 475 (alterations in original) (quoting State v.

Mixion, 110 N.C. App. 138, 148, 429 S.E.2d 363, 368, review denied, 334 N.C. 437,

433 S.E.2d 183 (1993) (Mem.)).

In the instant case, there is a statement of emotion: Grady testified Garcia said

he “was scared for the baby[.]” This statement was made “contemporaneously with

and in explanation of” Garcia’s statement Defendant had beaten him. State v.

Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 588, 509 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1998) (quoting State v. Westbrooks,

345 N.C. 43, 60, 478 S.E.2d 483, 493 (1996)). “ ‘The factual circumstances

surrounding [his] statements of emotion serve only to demonstrate the basis for the

emotions.’ ” Wilds, 133 N.C. App. at 206, 515 S.E.2d at 475 (quoting State v. Gray,

347 N.C. 143, 173, 491 S.E.2d 538, 550 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by, State

v. Long, 354 N.C. 534, 557 S.E.2d 89 (2001)).

Thus, Garcia’s statement Defendant “had beaten him” is a description of a

factual event but, like the statements at issue in Wilds, is admissible under Rule

803(3) because it shows his state of mind. Specifically, it demonstrates the basis for

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Opinion of the Court

his fear. Therefore, the testimony was admissible under Rule 803(3). Consequently,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.4

B. Rule 404(b) and Rule 403

Defendant also challenges the admission of Grady’s testimony and the

photographs under Rules 404(b) and 403. Because Defendant did not object to

Grady’s testimony under Rule 404(b) or Rule 403 at trial, she has failed to preserve

this issue on appeal. See Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. at 581-82, 697 S.E.2d at 806 (citations

omitted).

However, Defendant did object to the admission of the photographs at trial:

[The State]: Your Honor, the State would now move to introduce

[the photographs of Garcia’s injuries] into evidence.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection on prior grounds.

[Trial Court]: All right. The Court will overrule the objection.

The “prior grounds” in defense counsel’s objection included an objection to the

admission of the photographs under Rules 404(b) and 403.5 Thus, Defendant’s

arguments as to the photographs are preserved for our review.

4 Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony

under Rule 803(3), we do not address the trial court’s alternative grounds for its admission under

Rules 803(2) and 803(24).

5 Although Defendant’s pretrial motion only argued the photographs were inadmissible under

Rule 403—not Rule 404(b)—Defendant ultimately obtained a ruling from the trial court on the

admissibility of the photographs under Rule 404(b) pursuant to a Rule 404(b) hearing.

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Opinion of the Court

Rule 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in

conformity therewith.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2023). However, such

evidence may be admissible for any other purpose, including “proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,

entrapment, or accident.” Id. This list “is not exclusive, and such evidence is

admissible as long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the defendant’s

propensity to commit the crime.” State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, 457 S.E.2d 841,

852-53 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 116 S. Ct. 530, 133 L. Ed. 2d 436

(1995) (Mem.). Thus, Rule 404(b) is “a clear general rule of inclusion[.]” State v.

Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (emphasis removed). “We review

de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule

404(b).” State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012).

In the instant case, the State argues the photographs were properly admitted

to show Defendant’s intent, malice, premeditation, and deliberation. Indeed, at trial,

counsel for the State argued, based on the evidence surrounding the 1 April 2020

assault, the jury should find Defendant had the requisite intent for first-degree

murder. Likewise, in making its Rule 404(b) determination, the trial court found the

photographs were probative on the issues of Defendant’s intent, malice,

premeditation, and deliberation.

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Opinion of the Court

Nonetheless, Defendant argues it was impermissible for the State to use the

incident as evidence of the necessary intent for First-Degree Murder. We disagree.

Our Courts have been clear that “even though evidence presented may tend to show

that the defendant may have committed other crimes or ‘bad acts’, or that the

defendant had a propensity to commit those acts, it will be admissible if it is relevant

for some other purpose.” State v. Bynum, 111 N.C. App. 845, 848, 433 S.E.2d 778,

780 (1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Ervin, _ N.C. App. _, _, 914 S.E.2d 576,

584 (2025) (“Even though some evidence of prior acts may tend to show a defendant’s

propensity to commit the charged crime, such evidence is admissible under Rule

404(b) so long as it is used for some other purpose.” (citing State v. Bagley, 321 N.C.

201, 206, 362 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1987))). Intent is one such permissible purpose. N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2023).

Defendant also argues the 1 April 2020 alleged assault is too dissimilar and

temporally removed from Garcia’s murder to be admissible under Rule 403. Indeed,

“[d]espite the inclusive nature of Rule 404(b), it is still ‘constrained by the

requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.’ ” State v. Mangum, 242 N.C.

App. 202, 209, 773 S.E.2d 555, 561-62 (2015) (quoting State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C.

150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2002)). “In other words, ‘the ultimate test of

admissibility [under Rule 404(b)] is whether the incidents are sufficiently similar to

those in the case at bar and not so remote in time as to be more prejudicial than

probative under . . . Rule 403[.]’ ” Id. at 209, 773 S.E.2d at 562 (citation omitted).

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Opinion of the Court

However, the issue of whether the 1 April 2020 incident was sufficiently

similar to the incident at bar is not highly pertinent to our analysis because the

evidence was admitted to demonstrate Defendant’s intent and the elements of first-

degree murder. See State v. Golden, 224 N.C. App. 136, 144, 735 S.E.2d 425, 431

(2012) (where evidence of the defendant’s prior incidents with the victim were

properly admitted to show the defendant’s intent, “similarity” was not relevant); State

v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 682, 411 S.E.2d 376, 382 (1991) (“When determining

the relevancy of other crimes evidence offered to prove defendant’s motive, the degree

of similarity between the uncharged and the charged crimes is considerably less

important than when such evidence is offered to prove identity.” (citation omitted)).

Further, we are not convinced the incident was too temporally remote merely

because one year had passed between the alleged prior assault and the murder. See

Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. at 132, 726 S.E.2d at 160 (noting admission under Rule 404(b)

has been upheld even when the acts are separated by “long lapse[s] of years”).

“[R]emoteness in time is less significant when the prior conduct is used to show

intent, motive, knowledge, or lack of accident; remoteness in time generally affects

only the weight to be given such evidence, not its admissibility.” State v. Stager, 329

N.C. 278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991) (citing State v. Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 93, 195

S.E. 72, 80 (1938)) (allowing admission of a murder committed ten years before the

charged offense).

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Opinion of the Court

Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude the photographs of the injuries

Garcia allegedly suffered were admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403. Therefore,

the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs.

II. Motions to Dismiss

“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”

State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citation omitted).

“Upon [a] defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether

there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or

of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of

such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373,

378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984) (citation

omitted). “If the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to

either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the

perpetrator of it, the motion [to dismiss] should be allowed.” Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378,

526 S.E.2d at 455 (citation omitted).

“In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence

admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,

giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any

contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223

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(1994) (citation omitted). However, “[w]hether the State has offered such substantial

evidence is a question of law for the trial court.” State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113,

119, 215 S.E.2d 578, 583 (1975) (citations omitted).

In the present case, Defendant moved to dismiss the First-Degree Murder

charge for insufficient evidence. Our General Statutes set out the offense of First-

Degree Murder, in pertinent part, as follows:

A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of . . . any . . . kind of willful,

deliberate, and premeditated killing, . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the

first degree[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) (2023). Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying

her Motions to Dismiss because the State failed to present substantial evidence of

premeditation, deliberation, and the specific intent to kill.

“Premeditation means that the act was thought out beforehand for some length

of time, however short, but no particular amount of time is necessary for the mental

process of premeditation.” State v. Bullock, 326 N.C. 253, 257, 388 S.E.2d 81, 83

(1990) (citation omitted). “Deliberation means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool

state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an

unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused

by lawful or just cause or legal provocation.” State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 33, 506 S.E.2d

455, 472 (1998) (citations omitted). In proving the murder was deliberated, the State

must also produce evidence of the specific intent to kill. State v. Keel, 333 N.C. 52,

58, 423 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1992) (“The specific intent to kill is a necessary component

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Opinion of the Court

of deliberation[.]” (citing State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 23, 343 S.E.2d 814, 827 (1986),

cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1077, 107 S. Ct. 1271,

94 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1987) (Mem.))).

Some of the circumstances from which premeditation and

deliberation may be implied are (1) absence of provocation on the

part of the deceased, (2) the statements and conduct of the

defendant before and after the killing, (3) threats and

declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence

giving rise to the death of the deceased, (4) ill will or previous

difficulties between the parties, (5) the dealing of lethal blows

after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless, (6)

evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, and (7) the

nature and number of the victim’s wounds.

State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 565, 411 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1992) (citing State v. Gladden,

315 N.C. 398, 430-31, 340 S.E.2d 673, 693 (1986)).

In the case sub judice, the evidence tends to show eight minutes elapsed

between the time Defendant and Garcia were dropped off by the Uber Driver and

Defendant’s 911 call, and the two were fighting during the length of the Uber ride.

This is ample time for Defendant to have premeditated the murder. See Bullock, 326

N.C. at 257, 388 S.E.2d at 83 (citation omitted). The evidence also tended to show a

lack of provocation on the part of Garcia: Defendant did not assert she acted in self-

defense, did not assert Garcia had provoked or attacked her, and had no injuries—

suggesting there had not been a struggle between Defendant and Garcia prior to the

murder. See State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 452, 451 S.E.2d 266, 272 (1994) (finding

evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the defendant was uninjured and

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Opinion of the Court

“did not mention any provocation [by the victim] in any of his statements to law

enforcement”).

Additionally, the couple’s history of domestic violence suggests Defendant’s

actions were premeditated and deliberated. Presuming the evidence of Defendant’s

alleged 1 April 2020 assault on Garcia was inadmissible, additional unchallenged

evidence tended to show the police had previously responded to multiple domestic

disturbances between Defendant and Garcia. Further, the brutality, nature, and

number of Garcia’s wounds is evidence from which a jury could infer premeditation

and deliberation. See State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 518, 350 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1986)

(finding multiple stab wounds, including two wounds to the chest, one of which hit

the deceased’s heart, tended to show the killing was done in a brutal manner). Here,

the evidence shows Garcia suffered multiple stab wounds—including one which went

completely through his left upper arm—as well as additional abrasions and

contusions.

Finally, the evidence tends to show Defendant tried to minimize the

appearance of her involvement immediately after the murder. Within an hour of the

incident, Defendant was found in bed, apparently asleep. Defendant denied Garcia

being in the house that evening. Additionally, Defendant intimated to police that

Garcia could have stabbed himself. Thus, there was evidence tending to show

Defendant had a “planned strategy to pretend [she] had nothing to do with the

murder and to avoid detection as the perpetrator.” State v. Branche, 291 N.C. App.

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214, 223, 895 S.E.2d 597, 604-05 (2023) (concluding there was sufficient evidence of

premeditation and deliberation); see also State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 759, 440

S.E.2d 791, 795 (1994) (finding evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the

defendant did not check on his victim, returned home, hid the murder weapon, and

went to sleep).

Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial

evidence of premeditation, deliberation, and the specific intent to kill. Therefore, the

trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss. Consequently, the

trial court did not err in entering Judgment on the verdict.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude there was no error at trial

and affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

NO ERROR.

Judges TYSON and FLOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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