Scarano

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SANDRA SCARANO, et al., No. 2:25-cv-00099-DJC-CKD

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Plaintiffs,

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v. ORDER

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COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al.,

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Defendants.

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18 Plaintiffs Sandra and Ricardo Scarano filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

19 based on allegations that Defendants County of Stanislaus, Stanislaus County Sheriff’s

20 Department, and individual Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department Deputies of

21 unknown identities violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

22 Plaintiffs claim Defendants unlawfully seized Plaintiffs, searched Plaintiffs’ property

23 without a warrant or probable cause, used excessive force against Plaintiffs, and

24 violated their due process rights. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

25 (ECF No. 23) the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22) for failing to allege sufficient

26 facts to support a claim against the County of Stanislaus and the Stanislaus County

27 Sheriff’s Department. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

28 granted with leave to amend.

1 BACKGROUND

2 In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs allege Stanislaus County

3 Sheriff’s Department (“SCSD”) Deputies executed a search warrant for 5806 Beckwith

4 Road, Modesto, California in January of 2024. (FAC ¶¶ 4–5.) Defendants obtained the

5 warrant based on a “post” by Plaintiffs’ minor child in which the child allegedly

6 threatened to bring a weapon to school. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs assert Defendants

7 “incompletely represented” the contents of the post to the Stanislaus County Superior

8 Court to obtain the warrant. (Id.) Defendants allegedly “entered and searched 5818

9 Beckwith Road, Modesto,” even though Defendants knew this address differed from

10 the address listed on the warrant. (Id. ¶ 5.) In executing the warrant, Defendants

11 allegedly detained Plaintiff Sandra Scarano at gunpoint. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs further

12 allege Defendants detained Plaintiff Ricardo Scarano without a warrant at gunpoint via

13 a traffic stop conducted “about one mile from 5818 Beckwith Road.” (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.)

14 Plaintiff Ricardo Scarano’s detention lasted more than two hours, during which time

15 officers allegedly handcuffed him, placed him in a patrol car, and searched his vehicle

16 without a warrant. (Id. ¶ 11–13.) SCSD Deputies allegedly committed these acts

17 because the County and SCSD failed to train them to properly assess threats and

18 execute search warrants. (Id. ¶¶ 29–31.) Based on these events, Plaintiffs allege

19 Defendants violated their federal constitutional rights under the Fourth and

20 Fourteenth Amendments.

21 Defendant County of Stanislaus previously moved to dismiss the claims against

22 it for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and this

23 Court granted the Motion. (See Order (ECF No. 21).) Plaintiffs filed the First

24 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22), and Defendant County of Stanislaus and

25 Defendant SCSD again moved to dismiss the claims them. These Defendants argue

26 the FAC still lacks the necessary factual allegations to support Monell liability. Briefing

27 on this Motion is now complete. (Mot. (ECF No. 23); Opp’n (ECF No. 24); Reply (ECF

28 No. 25).) The Court held a hearing on October 2, 2025, during which the Court heard

1 argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Michael Warda appearing for

2 Plaintiffs, and Jacob Graham appearing for Defendants. The Motion was taken under

3 submission.

4 LEGAL STANDARD

5 A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

6 granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint lacks a

7 “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal

8 theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019)

9 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). The

10 Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light most

11 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d

12 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,

13 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an

14 entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

15 (2009).

16 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

17 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed

18 factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This rule

19 demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the

20 claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or

21 formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

22 555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task that draws on “judicial

23 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

24 DISCUSSION

25 Under the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

26 658 (1978), local governments may be liable under section 1983 for wrongs

27 committed by the local government itself. A municipality or other local government

28 entity is subject to Monell liability when that government, “under color of some official

1 policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another's constitutional rights.” Monell, 436

2 U.S. at 692. A municipality, however, cannot be held liable solely for the purported

3 constitutional violations of its employees, “or, in other words, a municipality cannot be

4 held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. Therefore, the

5 municipality itself must have acted through an official municipal policy or custom. Id.

6 at 694. The Ninth Circuit has recognized four theories for establishing municipal

7 liability under Monell: “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a

8 failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.”

9 Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019).

10 The FAC does not allege facts that establish liability for the County or SCSD

11 under any of the recognized theories of municipal liability. It contains no new facts or

12 allegations that would support liability under the first three bases of liability, and the

13 Motion to Dismiss is granted as to those theories for the reasons set out in the Court’s

14 prior Order (see generally ECF No. 21). However, the FAC alleges additional facts

15 regarding the adequacy of the County and SCSD’s officer training program.

16 I. Failure to Train

17 Plaintiffs appear to allege and have included additional facts in the FAC to

18 support a “failure to train” theory of municipal liability. “Failure to train may constitute

19 a basis for Monell liability where the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the

20 rights of those who deal with municipal employees.” Benavidez v. County of San

21 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). “To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff

22 must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional

23 violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to

24 constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if

25 the municipality properly trained their employees.” Id. at 1153–54; see also

26 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007).

27 Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails as the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to meet

28 the second requirement, namely that the County and SCSD maintained a training

1 policy deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights. This prong requires a plaintiff to

2 show that a defendant both chose a training program inadequate to prevent

3 constitutional violations and was deliberately indifferent to such violations. See Hyde

4 v. City of Wilcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs have not alleged

5 adequate facts to show either of these requirements were present.

6 First, Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that the County and

7 SCSD’s training policy was deficient. Plaintiffs allege the Deputies lacked the training

8 to assess the threat posed by Plaintiffs’ Minor Child’s post, to properly apply and

9 execute search warrants, and to limit searches and seizures to matters included in

10 warrants. (FAC ¶¶ 29–31.) However, an “inadequate training policy itself cannot be

11 inferred from a single incident.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. “[A]dequately trained officers

12 occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training

13 program.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989). The FAC offers

14 no facts about these Defendants’ training program or policies. The only factual

15 allegations concern the acts of individual deputies towards Plaintiffs. (See FAC ¶¶ 4–

16 31.) Therefore, as Plaintiffs rely solely on the single incident involved in this case, they

17 have not alleged the facts required to establish that these Defendants employ an

18 inadequate training policy. Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875 (holding Plaintiffs did not state a

19 failure to train claim under Monell because they relied solely on a single incident and

20 pled no other facts to suggest a deficient training policy); Smith v. City of Marina, 709

21 F. Supp. 3d 926, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (same).

22 Second, Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to support an interference that

23 the County and SCSD were deliberately indifferent to any alleged defects in their

24 training programs. There are two pathways to establishing a municipality’s deliberate

25 indifference to deficiencies in training. Hyun Ju Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952

26 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the first, a plaintiff can identify a “pattern of

27 similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Connick v. Thompson, 563

28 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Such a showing “is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate

1 indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan

2 Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Absent such a pattern, policymakers

3 lack notice and, without “notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular

4 respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training

5 program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. However, in a narrow

6 class of cases, an examination of the policy would show “the need for more or

7 different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of

8 constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have

9 been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; see also Flores v.

10 County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). In such cases, plaintiffs

11 are not required to identify a pattern of similar violations to demonstrate deliberate

12 indifference. Connick, 563 U.S. at 63. Instead, plaintiffs “need point only to the policy

13 itself to establish that the municipality’s policymakers were on notice that the plaintiff’s

14 federally protected rights would likely be violated if they failed to act.” Hyun, 952 F.3d

15 at 1141–42.

16 Plaintiffs have not pled facts that support an inference of Defendants’ deliberate

17 indifference under either path. The FAC contains no factual allegations of other

18 incidents in which officers committed similar violations. Plaintiffs’ allegations thus fail

19 to establish that, without the notice provided by a series of similar violations, the

20 County and SCSD were deliberately indifferent to inadequacies in their training policy

21 under the first path. Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding complaint did

22 not state a failure to train claim under Monell because it failed to identify a pattern of

23 similar violations to demonstrate deliberate indifference). Finally, this Court cannot

24 determine that Plaintiffs’ case falls within the narrow class of cases not requiring more

25 than a single incident to establish deliberate indifference based on the facts alleged.

26 Plaintiffs have not provided enough details about the constitutional violations they

27 allegedly suffered such that this Court can conclude the need for more or different

28 training was so obvious as to constitute deliberate indifference. Further, as explained

1 above, even if Plaintiffs had pled facts establishing the Defendants’ deliberate

2 indifference under the second path, Plaintiffs still failed to make a factual showing of

3 deficiencies in the training program because “an inadequate training policy itself

4 cannot be inferred from a single incident.” Hyde, 23 F.4th at 874–75.

5 Finally, although Plaintiffs reference a “history and pattern of prior lawsuits

6 alleging civil rights violations” (FAC ¶ 80), this Court cannot assess whether a pattern

7 plausibly exists based solely on vague allegations that others have brought similar

8 lawsuits. Prior similar lawsuits can indicate a pattern exists provided they are alleged

9 with adequate factual details. See, e.g., Chaidez v. Alameda County, No. 3:21-cv-

10 04240-RS, 2023 WL 6466385, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2023) (holding complaint

11 successfully pled Monell failure to train claim by identifying and describing the facts of

12 eight lawsuits with facts similar to those in plaintiff’s case); Est. of Adkins ex rel. Adkins

13 v. County of San Diego, No. 3:18-cv-00371-H-MDD, 2018 WL 1942397, at *5 (S.D. Cal.

14 Apr. 25, 2018) (holding complaint that identified five other lawsuits involving similar

15 facts alleged a pattern adequate to sustain a Monell failure to train claim). However,

16 Plaintiffs’ vague reference to the existence of other lawsuits does not provide the

17 Court with enough detail to assess whether there are factual similarities between

18 these other suits and Plaintiffs’ case sufficient to support a Monell claim. See Johnson

19 v. City & County of Honolulu, No. 1:22-cv-00447-DKW-RT, 2023 WL 1993972, at *5 (D.

20 Haw. Feb. 14, 2023) (explaining that plaintiff’s “unspecific reference” to “numerous

21 lawsuits” failed to establish a pattern for purposes of a Monell failure to train claim

22 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robinson v. County of San Bernardino,

23 No. 5:24-cv-01871-CBM-SP, 2024 WL 5466465, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2024)

24 (holding that “Plaintiffs cannot rely on prior lawsuits to establish such a pattern when

25 Plaintiff has not included allegations about those cases in the FAC”). Similarly,

26 although Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants were aware of prior similar violations,

27 including incidents involving the same Plaintiffs,” (Opp’n at 3), the FAC fails to specify

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1 || the facts of these other incidents or how such facts constitute analogous constitutional

2 | violations.

3 Plaintiffs’ Monell claims are the only claims stated against the sole named

4 | Defendants. As the Court has dismissed these claims, Plaintiffs’ FAC is dismissed in its

5 || entirety. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 428 n.2 (9th Cir. 1969)

6 | (explaining that the “dismissal of the action as to the named defendants necessarily

7 || require[s] dismissal as to the ‘Doe’ defendants”).

8 | Il. Leave to Amend

9 “In general, leave to amend is only denied if it is clear that amendment would

10 | be futile and that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

11 | amendment.” Cabo Distrib. Co. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1992)

12 || (cleaned up); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

13 | (explaining that a “district court should grant leave to amend ... unless it determines

14 | that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”). At this

15 || stage, it is not clear that amendment of these claims would be futile and, at argument,

16 | neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants objected to dismissal with leave to amend.

17 | Therefore, Plaintiffs will be given leave to amend. However, Plaintiffs are cautioned

18 | that failure to remedy the defects identified in this Order may result in future dismissal

19 | without leave to amend.

20 CONCLUSION

21 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion

22 || to Dismiss (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file a second

23 || amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days after the date of this order

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95 IT 1S SO ORDERED.

26 | Dated: October 6, 2025 “Daniel J bnretto—

Hon. Daniel alabretta

27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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