Loftis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

NATASHA LOFTIS,

Case No. 3:22-cv-01261-JR

Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

STATE OF OREGON; COLETTE

PETERS, Personally; PAULA MYERS,

Personally; ALANA BRUNS, Personally;

LT KING, Personally; OFFICER

DARLING, Personally; OFFICER DAVIS,

Personally; OFFICER LYON, Personally;

JOHN/JANE DOE,

Defendants.

BAGGIO, District Judge:

On August 25, 2025, Magistrate Judge Russo issued a non-dispositive order denying

Plaintiff Loftis’s Motion to Compel. Order 3, ECF No. 42. On September 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed

objections to Judge Russo’s Order. Pl.’s Obj. Order, ECF No. 43. The matter is now before the

Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).

In accordance with Rule 72(a), “[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim

or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must

promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating

the decision.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The standard of review for an order with objections is

“clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(A) (applying the “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review for non-dispositive motions). If a ruling on a

motion is not determinative of “a party’s claim or defense,” it is not dispositive and, therefore, is

not subject to de novo review as are proposed findings and recommendations for dispositive

motions under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(B).

The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s objections and conclude that they provide a

basis to modify Judge Russo’s Order. Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt Judge Russo’s

Order and reverses with instructions to grant in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.

DISCUSSION

Judge Russo denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel because Plaintiff’s requests for

admission posed questions previously addressed in depositions. Order 2-3. Judge Russo reasoned

that “requiring simple admissions or denials after [depositions] not only goes beyond the scope

of the purpose of requests for admission, but it also unnecessarily increases the time and expense

in conducting discovery . . . .” Id. at 3. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with Judge

Russo. Accordingly, the Court finds Judge Russo’s Order contrary to law and reverses it with

instructions to grant in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.

///

I. Rule 36

Rule 36 governs requests for admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. “The purpose of Rule 36(a) is

to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of

issues for trial.” Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981). Under

Rule 36(a)(1):

A party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the

pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)

relating to:

(A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and

(B) the genuineness of any described documents.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Within thirty days, the party to whom the request is directed must serve

a written answer or objection—otherwise, it is admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). “If a matter is

not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party

cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “A denial must fairly respond to the

substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only

a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Id.

Evasive answers, however, are treated as a failure to respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

Evasive answers fail to “specifically deny the matter” or “set forth in detail the reasons why the

answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter . . . .” Asea, Inc., 669 F.2d at 1245

(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, when the answering party asserts lack of knowledge

or information to admit or deny a matter, the party must also state “that it has made reasonable

inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit

or deny.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4); see also Asea, Inc., 669 F.2d at 1247.

Even “if a party already has personal knowledge and/or belief regarding relevant facts, he

may compel the opposing party to admit or deny such allegations, or to offer a valid reason why

the fact cannot be admitted or denied.” Diederich v. Dep’t of Army, 132 F.R.D. 614, 616

(S.D.N.Y. 1990). Thus, “[o]bjections that [a requesting party] should obtain the information by

independent discovery and investigation, or that the matter is already within [the requesting

party’s] knowledge, are . . . misplaced.” Id. at 617; see also City of Rome, Georgia v. Hotels.com

L.P., No. 4:05-CV-0249-HLM, 2012 WL 13020827, at *10 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2012) (“It is

improper for the responding party to answer a request for admission by referring to previously

produced discovery materials.”); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Hyundai Tech. Grp., Inc., No. SA CV

23-01709-CBM (DFMX), 2024 WL 4404963, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2024) (“Rule

36 . . . presupposes that the party proceeding under it knows the facts or has the document and

merely wishes its opponent to concede their genuineness.” (quoting Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron,

181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998)). For example, in In re Heritage Bond Litigation, 220

F.R.D. 624, 626 (C.D. Cal. 2004), the court held that the defendant’s response to requests for

admission “stating its answers are to be found in ‘previously produced business records’” was

improper. The court reasoned that by referring to “previously produced business records,” the

defendant “inferentially admitted it could have obtained the information to respond to [the]

requests for admissions [but] chose not to do so.” Id. at 626-27.

Here, many of Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s requests for admission are improper.

For example, Defendants object to most of Plaintiff’s requests as “cumulative.” However,

cumulative is not a proper objection, particularly considering the purpose of Rule 36. See Asea,

Inc., 669 F.2d at 1245 (“The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to expedite trial by establishing certain

material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.”); see also Hyundai Motor

Co., 2024 WL 4404963, at *1 (“Rule 36 . . . presupposes that the party proceeding under it

knows the facts or has the document and merely wishes its opponent to concede their

genuineness.”); see generally Stevenson and Fitzgerald, Rutter Group Prac. Guide: Federal Civ.

Pro. Before Trial 11:2054 (The Rutter Group 2025) (listing proper objections, including

privilege, irrelevance, and burden).1

Moreover, many of Defendants’ responses refer Plaintiff to their previous deposition

rather than admit or deny the matter.2 This too is not a proper response as it fails to “specifically

deny” the matter or “state in detail why [Defendants] cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 36(a)(4). Further, such a response “inferentially admit[s Defendants] could have obtained

the information to respond,” but chose not to. In re Heritage Bond Litig., 220 F.R.D. at 627.

Judge Russo reasons that Plaintiff’s requests for admission “address central issues that

require significant explanation . . . .” Order 3. But to the extent Plaintiff’s requests require

significant explanation, Rule 36 allows an answering party to “qualify an answer or deny only a

part of a matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). It is not enough for Defendants to say it’s too

complicated; that is evasive. Instead, an answering party must “specifically deny [the matter] or

state in detail why [it] cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Id. (emphasis added). Judge Russo

also reasons that Plaintiff “already had the opportunity to pose these questions during depositions

and fully explore the answers and explanations . . . .” Order 3. Yet if Judge Russo’s reasoning is

true, depositions would theoretically eliminate the potential to serve subsequent requests for

1 Defendants also object to several of Plaintiff’s requests for admission as “speculative.”

However, nothing in Rule 36 prohibits requests for admissions that invite speculation. In fact,

requests for admission may inquire into facts or opinions about facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

36(a)(1). Moreover, if an answering party is unable to admit or deny the request because it is

speculative, the answering party can explain so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) (an answering party

may “state in detail why [it] cannot truthfully admit or deny” a matter). Thus, Defendants’

speculative objections are also improper.

2 Defendants concede their “response of ‘refer to the deposition’” is not an objection.

Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Compel (“Defs.’ Resp.”) 3, ECF No. 38. Consequently, it is an answer.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted unless . . . the party to whom the request is

directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection . . . .” (emphasis added)).

admission. Here, the Court is not presented with Defendants’ deposition transcripts; thus, the

Court cannot evaluate the extent to which Plaintiff’s requests for admission are duplicative of its

deposition questions, nor can the Court evaluate the responsiveness of Defendants’ deposition

answers.

Some examples help illustrate the deficiencies of Defendants’ responses. Plaintiff’s

Request for Admission No. 3 to Defendant Steven King asks King to “[a]dmit that on June 9,

2020, [n]othing prevented you from moving Loftis.” Berman Decl. Ex. 1 (“King’s Resp.”) 2,

ECF No. 34-1. King objects to this request as “cumulative” and states that “to the extent . . . an

answer is necessary, I direct plaintiff’s counsel to the deposition taken March 20, 2025.” Id.

Defendants claim this response is justified because Plaintiff’s request for admission addresses “a

central issue of the case” and “a simple admission or denial would not allow a complete

understanding of the factors supporting the decision made at the time.” Defs.’ Resp. 4. Although

such justification may be true, King must say so. Rule 36 specifically requires an answering

party to either deny the matter or “state in detail why [it] cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). King cannot refuse to admit or deny the matter without explaining why; and

referencing his deposition is not enough.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s Request for Admission No. 9 to Defendant Phillip Thiel asks Thiel

to “[a]dmit that [his] gait at 11:43 depicts a stroll, not a running approach.” Berman Decl. Ex. 3

(“Thiel’s Resp.”) 3, ECF No. 34-3. Thiel objects to this request as “cumulative” and states that

“to the extent . . . an answer is required, I refer plaintiff’s counsel to the deposition taken on May

21, 2025 and the referenced video.” Id. at 2-3. Defendants claim this response is justified

because Plaintiff’s request “requires an explanation to describe why the officer was moving at a

specific rate.” Defs.’ Resp. 4. However, Rule 36 allows a requesting party to request the “truth of

any matters . . . relating to . . . facts . . . or opinions about [facts] . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1).

Thus, Thiel must either admit the matter, specifically deny it, or state in detail why he cannot do

either. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). Thiel cannot simply refer to other discovery materials.

For these reasons, the Court finds Judge Russo’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel contrary to law. The Court thus reverses Judge Russo’s Order with instructions to grant

in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. Attached as Exhibit A to this Order are three tables

addressing the adequacy of each of Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s requests for admission.

II. Rule 37

Rule 37(a)(5) provides that if a motion for an order compelling discovery or disclosure is

granted, the Court “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent

whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to

pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). The Court “must not order this payment” if an exception applies. Id.

Because the Court reverses Judge Russo’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel,

the Court refers Plaintiff’s request for reasonable expenses under Rule 37(a)(5) back to Judge

Russo with leave to refile. Plaintiff may refile her request for reasonable expenses as appropriate.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

CONCLUSION

The Court REVERSES Magistrate Judge Russo’s Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel [42] with instructions to GRANT IN PART Plaintiff’?s Motion to Compel [33].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2025.

United tf District Judge

8 — ORDER

Defendant Steven King’s Response to Plaintiff’s First Request for Admission. ECF No. 34-1.

Request for Admission Sufficiency of Objection Sufficiency of Answer

RFA No. 1 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 2 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 3 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 4 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 5 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 6 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 7 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 8 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 9 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 10 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 11 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 12 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 13 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 14 Improper Evasive

Defendant Patricia Lyon’s Response to Plaintiff’s First Request for Admission. ECF No. 34-2.

Request for Admission Sufficiency of Objection Sufficiency of Answer

RFA No. 1 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 2 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 3 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 4 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 5 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 6 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 7 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 8 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 9 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 10 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 11 Improper Evasive

Defendant Phillip Thiel’s Response to Plaintiff’s First Request for Admission. ECF No. 34-3.

Request for Admission Sufficiency of Objection Sufficiency of Answer

RFA No. 1 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 2 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 3 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 4 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 5 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 6 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 7 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 8 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 9 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 10 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 11 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 12 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 13 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 14 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 15 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 16 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 17 Improper Sufficient

RFA No. 18 Improper Evasive

RFA No. 19 Improper Evasive