Graciani

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARCELA GRACIANI, CASE NO. 3:24 CV 813

Plaintiffs,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOLEDO

CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Board of Education of the Toledo City School District’s

(“Toledo Public Schools” / “TPS”) Motion for Determination regarding its duty to defend and

indemnify Defendant Garrett Pelz. (Doc. 31). Defendant Pelz and Plaintiff Marcela Graciani,

individually and behalf of her minor child, J.M., opposed. (Doc. 41; Doc. 42). TPS replied (Doc.

44) and the matter is fully decisional. While jurisdiction lies over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, TPS’s Motion, for the reasons stated in this opinion, is denied for want of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from Pelz’s handling of Graciani’s child, J.M., in one of TPS’s special

education classrooms at Spring Elementary. Plaintiff alleges Pelz picked J.M. up and threw him

across the room after J.M. engaged in repeated disruptive behavior. (Doc. 1, at 7).1 J.M.’s face was

“severely injured” as a result of the incident, including suffering a bloodied mouth. Id. at 7-8.

1. TPS’s present Motion describes Pelz as having “grabbed both of [J.M.’s] shoulders and shoved

him sideways away from his desk. Which was more forceful than necessary and [J.M.] fell to the

ground/rug and then left the classroom and went to the office/nurse.” (Doc. 31, at 2).

Plaintiff brought numerous federal claims against both Defendants pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.), Title VI of the Civil Rights act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §

2000d et seq.), and § 1983 claims for violations of J.M.’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 1, at 8-14).

TPS brought the instant Motion for a “determination” pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §

2744.07(D) regarding its duty to defend and indemnify Pelz in this action. Subsection (D) provides

“[i]f a political subdivision refuses to provide an employee with a defense in a civil action or

proceeding as described in division (A) . . . upon the motion of the political subdivision, the court

shall conduct a hearing regarding the political subdivision’s duty to defend the employee.” Ohio

Rev. Code § 2744.07(D). The parties do not dispute TPS’s status as a political subdivision under

§ 2744.07. See id. at § 2744.01(F). A political subdivision is excused from the duty provide its

employee with a defense where the employee’s challenged actions were “manifestly outside the

scope of [their] employment or official responsibilities” or not made “in good faith.” Id. at §

2744.07(A)(2)(a)-(b). Similarly, the political subdivision need not “indemnify and hold harmless”

an employee if the employee was “not acting within the scope of [their] employment” or “not

acting in good faith.” Id. at § 2744.07(B)(2)(a)–(b).

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

At all times, this Court maintains an “independent obligation to determine whether subject-

matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583

(1999)). This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction defines the extent to which it has the “authority

to hear a given type of case,” and thus “represents ‘the extent to which [the Court] can rule on the

conduct of persons or the status of things.’” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635,

639 (2009) (first quoting United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); then quoting Subject-

Matter Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)).

Federal question jurisdiction is a species of subject matter jurisdiction and grants the

authority for this Court to adjudicate claims “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state

law claim where such a claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal claims.

See Hunter v. Mendoza, 197 F. Supp. 2d 964, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (citing United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)); 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

DISCUSSION

While no party raised a jurisdictional issue, the Court independently determines it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate TPS’s Motion. Generally, this Court may exercise

jurisdiction to interpret and apply state law in two principal circumstances. The first is when the

parties before the Court properly bring a state law claim for relief, e.g., a state law negligence

claim, within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Because the parties to this suit are not

diverse,2 asserting subject matter jurisdiction over those state law claims would be proper if such

claims shared a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal law claims, thus bringing the

claims within this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. The second

circumstance is when the resolution of the state law question is necessary to the rendition of a

judgment on a claim over which the Court otherwise exercises jurisdiction. See Meredith v. City

of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) (“[I]t has from the first been deemed to be the duty of

2. The parties to this action are not diverse, as at least Plaintiff and TPS are alleged to permanently

reside in Ohio. See Doc. 1, at 4; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (explaining

28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity between the parties before subject matter jurisdiction

will lie pursuant to that statute).

the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law

whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.”). For example, it is sometimes necessary for

courts to determine, as a matter of state law, whether certain governmental entities are subject to

a suit for violations of a plaintiff’s federal rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Lopez v.

Foerster, 2022 WL 910575, at *6 (6th Cir.) (“Whether a governmental body has a separate legal

existence allowing it to be sued in its own name generally turns on the law of the state that

established the body.”).

Neither circumstance is present here. First, TPS does not bring a claim for relief under state

law that may trigger this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate state law claims. Rather,

TPS styles its request as a “Motion for Determination” wherein they “move [the Court] under R.C.

2744.07(D) for an order declaring TPS does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendant

Garrett Pelz in this action.” (Doc. 31, at 1). Supplemental jurisdiction applies only to state law

claims, however, not freestanding motions requesting the Court interpret and apply state law to an

action raising only federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (explaining the district court “shall

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action”

within the district court’s original jurisdiction) (emphasis added); accord ReMedPar, Inc. v.

AllParts Medical, LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 616 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (explaining that, after

dismissing the plaintiff’s federal law claims, the court “decline[d] to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law causes of action”) (emphasis added). Without a state law

claim, there is no occasion for this Court to “rule on . . . the status of” TPS’s duty to defend and

indemnify Pelz under § 2744.07. Carlsbad, 556 U.S. at 639. This Court’s jurisdiction, particularly

in the context of supplemental jurisdiction, extends to claims for relief, not a mere motion, request,

or freestanding “determination” under state law.3

Nor is such a ruling necessary to the rendition of a judgment on any of Plaintiff’s federal

law claims. The question of whether TPS must, under Ohio law, defend and indemnify Pelz has

no bearing on whether Defendants are directly liable in the first instance for violating Plaintiff’s

federal rights. Thus, while Plaintiff has “properly invoked” this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction

by bringing federal claims for relief, the resolution of TPS’s duty to defend and indemnify Pelz

under § 2744.07 is in no way “necessary to the rendition of a judgment” on those federal claims,

Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234, and this Court thus lacks the jurisdiction to decide the question

presented by TPS’s Motion. Again, a request for an order or determination is not the same as a

claim for relief under which the claimant would be entitled to a judgment of this Court. “While an

order may under some circumstances amount to a judgment, they must be distinguished, owing to

the different consequences flowing from them . . . [r]ulings on motions are ordinarily orders rather

than judgments.” 1 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments § 19, at 28 (Edward W.

Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925).

This jurisdictional boundary is reflected in the fact that the mine run of federal cases

applying § 2744.07 involve a claim for relief under that statute seeking the remedy of a declaratory

3. An example from a different context helps elucidate the strange posture in which TPS’s “motion”

is brought. Consider a scenario in which, after being injured on navigable waters, a plaintiff brings

solely federal-law tort claims against the operator of a vessel. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v.

Richardson, 547 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982). Subject matter jurisdiction over those claims would lie

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). The plaintiff then proceeds to file a motion seeking a

“determination” that the defendant-operator violated a state-law regulation governing the

operation of the vessel. Surely, even if violation of that regulation may support a negligence per

se claim under state law, the absence of any such state law claim means the Court has no occasion

to opine on whether the defendant-operator violated a state regulation with little to no bearing on

the outcome of the suit under federal maritime tort law.

judgment. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Canton, 2022 WL 17552459, at *2 (N.D. Ohio) (analyzing

a plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to add a claim for declaratory judgment under § 2744.07’s

indemnity provision); Taylor v. Hooven, 2025 WL 1474623, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio) (describing an

individual defendant’s “claim for [a] declaratory judgment ordering the City to defend him against

plaintiffs’ claims under § 2744.07(A)”); Wallace v. Montgomery Cnty., 2018 WL 878327, at *2

(S.D. Ohio) (describing cross-claims for declaratory relief under § 2744.07(A)); Gillispie v. City

of Miami Twp., 2023 WL 11922094, at *3 (S.D. Ohio) (describing the City-intervenor’s complaint

for a declaratory judgment regarding its duty to defend and indemnify the individual defendant),

aff’d 2025 WL 1276900 (6th Cir.).

To be clear, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not itself create a cause of action to

vindicate the protections provided employees under § 2744.07. See City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc.,

52 F.4th 874, 878-89 (9th Cir. 2022); 28 U.S.C. § 2201; 10B Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2756 (4th ed. 2008) (“The Act and [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 57 are not

jurisdictional. They are procedural only and merely grant authority to the courts to use the remedy

in cases over which they otherwise have jurisdiction.”). Rather, § 2744.07 creates a private right

of action for both the employees entitled to defense and indemnification as well as the political

subdivision seeking to avoid the same. Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 99 N.E.3d 1269, 1277-78 (Ohio

Ct. App. 2017) (explaining the employee of the political subdivision, not a third-party creditor, has

the ability to enforce their rights under § 2744.07); Gillispie v. Miami Twp., 2025 WL 1276900, at

*14-16 (6th Cir.) (affirming a district court’s entry of judgment on a political subdivision’s claim

seeking a declaratory judgment under § 2744.07). Section 2744.07 thus provides both TPS and

Pelz with a private right of action to enforce the substantive provisions contained therein. If either

party brings an action under § 2744.07, the proper remedy at this stage in the proceedings would

be a declaratory judgment for the prevailing party, particularly given the lack of a monetary

judgment for which TPS could indemnify Pelz.

At the Case Management Conference held on September 16, 2024, the Court set the

deadline for filing amended pleadings for October 7, 2024. (Doc. 14, at 2). Additionally, this case

has proceeded well beyond the deadline to amend pleadings as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a)(1). Nevertheless, given the unsettled law4 on this jurisdictional question, the lack of prior

notice to the parties regarding the jurisdictional defect, and the potential for prejudice to the parties

stemming from the resources expended briefing the merits of this issue, the Court grants leave to

TPS and Pelz to amend their respective Answers, see Docs. 9, 11, to add a cross-claim for a

declaratory judgment under § 2744.07, should either party wish to do so. Doing so would support

this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the substantive question of TPS’s duty to defend and

indemnify Pelz, including what standard applies to that determination.5

4. Some federal courts have proceeded to interpret and apply § 2744.07 absent a claim for relief

under that statute. See, e.g., Newell v. Huepenbecker, 2019 WL 13241953, at *2 (N.D. Ohio)

(granting the County-defendant’s motion for a declaration that it need not indemnify or defend the

individual defendant under § 2744.07); Jackson v. Richard, 2022 WL 3701560, at *7-8 (S.D. Ohio)

(describing and granting the City-defendant’s motion for a “determination” regarding its duty to

defend).

5. After a “peek” into the merits of the § 2744.07 question, cf. Perry v. Martinez, 2011 WL 9304,

at *2 (N.D. Ohio) (quoting Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1999)), the Court is

skeptical TPS may avoid its duty to defend and indemnify Pelz in this action. For, even if Pelz

utilized more force than necessary to restrain J.M. or incorrectly determined J.M. needed to be

restrained in the first instance, the record at the current time is largely devoid of evidence

establishing Pelz actions were “either self-serving or wholly detached from the business of”

maintaining order in his special education classroom. Gillispie, 2025 WL 1276900, at *12.

Specifically, it is not enough that Pelz’s actions be wrong, harmful, or otherwise sufficiently

tortious so as to create liability. See Thomas v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 548 N.E.2d 991,

994 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Rather, the act must be so egregious so as to have “no relationship to

the conduct of [TPS’s] business” or to “sever[] the relationship of employer-employee.” Id.

Nevertheless, as the merits of TPS’s Motion are not before it at this juncture, the Court reserves

judgment on this question until a party properly asserts a claim for relief under § 2744.07.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Board of Education of the Toledo City School District’s

Motion for Determination (Doc. 31) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Board of Education of the Toledo City School

District and Garrett Pelz are GRANTED leave to amend their respective Answers to add a cross-

claim pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 should either wish to do so.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 18, 2025