The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAYA STEPHENS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 2:24 CV 1703
)
V. ) District Judge Cathy Bissoon
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
GATEWAY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., )
) Re: ECF Nos. 14, 103, 121
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
L RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff
Maya Stephens’ “Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief to Enforce Status Quo and Immediate
Reinstatement of School Access,” ECF No. 103. It is further recommended that the Court deny
Ms. Stephens’ Motion to Maintain Educational Enrollment, ECF No. 14; and deny her Motion to
Expedite Ruling Due to Ongoing Educational Deprivation and Federal Violation, ECF No. 121.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Maya Stephens (“Ms. Stephens”), brings this action pro se with her minor
daughters L.S. and M.S. (collectively, “Plaintiffs’”) against Gateway School District (“Gateway’’),
local and state educational agencies and employees, and counsel acting on their behalf.! ECF No.
92. Ms. Stephens alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the McKinney-Vento
1 On July 15, 2025, the Court granted Ms. Stephen’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel for her daughters. ECF No.
97. The Court’s request for pro bono counsel remains pending while the Clerk’s Office seeks volunteer counsel. Due
to the allegedly exigent circumstances surrounding Ms. Stephens’ pending motions for injunctive relief and her ability
to pursue claims on her own behalf, the stay currently in effect during the search for counsel for her children is lifted
solely as to Ms. Stephens and the motions considered at this time.
Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C § 11431, et seg., (“McKinney-Vento Act”), denied them due
process, unlawfully retaliated, defamed her and her children, and caused her children to suffer
emotional distress. Id. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Gateway’s determination that the Stephens’
children are not homeless, do not reside in Gateway, and are not entitled to the protection afforded
by the McKinney-Vento Act. As a result, L.S. and M.S. were subject to disenrollment under
applicable Pennsylvania law.
Section 1302(a) of the Pennsylvania Public School Code states that “[a] child shall be
considered a resident of the school district in which his parents or the guardian of his person
resides.” 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1302(a). The purpose of the residency provision is to prevent
“school shopping.” Velazquez ex rel. Speaks-Velazquez v. E. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 949
A.2d 354, 360 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (citing Paek v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist., 923 A.2d 563,
567 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007)). The McKinney-Vento Act provides a limited exception to this rule
to ensure that unhoused children “have equal access to the same free, appropriate public education,
... as provided to other children and youths.” 42 U.S.C. § 11431(1).
Ms. Stephens alleges that with her, L.S. and M.S. have suffered prolonged housing
instability since relocating to the Pittsburgh area in 2016. In 2021, L.S. and M.S. were residing in
“doubled-up housing” at Ms. Stephens’ mother’s residence in the Gateway School District.” Id. |
2. Based on their living conditions, Gateway deemed L.S. and MLS. eligible for enrollment under
the McKinney-Vento Act.
Ms. Stephens asserts that during the 2023-2024 academic year, she secured “her own
temporary housing” at 758 Second Street, Verona, Pennsylvania, with a month-to-month lease in
The McKinney-Vento Act includes within the definition of protected children those “who lack a fixed, regular, and
adequate nighttime residence. ..; and ... includes— ... children and youths who are sharing the housing of other
persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason.” 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2).
the Riverview School District. Id. § 3; see also ECF Nos. 107-1, 107-2. Ms. Stephens alleges that
despite a month-to-month lease, her housing “remained unstable,” so L.S. and M.S. remained at
their grandmother’s home. ECF No. 92 § 3. To facilitate transportation, Gateway requested Ms.
Stephens’ address. Id. § 4. Based on the information Ms. Stephens provided, Gateway began an
investigation to determine whether L.S. and M.S. were eligible for enrollment under the
McKinney-Vento Act. Id. 5. Sometime in May-June 2024, Ms. Stephens challenged the safety
of transportation for her children from their assigned school to her Verona residence. Id. § 7. On
June 3, 2024, Gateway informed Ms. Stephens that it determined she had secured fixed, regular,
and adequate housing. Thus, L.S. and M.S. no longer qualified for continued enrollment under the
McKinney-Vento Act. Id.
The McKinney-Vento Act requires each state to adopt “[a] description of procedures for
the prompt resolution of disputes regarding the educational placement of homeless children and
youths.” 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(1)(C). When a dispute arises, a local agency or school district must
provide written notification of the decision, set forth the right to appeal the decision and a contain
a referral to the local educational agency liaison who is to carry out the dispute resolution process
as quickly as possible. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii). During the pendency of an eligibility
dispute, the McKinney-Vento Act requires that children “be immediately enrolled in the school in
which enrollment is sought, pending final resolution of the dispute, including all available
appeals.” 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(E)(i) (the “Pendency Provision’).
Ms. Stephens initiated an appeal with the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”)
and Defendant Storm Camara, PDE’s State Coordinator for Homeless Children and Youth. ECF
No. 92 8. It is undisputed that based on Ms. Stephens’ representations, L.S. and M.S. were
deemed eligible to continue their education in the Gateway School District on August 27, 2024,
and were reenrolled pursuant to the McKinney-Vento Act. ECF No. 72-1 at 2; ECF No. 1-15 at 5
(correspondence from PDE dated August 27, 2024). However, Gateway challenged continued
enrollment based on the veracity of Ms. Stephens’ representations related to housing permanence.
Id.; □□□ also ECF No. 92 §§ 10-11. After investigating, Gateway learned that Ms. Stephens had
leased the Verona premises since at least January 1, 2024. See ECF No. 1-8 at 5-10. Thus, Gateway
provided notice to Ms. Stephens on November 8, 2024, advising her that continued enrollment was
denied. ECF No. 1-15 at 2-3. In compliance with the requirements of the McKinney-Vento Act,
Gateway advised Ms. Stephens of her appeal rights and the contact information for Pennsylvania’s
McKinney-Vento Homeless state coordinator.? Id.
Ms. Stephens commenced an appeal, but based on the information from Gateway,
including Ms. Stephens’ lease for the Verona premises in the Riverview School District
(“Riverview”), the PDE coordinator informed Ms. Stephens that because she falsified the
information supporting the August 27, 2025 decision, it was clear that L.S. and M.S. were not
homeless and thus no longer eligible for continued enrollment in the Gateway School District.
ECF No. 92 §§ 12-13.4 Ms. Stephens contends that in reaching this decision, Gateway and PDE
violated the procedures required by the McKinney-Vento Act.
On November 14, 2024, Gateway’s Solicitor notified Ms. Stephens that L.S. and MLS.
would be disenrolled. Id. | 13. Ms. Stephens alleges that she appealed the residency determination,
3 The PDE’s McKinney-Vento Act dispute resolution process is set forth at:
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/education/programs-and-services/instruction/elementary-~and-secondary-
education/homeless-education/dispute-resolution-process
Stephens also presents an invoice submitted by Riverview to Gateway for reimbursement of transportation
expenses for 162 days from the leased Verona premises for the 2023-2024 school year. ECF No. 1-15 at 7.
and that Gateway reenrolled L.S. and MLS. Id. § 14. Reenrollment was in accordance with the
provisions of both the McKinney-Vento Act and Act 67.°
Gateway held a residency hearing on November 26, 2024. Id. 16; see also ECF No. 1-19
at 1-3. On January 27, 2025, the School Board considered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions [of]
Law and Adjudication issued by the Hearing Officer and the President of the School Board. ECF
No. 80-2 at 2-6. The adjudication reflects that for purposes of McKinney-Vento, PDE provided
notice that the “students were not considered homeless under the McKinney-Vento Act and
therefore do not receive any protections under that Act.” Id. at 3. The Hearing Officer concluded
that she did “not have jurisdiction over any McKinney-Vento issues, and accepts the determination
regarding the same made by the Department of Education. Any challenges relating to that
determination rest with the procedural safeguards of McKinney Vento, which the Parent was
provided.” Id.
5 The referenced statute, 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1302-2, was amended in 2024, effective September 16, 2024. See
2024, July 17, P.L. 810, No. 67 § 1. As amended, and in compliance with the McKinney-Vento Act, Pennsylvania’s
Public School Code ensures that unhoused children are not disenrolled until:
(1) the parents, guardians or any other person having charge or care of the child are provided an
opportunity to appeal the decision through a hearing held pursuant to an appropriate grievance
policy of the school district and any appeal has been exhausted;
(2) after the parents, guardians or any other person having charge or care of the child have been
provided notice of such a hearing, the parents, guardians or other person having charge or care of
the child decline to participate in a hearing pursuant to the appropriate grievance policy of the school
district or appeals process;
(3) after the parents, guardians or any other person having charge or care of the child have been
provided information from the school district's liaison for homeless children and youth regarding
the educational rights of homeless students under 42 U.S.C. § 11431 (relating to statement of
policy). Information provided under 42 U.S.C. § 11431 shall be provided in a manner and form
understandable to the parents, guardians or any other person having charge or care of the child; or
(4) a court enters an order directing the child to be disenrolled and enrolled in a different school.
24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1302.
5 .
During the Act 67 residency hearing, Gateway admitted surveillance evidence and a copy
of Ms. Stephens’ January 1, 2024 lease. ECF No. 92 § 20. Evidence presented also confirmed that
while L.S. and M.S. “spend time at their maternal grandmother’s house, [they] do not reside there,
and the maternal grandmother does not share legal guardianship with Parent.” ECF No. 80-2 at 4.
Ms. Stephens alleges that on Wednesday, November 27, 2024, Gateway improperly
terminated transportation.® ECF No. 92 4 25. Transportation was reinstated on December 12, 2024,
but in the interim, she alleges that she suffered employment loss. Id. { 26.
The Gateway School Board adopted the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law and finalized disenrollment on January 27, 2025. ECF No. 72-4 at 6. Notification of the
decision was served on Ms. Stephens on January 31, 2025. The notice set forth her right to appeal
within 30 days to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Id. Ms. Stephens asserts that
Gateway improperly disenrolled L.S. and M.S. effective Friday, February 28, 2025, thirty days
from the date of the Schoo! Board’s ruling, but not thirty days from the date of notice to her. She
filed her appeal on Monday, March 3, 2025.’ Id. at 1. In her appeal, Ms. Stephens challenged the
® The Court takes judicial notice of Gateway’s published academic calendar for the 2024-2025 school year that
reflects school was closed for the Thanksgiving holiday on Thursday, November 27, 2024 and Friday, November
29, 2024, and resumed on December 2, 2024. See
https://resources. finalsite. net/images/v172781983 L/gatewayschoolsorg/kkasgctO0hrwvbanr0 ghv/2024-
2025schoolcalendar.pdf
Stephens asserts that the appeal period ran from January 31, 2025, the date of mailing, and therefore her March
3, 2025 appeal was timely. ECF No. 92 at § 28; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5571(b) (“Except as otherwise provided
in subsections (a) and (c) and in section 5571.1 (relating to appeals from ordinances, resolutions, maps, etc.), an appeal
from a tribunal or other government unit to a court or from a court to an appellate court must be commenced within
30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken, in the case of an interlocutory or final order”); and
see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5572 (the date of service of an order of a government unit, which shall be the date of mailing
if service is by mail, shall be deemed to be the date of entry of the order for the purposes of this subchapter”). The
Court takes judicial notice that the 30-day appeal period from the School Board’s disenrollment determination ran to
Sunday, March 2, 2025, thirty days from the date of the letter notifying Ms. Stephens of the decision. Thus, her appeal
filed on Monday, March 3, 2025, appears timely See ECF No. 72-2 at 3.
School Board’s disenrollment on several grounds, including alleged violations of the McKinney-
Vento Act Pendency Provision. Id. at 4.
After service of the appeal and pursuant to Act 67, Gateway reenrolled L.S. and M.S. on
March 5, 2025. ECF No. 92 § 29. The Court of Common Pleas scheduled a hearing to be held on
May 20, 2025, and rescheduled the hearing for June 20, 2025, at Ms. Stephens’ request. See
Stephens. v. Gateway, S.A. 25-00106 (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County) (Dkt. 8, 11,
12). The 2024-2025 school year concluded on June 3, 2025. On June 11, 2025, Ms. Stephens
voluntarily discontinued her statutory appeal, thereby abandoning any state court challenge to the
alleged premature disenrollment under Act 67 and the McKinney-Vento Act, and making
Gateway’s January 27, 2025 residency decision final. Id. (Dkt. 13); see also ECF No. 43 § 10.
The instant federal action remained pending during the litigation of Ms. Stephens’ state
court residency appeal. On June 6, 2025, the undersigned conducted a status conference to
determine Ms. Stephens’ interest in the appointment of counsel given her lack of standing to
represent her children, and to determine the status of enrollment for the 2025-2026 school year.
ECF Nos. 58, 75. Ms. Stephens declined the appointment of counsel and represented that she
enrolled her daughters in a cyber school unaffiliated with either Gateway or Riverview. She also
stated that her son remained enrolled in Riverview, but was waitlisted for enrollment at Penn Hills
School Charter School. ECF No. 75 at 17, 19, 28. She claimed that her housing remained unstable,
and that she anticipated moving. Id. at 6. Counsel for Gateway acknowledged pending
landlord/tenant litigation that may result in eviction.
Ms. Stephens asserts that she received notice from Gateway on August 20, 2025, informing
her that under Act 67, L.S. and M.S. “would be” disenrolled. ECF No. 113 § 31. She also received
an automated attendance email and text message from Gateway on September 2, 2025, and alleges
that the children were “enrolled in Cyber with Gateway School District.” Id. 33. On September
3, 2025, Ms. Stephens received correspondence from Gateway informing her that her request to
enroll L.S. and M.S. pursuant to the McKinney-Vento Act was denied. ECF No. 113-5. As
reflected in the letter, “[t]he Districts position that your daughters are not residents of Monroeville
or Pitcairn and have fixed, regular and night-time housing at 758 Second Street, Verona PA 15147
has not changed. You are the custodial parent of both [L.S. and M.S.], and you have clearly
maintained a residence in Verona Borough since such time.” Id.
On September 26, 2025, Ms. Stephens applied for enrollment at the PA Distance Learning
Charter School. ECF No. 113-6. The school advised her of the documents necessary to complete
enrollment in time for the “next scheduled start date” on October 8, 2025. Id. Unfortunately, Ms.
Stephens failed to complete enrollment for her children in Riverview or a cyber program of her
choosing at Riverview’s expense. Thus, as of October 8, 2025, the children have not attended
school for the 2025-2026 school year. ECF No. 121.
Ms. Stephens is also engaged in a landlord/tenant dispute for her residence at 758 Second
Street, Verona, Pa. Bosco v. Stephens, LT 25-1303 (Court of Common Pleas — Arbitration
Division, Allegheny County).* In that litigation, Ms. Stephens admits that she signed a lease for a
three-bedroom duplex on February 22, 2023, for a term set to expire on December 31, 2023. Id.
® Courts may take judicial notice of public records, including court proceedings, not for the truth of its contents, but
as evidence of the information provided there. See S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp.
Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). The court may therefore look to the existence of other
judicial proceedings to see if they “contradict[ ] the complaint’s legal conclusions or factual claims.” Id. at 427.
Further, “at the preliminary injunction stage, ‘procedures [ ] are less formal and evidence [ ] is less complete than in
a trial on the merits.” ... Accordingly, a court ‘may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be
admissible evidence.’” A.P.I. Inc. v. Broadway Elec. Serv. Corp., 673 F. Supp. 3d 714, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (quoting
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718 (3d Cir. 2004), in turn quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’]
Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995)). “But the weight given to such materials will ‘vary greatly depending
on the facts and circumstances of a given case.’” Id. Here, the Court will consider all materials filed on the docket of
this matter as well as Ms. Stephens’ statements in her state court landlord/tenant and residency disputes, as it is
undisputed that these matters are interrelated with the claims at issue here.
(Dkt. 10, Exhibit 1; Dkt. 20 §{ 7, 8). She also admits to “taking possession of the property on
February 23, 2023.” Id. (Dkt. 20 { 9). The parties renewed the lease on January 1, 2024, but
converted the lease to a month-to-month tenancy. Id. (Dkt. 10, Exhibit 2). Thus, Ms. Stephens’
filings make clear that she has not been homeless or in unstable housing since at least February
2023. As for her children, Ms. Stephens proffered exhibits in the landlord/tenant action that
confirm that she resides at the Verona premises with her three children. Id. (Dkt. 10 at 25, 35). Her
verified Emergency Motion for Extension to Obtain Supersedeas filed in that action also confirms
that Ms. Stephens resides at the Verona premises with all three of her children.
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Id. (Dkt. 4). Thus, as sworn to by Ms. Stephens, L.S. and M.S have had a fixed, regular, and
adequate nighttime residence with their mother since at least February 2023 and are not homeless
as defined by the McKinney-Vento Act.
Turning to Ms. Stephens’ pending motion for preliminary injunctive relief in this action,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, she requests that the Court order Gateway to
reenroll L.S. and MLS. and facilitate their enrollment at School District expense in the PA Distance
Learning Charter School, an independently operated cyber school. ECF No. 103. Id.; see also ECF
No. 113-6. Ms. Stephens’ asserts that her children’s housing situation has not changed since the
2024-2025 school year. Thus, she claims she is entitled to immediate injunctive relief to enforce
Gateway’s pendency obligations under the McKinney-Vento Act. Id.
In response, Gateway argues that residency issues under the McKinney-Vento Act have
been fairly and finally determined against the Stephens’ family and that the statutory appeal
process has concluded. ECF No. 107. Thus, Gateway contends it has no obligation to enroll her
children in cyber school at School District expense. Instead, her children should be enrolled in
Riverview, where the family resides, and where she can apply for attendance at a cyber school.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) provides that a court may issue a preliminary
injunction upon notice to the adverse party. “Preliminary injunctive relief is ‘an extraordinary
remedy’ and ‘should be granted only in limited circumstances.’” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp.,
369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program,
Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction
must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the
10
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Id. (quoting Allegheny
Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 Gd Cir. 1999)). If the first two “gateway factors are
met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all
four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Reilly
v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (June 26, 2017).
“TOJne of the goals of the preliminary injunction analysis is to maintain the status quo,
defined as the last, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties.” Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep.
Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation omitted). However,
“where the relief ordered by the preliminary injunction is mandatory and will alter the status quo,
the party seeking the injunction must meet a higher standard of showing irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction.” Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d
176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Tom Doherty Associates, Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-
34 (2d Cir. 1995)).
In this case, the parties dispute the burden of proof based on a challenge to the status quo
for enrollment in Gateway. Ms. Stephens asserts that as of September 3, 2025, the children were
enrolled in Gateway. Thus, the status quo is continued attendance. Gateway counters that the status
quo is the January 31, 2025, notice of disenrollment, made final on June 11, 2025, when Ms.
Stephens discontinued her state court appeal. It is ultimately not necessary for the Court to resolve
this dispute because the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Ms. Stephens
cannot show that she is likely to prevail on her injunctive relief clatm premised on her argument
that her children are homeless.
11
C. DISCUSSION
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor requires that Ms. Stephens demonstrate that the likelihood of success on
the merits is “significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.” Reilly,
858 F.3d at 179 (citing Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc); and citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (“It is not enough that the chance
of success on the merits be better than negligible[,]” and “more than a mere ‘possibility’ of relief
is required.”)).
Upon review of the record before the Court and the dockets of related litigation, Ms.
Stephens is collaterally estopped from relitigating residency. Even if collateral estoppel does not
apply, she cannot show that there is more than a “mere possibility” that she is entitled to relief.
Evaluating whether issue preclusion applies requires the Court to apply Pennsylvania law.
In re: Adams, 151 F.4th 144, 153 (Gd Cir. Sept. 3, 2025) (precedential) (“principles of full faith
and credit, ... as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738, require federal courts to ‘give the same preclusive
effect to a state court judgment as another court that state would give”) (quoting Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005)). See also Allen v. State Corr. Inst. at
Somerset Dept. of Corr., No. 23-cv-262, 2025 WL 964550, at * 4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing
Swineford v. Snyder Cnty., Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1266 (Gd Cir. 1994) Gn turn, citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has identified the following factors to determine
whether issue preclusion will apply:
(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented in the later
action; (2) there was a final adjudication on the merits; (3) the party against whom
the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the
party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding; and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding
was essential to the judgment.
12
Id. (citing Metro. Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Com’n, 767 F.3d 335, 351 (3d Cir. 2015),
in turn quoting Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51
(2005)).
Pennsylvania extends issue preclusion to proceedings conducted when “an agency is acting
in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact that the parties had an opportunity to fully
litigate.” J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 794 A.2d 936, 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002), alloc.
den., 818 A.2d 506 (Pa. 2003) (Table) (citing Grant v. GAF Corp., 608 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992), aff'd sub nom., Gasperin v. GAF Corp., 639 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1994)).
Here, the record reflects that Gateway’s counsel notified Ms. Stephens that an Enrollment
Hearing was scheduled for Tuesday, November 26, 2024 to determine whether she maintained a
fixed residence outside the district. ECF No. 1-19 at 1. She was advised that she could be
represented by counsel and that she would have the opportunity to call witnesses and present any
relevant evidence, as well as have an opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses. Id. Ms. Stephens
was further advised that if she could not afford counsel, she could request an attorney by contacting
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County or the Pennsylvania Lawyer Referral Service.
Id.
Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that
Gateway met its burden to prove that Ms. Stephens does not reside within school district
boundaries and the children “spend time at their grandmother’s house, but do not reside there.”
ECF No. 72-1 at 3-4. Further, based on Gateway’s investigation, the children were not homeless,
and Ms. Stephens had a permanent residence in Verona. The findings of fact and conclusions of
law were adopted by the School Board on January 27, 2025, and Ms. Stephens exercised her right
to appeal both the resolution of her residency claim and her McKinney-Vento claim to the Court
13
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. ECF Nos. 72-2, 72-3. In her appeal, she set forth grounds
for reversal based on alleged due process violations in the admission of evidence and testimony
and set forth her challenge to the decision for failure to maintain enrollment for the 2024-2025
school year in accordance with the McKinney-Vento Act. Ms. Stephens’ subsequent voluntary
dismissal of her statutory appeal on June 11, 2025, renders the agency adjudication final on the
merits. Stephens v. Gateway, S.A. 25-00106 (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County) (Dkt.
13)
Even if collateral estoppel did not apply, Ms. Stephens cannot show that there is more than
a mere likelihood that she would prevail in establishing that her children were homeless for the
2025-2025 school year, or that they are homeless for eligibility under the McKinney-Vento Act.
There is no dispute that a school district is “required to continue a homeless child’s
education in her or her school of origin for the duration of his or her homelessness if doing so in
the child’s best interest.” G.S. by J.S. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 914 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir.
2018) (citation modified, internal quotation marks and cites omitted). And there is no dispute that
there is no statutory limit on the duration of homelessness. Id. But unlike the facts presented in
Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., the evidence in the instant case reflects a change in living
arrangements in 2023, including long-term stability of a residence outside Ms. Stephens’ preferred
school district, enrollment of a sibling in the school district of residence (Riverview), and a PDE
determination that the students are not homeless. Thus, enforcement of Pennsylvania’s enrollment
requirements is warranted as is a cessation of protections under the McKinney-Vento Act because
L.S. and M.S. are not homeless.
In summary, the record including publicly available dockets in the state court
landlord/tenant litigation — including Ms. Stephens’ own verified statements — make clear that
14
since at least February 23, 2023, she has maintained a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence in Verona and has resided there with her children since at least January 1, 2024, and
certainly at the time of filing her pending motion. Thus, the conditions that supported Gateway
and PDE’s initial homeless determination do not exist, and she cannot show that she is likely to
prevail on the merits of her action that her children were (or are) homeless under the McKinney-
Vento Act.
2. Irreparable Harm
Ms. Stephens bears the burden to show that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief. Reilly, 858 F.3d at 180 n.5. “Irreparable harm is harm that ‘cannot
be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.’” Plummer v. Dancha, No. 24-
2294, 2025 WL 1950067, at *2 (3d Cir. July 16, 2025) (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air
Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989)). “The harm must be immediate and not
speculative.” Id. (citing Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992);
Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 488 (3d Cir. 2000)).
When it comes to education, “interruption of a child’s schooling causing a hiatus not only
in the student’s education but also in other social and psychological developmental processes that
take place during the child’s schooling, raises a strong possibility of irreparable injury.” N.J. v.
New York, 872 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Ross v. Disare, 500 F. Supp. 928,
934 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). See also L.R. ex rel. G.R. v. Steelton-Highspire Sch. Dist., No. 1:10-CV-
00468, 2010 WL 1433146, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2010) (“Pennsylvania state courts have
recognized, “deprivation of educational rights can produce irreparable harm and establishes a need
for prompt and immediate relief.”) (citations omitted).
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Here, however, Ms. Stephens cannot establish that under the circumstances alleged, her
children will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested preliminary relief. Ms.
Stephens asserts that she seeks immediate enrollment for her children in the PA Distance Learning
Charter School. ECF No. 103, ECF No. 113 § 37. However, she faces no impediments to
enrollment through Riverview, where she and the children reside. Pennsylvania law requires when
a child is enrolled in a cyber charter school, the school district where the student resides must
provide funding for cyber education and provide student records to facilitate placement. See 24
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 17-1725-A (Funding for Charter Schools); 24 P. Cons. Stat. § 17-1744-A (School
District Responsibilities). To the extent Ms. Stephens asserts that internet access through
Riverview is inconsistent, she offers no evidence in support. Thus, Ms. Stephens fails to carry her
burden to show that the denial of the requested immediate injunctive relief would result in
irreparable harm. Instead, she is solely responsible for the alleged harm suffered by her children
because she refuses to enroll them in Riverview, where they reside.
3. Remaining factors
Because Ms. Stephens fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim or
that denial of the requested relief will result in irreparable harm, the Court need not address the
remaining preliminary injunction factors. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 374 (d Cir. 2012).
D. CONCLUSION
At this stage of the litigation, and as explained above, Ms. Stephens has not met the burden
to show that she is entitled to the extraordinary preliminary relief requested. Thus, it is
recommended that the Court deny her Motion for Temporary Relief to Enforce the Status Quo and
Immediate Reinstatement of School Access, ECF No. 103, her Motion to Maintain Educational
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Enrollment, ECF No. 14, and her Motion to Expedite Ruling Due to Ongoing Educational
Deprivation and Federal Violation, ECF No. 121.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule
72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days
for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States
District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file
objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 Gd Cir.
2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days thereafter in
accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted, .
ee ee
Ca AO WMAML AIK FL
MAWREENP-KELLY = \,“/
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: October 15 , 2025
ce: The Honorable Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing
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