Paschall

1

FILED IN THE

2 U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Nov 14, 2025

3

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 ALICIA PASCHALL, No. 2:25-CV-00149-RLP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

9 v.

10 AMBER ANDRADE and JULIE

HARDISON,

11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is Plaintiff Alicia Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint,

13 ECF No. 24. Ms. Paschall appears pro se. Id. By separate Order the Court granted

14 Ms. Paschall leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 6. Defendants have not

15 been served.

16 LEGAL STANDARD

17 A plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject

18 to sua spone review of his or her complaint, and mandatory dismissal, if the

19 complaint is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state claim upon which relief may be

20 granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” See

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 537-38, 135 S.Ct.

2 1759 (2015); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

3 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in

4 forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

5 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or

6 in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989), superseded

7 by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27

8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir.

9 1984). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on

10 an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly

11 baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional

12 claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See

13 Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on

14 other grounds as stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

15 Still, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential

16 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

17 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

18 The facts alleged in a complaint are to be taken as true and must “plausibly

19 give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129

20 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). Mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of

1 truth.” Id. The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the

2 elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127

3 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). It must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

4 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

5 DISCUSSION

6 Ms. Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint alleges Defendants Julie

7 Hardison, a CPS Supervisor for Washington state, and Federal Probation Officer

8 Amber Andrade interfered with her custody over her children after a Washington

9 child dependency case. See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at 1.

10 Ms. Paschall alleges Defendants wrongfully removed her son, A.P., from her

11 custody without proper authority or justification. Id. at 1-3, 11-14. A.P. allegedly

12 experienced abuse in a foster home Ms. Hardison placed her in, and Ms. Hardison

13 denied A.P. access to various support services. Id. at 3-6, 14-15, 17-18. Ms.

14 Paschall alleges that when she attempted to report A.P.’s abuse, Defendants

15 retaliated against her by spreading false claims about her and her case. Id. at 6-7,

16 18-21. Ms. Paschall alleges these actions caused her to lose her housing and

17 destroyed her business. Id. at 18-20. Ms. Paschall and A.P. subsequently moved to

18 Kansas. Id. at 10. After moving to Kansas, Ms. Hardison allegedly refused to

19 transfer jurisdiction from Washington to Kansas or release the Washington case

20 file, preventing various Kansas agencies from providing services to her or A.P. or

1 restoring her other son, J.P., to her care. Id. at 9-11, 15-17.

2 Ms. Paschall further claims that Ms. Hardison wrongfully allowed J.P. to

3 move to Texas in violation of various state and federal laws. Id. at 8-9.

4 Ms. Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint asserts violations of her

5 constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth

6 Amendments, as well as a bevy of state and federal laws.1 See generally ECF No.

7 24. She seeks the restoration of her parental rights, reunification with A.P.,

8 expungement of false or retaliatory reports, federal investigation of Defendants, the

9 transfer of her children’s dependency cases to Kansas, and unspecified damages.

10 Id. at 23.

11

12 1 In the Court’s first Order to Amend or Voluntarily Dismiss, the Court

13 directed Ms. Paschall to organize her Amended Complaints by causes of action, and

14 then clearly state the facts supporting each cause of action. ECF No. 16 at 6. Ms.

15 Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint does not follow these directions.

16 Instead, the Third Amended Complaint is organized around a timeline of events,

17 with Ms. Paschall briefly listing constitutional and statutory violations stemming

18 from each occurrence with minimal factual explanation. Mr. Paschall’s failure to

19 properly organize her Third Amended Complaint hampers the Court’s ability to

20 ascertain whether she states a valid claim for relief.

1 Ability to Grant Relief Requested

2 Ms. Paschall fails to allege facts in the Third Amended Complaint which

3 plausibly show she can obtain much of the relief she requests. Ms. Paschall

4 requests the Court order her reunification with A.P., but she does not allege

5 Defendants have custody of her child. To the contrary, Ms. Paschall appears to

6 allege that A.P. resides with her in Kansas. See, e.g., id. at 9. Thus, she does not

7 plausibly allege that Defendants can reunify her with A.P. Similarly, Ms. Paschall

8 does not plausibly allege that Defendants have possession of records which they

9 can expunge.

10 Ms. Paschall also requests the restoration of her parental rights, the transfer

11 of her children’s dependency cases to Kansas, and the federal investigation of

12 Defendants. However, she fails to plausibly allege Defendants have the power to

13 grant her this relief. The Court lacks jurisdiction to issue an injunction against non-

14 parties. Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985). As such, she fails

15 to adequately state a claim for the above relief.

16 Standing

17 Many claims made in Ms. Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint arise from

18 injuries alleged to be suffered not by her, but by her children. Ms. Paschall lacks

19 standing to assert claims for injury suffered by her children absent a showing of

20

1 how she was personally harmed in an individual way. See Food & Drug Admin. v.

2 All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381, 144 S. Ct. 1540 (2024).

3 First, Ms. Paschall continues to make claims arising from abuse A.P.

4 allegedly suffered in foster care. Second, Ms. Paschall asserts claims arising from

5 Defendants’ alleged actions preventing A.P. and J.P. from obtaining support

6 services. As Ms. Paschall does not attempt to demonstrate how she personally

7 suffered an injury as a result of these actions, she lacks standing to raise these

8 claims.

9 Ms. Paschall also lacks standing over her claims arising from Ms.

10 Hardison’s refusal to transfer her children’s cases to Kansas, as she does not

11 demonstrate she was personally harmed by the refusal to transfer the case or

12 Kansas’s consequent refusal to provide A.P. services. While Ms. Paschall does

13 allege she is harmed due to Kansas’s inability to reunite her with her children

14 absent a transfer, she fails to plausibly allege how transfer of the case would result

15 in reunification. Ms. Paschall also fails to demonstrate she personally suffered an

16 injury due to J.P.’s move to Texas, distinct from J.P.’s removal from her custody in

17 general. For want of standing, these claims also fail.

18 Immunity

19 “[S]ocial workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-

20 prosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child

1 dependency proceedings.” Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812

2 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). This immunity extends to a social worker’s

3 decision to remove a child from a parents’ custody. McKinney v. Washington, 297

4 F. App’x 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2008).

5 Many of Ms. Paschall’s claims arise from Ms. Hardison’s removal of A.P.

6 Ms. Hardison enjoys absolute immunity from these claims. In parts of the Third

7 Amended Complaint, Ms. Paschall denies the existence of an open dependency

8 case and portrays A.P.’s removal as being extra-judicial. See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at

9 1. However, these representations are at odds with Ms. Paschall’s later statements

10 that Defendants withheld case documents or otherwise refused to allow transfer of

11 the child dependency case to Kansas, See id. at 9-11, and Ms. Paschall’s claims

12 that “[t]he initial handling of [A.P.]’s case violated fundamental state and federal

13 procedures.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). These statements make it clear A.P.’s

14 removal and placement in foster care was judicially sanctioned as part of a

15 dependency case. At the very least, Ms. Paschall does not plausibly allege that

16 Defendants removed A.P. from her custody independently of a dependency case.

17 Therefore, Ms. Hardison enjoys absolute immunity from claims stemming from the

18 removal and initiation of the dependency case.

19 Ms. Hardison is also entitled to immunity for her quasi-prosecutorial

20 functions connected with the pursuit of A.P. and J.P.’s child dependency

1 proceedings. These actions include her decisions to permit J.P. to move to Texas,

2 to not to transfer the child dependency cases to Kansas, and to not release the case

3 files to Kansas.

4 United States Probation Officers, such as Officer Andrade, are entitled to

5 absolute quasi-judicial immunity from injunctive relief for their role in

6 investigating, preparing, and submitting reports. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for

7 Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987); Dorman v. Higgins, 821

8 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1987) (federal probation officers immune from suit); Tripati

9 v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (federal probation officers

10 immune from suit).

11 Many of Ms. Paschall’s allegations against Officer Andrade appear to stem

12 from Officer Andrade’s investigation of Morgan Jones, Ms. Paschall’s romantic

13 partner.

14 Mr. Jones is currently serving a 50-year term of supervised release as a

15 consequence of a 2008 conviction for Travel for the Purpose of Engaging in Illicit

16 Sexual Conduct. ECF No. 169 in U.S. v. Jones, Case No. 2:08-CR-06044-EFS.

17 One of Mr. Jones’ conditions of supervised release is that he shall have no contact

18 with children without the advance approval of his probation officer. Id. at 5. On

19 April 16, 2025, Officer Andrade petitioned the Court for a warrant alleging Mr.

20 Jones violated his terms of supervised release by having unapproved contact with

1 Ms. Paschall’s children. ECF No. 311 in U.S. v. Jones, Case No. 2:08-CR-06044-

2 EFS. The Court ordered Mr. Jones to be detained as a result of the alleged

3 supervised released violations, ECF No. 315 in U.S. v. Jones, Case No. 2:08-CR-

4 06044-EFS. Ms. Paschall initiated this action on May 7, 2025. ECF No. 1. Her

5 previously dismissed Amended Complaint is peppered with references to Officer

6 Andrade’s investigation of Mr. Jones. See, e.g., ECF No. 3 at 28.

7 While Ms. Paschall stresses that Officer Andrade’s actions occurred outside

8 her role as a probation officer, it appears that some allegations against her

9 nevertheless occurred within this context. For example, Officer Andrade’s contacts

10 with Ms. Hardison, a social worker, and her assistance in preventing A.P. from

11 returning to Ms. Paschall’s custody appear to have occurred in the context of

12 Officer Andrade’s investigation of Mr. Jones’s unlawful contacts with Ms.

13 Paschall’s children. To the extent Ms. Paschall’s claims arise from Officer

14 Andrade’s investigation of Mr. Jones and his contact with A.P., Officer Andrade

15 enjoys absolute immunity from suit.

16 Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

17 Most of Ms. Paschall’s claims stem from the removal and placement of A.P.

18 in foster care, which she alleges was unjustified and procedurally improper. As

19 stated in this Court’s prior order to amend or voluntarily dismiss, these claims are

20 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stems from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker

2 v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923) and District of Columbia

3 Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). The doctrine

4 “is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising

5 appellate review over final state court judgments.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank,

6 N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2008). Congress vested “the United States

7 Supreme Court, not the lower federal courts, with appellate jurisdiction over state

8 court judgments.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). “The

9 doctrine [therefore] bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only over

10 an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’

11 of such an appeal.” Id. (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)).

12 “To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, [courts] ‘pay

13 close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.’” Cooper, 704

14 F.3d at 777-78 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir.

15 2003)).

16 If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous

decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment

17 based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction

in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts

18 as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party,

Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.

19

20 Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.

1 “There are two kinds of cases in which such a forbidden de facto appeal

2 might be brought.” Id. at 1163. “First, the federal plaintiff may complain of harm

3 caused by a state court judgment that directly withholds a benefit from (or imposes

4 a detriment on) the federal plaintiff, based on an allegedly erroneous ruling by that

5 court.” Id. “Second, the federal plaintiff may complain of a legal injury caused by a

6 state court judgment, based on an allegedly erroneous legal ruling, in a case in

7 which the federal plaintiff was one of the litigants.” Id. “Rooker-Feldman thus

8 applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or

9 errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court

10 judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004).

11 Only after a district court first determines a case involves a forbidden de

12 facto appeal does the “inextricably intertwined” test articulated in Feldman come

13 into play. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. In Feldman, the Supreme Court stated:

14 If the constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court

are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial

15 proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application [for relief], then the

District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court

16 decision. This the District Court may not do.

17 Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (alteration in original) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483

18 n.16). Accordingly, “[o]nce a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto

19 appeal, as in Feldman, that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is

20 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision from which the

1 forbidden de facto appeal is brought.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. A federal district

2 court must then “refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably

3 intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Id.

4 Ms. Paschall’s claims arising from the removal of A.P. and his placement in

5 foster care are forbidden de facto appeals of Washington child dependency

6 proceedings. Ms. Paschall’s requested relief makes this fact abundantly clear. She

7 seeks the return of her son and the restoration of her parental rights, or in other

8 words, for the state court’s dependency determination to be overturned.

9 Ms. Paschall at times frames her claim as a challenge to Defendants’

10 conduct relating to her child’s placement in foster care. However, review of her

11 Third Amended Complaint and the other filings in the case, see, e.g., ECF No.

12 19, make it clear she actually challenges the state court’s decision to order the

13 removal of A.P. and his placement in foster care generally.

14 Ms. Paschall’s claims concerning Defendants’ purportedly wrongful actions

15 to remove A.P. and initiate a dependency case are inextricably intertwined with the

16 outcome of the state court child dependency proceeding. Ms. Paschall herself

17 makes this abundantly clear – she states that because A.P.’s removal was improper,

18 “the entire process [was rendered] unconstitutional and void,” id. at 24, and

19 “because the intake process was never validly opened or reviewed, all actions that

20 followed – including [A.P.]’s removal, placement, and loss of services – were

1 procedurally and constitutionally unlawful.” Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).

2 Therefore, all of Ms. Paschall’s claims stemming from the removal of A.P. and his

3 placement in foster care are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a de facto

4 appeal of the state court dependency case.

5 Retaliation

6 The above identified legal infirmities leave only Ms. Paschall’s retaliation

7 claims. Ms. Paschall asserts Defendants’ purported retaliation against her reporting

8 of A.P.’s abuse in foster care violated various constitutional amendments and

9 federal laws, giving rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(3), and other

10 federal statutes. Each legal theory is addressed in turn.

11 § 1983 Claims

12 Ms. Paschall asserts §1983 claims stemming from retaliation she alleges

13 violated her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

14 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging

15 the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. “A plaintiff may bring a Section

16 1983 claim alleging that public officials, acting in their official capacity, took

17 action with the intent to retaliate against, obstruct, or chill the plaintiff’s First

18 Amendment rights.” Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d

19 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016). “To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the

20 plaintiff must allege that (1) it engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2)

1 the defendant’s actions would ‘chill a person of ordinary firmness’ from continuing

2 to engage in the protected activity; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial

3 motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct—i.e., that there was a nexus between

4 the defendant’s actions and an intent to chill speech.” Id. Bare assertions of a

5 retaliatory motive are insufficient to state a retaliation claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778

6 F.2d 527, 533 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1985).

7 Ms. Paschall’s First Amendment retaliation claims rest on Defendants

8 retaliation against her for reporting A.P.’s alleged abuse in foster care by spreading

9 false claims about her, “coercing” her to give up her Section 8 housing voucher,

10 and causing her to lose business. First, Ms. Paschall’s allegations are too vague to

11 ascertain how Defendants “coerced” her into giving up her housing, or how they

12 caused her to lose business. ECF No. 24 at 18-19. Therefore, Ms. Paschall fails to

13 state a First Amendment claim stemming from this purported retaliation. As for her

14 remaining First Amendment allegations, Ms. Paschall fails to adequately allege

15 facts demonstrating a retaliatory motive. While Ms. Paschall asserts Defendants

16 disseminated false claims against her to retaliate against her reporting A.P.’s abuse,

17 she fails to plausibly suggest why Defendants would take these retaliatory

18 measures, or allege any nexus between Defendants’ actions and her reporting of

19 abuse. Therefore, her First Amendment retaliation claims fail.

20

1 Ms. Paschall’s Fifth Amendment retaliation claim alleges Defendants

2 deprived her of housing and business without due process. This claim is better

3 described as a Fifth Amendment takings claim. As stated above, Ms. Paschall’s

4 fails to adequately allege how Defendants deprived her of housing or business.

5 Moreover, a Fifth Amendment takings claim generally requires the Government to

6 directly appropriate property – something Ms. Paschall does not allege in this case.

7 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).

8 Therefore, her Fifth Amendment claim fails.

9 Ms. Paschall finally asserts her Fourteenth Amendment substantive and

10 procedural due process rights were violated. Yet again, Ms. Paschall’s allegations

11 are too vague to state a claim. Ms. Paschall only asserts that Defendants’ retaliation

12 denied her the ability to seek redress, ECF No. 24 at 7, and that they “interfere[d]”

13 with her family, housing, and economic stability. Id. at 19. Without more

14 explanation how Defendants frustrated her ability to seek redress or interfered with

15 her family,2 housing, and economic stability, Ms. Paschall fails to state a claim.

16

17

18 2 To the extent that Ms. Paschall alleges that the removal of her children was

19 retaliatory, such a claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as discussed

20 above.

1 Ms. Paschall also alleges Defendants retaliated against her by “[f]abricating

2 evidence and falsifying case notes to justify child removal” in violation of her

3 Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. ECF No. 24 at 21.

4 As discussed above, these claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as

5 they are inextricably intertwined with her de facto appeal of her child dependency

6 case.

7 § 1985(3) Claims

8 Ms. Paschall asserts two §1985(3) claims. The first alleges a conspiracy by

9 Defendants to intimidate or retaliate against her for attempting to bring attention to

10 A.P.’s abuse in foster care. ECF No. 24 at 6. The second asserts a conspiracy

11 between defendants to “obstruct justice or deprive equal protection of the laws.”

12 A § 1985(3) claim requires plaintiffs to allege and prove four elements:

13 (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,

any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

14 privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this

conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or

15 deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

16 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,

17 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352 (1983). The second element §1985(3) claim generally

18 requires evidence that a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights was motivated by racial

19 animus. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).

20 Ms. Paschall fails to articulate how Defendants deprived her of the equal

1 protection of the laws, or of equal protection and immunities under the laws, and

2 how this deprivation was motivated by racial animus against her. Therefore, her

3 §1985(3) claims fail.

4 Other Statutory Claims

5 Ms. Paschall also alleges Defendants’ retaliation violated the Americans

6 with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203, 12132, the Child Abuse

7 Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. §

8 1512(b), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq., the Medicaid Act,

9 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, and the Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA). Ms.

10 Paschall fails to articulate a claim under any statute, or a statutory right which can

11 be vindicated under a § 1983 claim.

12 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) of the ADA prohibits retaliation in an employment

13 context. As Defendants did not employ Ms. Paschall, this statute does not apply. 42

14 U.S.C. § 12132 prohibits denial of the benefits of services, programs, or activities

15 of a public entity by reason of disability. However, Ms. Paschall fails to articulate

16 how Defendants denied her of a benefit on the basis of her disability. Therefore,

17 she fails to state an ADA claim.

18 Ms. Paschall alleges Defendants’ retaliation violated CAPTA’s requirement

19 that states create channels for reporting abuse. However, there is no law that

20 CAPTA creates a privately enforceable right to report abuse free from retaliation,

1 or that government actors’ retaliation for reporting abuse violates any CAPTA

2 right. Therefore, Ms. Paschall fails to state a claim under this statute.

3 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) criminalizes witness tampering and does not create a

4 private civil cause of action.

5 To state a claim for retaliation under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, a plaintiff

6 must allege (1) they engaged in some activity protected by the FHA; (2) an adverse

7 housing consequence causally linked to the protected activity; and (3) damages.

8 San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998). Ms.

9 Paschall fails to allege she was retaliated against for engaging in some activity

10 protected by the FHA. As discussed above, she also fails to specifically allege how

11 Defendants interfered with her housing, and fails to plausibly allege a retaliatory

12 motive. Therefore, she fails to state a claim for retaliation under the FHA.

13 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, which lies out requirements for state plans for Medicaid,

14 does not create a private cause of action, and there is no law holding that it creates

15 any right to be free from retaliation which can be vindicated by a § 1983 claim.

16 Finally, Ms. Paschall fails to identify any portion of the FFPSA which gives

17 rise to a private cause of action or a right which can be vindicated by a § 1983 claim.

18 For all the above reasons, Ms. Paschall fails to state a claim for retaliation.

19 The Court previously provided Ms. Paschall two opportunities to amend her

20 complaints to assert a claim. In all three Amended Complaints Ms. Paschall filed,

1|| she failed to state a cognizable legal claim. For that reason, the Court declines to

2|| provide Ms. Paschall a fourth attempt to articulate a claim as it is clear that further

3|| opportunities to amend would be futle. Ms. Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint

4|| is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28

5|| U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Ms. Paschall’s outstanding Motion for Appointment of

6|| Counsel and Request for Subpoena of Records is denied as moot.

7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

8 1. Plaintiff Alicia Paschall’s Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 24, is

9|| DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

10|| be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

11 2. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal

12|| of this Order would not be taken in good faith and would lack any arguable basis in

13 || law or fact.

14 3. Plaintiff Alicia Paschall’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and

15|| Request for Subpoena of Records, ECF No. 25, is DENIED as moot.

16 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter this Order,

17|| enter judgment, provide copies to Plaintiff and counsel, and CLOSE the file.

18 DATED November 14, 2025.

1

20 ~ REBECCA L.PENNELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER NIGAIICCINIG ACTION * 10