McBroom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BENJAMIN McBROOM, )

M35692, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-1309-DWD

)

ILL. DEPT. OF CORR., )

JEREMIAH BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Benjamin McBroom, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), brings this civil

rights action for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On September 25, 2025, the Court

designated claims sufficient to proceed beyond initial review (Doc. 13), it initiated service

of process, and it directed the defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11). Defendants have responded

(Doc. 24). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s September 25, 2025,

Order, and a Motion to Strike Defendant’s Response (Doc. 25). Additionally, Plaintiff has

filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Reply and for Sanctions. (Doc. 26). For reasons

explained in this Order, Plaintiff’s Motions (Docs. 11, 22, 25, 26) are all denied.

Background

The operative claims from the Complaint are:

Claim 1: Violation of the ADA due to lack of accommodations;

Claim 2: Violation of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) due to lack of

accommodations.

(Doc. 13 at 6). At the time of service, the Court narrowed Plaintiff’s request for injunctive

relief as seeking access to a typewriter in his cell. (Doc. 13 at 15-17). Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that the prison is adhering to an improper rule or policy to keep inmates at

maximum security prisons from having typewriters in their cells. He claims that without

a typewriter he has a limited ability to fill out request slips required to participate in

programs and services, he is limited about how he can use his leisure time, and he is

limited in his ability to lodge grievances or legal documents with the courts.

Defendant’s Response (Doc. 24)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on

the merits of his claim, particularly because there is evidence of significant typed material

via grievances, this lawsuit, and a prior lawsuit in 2024. Defendant also pointed to an

apparent willingness to accommodate his needs by reference to a declaration and

grievance response from ADA coordinator Katie Bice.1 In the declaration, Bice indicated

that Plaintiff receives typewriter or computer access at the law library, and that he can

1 One of Plaintiff’s major recent complaints is that in August of 2025 he attempted to partake in an exam to

be considered for a job as an IDOC Law Clerk, but he had significant difficulty because on the day of the

exam he was not allowed to type. Bice’s response indicates that he waited until the day of the exam to

request an accommodation, which was too late, but in the future if he makes an advance request it will be

considered. The law library exam itself was not an issue presented in the underlying complaint filed on

July 1, 2025, because the exam had not occurred yet.

request more time as needed. In her declaration, Bice indicated that no doctor at the

prison has suggested to her that Plaintiff needs any accommodations. (Bice Decl., Doc.

24-1 at ¶ 11). In support of the response, Defendant also submitted an excerpt of

Plaintiff’s medical records which show that medical staff has discussed and attempted to

better understand Plaintiff’s right hand injuries. A doctor opined in March of 2025, “I see

no evidence on medical exam that IIC would qualify for ADA status on basis of his “R”

hand.” (Doc. 24-4 at 1). Defendant also provided call pass history and indicated that it

reflected nearly forty hours of law library attendance for Plaintiff in the last 5 months.

(Doc. 24-2). Based on this evidence, the Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not

demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on his claims.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not shown the lack of an adequate remedy

at law or irreparable harm during the pendency of this case, and his request for a

mandatory injunction within the confines of a prison is against the public interest.

Analysis

To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: a likelihood of success

on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and irreparable harm without the

injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). As for the first

requirement, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any likelihood of success—

in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM General Corp. v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). “A movant’s likelihood of success

on the merits must be strong.” Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020). While

Plaintiff is not required to “show that [he] definitely will win the case…a mere possibility

of success is not enough,” and he must make “[a] strong showing that [he] is likely to

succeed on the merits.” Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020).

A strong showing typically entails a demonstration of how the applicant intends to prove

key elements of his case. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir.

2020); Doe v. University of Southern Indiana, 43 F.4th 784, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2022) (the court

is not required to make inferences in the movant’s favor when considering preliminary

injunctive relief).

The Court must also decide whether an adequate remedy at law exists and

whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Irreparable

harm is harm which cannot be repaired. Graham v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 296

(7th Cir. 1998) (“Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down

again, atoned for. The injury must be of a particular nature, so that compensation in

money cannot atone for it.”). The Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the

parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction

on the public interest.” Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). “This

equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of

success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s

favor.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 665.

An injunction that seeks an affirmative act by the respondent is a mandatory

preliminary injunction and should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818. If

injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the

injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the

harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(2).

Under the ADA and RA, a Plaintiff must allege that he is a qualified individual

with a disability, who was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities at

the prison, by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA

and RA also require a prison to reasonably modify its policies or practices to avoid

discrimination based on disability. 28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(7); 28 C.F.R. §41.53. Practically

speaking, the two statutes are the same for purposes of initial review. See e.g., Shaw v.

Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that

disability discrimination under the RA and the ADA can be “established in three different

ways: ‘(1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis of the disability, (2) the

defendant refused to provide a reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant's rule

disproportionally impacts disabled people.’” A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High School Assoc.,

881 F.3d 587, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2018). The proper defendant for an ADA or RA claim is the

Department of Corrections or the Director. Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 n.2

(7th Cir. 2012) (the department or the director of the department are appropriate

defendants for ADA/RA claims). An inmate seeking money damages under the ADA or

RA must also establish that the entity acted with deliberate indifference to his situation.

See e.g., Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022) (to recover money damages,

plaintiff must identify intentional misconduct, and not mere negligence, by a named

defendant); Bernard v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 2023 WL 2018915 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2023) (in

the ADA and RA contexts, courts evaluate knowledge and deliberate indifference

attributable to the prison entity).

Here, Plaintiff complains that the prison will not allow him to have a typewriter

in his cell, which he contends he needs because of a chronic right hand injury. Defendant

provided a recent medical assessment wherein a doctor opined that Plaintiff did not have

a hand injury warranting accommodation, which weighs against a finding that he is a

qualified individual with a disability. Assuming for sake of argument that Plaintiff has

a disability, his argument about typewriter access is akin to the defendant refusing to

provide an accommodation, or maintaining a rule that disproportionately impacts a

disabled inmate. As to the refusal to provide an accommodation, as the Court noted in

the September 25, 2025, Order, a prison is not obligated to provide the preferred

accommodation if there are other alternatives. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 431 (7th

Cir. 2020) (finding that a district court was correct to grant summary judgment on an

ADA/RA claim about access to a typewriter in Plaintiff’s cell where the Plaintiff was still

able to draft documents with the accommodations provided of library time and an

assistant). Not only is the prison not required to provide a specific accommodation, but

Defendant’s response provides evidence that Plaintiff has enjoyed ample access to the

law library where he can type documents, and he has filed a considerable amount of

typed material in this case, in a prior case, and via the prison grievance process2. This

2 Plaintiff’s 39-page complaint had approximately 25 pages of typed material (Doc. 1), his Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) had 25 pages of typed material, Defendant produced 27 pages of typed

materials in the form of grievances and past litigation documents Plaintiff has filed in recent cases (Doc.

24), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike was 4-pages typed (Doc. 25).

evidence is plenty to demonstrate that Plaintiff does not currently have a reasonably

strong chance of success on the merits of his claims, and thus the Court will not grant

injunctive relief.

Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff argues the rule against typewriters

disproportionately impacts him, the Court does not find that he has a high enough

likelihood of success to proceed on this theory to warrant preliminary injunctive relief.

See e.g., Love v. La Voie, 2025 WL 500216 (7th Cir. 2025) (affirming a district court’s denial

of a preliminary injunction for an inmate who desired urine testing rather than blood

testing as a disability accommodation because there was evidence that the blood testing

was necessary to accurately monitor blood levels of prescription drugs). The defendant

reasonably contends that typewriters are a safety issue, and that Plaintiff has been

afforded considerable law library time where he is able to use a computer or typewriter

to meet his drafting needs. At this early phase of the case when weighing the likelihood

of success, the Court is not required to make inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. At this

juncture, the Court is simply not convinced that Plaintiff has identified evidence or

potential evidence significant enough to support a likelihood of success on his claim that

he needs an in-cell typewriter for legal or leisure purposes.

Plaintiff has expressed a desire to reply to the Defendant’s response, but the Court

does not find that a reply would be useful to the analysis of the present motion. To the

extent that Plaintiff challenges the response based on it naming Latoya Hughes as a

respondent rather than the IDOC, the Court finds this detail harmless. Although Hughes

was dismissed from the case earlier in favor of IDOC, a proper party for an ADA claim is

the IDOC itself or the Director. Jaros v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 n.2 (7th Cir.

2012) (the department or the director of the department are appropriate defendants for

ADA/RA claims). Plaintiff has not suffered any harm by Hughes being listed as the party

responding, rather than the brief generically referencing the IDOC. Thus, Plaintiff’s

desire to file a reply, or his desire to strike the Defendant’s Motion for this naming issue

do not warrant a delay in ruling here and do not justify any relief. To the extent Plaintiff

further takes issue with the timing of the response, the Court already had granted an

extension of time for the response to be filed, and the response was filed by that extended

deadline.3 Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 25) is DENIED.

On October 29, 2025, Plaintiff suggested in his response to the Defendant’s Motion

for an Extension of Time that he also sought reconsideration of the Court’s September 25,

2025, Order. (Doc. 21, 22). Specifically, he argues that the Court should reconsider the

September 25, 2025, Order because it did not mention the motion for a temporary

restraining order. Given that the Court has already determined in this Order that there

is no basis for a preliminary injunction, there is also no basis for a temporary restraining

order. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 22) is DENIED.

Finally, on November 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to

Reply and for Sanctions (Doc. 26). In the Motion, Plaintiff claims that he has “not had

3 Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that Defendant IDOC returned an executed waiver on October 1, 2025,

making the response deadline October 22, 2025, whereas Warden Brown filed a waiver October 3, 2025,

and filed a timely request for extension on October 24, 2025. He complains that it is improper that Brown

sought the extension, and then Director Hughes ultimately filed the response to the TRO. While Plaintiff

is correct about these small discrepancies in the briefing, these issues do not impact the ability to ultimately

address the merits of the issues in dispute, namely the appropriateness of preliminary injunctive relief.

Therefore, the Court sees no basis to strike the Defendant’s response as untimely or to disregard the

contents of the response.

any ability to type since getting the response [d/e 24] on 11/5/25 but need to rebut the

lies and hearsay[.]” (Doc. 26 at 1). This contention is plainly a lie as evidenced by

Plaintiff’s own November 6, 2025, Motion (Doc. 25). On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff typed

and submitted his Motion to Strike Hughes’ response to his Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction. In the Motion, he took time to explicitly quote from Hughes response at

document 24. Thus, Plaintiff’s own November 6, 2025, submission demonstrates that in

his November 14, 2025, submission he has lied. He states in the November 14 submission

that he has not had a chance to type since November 5, but he has obviously had a chance

to type which he wasted arguing petty technicalities rather than focusing on the merits

of his alleged need for accommodations. Plaintiff’s lie in pursuit of a preliminary

injunction is not well taken, particularly because it is made in a motion where he

simultaneously attacks the credibility of his opponent and contends that they should be

sanctioned. If anyone deserves a sanction, it is Plaintiff.

Pro se litigants are not held to the same exacting standards as licensed attorneys,

but they are still obligated to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including

Rule 11. Rule 11(b) requires that factual representations to the Court have evidentiary

support. Rule 11 also provides that if the Court determines Rule 11(b) has been violated,

then it can impose sanctions on the party that violated the Rule. Plaintiff is hereby

warned that if he is found to be in violation of Rule 11(b) at any time as this litigation

progresses, he will be sanctioned.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11) is DENIED. Plaintiff's

Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 22), Motion to Strike (Doc. 25), and Motion for an Extension

(Doc. 26) are also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2025 Dern x (i i

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge